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First, then,

it

must be said

construction of the

according to

that in those

days things were achieved scarcely inferior

Tower of Babel, although

human

reckoning, strongly

at

to the

as regards divine approval, at least

variance with that work.

1

say this because

during the early days of building a scholar wrote a book in which he drew the comparison
in the

its

most exhaustive way.

In

it

he

tried to

prove that the Tower of Babel

goal, not because of the reasons universally advanced, or at least that

failed to reach

among

those

recognised reasons the most important of all was not to be found. His proofs were drawn
not merely from written documents and reports; he also claimed to have

made

enquiries

on the

to fail

because of

the

spot,

and

to

have discovered

that the

tower failed and was bound

weakness of the foundation.

Franz Kafka, “The Great Wall and the Tower of Babel”
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My dissertation is a study of the origins and legacy of participatory democratic thought in
America.

In

June 1962, the Students for a Democratic Society signed the Port Huron

Statement, in which they articulated their vision of citizens participating directly in the

governance of their country and putting an end
life,

to

many

intractable problems in

American

including racial discrimination, poverty, and the paranoid logic of cold war policy

(e.g.,

New

brinkmanship). The

imagination of a generation of political activists in the

never planted a firm foothold

in

American

unviable idea in such a large country,

political institutions in the

from

political theorists.

it

late

political soil.

1950s and early 1960s but

Largely dismissed as an

had limited influence on the development of

United States and would only receive serious consideration

To understand why

argue that one must trace

democracy captured the

Left ideal of participatory

its

participatory

democracy was so

intellectual origins to the pragmatists

who

short-lived,

in the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries laid the foundation for this ethos. Thus,

on the writings of the early pragmatist philosophers, including Charles Sanders
William James, and John Dewey. Next,

I

I

focus

Peirce,

turn to the legacy of participatory democratic

I

thought and examine the work of Sheldon Wolin and
Benjamin Barber, two

contemporary

political theorists

versions of this idea. Finally,

I

who, respectively, represent

radical and

mainstream

argue that once situated within the pragmatist tradition,

participatory democratic thought proves not only impracticable
but also theoretically

untenable. This might compel political scientists to revisit questions
about participation,
civic education, citizenship, civil society, and representation.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

In

June of 1962, the Students for Democratic Society (SDS)
released

founding manifesto, the Port Huron Statement. Written
in Port

Huron, Michigan,

they lived

in.

particular, led

it

reflected the authors’

United Auto Workers

at a

retreat

growing disenchantment with the world

Racial bigotry in the South and the paranoid logic of the
Cold War, in

them

to question the status

quo — the

and social institutions

political

most Americans accepted, even embraced, without question.

American principles of democracy,

liberty,

dangled over the precipice of total annihilation and had

The

Politicians invoked the

disenfranchised and oppressed in

still

the South, despite the growing popularity of the civil rights

direction of American foreign policy.

that

and equality, but these terms rang

increasingly hollow to those in SDS. Blacks were

pillars

their

elites

movement. The

little, if

entire nation

any, control over the

of the country had a firm grip on the

of power, and they alone controlled the nation’s destiny, a destiny

that portended

disaster: stark inequality, poverty, racial discrimination, greed, alienation, war, famine,

and perhaps world annihilation.

Much

to the consternation

were complacent because they enjoyed unprecedented
veneer of satisfaction, the

The authors were

SDS

of the SDS, most Americans

prosperity. But beneath this

believed, lurked a specter of widespread anxiety.

in part reacting against the

1

950s, a decade often associated

with repressive conformity and an almost military-like regimentation, but they were

particularly agitated

by the

lack of popular control over political institutions.

of the country remained apathetic about, or unaware

of, their political

While most

impotence, the

SDS became
politics.

will

convinced

that

only “participatory democracy” could restore
sanity

Conventional democratic

institutions,

which

at

to

best obliquely represented the

of the people, were woeftilly inadequate. Participatory
democracy, on the other

hand, meant that each

individual share[s] in those social decisions
detennining the

quality and direction of his

men and

society be organized to encourage independence in

life; that

provide the media for their

common

participation.”

All “decision-making of

basic social consequence [would] be carried on by public
groupings,” and politics would
create an

into

acceptable pattern ot social relations” and draw “people out of isolation
and

community.”

1

For SDS, participatory democracy represented the panacea for the country’s
social

and

human

and led

political ills

to a

world

in

which

their optimistic

assumptions about

nature could be realized. Unlike political thinkers in the liberal tradition, they

believed that

man was

nearly perfectible, a

work

in progress that could reach untold

moral heights.

We regard men

as infinitely precious and possessed of unfulfilled

capacities for reason, freedom, and love...

We oppose,

too, the doctrine

of

human incompetence because it rests essentially on the modem fact that
men have been “competently” manipulated into incompetence we see
little reason why men cannot meet with increasing skill the complexities

—

and responsibilities of their

situation, if society is organized not for

minority, but for majority, participation in decision-making.

SDS
to

1

believed liberal doubts about the

be unfounded and

elitist.

wisdom of the people and

For them, every

man

2

fear of majority tyranny

possessed this unfulfilled potential.

If

“Port Huron Statement.”

2

Ibid.

Port

In his

memoirs,

Huron statement

for “infinite.”

Tom Hayden

describes

how

at

words “precious”

substituted the

See Hayden, Reunion 96.
,

2

the last minute the drafters of the
for “perfectible”

and “unfulfilled

only he were situated in the proper political and
social context, wherein he had ample
opportunity for truly deliberative political participation,

man

could cultivate his unlimited

capacity for goodness and empathy, for thinking
beyond narrow self-interest. They

believed that participatory democracy was both educational
and enlightening, that
deliberation with others in the
reveal to man, in

Participatory

all

collective.

would

lift

is

To

the veil of ignorant selfishness and

their stark reality, the experiences

democracy was transformative, turning

souls into citizens

This

community would

who

considered

and needs of his fellow men.

isolated, perpetually inward-looking

communal good over

private interest.

not to suggest that people must submit their individual identities to the
the contrary, out of their political and social involvement, individuals

in part find

“meaning

in personal life”

and also a way

to reach their “unrealized

potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity .” 3

undoubtedly influenced by Marxist alienation theory, the early

Though

SDS members were

not

adherents of communism or any of its twentieth-century manifestations. Indeed, the free
individual

was paramount

in their

unwaveringly humanist judgment.

On the other hand,

they also understood the individual self to be malleable and dependent on social relations.

The

individual

was not subordinate

ways accountable
in

to

it.

to society, but

he was a product of it and thus

Forcing the individual to submit

to the general will, as

Rousseau’s (and indeed Stalin’s) chilling formulation, robbed

freedom. But placing the individual

can of his own volition arrive

community, was

a

win-win

in

many

was seen

dignity and

an ideal social and political context, in which he

at certain ethical realizations

situation:

man of his

in

He

about his role in the greater

maintains his personal dignity and freedom

3

Ibid.

3

while

at

the

just society.

same time he

learns he has the responsibility to help

more just, and each

is

somehow convinced
few dozen student

SDS

activists

were

that literally

in attendance for those five days,

a

it

gave voice

moment

activists.

lost relic ot civic republicanism,

in the history

It

was something

participant,

Bob Ross,

that

to control their

own

their “vision

lives.”

midwest, yet the Port

Still,

of American

the Port

Huron

political thought,

democracy which captured the imagination of

and galvanized a movement. Sharon Jeffrey,

somehow had

separately and together, have the

most of them hailing

ceased to be an empty intellectual concept, the

participant at Port Huron, said that “the key

this

leaders

for defining the political values that animated

to the idea of participatory

whole generation of student

and

in the

thousands claim to have been there.

gathering represents an important
for

its

a

they could effect a radical transformation of American
values. Only

Huron Statement has become so legendary
960s activism

members and

had hubristic ambitions,

from the University ot Michigan and a few others colleges

1

and more

individual happier.

nascent student organization, with only 800 dues-paying

handful of functioning chapters in the north, the

a

a better

Participatory democracy, then, promotes the
general welfare and the moral

development of each individual. Society

A

make

a

theme there was participatory democracy,

a resonance to

4
it.”

According

to another

of participatory democracy” was “that people,

power

to direct the

key

institutions

of the society, power

This meant, said Steve Max, yet another attending

activist,

that

democracy was something you go out and do everyday, and it wasn't
merely voting for representatives every couple of years... You found ways
of implementing democracy every time you got up in the morning. You

4

“Rebels with a Cause.” (Film.)

4

didn't wait for the

government

into the barber shop.

to pass a civil rights

You opened

the doors and

law

went

you couldn’t get
and that was the

if

in,

s
essence ot what participatory democracy was
about.

Not

surprisingly,

members of SDS drew

inspiration

from the

civil rights

especially the activities ot the Student Non-Violent
Coordinating

which organized peaceful
south.

As

the civil rights

to take direct action

sit-ins

and demonstrations

social

and

Committee (SNCC),

to protest racial segregation in the

movement made unmistakably

when

movement and

clear,

people had no choice but

political institutions controlled

by

elites failed to

address their grievances and even went so far as to safeguard the practices
of bigotry and
hatred.

Many in SDS became Freedom

Riders, spending their

summers

in the south to

help organize voter registration drives and participate in demonstrations, but their
grievances extended far beyond racial injustice. They believed that the problems of race,
poverty, social and economic inequality, and nuclear proliferation

symptoms

of the

more fundamental

numbing acquiescence

activists

the dormant

were audacious enough

Unlike the old

Marx and

awaken

Lenin,

or truths handed

SDS
down

left,

elites.

which received

its

name

Only

American public from

to believe in their ability to help

a

few

—were

inspiration

its

direct

slumber, and

make

this

happen.

from the dogmatic assertions of

did not believe that people should ever blindly embrace the values

to

them by previous generations or venerated

Though SDS shared many concerns with
arrive at truths

to

complacency and apathy, of mind-

system controlled by self-regarding

to a

political participation could

SDS

issue of citizen

—

and principles on

their

the old

left, it

own, through

figures of the past.

believed that communities had to

a painstaking

and deliberative

process. Rather than awaiting orders from a revolutionary vanguard, a

5

Ibid.

5

community had

to

believe in

its

own

idea that you

ability to construct values

made your own

by which

values as a group was a

it

would willingly

new

abide.

thing,” said Steve

“The

Max. “That

values weren’t just inherited and just weren’t
transmitted from the older generation but
that people could actually

sit

down and work

organization,
7
and then go and try to live that
in the culture.’’

“new

thing,”

it

6

Though Max

out an ethical framework as an

way was

not something that

was popularly

characterized this faith in participatory democracy as a

did not emerge in a vacuum. Given the responsibility of
writing an

draft of the manifesto that

would

later

has cited a number of influences,

become

the Port

among whom

thinkers C. Wright Mills and Arnold

Huron Statement,

the most important were

Kaufman and

initial

Tom Hayden

New

Left

the pragmatist philosopher John

Dewey.
Perhaps the most immediate inspiration for the Port Huron Statement was a short
essay by C. Wright Mills entitled “Letter to the

Review

in I960.'

mantle of

In this brief missive, Mills

political radicalism

of the prevailing

liberal

and

New

speaking directly to them, which served

New Left

urged young intellectuals to accept the

to reject the status

democratic ethos.

Left” published in The

quo and the complacent acceptance

Members of SDS

felt

to intensify their sense

as if Mills had been

of urgency.

In his

6

Ibid.
n

See Hayden, Reunion 42, 75-81; Hayden and Flacks, “The Port Huron Statement at
Hayden also cites Albert Camus as an important influence on the
,

40.” In his memoirs

SDS

and his drafting of the Port Huron Statement, but the French existentialist had less
their view of the “absurdity” of the

impact on their democratic thought and more on

human

condition.

Inspired especially

by

their reading

of The Plague they perceived a
,

“desperate weariness” and “sense of exile and deprivation” infecting humankind. But
they had to turn to Mills, Kaufman, and Dewey for democratic solutions to this “plague."
8

Hayden and

Flacks,

“The

Port

Huron Statement

6

at

40”;

Amowitz, “A Mills Revival?”

memoirs, Hayden describes Mills
professor ot sociology

establishment and
Elite, in

its

at

of the

Columbia University offered

New

Left,” for the renegade

a devastating critique of the

elite-driven institutions. Especially influential

which Mills argued

relatively small

as “the oracle

that real

power

number of elites occupying

in this

was The Power

country was vested in the hands of a

positions of power in the corporate, political,

and military worlds. He understood the power

elite

not as a permanent ruling class, such

as an aristocracy, but as a loose network of corporate leaders
and other high-level

decision-makers.
they shared

common

social change.

old

leftist

Though

these elites did not

interests, especially in

Though he

work together

in a conspiratorial fashion,

denying average citizens the power

to effect

offered no easy solution to this problem, Mills argued that the

approach, dictatorship of the proletariat, would only replace one group of elites

with another. Instead, he called for the radical democratization of society, in which

“everyone

vitally affected

by

a social decision, regardless

voice in that decision and a hand

in its administration.”

10

of its sphere, would have a
His hope was that America

could recapture the intense level of public spiritedness and civic engagement once

enjoyed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
the

famous

visitor

He

Tom Hayden and

9

Mills,
10

The Power

Mills, The

died in

March of 1962,

by

live to

three

the retreat in Port Huron.

Arnold Kaufman, a professor of philosophy
taught

praised so eloquently

from France, Alexis de Tocqueville. Sadly, he would not

witness his influence on a generation of activists.

months before

— and

other

at

the University of Michigan

members of SDS and shared

their admiration for Mills,

Elite.

New Men of Power: America

's

Labor Leaders, 252-53.

7

who

1

was

also an important influence

on the emerging

students with his lectures on “participatory

New

for coining."

Port

Left historian

New

democracy”— a term he

James Miller suggests

that

Huron Statement can hardly be overestimated. 12 Like

denied that

human

he inspired many of his

Left;

often receives credit

Kaufman’s influence on

his student acolytes,

the

Kaufman

beings were incapable of assuming the responsibilities of
self-

governance and maintained

that

democracy had the power

to transform its participants,

both morally and intellectually. “The main justifying function of
participation,” he
argued,

is

development of man

and making

men

their

is

it

1

to

and also

quite reasonable to

assume

initiate

to rule wisely.

that a participatory

men and

policy in suitable spheres.”

15

Flacks,

“The Port Huron Statement

at

14

In the

democracy would

policies with reasonable

That

said,

dismantle traditional institutions in which bureaucrats and

Hayden and

“men

best for them,” he refused to accept the assertion that a

provide citizens the education necessary to “judge

wish

respect,

powers of deliberate action.” 13 While

would have superior knowledge with which

end, he considered

intelligence,

—inducing human dignity and

the fallibility of the people, even going so far as to suggest that

do not always know what
coterie of experts

powers

by developing

responsible,

Kaufman accepted

s essential

Kaufman

elites

did not

operated but,

40”; Hayden, Reunion 42; Mattson,
,

Intellectuals in Action , 197.

“

13

Miller,

“

Democracy

is in

the Streets

Kaufman, “Human Nature and

From Port Huron

Participatory

to the

Siege of Chicago, 95.

Democracy.” Reprinted

in

Connolly,

The Bias of Pluralism, 198.
14

Kaufman, The Radical Liberal, 58-59. See
Participatory Democracy,” 191-93.
15

Kaufman, “Two Cheers

for

also

Kaufman, “Human Nature and

American Education,"

8

23.

ed.,

instead, sought to “enrich the Welfare State

democracy.
state

,l6

He

recognized the

by increasing the element of participatory

many achievments of the

centralized and bureaucratic

and argued that opportunities for citizen participation
should supplement rather than

replace

His ultimate aim was

it.

to reconcile participatory

democracy with

New

Deal

liberalism.

In

of the

many

New

Kaufman

ways, Kaufman stands as one of the most important figures

Left,

it

largely forgotten. Unlike Mills,

lived to experience the rise of 1960s

invitation to participate at Port Huron,

who

campus

in the history

died prematurely in 1962,

He

activism.

received an

where he proudly worked alongside many of his

students and former students and helped create a founding document that echoed
his ideas.

A

against the

few years

war

in

later

Vietnam,

nationwide two months

country.

Kaufman saw

for teachers, students,

he assumed a leadership role of his own, organizing teach-ins
first at

later.

groundbreaking, paving the

many of

the University of Michigan in

March of 1965 and then

These early and highly successful teach-ins proved

way

for their proliferation

the teach-in as participatory

on campuses throughout the

democracy

and members of the campus community

lengthy and fruitful discussion about

vital issues affecting

particularly useful purpose, creating a

forum where

in action, an opportunity

at large to

them

all.

engage

in

Intellectuals served a

citizens can learn useful information,

express their opinions, relate their experiences, and listen to the perspectives of others.

Kaufman was

careful to

make

sure that teachers limited their efforts to providing

information and facilitating discussion and gave everyone in the community an equal
voice. Exhibiting an

16

immense

reserve of energy,

Kaufman, “The Affluent Underdog,” 350.

9

Kaufman devoted more and more of his

time to political activism.
organize the

New

He

Democratic Coalition (NDC)

Party leftward, and

became

union

to

after

threw himself into the

moving

civil rights

an attempt

in

to

movement, helped

move

to

the Democratic

the president of his local American Federation
of Teachers

UCLA in

1969. Unfortunately,

Kaufman

also

met an

early demise,

perishing in a plane crash in June of 1971. 17

Though both

Mills and

Kaufman played important

roles in shaping the

participatory democratic ethos that animated a generation of student
radicals,

back a step or two further
its

in history to locate the intellectual origins

of the

we must go

New

Left and

founding manifesto. In developing their radical conceptions of democracy, both
Mills

and Kaufman drew heavily on the pragmatist school, especially the work of John Dewey,
a towering figure in

American philosophy through

Both Mills and Kaufman were steeped
debt to

it.

definitive statement

Kaufman

also admired

participatory

17

18

19

in the pragmatist tradition

and acknowledged

democracy must

in

political thought

rest, at least partly,

Kaufman, or SDS came on

the scene,

and argued

on pragmatist grounds.

Dewey espoused

20

Mill’s dissertation

of

Long before

the kind of participatory

Action 197-207, 210, 218-19. See also Kaufman, “Teach-Ins:

See Mattson, Intellectuals

,

in Action,

12-1 A, 191-96.

was published and

entitled Sociology

Mattson, Intellectuals in Action, 72-73.

Ibid.,

their

that a defense

Force for the Times.”

20

18

on democratic theory, The Public and Its Problems} 9

Dewey’s works on

Mattson, Intellectuals

New

half of the twentieth century.

first

Mills wrote his dissertation on pragmatism and read with particular interest

Dewey's

Mills,

the

191-92, 195-96.

10

and Pragmatism. See

democracy

for

New

which the

invoked pragmatist ideas

democracy

first

work

argue that pragmatism, founded

I

first

improvable, and that

and socially-constructed,

probabilistic

men

that

are poised for willful action, pragmatism

radically different understanding of democracy.

It

meant

later

and only native-born

philosophy, pragmatism challenged conventional ideas about truth and
is

in

the necessary

democratic ideas advocated more than half a century

Often considered America’s

Left.

maintaining that truth

often

locate the origins of

is to

by Charles Peirce and William James, provided

intellectual foundation for the

New

objective of this

in the pragmatist tradition.

the late nineteenth century

by SDS and the

would have such boundless enthusiasm, and
he

in his efforts.

Accordingly, the
participatory

Left

that

human

men

By

nature.

are mutable and

opened the doors

human beings

for a

could no

longer appeal to an established authority for political and ethical truths, that they must
share the responsibility of creating values and solutions to social problems with their

fellow citizens. Rejecting inherited

dogmas and

first

principles, citizens

must employ

democratic methods to attain socially useful knowledge, and they must believe that they
can always better themselves and meet the challenges of group deliberation and
cooperation. While liberals have long argued that democracy unrestrained can quite
easily degenerate into

participatory

I

rule

and thus become inimical

democracy have seen democracy

life for all citizens.

grounds,

mob

find

it

far

intellectual origins.

Rather than criticize

Throughout

this

thought seriously, even to approach

work,

it

advocates of

as an unqualified good, an ideal

this position

productive to understand

to liberty,

it

on

my aim

its

on

liberal-elitist or

own

is to

way of

Madisonian

terms and explore

its

take participatory democratic

with a certain measure of sympathy. All along,

11

I

worked under the assumption

that exploring the pragmatist origins

democracy, unfettered by any preconceived notions
about

it,

of participatory

could help shed light on

this

theory and enrich our understanding of its underlying
assumptions and of its usefulness

and coherence as a theory

in today’s world.

This leads to the second objective of this work
the legacy of

after Port

New

—

to leap

Left enthusiasm for participatory democracy.

forward in time to assess

More

than forty years

Huron, the influence of participatory democratic thought appears
limited

non-existent.

Our formal

Dewey began

his crusade, and the call for participatory

political institutions

even

have remained largely the same since

democracy has created

neither

formal mechanisms nor public space tor citizen deliberation and decision-making.

Moreover, democratic uprisings have failed
system.

The American people show

to deliver

little interest in

Studies

show

citizens are less

to the prevailing

opportunities for political

participation; the level of political ignorance, apathy,

ever.

any death blows

and complacency seems higher than

knowledgeable about, and interested

in,

public affairs

than they were a generation ago, and voter turnout has reached all-time lows, barely

exceeding 50 percent of the voting-age population

The

New

22

21

England town meeting, one of the few shining examples of participatory

democracy

21

in recent presidential election years.

in the

United States, has on the whole experienced decreases

in attendance.

22

See R. Putnam, Bowling Alone, and Patterson, The Vanishing Voter.

Bowling Alone, 42-43. Putnam cites the Roper Social and Political Trends
surveys, which indicate that the number of Americans who attended at least one public
meeting on town or school affairs in the previous year declined by 40 percent between
R. Putnam,

1973 and 1994.

12

Even

Tom Hayden

and Dick Flacks, two principal authors of
the Port Huron Statement,

admitted recently that their “dreams have hardly
been realized.” 23

Though

the

the spirit of John

landscape. In the

dreams of true participatory democracy may
never have been

Dewey has permeated
last forty

the

American

political, social,

realized,

and intellectual

years nearly every political and social institution
in America

has undergone some form of democratization— a downward
shifting of power from
to the

elites

rank-and-file—under the very premise that “the people” should
have more direct

We have become increasingly wary of leadership and elite-

say in decision-making.

driven decision-making in this country, and the academic

we

fueled this line of thinking. But

New

can find the legacy of the

Left in particular has

New

Left most readily

within the margins of academia. Intellectual heavy-weights Sheldon Wolin, C. B.

Macpherson, Robert Dahl, Carole Pateman, Benjamin Barber, Jane Mansbridge, and

Amy Gutmann
that liberalism

to

name just

fairness.

power of an

Some of these

while others believe

compromising

few

—have

all

called for deepening democracy, arguing

and representative democracy have done more

of a bloated plutocracy than
consolidate the

a

it

oneself.

to safeguard the rights

of the truly vulnerable, more

all

institutions

and refonn

efforts with suspicion,

possible to change the system from the inside without

But they

all

reject liberalism, share a

complacency and passivity of most people today, and believe

demand

to

established elite than to promote political equality and

thinkers regard

is

to protect the prerogatives

concern about the

that

political

our current crises

a significant devolution of power into the hands of average citizens. Their

influence, even if confined within the gates of academia, invites a careful analysis of the

23

Hayden and

Flacks,

“The

Port

Huron Statement

13

at

40.”

assumptions undergirding their thought and an
assessment of its relevance and

viability in

twenty-first century America.

It

might be useful

to describe

my work

here as a before- and after-picture of

participatory democracy, an idea that captivated
a generation of activists and inspired,

ever so briefly, the

New

Left

movement.

I

first

turn

my attention to

American

pragmatism, which planted the genn of participatory
democracy and nurtured

embryonic

state to early adolescence.

I

then

participatory democracy, an idea that never

jump

to the present to see

seemed

thing

is

for certain, in the aftermath of

quickly withered

away from

into

Was

what happened

that forced

it

met

My aim is to discover why

the idea so terribly naive and unrealistic that

conclude

in this

it

it

was bound

to

recede

a viable idea that failed to gain traction because

work

that the

fated for a short

it

in

withdrawal of participatory democracy into

academia seemed preordained from the beginning. Burdened with pragmatist DNA,

was

its

into reclusion.

reactionary forces, personified by Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, overwhelmed

1

to

the mainstream of American political discourse, only

academic obscurity, or was

the end?

its

1960s radicalism, participatory democracy

enjoying serious attention today from a handful of scholars.
this occurred.

from

to reach adulthood, that either

untimely demise or was stricken with a debilitating condition

One

it

it

life.

I.

Though William James introduced pragmatism

to the

world

the University of California in Berkeley, the philosophy actually

1872,

1898 lecture

emerged

as early as

— including James, Charles
discuss
Chauncey Wright, and Oliver Wendell Holmes— met occasionally

when

Peirce,

in a

a

number of young

intellectuals at

Harvard

to

14

at

philosophy
“ironically

in the short-lived

and ironically named “Metaphysical Club.”

named" because pragmatism was

wake of Darwin and

modernity suffered from what historian John Diggins has
called a

ideas

it

24
.

Any

was

putatively a rejection of metaphysics—
of

abstract sources of moral or intellectual authority.
In the

and authority," and pragmatism offered

It

of knowledge

“crisis

a solution without invoking old

Nietzsche,

and outdated

attempt to describe pragmatism in brief will undoubtedly
be inadequate, as

embodies many variants and subtly

different approaches.

But Louis Menand, whose

Pulitzer prize-winning The Metaphysical Club has revived
popular and scholarly interest
in

pragmatism, has perhaps come the closest

to capturing its essence in a

few words!

If we strain out the differences, personal and
philosophical, they had with
one another, we can say that what these four thinkers had in common was
not a group of ideas, but a single idea— an idea about ideas. They all

believed that ideas are not “out there
tools

—

like forks

waiting to be discovered, but are

and knives and microchips

—

that people devise to cope
with the world in which they find themselves. They believed that ideas

—

are produced not

are social.

by individuals, but by groups of individuals
They believed that ideas do not develop according

that ideas

to

some

inner logic of their own, but are entirely dependent, like germs, on their

human

carriers

And

and the environment.

they believed that since ideas

are provisional responses to particular and unreproducible circumstances,
their survival

Of course,

depends not on

to suggest there is

their immutability but

an “essence”

to

on

their adaptability.

pragmatism belies what

for its adherents reject essences; they reject the notion that there

objective reality of which, if we

image.

A priori

matter

how much

24

‘

truth

may

is

it

is

trying to do,

an a priori truth or an

work hard enough, our minds can produce

in fact exist, but

we do

See Diggins, Promise of Pragmatism.

Menand, The Metaphysical Club

,

xi-xii.

15

a mirror

not have the capacity to attain

logic, reason, prayer, meditation, or study

we

2^

it.

No

devote to our quest for

.

truth (a strategy metaphysicians

and philosophers have pursued relentlessly
and

we will

fruitlessly tor centuries),

never find

it

outside or independent of our earthly

experience. For truth, according to pragmatist
thought, does not exist pnor to

experience; rather, truth

we have

ideas because

constituted

is

we must

act.”

by

Thus “we don’t

it.

The

if they

tor action’’

we have

ideas;

which become

true if they

have what he called “cash-value.”

great assumption of the intellectualists

an inert

because

26

William James described ideas as “rules
give us satisfactory results,

act

human

is that

truth

means

essentially

static relation...

Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks
idea or belief to be true,'

it

its

usual question. ‘Grant an

says, ‘what concrete difference will

its being
anyone’s actual life? How will the truth be realized? What
experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief

true

make

were

in

false?

What,

in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential

terms?

The moment pragmatism asks this question it sees the answer:
True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and
verify. False ideas are those that we cannot.
The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth
.

happens
in fact

to

an idea.

is

becomes

true, is

made

by

true

events.

Its

an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying

veri -fication?

Truth

It

embedded

verity

is

itself, its

1

in life experience.

Like scientists

we must

subject truth claims to a

process of verification. Truths are always tentative and must undergo re-testing as
experiential data arrives. “Intellectualists,” as

James

calls

pragmatist, hold that a true idea must correspond with

reality.

Ibid.,

"7

is

not a

some immutable and independent

Pragmatists, on the other hand, argue that a true idea must only correspond with

our experience of reality.

26

anyone who

new

A

truth is an idea that works.

364.

James, Pragmatism, Writings 1902-1910 573-74.
,

16

I

do

not, for

example, accuse

my

neighbors of being noisy because they have
met some a priori condition of noisiness;
rather,

I

make

this accusation

because their loud music and foot-stomping
disrupted

concentration while reading William James.

I

experienced

afterwards applied the term “noisy” to describe
not objective

knowledge about

truth claim about

be hard-pressed

and

my neighbors. My subjective experience,

the essence of noisiness, led

me to make this particular

my neighbors.

James claimed metaphysical
religious belief

this disruption first,

works
to

for

conception of truth

me,

if

it

truths

can be put

me

gives

to this

same

test:

emotional satisfaction,

it

If a particular

One would

is true.

determine conclusively whether Jesus was actually the son of God, but

so long as this belief has

may

cash-value,

is true.

it

The problem

is,

ultimately prove unsatisfactory. After

this instrumental

all,

Christianity

emotional and psychological benefits, but

we

principles are universal and timeless. If

observe Christianity in the pragmatic

it

not

fail to

give

me

first

I

only enjoy them

satisfaction and thus fail to

Chesterton suggested as

and one of the

much when he

of human needs

is

said,

to

if

we

meet the pragmatist

“Pragmatism

is

to believe in a truth that exists outside

test

9Q

Quoted

in

spirit, will

of truth? G. K.

a matter of human needs,

be something more than a pragmatist.”

—

critics to

28

In

We all

need

charge pragmatism with opening the

or even a Nietzschean nihilism

Dostoevsky once described a world without God, everything

"

its

our subjective experience.

This radical subjectivism has led
floodgates to a dangerous relativism

may have

actually believe

other words, one can and should reject pragmatism on pragmatist grounds.

28

my

Menand, The Metaphysical Club 362.
,

Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamzov.

17

is

—where,

permissible."

as

But

—
pragmatists were no Nietzscheans. While
pragmatism shared with Nietzsche a disregard
tor metaphysics,

proved useful

it

remained optimistic about the possibility
of acquiring

truths that

our experience. Nietzsche disparaged
instrumental conceptions of truth:

in

We have no organ at

knowledge, for "truth”: we "know" (or believe
as may be useful in the interest of
the
human herd, the species: and even what is here called
"usefulness" is in
the end only a belief, something imagined
and perhaps precisely that most
fatal piece of stupidity by which we shall
one day perish. ^
all

or imagine) precisely as

for

much

1

Rejecting the quest for truth altogether, Nietzsche argued
that science was just another

metaphysic, another religion that mistakenly put truth within
man's grasp. Though

more sanguine than Nietzsche about man's capacity
embraced

a

dynamic of uncertainty

for acquiring truth,

far

pragmatism

that could not so easily escape charges

of relativism.

For the pragmatists put a great deal of emphasis on science and the scientific
method.

Pragmatism democratized the

scientific

knowledge just

does

like a scientist

empirical evidence

at

fail to

work

as they

—by

our disposal.

verification and re-verification.

once

did,

method
testing

We all

If at

in its

at

we

all

acquire

and re-testing hypotheses with the

generate truths through an endless process of

some point our

we must

suggestion that

truths fail to

the very least adapt

meet these

them and

at

tests, if

they

most scrap them

altogether. All truths are provisional, according to pragmatism, except perhaps for one

the

method by which those

truths are attained.

The English philosopher Bertrand
indictments of pragmatism.

He was

Russell wrote

quick to detect a democratic

pragmatism, but he believed that underneath

Nietzsche, The

Gay Science Aphorism
,

some of the most

all its

354.

18

spirit

scathing

inhabiting

impatience with authority, prejudice,

and certitude lurked “the worship of force.” 31
Pragmatism was objectionable
because

rejection of any kind of absolute truth
existing outside of human experience

its

led to a Nietzschean epistemology

man

s

to Russell

limitless capacity to

of power.

flaw was hubris— the belief in

improve himself and the world around him.

reversal of the crude Machiavellian motto,

actually suggested that the

Its fatal

means justify

“The ends justify

the ends in their

agreement on what

is

the means,” pragmatists

myopic focus on method. 32 The

assumption was that concentrating on the correct means, the
automatically yield a conformity of good

In an astonishing

scientific

ends—that we would

true and right. Russell considered this

is

all

method, would

naturally

come

an

to

a naive and dangerous

assumption. If taken seriously, this refusal to consider ends uptront
deracinates

man

from any moral foundation, leaving him

which he

considers “expedient.”

works

for

me

33

free to define “the true” simply as that

Truth simply becomes what works for me, period.

clashes with what works for

whom we can

someone

else, there is

methods of the struggle

for existence

questions, and that ironclads and

32
“

what

no objective referee

to

must be applied

Maxim

it

seems evident

to the elucidation

guns must be the ultimate

that the familiar

of difficult

arbiters

of

Russell , Philosophical Essays, 106-109.
Russell himself does not suggest that this

fact, this is

method
33

if

turn to settle our dispute. Russell colorfully described the problem: “In

the absence ot any standard of truth other than success,

31

And

my suggestion —but he does

(the

is

—

of the Machiavellian motto in
pragmatism for focusing exclusively on

a reversal

criticize

means) instead of values or principles

(the ends).

James, Pragmatism Writings 1902-19 JO, 583. James was quite comfortable with

formulation

—

,

truth as

—but

expediency

it

made

19

Russell shudder.

this

metaphysical truth.”

34

Only through violent struggle and bloodshed

an authoritative settlement between competing

The

truths.

s

argument proved so powerful

that

it

who have

victors, those

achieved power, will write history. The victors
will determine
Russell

will people arrive at

truth.

resonated throughout the twentieth

century in the writings of such luminaries as Randolph
Bourne, Lewis Mumford.

Mortimer Adler, Robert Hutchins, and Leo

Strauss, to

name only

a few.

echoed Russell’s discomfort with the pragmatist disavowal
of objective
in light

of the inconceivable devastation and horrifying

atrocities

All these critics

truth.

Especially

which beset humanity

in

the twentieth century, the pragmatist abandonment of
objective truth invited sharp
criticism.

In the end,

why Nazism was

seemed

it

After

evil.

this

all,

method-oriented philosophy could not even explain

could not the most enthusiastic and horrifying

participant in the Final Solution, Josef Mengele, have justified his actions on
pragmatist

grounds? Could he not have said
true and right because

no

words

—

which

matter

to criticize the

“first

35

for the

mass destruction of the European Jewry was
Nazi cause? Because pragmatism “stands for

no dogmas, and no doctrines save

it

method,”

or sickening they

becomes

—

35

to use

it

has no basis

James’s

can only assess the truth of an idea by the degree

that idea fulfills the “last things, fruits, [or]

how monstrous

its

Nazi cause. Because pragmatism rejects

things” or “principles,”

the ends, everything

34

“worked”

particular results... has

on which

to

it

that the

may be

permissible.

Russell, Philosophical Essays, 109.

James, Pragmatism Writings 1902-1910, 510.
,

36

Ibid.

20

consequences” one seeks,

to the rest

of us.

When

the

36

no

means justify

But these seemingly devastating criticisms
understanding of pragmatism. While
method-oriented,

it

was

in part betray a superficial

true that

pragmatism was instrumental and

tended to overlook another essential
characteristic of

its critics

pragmatism: the quest for truth must be social and
public. This

who

cntic

focuses on the

of learning

social aspect

work of James, whose

fact

individualist streak

in pragmatist thought, but Peirce

and

might be

lost

on the

downplayed the

Dewey

could not stress

this

point enough. Indeed, Peirce warns his readers
not to take the instrumental

understanding of truth “in too individualistic a sense.” 37
Behind Peirce’s epistemology

was
is

his concept

likely to find

errors.

Any

woelully

many

A real, objective truth may exist out there, but none of us

of falliblism.

it

on our own. All

and experiences were subject

fallible.

people,

An

is less fallible.

reduce the amount of standard

explicitly statistical:

fact,

—

this

—was

the principal

father, Peirce liked to

are equal in their political rights;

Peirce, Collected

closer to the truth

(i.e.,

very process of sampling specific facts from

demonstrate the unreliability of deduction:

men

little

to the inquiry

way people

acquired reliable

he was suspicious of deductive forms of reasoning. Exposing a

racism he inherited from his

37

Add more people

error).

infer generalizable truths

knowledge. In

is

advanced student of mathematics and probability

was

Peirce believed induction

which one can

law of

But a collective, which draws on the experiences and perceptions of

increase the sample size), and you are likely to get a

All

to the

individual truth claim, based on one person’s subjective experience,

theory, Peirce’s epistemology

(i.e.,

truth claims

Papers 5.402
,

n. 2.

21

use the following syllogism to

Negroes are men;
Negroes are equal

The problem with deductive
political equality ot

in political rights to whites. 38

logic, for Peirce,

blacks—rested on highly

from faulty assumptions, induction could
truth.

Deduction moves from the general

was

that all

conclusions— such as the

suspect and general postulates.

Working

the very start lead us astray in the
pursuit of

at

to the specific, while induction

does the

opposite. Induction begins with specific experiences
from which one can draw general

conclusions, and this

attainment.

Any

was why Peirce considered

individual experience

is

it

a superior form of knowledge

certainly fallible, but a collection of

experiences can begin to shed light on a subject through a
process of verification and
validation.

The
again by a

scientific

method involves

community

Peirce suggests that

ot scientists

all

for a group ofpeople who,
about the

utility

To

of an

for

one or two people hardly makes

after exhaustive testing

effect.

it

true.

An

idea must

permanency

Some

it is

may be

necessary that a method should be

determined by nothing human, but by

—by something upon which our thinking has

mystics imagine that they have such a method

inspiration from

in a private

on high. But that is only a form of the method of tenacity,
in which the conception of truth as something public is not yet developed.
Our external permanency would not be external, in our sense, if it was
restricted in its influence to one individual. It must be something which
affects, or might affect, every man. And, though these affections are
necessarily as various as are individual conditions, yet the method must be

38

•

Peirce quoted in

Menand, The Metaphysical Club

22

work

and deliberation, reach a consensus

idea.

found by which our beliefs
external

share information and review each others’ work.

must apply the same rigorous method. That an idea

satisfy our doubts, therefore,

some
no

who

truth inquiries

works or has “cash-value”

the testing of hypotheses (or beliefs) time and time

,

161.

such that the ultimate conclusion of every
the method of science.

man

shall

be the same. Such

is

Peirce suggests that the “method of
8016006”— unlike our individual experiences— is a
reliable arbiter

of truth.

It is

a

“method. .by which our beliefs
.

nothing human, but by some external

may be

determined by

permanency—by something upon which our

thinking has no effect." While James agreed that
the method of science was

made

a point of stressing that his “conception of truth”
must be “public”

tails to

affect,

be

scientific.

It

only applied to “one individual” and not

then the method

is

this

To

opinion

all

is

who

investigate, is

the real.

what

Truth, then,

state this in statistical terms:

As

is

the

we mean by truth,
an agreement

is

“every man”

it

it

“might

and the object represented

among

a

(i.e.,

as the

in

community of inquirers.
to constitute the entire

sample size approaches the

population size), the proximate truth will converge on the actual truth

become

—otherwise,

fated to be ultimately

number of inquirers grows

population ot the community in question

error will

Peirce

not adequately scientific. Peirce summarized his social
and

consensual conception of truth as follows: “The opinion which
agreed to by

to

vital.

(i.e.,

entire

the standard

negligible).

Another element of pragmatism

to

which we should pay attention

is its

understanding of habit. Ideas and beliefs are “rules for action,” according to the
pragmatists, and

into habits.

39

40

when

they work, these rules quickly

In fact, both Peirce

and James suggested

Peirce,

“The Fixation of Belief,” Collected Papers

Peirce,

“Flow

to

Make Our

become engrained
that

,

form

even natural laws are really just

5.384.

Ideas Clear,” Collected Papers 5.407.
,
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in us; they

habits.

This meant that

man had

immutable laws ot human
acted

nature.

upon repeatedly, become

They

habits cease in a

way

James maintained

to

elicit

agent/’

nature.
4~

there

be ideas because

beliefs,

when

our neural pathways, thus

we do

not think about them anymore.

seem immutable and

are often construed as

But, though habits are indeed difficult to break
and thus a “conservative
is

always the possibility

that they

useful or a different rule for action proves

condition themselves to develop

new

engrained or hard-wired depends on

more

habits.

can be changed.

is

The

extent to which a habit

on how well

its reliability,

Man,

not fated by the laws of nature. Rather, he

has the power to change

when more

If a habit ceases to

be

useful, individuals or groups can

individual in question but for others in his community.

uneducable; he

in

and

predictable (or habitual) reactions. Ideas
that

are automatic. Before long, these habits

human

that our ideas

which are hard-wired

habits

ensuring that certain stimuli will

become

unlimited potential, that he was not
restricted by the

it

works

then,

is

is

becomes

—not

just for the

not rigid and

a “bundle of habits”

43

and

useful ideas materialize.

This of course presupposes that people have a certain degree of agency or free
will, a notion that Peirce

and James embraced whole-heartedly. Both argued

and beliefs serve as guides or

rules for action,

and

that these ideas are necessarily pre-detennined.

chance or spontaneity

41

I,

4~

that there is

Peirce and James

in the universe that leaves considerable

See Peirce, “Design and Chance”

no reason

that ideas

for us to think

saw an element of

room

for

human freedom.

Houser and Kloesel, eds. The Essential Peirce, Vol
223-24; and James, Psychology: Briefer Course Writings 1878-1899.
in

,

James, Psychology: Briefer Course, Writings 1878-1899.
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The universe
part

did not resemble a large and complex
machine of which

and whose immutable laws were slowly
becoming known

to us.

we were

an integral

Rather,

was an

it

evolving system whose laws were subject to random
mutation. Laws of causation do
exist in the universe, said Peirce, but
“conformity to

range of events and even there

is

lawless originality mingles, or

at least,

everywhere.

It

is

law

exists only within a limited

not perfect, for an element of pure spontaneity
or

must be supposed

quite reasonable to believe that

mingle, with law

to

human beings who

often reflect this “pure spontaneity or lawless originality.”

act

on

their ideas

The influence of Darwinism

cannot be overestimated here, for the pragmatists rejected a
mechanistic view of the
universe in favor of chance variation. 45

Furthermore, according to the pragmatists, the very process of ascribing
meaning

and finding truth
volition

world.

is

in the

fundamental

world requires
to

human

Both Peirce and James argued

volition.

experience and our ability to

make any

We cannot interpret the world around us or be conscious of

it

into

it

and

until

we

look

at

it

and notice

it

taste its peculiar juiciness, etc.

is red,

44

45

them, touch them, inspect them,

Peirce,

To

“A Guess

at

etc.).

it

up and

feel its

The idea of appleness

apples, but the idea will not manifest itself until

bite

pick

Our

we

total

sum of

We do not know a certain object

sensory experiences which our willful actions produce.

an apple

sense of the

without the power

of volition. The general idea of an apple, for example, comes from the

is

that

smoothness, bite

exists within individual

exercise our will on those apples

willful actions test the veracity

the Riddle,” Collected Papers

,

1

(i.e.,

of our

.407.

more about the influence of Darwinism on pragmatist thought, see Wiener,
Evolution and the Founders of Darwinism., and Menand, The Metaphysical Club.
learn
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ideas— in

example,

this

been fashionable

to believe that

control— whether

we meet

that this particular object is

human

beings are

has often

mercy of systems beyond

the

meaning through our

it

world and not vice-versa. To believe otherwise

While Russell and other
to

at

it

biological, social, or political— pragmatism
subscribes to the

the world half-way and give

was wrong

indeed an apple. While

critics

were

is to

actions, that

their

view

we make the

deny us our humanity.

right to associate

pragmatism with power,

argue that power was the arbiter of truth in the pragmatist
conception.

would be more accurate

that

to suggest that, for the pragmatist,

power

it

It

(or will) operates as the

agent ot action and freedom. People are free so long as they
have the power to act on
their ideas

to put

them

essence, one and the

into practice.

same became

The notion

that

freedom and power

especially manifest in John

are, in

Dewey’s work. Dewey

represented the next generation of pragmatists and, unlike his predecessors,
devoted a
great deal of time and energy to political philosophy, advancing a participatory

democratic theory that anticipated the ideas espoused in the Port Huron Statement.

summarized

his political philosophy

most succinctly

in

The Public and

(1927), where he argued that “the cure for the ailments of democracy

democracy.”

46

in practice or

Whenever

his contemporaries

bemoaned

argued that these concerns did not reveal any problems inherent

democratic enough.

Dewey rejected

that

is

more

to

majorities,

Dewey

democracy. Instead,

our political institutions were not

the purported tension between individual freedom

and the social good, between liberty and democracy, which necessitated

46

Problems

the inadequacies of democracy

warned against the tyrannical tendencies of democratic

any problems facing democracies today showed

its

He

Dewey, The Public and Its Problems Later Works 2:327.
,

,

26

restraints

on

democratic institutions. All the “ailments”
identified by Walter Lippmann
and otherssuch as widespread popular ignorance about
important public issues, or the inability
of

democratic governments to address social problems
rationally and efficiently—were

prima facie evidence

that

democracy had not

fully set root in the

American

political soil.

For Dewey, free elections were not sufficient
grounds for true democracy.
the people played a direct role in political decision-making,
participation

became

a

way of life

democracy and nation of free

Democracy was an

for

all citizens,

ethical ideal in

community based on

descendents in the SDS,

human

He

when democratic

would America become

a true

citizens.

to realize his potential for self-governance

build a

Only when

which each individual
and his

ability to

is

given the opportunity

work with

men

to

“faith in the capacity

of

his fellow

reciprocity and mutual respect. Like his intellectual

Dewey

rested his democratic ideal

beings for intelligent judgment and action

if proper

on a

conditions are furnished .”

47

bitterly rejected the notion that individual genius or intelligence develops

autonomously, for every person

is

socially constructed and thus only as brilliant or

talented as his circumstances allow. Education and learning are inherently social

processes, and

ideas

democracy

emerged and

ethically.

in

itself

could become the school from which socially beneficial

which individuals

realized their potential, both intellectually and

For Dewey, participatory democracy represented the

excellence and an ideal

way of life. As James Kloppenberg

scientific

method par

has suggested, the

Deweyan

“democratic community replicates the community of broadly conceived scientific
enquiry... Free and creative individuals, in democratic as in scientific communities,

47

Dewey

quoted in Westbrook, John

Dewey and American Democracy

27

,

xv.

collectively test hypotheses to find
out

own

goals, determine their

cooperation.”

community

tests,

and evaluate

In other words, participatory

writ

large—or science without
to ascertain social truths,

fulfillment and happiness.

These communities

their results in a spirit

The accusation

democracy represents the

the professional exclusion.

and the best ends
that

set their

of constructive

participatory democracy,

in

which

scientific

It

was

in its love

pragmatism culminated

for

the best

to find self-

pragmatism sacrificed ends

method was wrong, Dewey believed,

Participatory

best.

48

means by which

affair with

own

what works

in

which was both the means and ends of an improved humanity.

democracy promoted

the

common good

and empowered the individual.

II.

This
the

Deweyan

common good

first is that truth is

and

faith in participatory

—

democracy

to transform the individual

—

rests

in its capacity both to

on three pragmatist

probabilistic and socially-determined, never absolute.

promote

tenets.

Man

The

does not

arrive at truth through the use of reason or the pious contemplation of God, nor does he

arrive at truth within the confines of his scholarly hermitage. Instead,

socially, deliberatively,

and experientially, and the more people involved

unruly and messy process, the closer they get to

Mohammad

men

and even human reason,

statistics

truth.

and the

arrive at truth

in this rather

Displacing Jehovah, Jesus,

scientific

method become

gods, the arbiters of truth: by increasing the sample size of competent inquirers

the

new

who

rigorously apply the scientific method, by allowing more participants to bring their

48

Kloppenberg quoted in Westbrook, “Pragmatism and Democracy: Reconstructing the
Logic of John Dewey’s Faith.” In Dickstein, ed.. The Revival of Pragmatism, 130.

28

experiences and knowledge to the fore,
ot standard error, and

must

more accurately approximate

attain truth inductively,

which we can
collective.

We can call

construct.

In other

character that

this a

tenet,

power, reduce the amount

the true answer.

truths— truths

Put another way,

that serve the interests

democratic epistemology

which flows from the

words, there

is static

statistical

we

sampling a large number of specific experiences
from

infer generalizable

The second

we maximize

or fixed.

is

first, is

49
,

that

no such thing as human

What

at first

of the entire

man

himself is a social

nature, nothing in

appears to be nature or law

habit— perhaps deeply entrenched habit— which can

is

man’s

merely

ultimately be changed.

Man

is

eminently mutable and educable and therefore brimming with
unlimited potential; he
forever remains a soft piece of clay that can be wrought and
re-wrought into near
perfection. Despite

what pessimists

say,

man

wayward). He only awaits a proper education

is

not fatally flawed (or irredeemably

to fulfill his

immense capacity

for love,

empathy, and moral strength. What constitutes a “proper” education becomes evident

when we

recall the first tenet, the

democratic epistemology. As

man

arrives at truth

socially and experientially, not autonomously and contemplatively, the best form of

education must create opportunities for
education.

We can call

this a

humankind gains knowledge
improve himself

kind of group-based and interactive

democratic psychology. Given these assumptions
socially and that each

—participatory democracy appears

Unlike any other conceivable

49

this

political system,

it

man
to

—

that

has nearly limitless potential to

be the logical form of governance.

rightly includes as

many people

as

See Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy xx. He uses the term, democratic
,

epistemology, in this book.
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possible in the process of acquiring better
truths, and, in turn, these
truths-along with
the process of forming

them—educate,

the democratic participant

is

rehabituate, and transfonn the
participants.

both sculptor and sculpture, both

Thus

and work of art, both

artist

Professor Higgins and Miss Doolittle.

The
free will

Even

if

third pragmatist tenet

and thus have the capacity

a serious way. Or, to put

those

it

is

people have

devote considerable time and energy to

no guarantee

bluntly, there is

damned meetings. But

argument betrays a
liberal

to

faith rests is that

politics.

democratic participation has the aforementioned
epistemological and

psychological benefits, there

all

upon which democratic

liberal

that

no

people will actually engage in politics

telling

whether people

will actually

go

in

to

participatory democratic theorists argue that this

misunderstanding of the

human

condition.

They claim

that

theory rests on the fiction that man, completely rational and unencumbered
by

history or custom, contracts with others and willingly exchanges his natural
liberty, his

power, for security
each person

is

lest

he should die violently and painfully. In the

a self-contained

atom

fearful

liberal conception,

of injurious contact with other equally

self-

contained atoms. Freedom means assuaging people's fears of physical suffering and
violent death

is

by guaranteeing

accomplished

is

their safety

and comfort. The

really beside the point. Pragmatists

the other hand, understand that

man

is

embedded

in a

—

a goal that

is

as imprudent as

freedom depends on the power
customs

to

which he

is

it is

complex web of history,

inextricably bound.

From

30

ties

a

this

of the

traditions,

with this social and historical

impossible.

to share in the shaping

means by which

and participatory democrats, on

and customs. His freedom does not depend on severing

embeddedness

political

On

the contrary, his

history, traditions,

Deweyan

perspective,

it

is

and

inconceivable that people

may prefer to exchange

this

freedom for security and material

comfort. Vested with tree will, people are
poised for civic action. That people have
this

freedom and
theology.

It

will

is

embrace

it

unrelentingly—this

is

what we might

call a

democratic

the belief that, if given chisels, people will
take hold of them and begin the

long and painstaking process of sculpting themselves
and the world around them.
the faith that if given the opportunity people will
exercise this

It is

power and work

collectively to put their ideas into action.

James and Peirce believed
hitherto had looked at the world.

between science and
individual.

religion,

Dewey built on

that

pragmatism corrected the way philosophers

Pragmatism

body and mind, experience and

purported tensions

truth, society

this project in his efforts to reconcile the

tension between democracy and liberty.
that true

tried to reconcile the

He

and the

long purported

spent a lifetime trying to convince people

freedom depended on a deepening of democracy. Detractors of his

philosophy abounded. They just could not believe
considerable time and energy to civic

would ever do so

intelligently

life,

that citizens

political

would ever devote

or that, if they happened to by chance, they

and judiciously.

III.

A

number of thinkers emerged

to challenge his idealism.

in the

wake of Dewey’s

Often called democratic

realists,

these thinkers proffered an

alternative democratic theory that placed far less responsibility

average

citizen.

writings about democracy

on the shoulders of the

Walter Lippmann, journalist and fonner student of William James,

raised questions about the effectiveness of democracy in his

31

two

influential books, Public

°pini0n and

The Phanto m Public

damaging was
grounds.

He

•

wh * made Lippmann’s criticisms especially

the tact that they rested on similar
philosophical and epistemological

agreed with the pragmatists that

man

could only ascertain truth through the

lens of his subjective (and hence
epistemologically fallible) experiences, but
he did not

conclude, like Dewey, that democracy was the
scientific method writ large. Lippmann

doubted the average
citizens to learn

man

s

capacity to act like a scientist and collaborate
with his fellow

from the collectivity of their experiences. The

democracy faced some serious

real

world challenges:

man had

ideal

of participatory

limited access to

information germane to political and social problems, and he
possessed a mind that

all

too easily distorted the facts to which he did have access.

According
artificial

to

Lippmann, public opinion

will

always be

fallible

because of

censorships, the limitations of social contact, the comparatively

meager time available

in each day for paying attention to public affairs,
the distortion arising because events have to be compressed into very short

messages, the difficulty of making a small vocabulary express a
complicated world, and finally the fear of facing those facts which would
seem to threaten the established routine of men’s lives. 50

Man

is

subjected to the influence of his culture and heritage: “In the great blooming,

buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined
us,

and

by our

we

tend to perceive that which
51

culture.”

we have

picked out

Each man perceives the world “through

in the

form stereotyped for us

a class, darkly,”

and he

reinforces his stereotypes within his social set and passes them along to the next

50

Lippmann, Public Opinion

,

18.

51

Ibid., 55.
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for

generation.

52

These stereotypes are habits

time and energy,

man

to scientific scrutiny,

no one can easily break.

that

their

own

had the

could theoretically counteract these
stereotypes by subjecting them

by

treating

them

as tentative hypotheses

evaluated. But reality places limits on the
possible.

of opportunities

If he

to deliberate

which must be

Most men

will not avail

tested and

themselves

with their fellow citizens and will not
constantly question

preconceptions about the world. Most of us cannot
achieve this scientific habit

of mind and instead believe
treacherous character ot

all

agreement among people

in the absolutism

opposition.”

is a

53

As

of our

own

a result,

vision,

and consequently

Lippmann concluded

in the

that truth as

pipedream.

Other democratic realists— such as Charles Merriam, Harold
Lasswell, Joseph
Schumpeter, David Truman, and E. E. Schattschneider

Deweyan democracy,

rejecting the notion that

— compounded

the attack

government decisions should

on

reflect public

opinion. Instead, they conceived ot democracy in pluralist terms, as a
competition
elites or

among

groups for influence over government. 54 Most people have neither the time nor

the energy tor serious political activity, and they wisely delegate these responsibilities
to

experts and specialists

whose

influence public policy.

this

full-time job

Many of these

is to

represent their interests and

realists, like

work hard

to

Schumpeter and Truman, believed

competition yielded the most efficient and socially desirable policy outcomes, but

others, like Schattschneider, argued “the flaw in [the pluralist conception of democracy]

52

53

54

Ibid., 119.

Ibid., 126.

For a classic statement on the

pluralist school, see

Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism

and Democracy or Truman, The Governmental Process.
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is

that the

heavenly chorus sings with a strong
upper-class accent.” 55 Schattschneider

certainly agreed that

democracy was

but he maintained that

a competition

some groups never gained

among groups

make

the system

more

political parties,

inclusive and bring these

alienated groups into the competition. Despite
their differences of opinion,

democratic realists rejected crude majoritarianism and
favored,
liberal constraints

The

one

law.”

56

of unrestrained democracy

urges us to consider that democracy

not an end in

at that

assuming

It

in

all

some form

the

or other,

on democracy.

liberal critique

overlooked.

elites,

access to the system, and thus the

system favored the interests of the rich and
powerful. Only strong
according to Schattschneider, could

by

represented

that “the will

itself.

is

compelling and should not be

merely a procedure

is

—and

a fallible

Frederick Hayek scolded the “doctrinaire democrat” for

of the majority determines not only what

is

law but what

This “fetish" of democracy, for which he held democratic enthusiasts like

responsible, rested on the naive faith that “so long as

procedure,

it

cannot be arbitrary.”

57

power

is

good

is

Dewey

conferred by democratic

Liberals admonish us never to forget that a

democratic majority can be just as tyrannical as a monarch

—perhaps more

so, for as

Tocqueville suggests, the democratic polity derives power from numbers and, with

appearance of legitimacy.

58

Fearful of unfettered democracy, the

it,

the

American founders

established constitutional government and a system of checks and balances to secure the

55

Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People 34-35.
,

56

57

'

Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 103.
Hayek, The Road

to

Serfdom

,

53.

See de Tocqueville, Democracy

in

America.
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nghts of minorities. They believed
democracy requires
mitigate

its

institutional safeguards that

excesses and protect individuals from
tyrannical majorities; accordingly,
they

designed a fragmented governmental system
that frustrated the whims of the
people and

promoted incrementalism,

and compromise.

deliberation,

Liberals detect a trace of Rousseau in the

metaphysical

New

faith in the general will that frightens

republic in which

all

men

Left,

and

it

is this

almost

them. Rousseau, too, envisioned a

participate actively in civic affairs and develop
a strong sense

of citizenship. But in Rousseau’s formulation,
civic participation and freedom are
indistinguishable:

when

his private will conflicts with

follows that

error,

man must become

and

when

that

what

liberals,

it.

Because the general

"the opinion contrary to

I

mine

will is "always right,"

prevails, this proves

merely

took to be the general will was not so.” 59 Should

stubbornly to exercise

many

free through his obedience to the general will,
even

my private will,

I

must be “forced

Rousseau anticipated twentieth century

to

be

free.”

proponents of participatory democracy have continued

liberal

in the

In the

of little value

made on

59

puts

if

it,

“The formal existence of certain

they cannot be genuinely enjoyed.

camp, contemporary

Deweyan

is,

Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings 206.

60

Ibid.

See Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism.
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in

61

faith.

They
liberty.

while not unimportant,

assessment of freedom must be

the basis of liberties that are tangible, and capable of being deployed within

,

61

An

rights

was

minds of

cannot contain their frustration with the inadequacy of guaranteeing only formal

As David Held

I

decide

60

totalitarianism.

Despite these powerful warnings emanating from the

I

that

it

realms of both state and

civil society.”''

2

In reality,

some people enjoy more freedoms

and privileges than others, and these
inequalities do not
differences.

They often have

just

stem from innate individual

structural causes that liberals are
too prone to dismiss out-

of-hand. Theorists like C. B. Macpherson,
Carole Pateman, and Benjamin Barber
criticize liberals for failing to

acknowledge

some groups systematic advantages

—

that

social,

asymmetries of power and resources give

economic, and

These advantaged groups can quickly mobilize and

government

institutions; not surprisingly, they

political

—over

others.

attain better access to liberal

have a preponderant influence on public

policy and enjoy a disproportionate share of the benefits.
Furthermore, as Pateman
argues, the assumption that the liberal state

The implication here
nightwatchman

some way, and
The

is that,

is

separate from civil society

is

clearly wrong.

despite what liberal theorists say about the ideal

role of the state, the state and civil society will always intermingle
in

thus the state itself is often culpable of perpetuating social inequalities. 63

liberal state

claims to be neutral on questions of the good

in civil society, but its actions (or, in

many

life

and on group

conflicts

cases, inaction) undoubtedly privilege certain

groups over others.
This

people

is

where participatory democracy comes

who have been

them the opportunity
opportunity to

make

in.

The goal

is

to

empower

those

effectively disenfranchised in liberal democratic society, to give

to participate directly in politics.

Until everyone has the

his voice heard, the chorus of democracy

is

incomplete. In

suggesting that the pluralist heaven “sang with an upper-class accent,” Schattschneider

62
“

63

Held, Models of Democracy, 255.

Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation 173 ff.
,
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agreed that

many

voices were excluded from the chorus.
Yet he thought the creation of a

robust two-party system would be
sufficient to connect hitherto
excluded groups to the
political process.

But, for participatory democrats, the
solution

is

individual, not to strengthen political
parties or state institutions.

each individual what Isaiah Berlin called positive

own

life

and

to

be the author and definer of one’s

freedom contend

that in concentrating

to

The

or be?"

own

the

give

is to

to lead one’s

existence. Proponents of positive

on “freedom from”

intrusion

on the individual’s

"What am

I

free to

own

involvement

master. Participatory democrats maintain that civic
engagement, direct

in the political process, is the principal

positive freedom and control his

in

own

seeking the

way

a person can exercise his

destiny. Liberal warnings about threats to negative

an unrestrained democracy are unwarranted because

enlarges man's thinking and transforms

common

him

political participation

into an enlightened citizen

good, always remains mindful of individual

who, while

rights.

Participatory democrats have been vague about the practicalities, but many,

including Benjamin Barber and Carole Pateman, agree that
impracticable) to discard

many of the

central institutions

it

would be

foolish (and

of liberal democracy, such as

competitive parties, political representatives, an independent judiciary, and periodic
elections.

65

Often called proponents of deliberative democracy, they acknowledge

civic participation will

64

Berlin,
65

do

Positive freedom affirms a person’s right to self-determination,
his “freedom

to” be his

freedom

solution

freedom—the freedom

private sphere, liberalism fails to address the
fundamental question,
64

empower

work

Four Essays on

best with those issues that affect people directly.

Liberty, 130.

Held, Models of Democracy, 260.
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that

More

complex or remote national
but simpler and
likely

more

democrats,

be

at

it

is

have an immediate and discernible impact
would

to the political process. 66

would complement,

have a limited role

still

salient issues that

draw more people

institutions

issues are less likely to attract the
interest of average citizens;

rather than replace,

in the political process.

important to underscore

and

in their

institutions

and would

vital these participatory institutions

made

to

own

could

understand that their participation will

results, that their participation will

faith in political institutions

many of these

But, according to these participatory

how

a broader level, for if people are

produce tangible

This means that participatory

make

a difference in their lives, their

political efficacy will

be restored. Their

participation will elevate government accountability and
ensure that, in listening to

all

the

voices in the democratic chorus, the government will serve the public
good, not just
privileged interests. And, perhaps

transformative effect: people

more

importantly, participation will have a

who engage

in public affairs will learn about the nuts

and

bolts of democratic procedures, the painstaking nature of deliberation, the necessity
of

compromise, and the virtue of thinking beyond one’s own
pragmatist influences on his

own

interests.

Conscious of the

democratic thought, Barber articulates well the

transformative element of participatory democracy.

The

participating citizen... is a being with a mutable nature,

evolution

is in

part a function

of its social

habitat.

It

is this

whose
very talent for

self-transformation that enables the citizen thus conceived to engage in the

process of individuation: not merely in bargaining and exchange over
fixed and permanent interests but to modify the notion of what those
interests actually are.

transformation

member.

66

67

—

Participation entails change

for the

community

—

a faculty for self-

as well as for the participating

67

See especially Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory.
Barber,

A Passion

for

Democracy,

10.
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Like his pragmatist predecessors, Barber
believes that

whose capacity

for “self-transformation”

man

is

a decidedly social creature

stems from deliberation and interaction
with his

fellow men. Democratic participation, he
claims, changes “the community as well
as.

.

.the participating

But

member.”

many participatory democrats uphold

a

more

radical

and uncompromising

vision of democracy to which they compare the
extant system of centralized power.

Nothing short of a
crisis in

American

total

Sheldon Wolin, often considered the patriarch of the history

politics.

of political philosophy
called radical

subversion of the system will bring an end to what they
see as a

in the

American academy, has been

democracy and, through

his reputation as an august

scholar, has given credence and intellectual gravitas to the

the term

democratic state

is

a forceful advocate of so-

New

and unassailable

Left ethos. For Wolin,

an oxymoron. The rise of the megastate, which comprises

the sinister cooperation of big government and big business,

the tragic story of

is

modernity and signifies the beginning of a Kafkaesque nightmare from which no one can
easily escape.

In his view, until

power

is

reconstituted in a serious way, such that

remains decentralized and resistant to cooptation by the
flourish and remain

will continue to

immune

Though he

offers

in

our

—

until

democracy can

and institutionalization

to systemization

loom ominously

state

—

a quiet despotism

lives.

no clear remedy

to the

problem,

it

is

quite clear that he

considers reform efforts insufficient; only in renegade democratic uprisings

calls “fugitive

democracy”

social injustices

—does he

it

find hope.

Empowering communities

and promote the commonweal, participatory democracy
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—

or what he

to redress

in its purest

form remains spontaneous and unencumbered
by plans,
Blue prints are anathema

to

rules,

and institutional norms.

democracy because they immediately place

possible and necessarily guide politics in
particular directions.

metaphors, they load the deck or rig the
foolhardy) as to take pragmatism to

remain pure, they keep open

all

its

lottery.

To use

limits

on the

probabilistic

Radical democrats have been so bold (or

logical extreme.

By insisting that democracy

horizons and search endlessly for

truth.

But without a

blue print, democracy remains an elusive and
perhaps illusive political form. What

emerges from Wolin

writings

s

is

a blurred line between “pure” democracy and

anarchism. Though representing a more radical vision,
Wolin also sees democracy as a
transformative process:

Democracy involves more than participation in political processes: it is a
way of constituting power. Democracy is committed to the claim that
experience with, and access to, power is essential to the development
of
the capacities of ordinary persons because power is crucial to
human
dignity and realization. Power is not merely something to be shared,
but
something
about.

Wolin brings

to

be used collaboratively

68

far

more focus on power

in his

in order to initiate, to invent to bring

democratic theory than

many of his

counterparts, arguing that the democratic re-constitution of power can bring about not

only positive change for the community but can also develop “the capacities of ordinary
persons.”

Locating participatory democratic thought, of either the deliberative or radical
variety, in the pragmatist tradition

participation can

eyebrows. After

all,

the idea that civic

promote the general welfare and transform self-absorbed

into other-regarding citizens

68

may raise some

would seem

individualists

to fall within the civic republican tradition,

Wolin, The Presence of the Past 154.
,
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which began with the proclamatton by

Aristotle that

enjoyed some continuity over the centuries

in the

man

is

a political antmai, has

thought of Machiavelli, Rousseau.

Harrington, and the Anti-Federalists, and
can be seen in the writings of contemporary

communitarian thinkers, such as Michael Sandel
and Alisdair MacIntyre. Though
shares similarities with this tradition,
participatory

democracy

First, civic

think there are sound reasons for
understanding

I

as a descendant

of American pragmatism instead.

republicans place considerable emphasis on the
importance of virtue

and the cultivation of this quality

in the citizenry.

shy away from discussing

mostly because

in the existence

of fixed

virtue,

truths, prior to

democratic participation, for

it

human

implies that

Participationists like

it

Wolin and Barber

smacks of foundationalism, the belief

experience. This belief is anathema to

we must

rely

on those

elites

or expertise to attain these truths and then instruct the rest of us on

As

it

how

anti-foundationalists, participatory democrats believe that politics

is

with the authority

to act virtuously.

an ongoing

process ot discovery which must include every person with relevant experiences to share.
In other words, they

embrace

Second, there
participationists

is

a democratic epistemology, while civic republicans do not.

an element of elitism in the republican tradition for which

have great contempt. This

elitism stems in large part

from

its

embracing

foundationalism, believing that only a select few, perhaps a certain class, have the natural

endowment

to attain truth.

As

a result, the republican tradition has never

inclusion in the political process.

Over

the centuries,

—

excluding certain segments of society

slaves,

it

women,

demanded

has been comfortable with
peasants, the working class,

“barbarians” or “savages.” Participatory democrats have been uncompromising on

point, that

all

full

this

people have the capacity for citizenship and must be given the opportunity
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to

engage

fully in politics.

For participation

is

the road to self-realization. While

participation's subscribe wholeheartedly
to a democratic psychology, civic
republicans

have betrayed

a distrust

of human nature.

Third, civic republicans are prepared to
subordinate individual freedom and

happiness to the
refuse to

common

Though mindful of the commonweal,

good.

compromise individual dignity and development.

participationists

In an attempt to reconcile

individualism and communalism, they insist that the
dignity of the individual requires

voluntary civic engagement. Hardly subsumed by the
collective, the citizen elects to

engage with
to

become

it

and

free.

is

transformed

in the process.

He

is

not forced to be free; he chooses

The democratic theology of participationists remains

intact.

The same

cannot be said of civic republicans.

IV.

In part a

work of intellectual

democratic theory to

its

pragmatist roots.

American pragmatism, Charles
the participatory

history, this study traces the lineage of participatory

democracy

for

The

briefly, in the early 1960s.

Peirce,

I

William James and John

which the

New

Dewey— the origins

of

Left had such enthusiasm, however

story ends with contemporary democratic theorists

Benjamin Barber and Sheldon Wolin, who
political

a story that begins with the founders of

tell

in

many ways

deserve to be called the

descendants of the early pragmatists. They represent the legacy of participatory

democracy. But while

this story

history for history's sake.

examining

it

I

may be

illuminating in

also shed light

its

own

right, this is

hardly

on participatory democratic theory: by

through the lens of pragmatism,

I
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hope

to explain

why

it

has receded to the

margins of academia. Most

Madisonian or

on

its

own

political scientists attack participatory

liberal-elitist

grounds, but

terms and explore

its

maintain that

I

intellectual origins.

it

is

more

democracy on
useful to understand

it

My analysis shows that participatory

democratic theory—of all kinds, whether
institution-friendly or radical— rests on
three
pragmatist tenets: that truth

epistemology); that

man

vested with free will,

probabilistic and socially-determined
(democratic

malleable and educable (democratic psychology);
and that

is

man

is

is

poised for civic action (democratic theology). Taken

together, these tenets lay the foundation for the
participatory democratic creed: that

democracy

a transformative experience for both individuals
and communities, and that

is

people have the freedom
benefits.

In the

to partake in that

experience once they become aware of its

view of participatory democrats,

political

man

learns best in the school of

democracy, where a community of competent inquirers can devise the best
policies
their

community and where each

citizen.

forces,

And
man

unfettered

participant can

grow and mature

by biological determinism or the hard

into a

for

broad-minded

logic of historical or social

has the freedom to enter that school and will certainly do so once he

discovers the transfonnative effects of democratic participation. But should any of the
three tenets prove untenable, participatory

Ultimately, this could account for

discourse.

As

will

be seen,

its

we have

democracy stands on shaky ground.

untimely death or withdrawal from political
every reason to

call all three tenets into question,

especially the democratic theology.

To

recap, this

work

is

a study of the origins and the legacy of New Left

—

enthusiasm for participatory democracy
idea that peaked, ever so briefly,

at

a before- and after-picture, if

you

will,

of an

a quiet retreat in rural Michigan. In Chapters

Two
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and Three,
James,

I

who

focus on the founders of pragmatism,
Charles Sanders Peirce and William
quite unwittingly laid the philosophical

democratic theory. In Chapter Four,

I

groundwork

for participatory

how John Dewey drew on pragmatism

discuss

develop his participatory democratic theory.
In Chapters Five and Six,

work of two contemporary
respectively, and

I

participationists,

I

to

examine the

Sheldon Wolin and Benjamin Barber,

not only identify the pragmatist tenets
supporting their ideas but also

highlight their shaky democratic theologies which
stem from doubts about the viability of
participatory democracy. In Chapter Seven, the
conclusion,

evaluate the democratic tenets and

show how

I

make

preliminary efforts to

participatory democratic thought rests on

tenuous philosophical ground.
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CHAPTER

II

CHARLES PEIRCE: THE JOYFUL NIRVANA OF THE
UNLIMITED COMMUNITY

Charles Sanders Peirce

own

(1

838-1914), under-appreciated and misunderstood
in his

time, has in recent years been called
the most important philosopher in the

American

canon. Although his erudition was undoubtedly
impressive, ranging from the study of

mathematics and astronomy

to formal logic

and semiotics, he probably

the founder (or one of the founders) of pragmatism.

He

is

best

known

as

hardly devoted any systematic

study to political philosophy or showed any serious
interest

in

democratic

politics, but

Peirce’s pragmatism helped lay the philosophical
foundation for the rise of participatory

democratic thought

of which he

in

America. Peirce’s philosophy evoked a democratic temperament

may have

overlooked, for

we

only been partly aware but which nonetheless should not be

can identify

all

three democratic tenets in Peirce’s thought.

Endorsing a democratic epistemology, he maintained

knowledge

that

people can only acquire

socially and deliberatively, and that they should always keep an open

and accept the provisional

status

of all

human knowledge. He

unquestionable democratic psychology, asserting that

human

socially-determined, that people have the capacity to learn

also

embraced an

nature

new

mind

is

malleable and

habits and, drawing

on

the spirit of social cooperation, transform themselves for the better. Finally, he revealed
a democratic theology in his belief that

limited— to choose
It

ideas, as

human

beings enjoy the freedom

—

albeit

their social destiny.

seems never

to

Dewey would

have occurred

begin

to

do

to Peirce to derive political lessons

in the 1920s, in large part
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from these

because he understood the

pursuit of

knowledge

as primarily a scientific endeavor
in

which only an educated

elite

could participate. But Peirce’s epistemology
does strike a democratic tenor when
he
suggests that the scientific method should
and could be applied more broadly-inside
and
outside the laboratory and by scientists and
laymen
the seeds for a democratic theory that

throughout the twentieth century

in

the 1960s but continuing to have

its

would grow

alike.'

Accordingly, Peirce planted

in importance

and influence

America, culminating perhaps with the

New

Lett in

voice heard in academic circles to this day. The

story of participatory democratic thought in
America, thus, begins with pragmatism and
its

founders, especially Charles Peirce.

Having devoted two years of his

early years to daily study of

Critique of Pure Reason the young Peirce
,

was

particularly struck

by

Immanuel Kant’s
the

German

philosopher’s notion of “pragmatic belief’. Kant provides the example
of a physician

who

observes the symptoms of a dangerously

diagnosis to the best of his

ability.

ill

patient and

makes

a provisional

Quite aware that “his belief is contingent

doctor understands that “another observer might perhaps come
Nevertheless, this “contingent belief’

—

particular course of medical treatment.

his diagnosis

He

does not

—

to a

only,’’ the

sounder conclusion.”

will guide the doctor’s action, his

know

for sure that the patient suffers

from, say, jaundice, but the symptoms indicate that he probably does. Betting that the
patient has jaundice, the doctor acts accordingly.

1

Philosopher Richard

J.

2

Whereas Kant believed “pragmatic

Bernstein has argued that Peirce’s thought, especially his idea of

community, has “important consequences for democratic theory,” even though he did not
necessarily conceive of community in democratic terms. See his chapter entitled

“Community
"

in the

Pragmatic Tradition"

in Dickstein, ed..

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 647-48.
,
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Revival of Pragmatism, 144.

belief was one of many kinds of belief,
Peirce believed
beliefs of

any kind, said Peirce, are just

our experience.
the early

We can thank

Kant

rules for action

it

was

which we are betting

for inspiring Peirce to coin the
tenn

870s, even though the world did not hear
the term

1

introduced

it

nearly 25 years

later,

the only kind. Ideas or

until

work

in

“pragmatism”

in

will

William James

and also for planting the germ of a new and
fecund

idea.

Alexander Bain, whose The Emotions and the Will
was published

in 1859, also

had a profound influence on Peirce and the other
participants of the Metaphysical Club.

The

Scottish philosopher defined a belief as “that

and Peirce and his fellow club members found
Kant, Bain, and the intellectual ferment
delivered

at

at

upon which

this

first

man

is

prepared to act,”

an exciting proposition. Drawing on

Harvard, Peirce wrote a paper which he

the last meeting of the Metaphysical Club in the

according to James, he

a

summer of 872 where,
1

introduced the idea of pragmatism. Six years later he

published a version of his paper as an article entitled

“How

to

Make Our

Ideas Clear” in

The Popular Science Monthly. Though Peirce does not use the term “pragmatism”
article,

he does clearly

articulate a pragmatist

creed—the

establishment in our nature of a rule of action,
beliefs habitually is our

for us

we

are irritated

modus

by doubt. Seeking

contented state of belief,

we

we

idea that beliefs involve “the

say for short, a habit.”

when

3

Acting on our

these beliefs suddenly cease to

to alleviate this irritation

and return

investigate the problem immediately, and

by

to

trial

work

our

and error

discover what went wrong and, accordingly, modify our habits or develop entirely

new

3

operandi, but

or,

in the

ones.

“How

to

Whatever ultimately works

Make Our

after repeated tries

becomes

Ideas Clear,” Collected Papers 5.397.
,
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the modified or

new

habit.

This fairly simple idea constitutes the
core of Peirce’s thought. While
Peirce’s

ideas matured considerably over the
next 40 years or so, what

became

complex and comprehensive philosophical
system can be traced back
rudimentary ideas tormed during his early
years

was indebted

in

Cambridge.

4

his stunningly

those

to

Without a doubt Peirce

number of philosophers and thinkers— including
Duns

to a

Ockham, Hume, Kant, Bam, and many of his peers

in

Cambridge—but

Scotus,

it

is

important to

note that his ideas grew far beyond his influences
and into something quite original.
Peirce

was

attracted to

settle the centuries-long

the-wool

realist.

He

pragmatism

in large part

because he believed

believed that the regularities or uniformities that

name

introduced the concept of gravity, for example,

is

real

the ground

in the sense that

behave, and about

how

it

when we

tells

we

observe in our

or label, reflect a reality independent of what anybody

thinks ot them. In other words, mental ideas or general concepts
are

fall to

helped

debate between realism and nominalism. Peirce was
a dyed-in-

experience, and then give a

consistently

it

let

when he observed

go of them.

how

Newton

that objects

According

us something essential about

real.

to Peirce, this concept

objects in the universe

the universe in general operates. Nominalists, on the other hand,

maintain that general concepts are not real but convenient fictions which help us
negotiate the world around us but

tell

us nothing about the reality of the universe. The

only real things in the universe of which

we

can be certain are particulars, individual

events or objects. Peirce characterizes nominalism as the view “that the facts are, in

themselves, entirely disconnected, and that

it

is

4

the

mind alone which

unites them.

One

See Menand, Metaphysical Club Diggins, Promise of Pragmatism', Moore, American
Pragmatism Dickstein, ed. Revival of Pragmatism.
;

;
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stone dropping to the earth has no
real connection with another
stone dropping to the
earth.”

5

The connection between these

objects themselves.

observe something

I

similar events exists only in our
minds, not in the

observe something real when

real again

when immediately

event and the objects involved are
to explain this regularity or

real,

I

my

drop

afterwards

I

fork to the ground, and

drop

my pen.

I

Each discrete

but any general or universal concept
that attempts

commonality can never be

real, for there is

no

telling

whether

the fork or pen will drop to the ground
tomorrow. At most, the concept has proven

convenient to us so

While
tomorrow, the

it

far,

may be

but

we do

not

true that the

will occur in the future, but they

maintained that

tells

do

tell

real

when

I

go of it

let

about the strong likelihood of

like gravity

us something about what

is

may not

is likely to

tell

us what

occur. Peirce

which we gauge from past

tell

not merely to construct associations in our minds but

us something about the objective world and that predict

likely to occur in the future under similar circumstances.

work

demonstrated a high degree of reliability

While not

for us time and time again.

in the past, these

laws are

his contemporaries in the scientific

at a

moment’s

real,

according to

,
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for

we know we

notice if we desired. That

community subscribed

“Uniformity,” Collected Papers 6.99.

infallibly

Having

even when instances of them are not currently being exemplified,

could put any of these laws on display

5

something

to the floor

and again. Concepts

predictive, scientific laws generally

Peirce,

drop

us something real about the universe. The whole point of scientific

rather to establish laws that

is

may not

the future holds.

this potential, this statistical likelihood,

investigation, Peirce argued,

what

pen

realist believes that there is

the pen falling to the floor again

experience,

know what

to

nominalism was a

many of

considerable source of frustration for
Peirce.

An

unwillingness to believe in the reality
of

generalizable expenences (or “generals”)
belies what they were trying to

namely, to explain

why the universe operates

in certain

ways. Said Peirce: “Uniformities

are precisely the sorts of facts that
need to be accounted

sometimes tum up heads and sometimes

shows heads every time, we wish

par excellence

tails calls for

know how

to

the thing that wants a reason.” 6

for.

no

this result

The

accomplish-

That a pitched coin should

particular explanation; but if

has been brought about.

scientist

it

Law

is

always seeks an explanation

behind observed regularities and believes his analysis
can reveal something

and

real

general about the objective world.

The

nominalist-realist debate extends

everyday experience, such as when
apple.

The

realist

we

consider the general concept of an object

would have us believe

while the nominalist would say
individual objects that

we

call

it

is

beyond the realm of scientific laws and

that there is

something

a linguistic construction, a

“apples" out of convenience.

suggest, to assert that a general idea ot “appleness

corporeal experience. But Peirce was no Platonist.

tortured prose: “Consider

we

6

what

effects, that

conceive the object of our conception

grouping together of

As

He

the nominalists

would

outside our

argued that the meaning of our

we

call

“conceivable practical effects" which constitute appleness. In

commonly

about this concept,

some transcendent realm

ideas inhere in our particular experiences. Those objects

is

say, an

exists in the universe is almost

laughable, echoing the Platonic forms which exist in

Clear" Peirce articulated what

real

—

into

“apples” have a

“How

called the “pragmatic

to

set

Make Our

maxim”

in

of

Ideas

famously

might conceivably have practical bearings,

to have.

Then, our conception of these effects

“The Architecture of Theories,” Collected Papers

50

,

6. 12.

is

the

whole of our conception of the

object or idea stems from the

sum

object.”

total

7

In other words,

of its conceivable

our conception of an

effects

on

us.

It

is

worth noting

8

that Peirce

used the qualifier “conceivable” because
“[i]f pragmattsm

every conception

is

a conception

reach far beyond the practical.

It

of conceivable practical

effects,

it

is

the doctrine that

makes conception

allows any flight of imagination, provided
this

imagination ultimately alights upon a possible
practical effect.”

This means that

we

derive our general conception of an apple from
our actual and our imaginable experiences

with those objects to which

we

eventually attribute the

conceivable practical effects from an apple
will

be

illustrative:

will taste

throw

its

it, it

If

I

look

at

an apple,

unique flavor and juiciness;

will fly fairly far; etc.

have with apples— their

what any ot us

may

I

is

“apple”.

The

of course infinitely long, but

entire set

listing a

will see the color red or green; if

if

I

hold

it, it

will feel

smooth and

I

few

bite into

The

real,”

he claimed,

“is that

recognition as something other than the mind
inheres in those very real experiences

“How

8

to

closer examination of the pragmatic

which

s creation.

we have or

Make Our

etc.— exist independently of

insists

10

upon forcing

its

way to

The meaning of appleness

could conceivably have with apples.

maxim

requires a discussion of Peirce’s

Ideas Clear,” Collected Papers 5.402.
,

Collected Papers 5.196.
,

9

Knight, Charles Peirce, 54.

10

I

we

three phenomenological categories. Perhaps Peirce’s most original and provocative

7

it, I

spherical; if

Peirce the realist maintained that the experiences

color, taste, texture, throwability,

of

think of them, forcing themselves into our consciousness through

their brute reality.

A

name

Collected Papers, 1.325.
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1

contribution to pragmatist thought

cosmos, for
logic led

like a

apt,

matter— to

that

him

was

human experience-the

three “indecomposable concepts.”

to the conclusion that

chemical compound, into

its

any experience

1

His extensive study in

in the universe could

and thirdness.

An

(i.e.,

his epistemology, psychology, and theology).

“pragmatism cannot be understood without

explication of these

Firstness

conscious of

something

it.

is difficult to

human

Peirce put

nature, and

it,

12

describe or conceptualize because

we

are not exactly

Peirce often characterized firstness as the possibility of
an idea,

that enters the

mind

upon, or compared to anything
Imagine,

As

[the categories].”

you

as pure sensation but

else.

He

is

never fully cognized, reflected

wrote:

consciousness in which there is no comparison, no
no recognized multiplicity (since parts would be other than the
whole), no change, no imagination of any modification of what is
if

will, a

relation,

—

no reflexion nothing but a simple positive character.
Such a consciousness might be just an odour, say a smell of attar, or it

positively there,

might be an

dead ache; it might be the hearing of a piercing eternal
any simple and positive quality of feeling would be

infinite

whistle. In short,

something our description
anything

fits

that

it

is

13

else.

11

Ibid., 5.5.

12

Ibid.,

8.256

13

Ibid., 5.44.
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such as

it

is

is

phenomenology only has

categories will eventually shed light on his
theories about knowledge,
free will

be broken down,

The chemistry analogy

12 elements while Peirce’s

calls firstness, secondness,

entire

1

constitutive elemental parts.

although the periodic table has

three— which he

his reduction of all

quite regardless of

Firstness

is

a decidedly non-cognitive quality,
a “purely

which has no

attributable source or

feeling that “retains

vividness, which

its

monadic

state

opposing point of comparison.

positive character but absolutely loses

all

of feeling” 14

It is

the kind of

relation (and thereby

all

only the sense of shock).” 15 While Peirce's
comparison of firstness to

is

an infinite dead ache” or “a piercing eternal
whistle” (emphasis added) captures the

sensory monotony of firstness,
dullness

should not mistake firstness as an experience
to whose

we become too accustomed from

experience firstness
fresh,

we

at

the very beginning

when

a percept

new and spontaneous— representing mere

indeterminacy.

time

firstness, that

dream,” a

state

because the

In his

On

long-term exposure.

first

possibility in

imposes
its

itself

immediate

in “the infinitely distant past”

of “original chaos”

in

when

in

which there was no

in their "regularity”

—

in the early

morning when one has entered

has yet to acquire any meaning for

14

persistent regularity.

Ibid.,

of

16

And

themselves upon

us.

that state

yet recognize

its

hum of an

of semi-consciousness

significance or source.

We hear the noise but have become aware of

being present.

Ibid, 1.303.

15

16

its

state

the immediate and original experience of firstness

which one can hear the sound but cannot

nothing but

on us

the universe began, as a “confused

does not leave a marked impression on our consciousness. 17 Consider the
alarm clock

we

mind-bending cosmological speculations Peirce characterized

reality ot things consists in their persistent forcing

recognition

the contrary,

8.267.

Ibid, 1.175.
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It

Like

firstness,

conscious but, unlike

secondness
firstness,

each other in some fashion.

It

it

is

is

is

also an experience of which
relational, involving

we

are not folly

two objects

that resist or

oppose

the often startling confrontation
with brute fact, the

experience of acting or being acted upon.
Peirce also used the ideas of volition
or
struggle as

terms

synonyms

is fairly

tor secondness.

The experience of secondness

easy to comprehend. In pushing against a door,

apply force while the door, whether or not successfully,
recognize the door or
interplay

between

my actions

“effort

upon

it

and resistance”

surprise

in the subject

when he

is

exercise volition and

my efforts.

in general tenns; rather,
18

I

I

do not

experience this

as an individual and isolated event. But the

psychological manifestations of secondness are a
or

resists

I

in these physical

bit different, typically

Though

acted upon.

it

“is

evoking “shock”

something which cannot

properly be conceived,” secondness can often be characterized as the
“shock of reaction

between ego and non-ego.” 19

we would be
attribute the

notice

its

If the eternal whistle, for instance,

should suddenly stop,

surprised by the unprecedented experience of silence. Again,

sudden silence

particular effect

to a particular event or

on

us.

The moment we

meaning, but

we would

we would

nevertheless

identify a reason for the abrupt

cessation of the whistle, once a general conception of the whistle and the silence that

follows enters our minds,

we have moved beyond

the initial experience of shock and

entered the realm of thirdness.

Peirce scholar

Thomas

S.

Knight distinguishes thirdness from the

categories as follows:

18

Ibid., 8.266.

19

Ibid.
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not

first

two

.

Neither firstness nor secondness is
cognitive; they cannot be said to
be
known; they are merely experienced. Now
thirdness

is

cognitive;

what we can know. It is cognition, conception,
meaning
is and has conceptual meaning;
it at once

in that

it

it

is

at

once

mediates firstnesses and

secondnesses and makes their mediation possible. 20

An

explicitly cognitive experience, thirdness
entails explaining the relationship

firsts

and seconds, identifying regularities on which

and conceiving general laws which become rules
conceptions that link
relationship.

third.

come

When

we

can rely

our daily experience,

in

for action (or habits).

and seconds together, thirdness introduces a

firsts

In establishing

third object to the

Thirdness establishes a relationship between two objects
by

person

A

acts

across an object that

on object B,
is

unknown

(seconds) to gain sensory information
(third) about the object as

certain perceptions.

I

it

to

will yield the set

me,

(firsts).

I

will act

way of a

of practical effects C.

upon

Eventually

I

the object in various

As

I

ways

learn that certain acts of volition will regularly produce

The experience of thirdness

is

what

we

often characterize as

we

the example of the piercing whistle demonstrates, sometimes secondness

involves the subject being acted upon.

And when we awake from

dawning consciousness of its meaning, or

We will

If

will develop a general idea

consciousness, the awareness of general concepts or relationships in the world
negotiate.

between

our foggy slumber, our

thirdness, will not require us to act physically.

consider the relationship between the piercing sound and the ensuing silence and

eventually realize that the passing of a train probably accounts for the practical

consequences.

20

Said Peirce: “The elements of every concept enter

Knight, Charles Peirce 80-8
,

21

More complex

proved logically

thought

1

relationships can certainly involve four or
that

in logical

more

objects, but Peirce

such experiences are always reducible to a series of triadic

relationships.

55

at

the gate of perception and

cannot show
reason.”

on

us,

22

its

passports

Only by

make

their exit at the gate

both these two gates

at

of purposive action; and whatever

is to

be arrested as unauthorized by

interacting with the world around us,
either

by acting on

and then learning from these expenences,
do we develop ideas and

which we

are prepared to act habitually.

piercing whistle,

we

Once we comprehend

the

it

or

it

on

beliefs

meaning of the

will automatically attribute this experience
to the passing train

will continue to bet that this

is

the case unless

new

acting

and

information casts doubt on our belief.

Peirce s categones were the core elements of his
philosophy, the building blocks
for nearly everything else he

this triadic analysis

had

to

say in his philosophical writings.

could be applied to any kind ot

human

(or

He

insisted that

nonhuman) experience.

Hardly just figments ot the mind, laws and generals impose themselves
on us
experience, as if demanding that

we become aware of them. But whether or

about these generals, they are real nonetheless.

To assume

in

our

not

we know

they are not, that instead

generals are just convenient fictions or the mental groupings of individual events,

analogous to having a “court without a

A

sheriff.”

court in that predicament might probably be able to induce

to act as sheriff; but until

it

had so provided

itself

some

citizen

with an officer who,

could not discourse authoritatively but who could put forth
the strong arm, its law might be the perfection of human reason but would
remain mere fireworks, brutum fulmen. Just so, let a law of nature say
unlike

itself,

the law of gravitation

—remain

a

mere unifonnity

establishing a relation between terms

induce a stone, which

for

this stone too
it

not a term nor a concept but just a plain thing, to

on former occasions, and

not to do so. But what of that? There
9o

stone.

22

23

in

—

mere formula
the world would
a

conformity to that uniformity? All other stones

act in

and

is

— and what

—

It

is

deaf and

it

has no reason.

Collected Papers, 5.212.

Ibid., 5.96.
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it

is

may have done

would break

so,

the uniformity

no use talking reason

to a

is

all

In other

words, stones have no choice but to

this case,

its

the ground because the sheriff-in

gravity— compels them. Our awareness of this
concept

practical effects,

Newton discovered
effects

fall to

which we have observed
it

and gave

it

a

for

No

name.

many

objects always

fall to

the earth.

human

doubt,

of gravity and have developed habits from

years, but

walking down the

street

with a

the sheriff is in

star

person, but this does not prevent us from

streets

they exist chiefly by

town not when we see someone

fact,

we may

knowing he

is real.

we

notice that law-

never meet the sheriff in

For

we know

he

is real

and crowded jails, perhaps. Representing the irreducible elements of experience,

make

about

we know

the practical effects of his regularly performing sheriff duties— safer

the Peircean categories

to

beings have long noticed the

pinned to his vest but when

breakers are arrested and brought to justice. In

when we observe

indeed existed before

it

We do not see gravity per se, just like we do not really

we know

Similarly,

from

their observations that unsupported

see electricity or ultraviolet rays in and of themselves,
but
their effects.

(or sheriff) stems

sense of the world around

how

reality.

show how each of us
us.

never

know

ways

to

independent reality

in

our search

We turn next to Peirce's epistemology,

people can collectively acquire

An

maxim

applies the pragmatic

reliable, if not infallible,

may indeed

exist,

reduce the degree of uncertainty.

57

knowledge about

but Peirce reminded us that

for certain that he has grasped this reality.

But, as

we

his ideas

man

can

shall see, there are

I.

At the heart of Peirce's epistemology

is

the idea of fallibilism, the idea
that no

individual or group of individuals can assert
with complete confidence that they
have an

accurate knowledge of reality or a finn grasp
of the truth.

knowledge

is

never absolute but always swims, as

and indeterminacy.” 24 While he thought

that

lives, the fallibilist is

“dump

moment experience

always prepared

is

against them.”

but opinions at most, and the whole
fallibilist

par excellence

to

25

Even

we

his

He

objective reality about which

risks nothing

all

human

On

way of inquiry."" 7 The

entirely wrong.

fallibilist

is

famous

to

abandon one

equipped for attaining

for admonishing,

always searches relentlessly for

how

“Do

truth,

truth.

in this

most

not block the

acknowledging

at

satisfactory they appear to us,

accepts neither the rigidity of absolutism nor the hopelessness

Ibid., 1.171.

25

Ibid., 1.55.

27

not in the least

a realist, Peirce argued that there is an

we were poorly

24

26

is

our deficiencies should prevent us from engaging

the contrary, he

He

man

upon them. He stands ready

every point along the road that his beliefs, no matter

may be

our ideas in our daily

beings, especially scientists, busied themselves

trying to learn, but he also maintained that

that

trust

cart-load of his beliefs, the

in Peirce’s estimation, the “scientific

soon as experience opposes them.” 26 As

noble of enterprises.

whole

continuum of uncertainty

provisional.” Perhaps representing the

list is

or

But he never suggested

in a

our

the “accepted propositions” of science are

to his conclusions.

as

were,

it

“is the doctrine that

can generally

wedded
all

It

Ibid, 1.635.

Ibid, 135.
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of skepticism. Falling quite comfortably
between these two extremes, he

is

sanguine

about the possibility of attaining knowledge
about reality but remains forever open
to

new

ideas and

always willing
light;

humble about what he alone can
to reassess his beliefs

and revise them as new information

is

is

brought to

unlike the skeptic, he believes humanity
has both the capacity and the responsibility

to seek out the truth,

even though

we

will never

Implicit in his discussion of fallibilism

man

achieve. Unlike the absolutist, he

can never

reality, so

call in

know

know

is

for sure

when we have found

the idea that truth

“tests

of externality,” the most important of which

other observers from his community. 28 If upon walking
into

experience something out ot the ordinary,
ask them to verify that

As

the

I

to bet

his analysis

immediately
this strange

call

my

event or

my apartment

on

it.

I

According

become more

between

firsts

certain that

I

am

to Peirce, logic dictates that

we develop

that

somehow

and seconds. Or,

in other

conceptions or truths by observing uniformities

in

words,

right

we

thirds

we

is to

I

friends and family and

perceived

community of inquirers grows, presumably confirming

of the three categories shows

relationships

I

have not imagined

ot the extraordinary experience,

be willing

One

probabilistic.

for sure that his perception of reality
corresponds with objective

he instinctively applies

incorrectly.

is

it.

it

my perception

and will eventually

operate this way, for

by identifying

persistent

arrive at general

our experience, the unfailing

connections between our sense percepts and our actions. This means that limiting
ourselves to only our

defies logic.

we

28

own

subjective experiences as

we

try to identify these uniformities

We must draw on the experiences of other people in our community before

can embrace any general concept with confidence.

Collected Papers 6.334.
,

59

Peirce invoked lessons drawn from
astronomy, in which a community
of scientists

pooled their observations to determine
the most probable locations of
stars.
telescopic observation can locate a star
reliably because
a

it

is

No

prone to subjective

sample of observations measured by different
people, and often from

single

error, but

different

observatories, can reveal the most likely
location. Astronomers in the eighteenth
century
realized that a graphical distribution of every
observed location always took the shape of

a bell-shaped curve, and then drawing on
statistical theory, concluded that the
arithmetic

mean, around which
the

star.

curve converged, represented the most probable

real location

of

This solution became known as the method of least
squares, whereby the most

likely location

it

this

was determined by minimizing

and each of the observed locations.

mean accomplishes
location of a

this task.

moving

When

the

sum of the squared

an object

is at rest,

calculating the arithmetic

Applying the method of least squares

celestial object,

eighteenth century and involved far

differences between

to estimate the

such as a comet, was discovered

more

at the

end of the

sophisticated computational techniques. But

the principle remained the same, pinpointing the location “around which repeated

observations ineluctably converge.”
fallible but that collective

29

knowledge

The method of least squares
logic,

and he argued

general truths.

An

subject, parsing

differentiate

29

it

is

The
is

idea here

is

that individual

knowledge

is

less so.

a prime example of what Peirce called inductive

that this is the only

way

in

which a community of inquirers can

infer

accomplished student of logic, Peirce wrote extensively on the

main types

into its three

them succinctly, Peirce

said:

— abduction, deduction, and
“Deduction proves

Menand, Metaphysical Club 177-80, 228.
,

60

that

induction.

To

something must be;

—

1

Induction shows that something actually

something may be.” 30 Almost

all

operative; Abduction merely
suggests

is

truth inquiries begin with
abduction, generating a

hypothesis or guess that could possibly
explain the occurrence of a surprising
event.

We

then turn to deduction to infer particular
conclusions that necessarily follow from
that
hypothesis. Finally, the purpose of induction

whether the hypothesis and the conclusions
true.

is to test

that necessarily follow

The process of induction involves drawing on

which one can

inter general truths

final step, the actual test, is to

induction with the

initial

—

these conclusions, to determine

from

it

are empirically

a set of specific examples from

truths that are “operative” in the real world.

compare these general and operative

The

truths inferred

hypothesis and the deduced conclusions. While

by

three types

all

of logic have an important role

to play in the search for truth, Peirce placed particular

emphasis on induction, for

the only one that can

it is

what may be true or what must be

true if we accept

Peirce identified three kinds ot induction

and clearly found the

latter the

most

reliable.

—

He

tell

us what really

some dubious

is

true

—not

just

premises.

crude, qualitative, and quantitative

defined induction as

an argument which proceeds upon the assumption that all the members of
a class or aggregate have all the characters which are common to all those

members of this

class concerning

which it is known, whether they have
these characters or not; or, in other words, which assumes that this is true
of a whole collection which is true of a number of instances taken from it
at random. This might be called statistical argument.
must generally afford pretty correct conclusions from

No
a

30

matter what kind of induction one

random sample of cases from

may

apply,

it

In the long run,

true premises.

always involves

at

some

level taking

a defined population, observing certain characteristics in

Collected Papers 5.171.
,

3

it

31

“Some Consequences of Four

Incapacities,” Collected Papers, 5.275.
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.

that sample,

and infemng

that the

whole population has the same

words, induction assumes that the sample

is

characteristics.

In other

an adequate reflection of the whole.
While

both crude and qualitative induction draw
on a very limited number of cases,
quantitative
induction involves taking a large enough
sample to infer general truths with a certain

of statistical confidence. Our confidence grows
along with the

level

as

it

approaches

infinity,

size

of the sample:

our degree of doubt approaches zero. Peirce
provided the

following example to illustrate the logic of induction:

—These beans
—These beans
Therefore,
—
Case.

are

Result.

Rule.

from

this bag.

are white.

All the beans in this

2

bag are white.

We cannot be entirely certain about the inferred rule, but as the sample of beans increases
in size,

we become more

with an infinite sample,

confident that

we

it

is

representative of all the beans in the bag. But

can be completely sure.

This preference for inductive logic, especially the quantitative variety, led
Peirce

make

to

by

all

his

who

opinion

is

famous formulation: “The opinion which

investigate,

the real.”

destiny “which

is

33

is

what

is

we mean by the truth, and

fated to be ultimately agreed to

the object represented in this

Fate was a statistical concept for Peirce.

sure to

come about although

there

is

It

represented a kind of

no necessitating reason

for

it.

Thus, a pair of dice, thrown often enough, will turn up sixes some time, although there

no necessity

that they should.

sixes are destined to

32
“

The

probability that they will

come up sometime

if

is

1

:

that is all.”

you throw a pair of dice an

34

infinite

“Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis,” Collected Papers 2.623.

34

“How

to

Make Our

“Prolegomena

to

Ideas Clear,” Collected Papers, 5.407.

an Apology for Pragmatism,” Collected Papers 4.547,
,
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n.

Just as

number of

,

33

is

1

times, the final opinion of an infinitely
large
In both cases, said Peirce, the
probability is

Peirces famous formulation cannot
a social construction, whatever the

truth

1

is

in these statistical terms,

have suggested-that

community of inquirers
is

destined to represent the truth.

Once understood

.

mean-as some

contrary, Peirce did not claim that truth
inquirers

community

truth is

arbitrarily opine.

subjective but rather that a

To

merely

the

community of

destined to formulate a final opinion that
corresponds with the objective

is

that

is, if

they pursue their investigation into the infinite
future.

The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and
reasoning
would finally result in, and which is therefore independent
of

the vagaries

me

and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality
shows
that this conception essentially involves the notion
of a COMMUNITY,
without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of
35
knowledge.
ot

As

Peirce

people

saw

may

it,

think about

“destined to lead,

—

reality

reality is indeed independent

it,

and an

at last, if

in the truth.

36

infinite quest

I

or

some

is

an explicitly

infinity, its

unreachable endpoint for which

we

reducing subjective error as

much

does not imply that only an

infinite

35

36

fortunate

enough

epistemology:

statistical

to find

it.

to

Make Our

As

is

the size of the

opinion converges asymptotically on the

should nevertheless always strive

as possible.

It

is

community can know
But an

truth.

is

a hypothetical, an

in

hopes of

the truth, for even one

infinite investigation is necessary “to

,

5.31

Ideas Clear,” Collected Papers 5.408.
,

63

This

important to note, however, that this

“Consequences of Four Incapacities,” Collected Papers

“How

number of

conducted by an unlimited community

unlimited or infinite community whose opinion merges with the truth

may be

finite

continued long enough to a belief’ in that independent

This

community approaches

of what you or

1.

man
know

that

we

we know

the real object." 57 In practical
terms, this

are nght, even

fallibilism

drew

This

when we

explicitly

are, for infinite investigations
are unattainable.

on

this

statistical logic led

endeavor which

filters

means we can never be

Peirce to believe that the search for
truth

is

gave an example ot a deal man and a blind man who both
witness
declare he

means

cry, the other sees the

a social

out the idiosyncrasies and peculiarities
of individual observers and

human being who

cannot help but perceive the objective world through
a radically subjective

man

Peirce's

notion of statistical error.

corrects the "limitations in circumstances,
power, and bent” of each

a

certain

to kill another, hears the report

murder done.

of the

lens.

a murder.

pistol,

Peirce

“One hears

and hears the victim

Each witness has an incomplete understanding of

the event, but should they talk with one another and share their
subjective information,
“their final conclusions, the thought the remotest

from sense,

will

be identical and free

from the one-sidedness of their idiosyncrasies.” 38 Peirce suggested here

community

ot investigators

in this case, the

deaf man and the blind

that if the

man

—

deliberate

long enough, their disparate individual beliefs will eventually converge around one
shared belief.

As he saw

it,

this is the

way

scientific inquiry

works, with investigators

searching collectively for solutions from different angles and then ultimately gravitating

toward one “destined center” upon which they

draws on

statistical logic,

it

will all agree.

39

While

this

reasoning

also speaks to the public and deliberative quality of the

37 n

Moore, American Pragmatism
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,
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“Review of Fraser’s Edition of The Works of George Berkeley ,” Collected Papers,

8.12.
39

“How

to

Make Our

Ideas Clear,” Collected Papers 5.407.
,
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scientific

method, openly sharing information
with other inquirers

in the

community and

building on their prior work. According
to Peirce, the selfless devotion
with which
scientists

pursue knowledge leads

to their unreserved discussions
with

one another, to each being fully
mfoniied about the work of his neighbour,
and availing himself of that
neighbors results; and thus in storming the
stronghold of truth one mounts

upon the shoulders

of another who has to ordinary
apprehension failed, but
has in truth succeeded by virtue of the
lessons of his failure. This is the
veritable essence of science. 40
In other

words, the community of inquirers

independent agents

who

is

just that, a

community, not a collection of

pursue the truth alone and contribute their data
to some

repository where final results are tallied and
released to the world.
settles belief

more

satisfactorily than other

approaches because

it is

The

scientific

method

self-corrective,

incrementally improving on the failures and successes of
others and creating consensus

along the way.

Tying

in

both the logic of statistics and the virtues of deliberation,
Edward C.

Moore described

this

The method

is

self-corrective’ element

of Peirce’s epistemology wonderfully.

self-corrective because, although

one observer, or a large
group of observers, may examine an object and come to a false conclusion
about it, the object continually constrains each successive observer to see
it as it really is, and if this process is continued over
an infinite period of
time the method will correct the error, since, by continually referring back

number of observers must sooner or later discover
and remove any subjective elements in the conception of the object and
to the object, an infinite

eventually perceive the object as

A

really

work of his predecessors and

to get that

Collected Papers 7.51.
,

41

41

is.

successful application of the scientific method never ends, pushing each investigator to

build on the

40

it

Moore, American Pragmatism 64.
,
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much

closer to the truth. But Peirce

acknowledged
decidedly
matter

that, realistically, a

finite,

how

may

hard they

community of inquirers, whose

not correct itself and

may

try, participants will

often not be able to

size

and time

is

remain divided on many questions.

make

No

significant progress

or reach any kind of consensus on
a particularly difficult question.
Nevertheless, this
reality

check should not dash

particular questions with

Peirce

was the process,

cooperation, even

all

hope

we

can collectively find answers to
those

which our inquiries are busied.” 42 What
mattered most

when

in large part

the fruits of this labor are not immediately
evident.
for Peirce cannot

stemmed from

its

be overstated.

assumption that

reality can

His aversion to

only be

experienced on a particular basis, that the acquisition of any
kind of truth
endeavor. But no one can determine what
said Peirce, limits the

number

that this

number

is

is

of experiences

kind of general truths. Because the

assumption

right

on

his

own. The

is

an individual

certainty

from which any one person can

of death.
infer

indefinitely great,” logic dictates that

at

our

own

fate,

but

must embrace the whole community. This community, again, must not be
limited, but must extend to all races of beings with whom we can come
into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It must reach, however
vaguely, beyond this geological epoch, beyond all bounds. He who would
not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me,
illogical in all his inferences, collectively.

42

43

“Reply

any

very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on the

our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop

principle.

to

striving for consensus through painstaking
deliberation and

The importance of community
nominalism

that

Logic

is

43

to the Necessitarians,” Collected Papers, 6.610.

“The Doctrine of Chances,” Collected Papers 2.654.
,
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rooted in the social

Pe,rce

was

a great critic

inquiry but also of

of individualism and believed

human

To assume

progress.

that

that

it

blocked not only the road of

one can leam autonomously, by

solely looking into the dark recesses
of the self in the Cartesian fashion,

vulgarest delusion of vanity,”

44

and to suggest

every individual’s striving for himself with
under foot whenever he gets
Greed.

chance

to

that “progress takes place

his might

and trampling his neighbor

so... may accurately

do

by virtue of

be called the Gospel of

Peirce called tor a return to the gospel
of Christ which states that “progress

comes from every

No

a

all

was the4

individual merging his individuality in
sympathy with his neighbors.”

doubt, he believed that the widespread practice
of the scientific method constitutes

this return.

II.

Peirce embraced tallibilism not only because he thought
that
inability to

know anything

seeks to understand

as

is

has a native

with absolute certainty but also because the natural world

always changing.

infallibilism is that

it

cannot accommodate

growing and evolving world— a world where events occur spontaneously and

unexpectedly and where nature and

The

its

laws are never

infallibilist naturally thinks that

now. Laws

any

stable.

everything was substantially as

it

is

being absolute could not grow. They either always
were, or they sprang instantaneously into being by a sudden fiat like the
drill of a company of soldiers. This makes the laws of nature absolutely
at

rate

blind and inexplicable. Their

44

why and

wherefore can’t be asked. This

Collected Papers 7.571.
,

45

man

In other words, nature itself is just as unreliable

man's perception of it. The problem with

this

man

“Evolutionary Love,” Collected Papers, 6.294.
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absolutely blocks the road of inquiry.
as s may these forces ot nature not
be

May

The fallibilist won’t do this. He
somehow amenable to reason?

they not have naturally grown up?
After all, there is no reason to
think they are absolute. It all things
are continuous, the universe
must be
undergoing a continuous growth from
46
non-existence to
existence.

We can never pursue the meaning of law if we simply assert that
or appeared one day in

its

it

either

always existed

fixed condition out of nothing. Either
supposition “blocks the

road of inquiry,” according to Peirce, because
they do not offer any kind of explanation
for the existence ot laws.

Instead of defining law in dichotomous terms

absolute or non-existent— Peirce found
terms,

at a

moving along

a

continuum

it

more reasonable

that ranges

to

—

as either

understand law

between two asymptotic

poles.

point of complete indeterminacy in the infinitely distant
past and ends

in

dynamic

Law

at a

begins

point of

absolute certainty in the infinitely distant future. “[Conformity
with law,” Peirce

concluded, “is a fact requiring to be explained; and since law

in general

cannot be

explained by any law in particular, the explanation must consist in showing

developed out of pure chance,

irregularity,

argument, but Peirce did not contend that

and indeterminacy.” 47 This

this

to regularity is absolutely true.

hypothesis,

whose conformity with our experiences can

and effect

will

He

only suggested that

much of an

law presupposes

we have

it

is

a

more reasonable

actually be tested.

that instances

occur with exact precision and infallible regularity.

imprecision or irregularity in our laws,

not

If

we

of cause

observe

reason to believe that our laws are not the

product of a vast and unchanging mechanism but are instead subject to spontaneous

46

47

Collected Papers

,

1

.

1

75.
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is

dynamic view of the universe unfolding

from chaos

A belief in the immutability of natural

is

how law

deviation or chance variat,on-or
what he called tychism. Petree
contended that there

were many examples of tyehism of which

scientists are parttcularly aware.

The

inexactitude of emp.ncal observattons
in the laboratory, for example,
confirms the

hypothesis that the universe and

To one who

its

laws are evolving.

behind the scenes, and knows that the
most refined
comparisons of masses, lengths, and angles, far
surpassing
is

in precision all
other measurements, yet fall behind the
accuracy of bank accounts, and
t a at the ordinary
determinations of physical constants, such as
appear from
month to month in the journals, are about on a par with
an upholsterer’s

measurements of carpets and
being demonstrated

While some

scientists

completely to

human

curtains, the idea

in the laboratory will

would

of mathematical exactitude
appear simply ridiculous. 48

attribute these variations

error, Peirce

claimed that

and imprecisions

in

this is a quixotic attempt to

measurement
defend a

mechanistic view of the universe, the notion that events unfold
in a necessary and logical
sequence. At this point,
this

way, and

we

we have no way of knowing whether
make

should not

such a hypothesis.

Men

this

assumption when our experiences seem

of science usually have the sense to remain

those crude mechanists

who

have not found

the

men whose

are

most inclined

that

it is

who

physical laboratory

metaphysics."

44

events are detennined in

lives are

to

be

mostly passed within the fours walls of a
satisfied with a purely

They know from empirical observation
it

is

in fact

that

,

69

may

teeming with chance occurrences and

“The Doctrine of Necessity Examined,” Collected Papers
Collected Papers 5.65.

mechanical

though the world

irregularity.

4)

more humble than

believe they hold the secret of the universe. Said Peirce: “I

appear mechanical to the untrained eye,

48

to belie

,

6.44.

Pe,rce argued that tychtsm

is

the only reasonable
explanation not only for

observable inrpreciston

in the laboratory but also
for the

complexity and variety

in the universe.

growth toward tncreastng

By... admitting pure spontaneity of
life as a character of the
universe,
acting always and everywhere though
restrained within narrow bounds
by
the law, producing infinitesimal
departures from the law continually
and
great ones with infinite infrequency,
I account for all
the variety and
diversity of the um verse... mechanical
law cannot

account for this in the
can spring only from spontaneity, and
yet denies without
any evidence or reason the existence of this
spontaneity, or else shoves it
back to the beginning of time and supposes
it dead ever since.
The
superior logic of my view appears to me is
not so easily controverted. 50
least, that variety

Quite simply, mechanism cannot account for the
observable increase of diversity in our
world, and “wherever diversity

drew

explicitly

on Darwinism

is

to

increasing, there chance

make

this

argument. Darwin contended that evolution

begins with chance variation, the random change in the
then passes on to future generations.

Darwinism knows

that

sometimes

particular species or spell

its

Of course, anyone

this trait

future

must be operative.” 51 Peirce

traits

of an individual, which

it

with a passing knowledge of

may prove conducive

doom. But Peirce was more

to the survival

interested in

of a

how

tychism, unlike mechanism, can explain both the increase in variety within a
species and,

on

rarer occasions, the creation of new species.

element ot spontaneity to the universe, adding

mean

that the universe has

Although tychism introduces

to its richness

no order or regularity

at all.

constrain chance variation “within narrow bounds.

To

and variety,

this

51

Tychism merely suggests

“The Doctrine of Necessity Examined,” Collected Papers,

“Man’s Glassy Essence,” Collected Papers

,
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6.267.

does not

the contrary, laws always

universe produces innumerable “departures from the law,” most of which are

50

this

6.59.

that the

“infinitesimal”

laboratory

but

such as those small but measurable
inexactitudes observed in the

some of which, on extremely

monumental. This means

that laws

rare occasions, prove
“great” and

have a certain uniformity and order

to

them but

that

they are always subject to the possibility
of variation. Just as fallibilism rests
on the
notion of probability, so does tychism.

which

We can

think of law as a statistical

a distribution ot events, shaped like
a bell-curve, can be drawn.

mean around

While large-scale

(or “great”) deviations are statistical outliers
and thus will occur infrequently, minor
(or

“infinitesimal”) deviations are quite

Understood

common

in statistical terms,

likely but never precise.

and will occur frequently.

laws are variable, giving us predictions that
are

While Peirce speculated

that

laws are becoming less variable

over time and will become absolutely certain and mechanistic

means

that for all practical

purposes he had to replace the mechanical metaphor with an

organic one. The Peircean universe

mind. This organism,

modes of behavior

bom

in the infinite future, this

is

in a state

not a machine but a conscious organism or a living

of utter confusion and indeterminacy, must develop

in order to establish a sense

of order. Laws, then, do not follow the

unalterable logic of machines but instead resemble habits, those patterns of
behavior that

any

life

form develops over time

actually the

same thing

after countless repetitions.

in Peirce’s estimation.

develops laws or habits which give
Habit

is

it

habits

were

the universe evolves over time,

it

an increasingly recognizable and predictable form.

responsible for creating any kind of intelligibility in the universe, endowing

with a predictability and coherence with which

day

As

Laws and

in the infinite future, habits

have

it

did not

start.

that peculiar quality

71

it

Nevertheless, until that

of “not acting with

exactitude,"

52

of responding to

certain circumstances in generally
reliable, but never

precisely uniform, ways.
Peirce’s discussion of habit had
important implications for his ideas
about
nature.

Because laws were not immutable

In his search tor ideas

modes of behavior

and beliefs

in Peirce’s

view, neither were

that serve as “rules for action,’’

that in his experience

man

human

how mechanical

beings.

develops habits,

prove useful time and again. Eventually,
he

employs these habits without thinking about them
too much, and they come
him. But no matter

human

his habits

may

to define

appear, they are not hard-wired

irrevocably.

But no mental action seems to be necessary or
invariable
In whatever manner the mind has reacted
under a given

in its character.

sensation, in that

manner

it

is

more likely to react again; were this, however, an absolute
would become wooden and ineradicable and, no room

necessity, habits

being

it,

the formation of new habits, intellectual life would
come to a
close. Thus, the uncertainty of the mental law is no
mere defect of

left for

speedy
but

is

on the contrary of its essence. The

subject to law in the

same

truth

is,

rigid sense that matter

is.

the
It

mind

is

not

only experiences

gentle forces which merely render

it more likely to act in a given way
than
otherwise would be. There always remains a certain amount of arbitrary
spontaneity in its action, without which it would be dead. 53

it

Like the natural laws which provide form to the universe, mental habits are not
necessary or invariable.

In tact, mental habits are

even more uncertain than natural

laws, for they are only under the influence of “gentle forces" which guide our actions in a
certain directions without ever

removing an element of “arbitrary spontaneity.”

be creatures of habit, but these habits can always be

52

Ibid.,

53

6.260.

“The Law of Mind,” Collected Papers 6.148.
,
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altered.

We may

A believer in the epistemological
believed that
the

truth— in

human beings

could only develop good habits-or
habits that accord with

a social context. Peirce

because he believed that

in

superiority of the unlimited community,
Peirce

was

a great critic of nominalism in large
part

denying the existence of universal

truth

promoted an ethos

it

of individualism, selfishness, and greed. Peirce’s
realism, on the other hand, teaches
people that universal truth actually exists and that
a community of inquirers can become
quite confident, though not completely certain,
of having attained

have

to

That

it.

said,

people

adopt the right social habits to form such a community
and become productive

members

of

it.

We have the choice,

said Peirce,

between two

embrace "Americanism, the worship of business, the
of genial sentiment dries up or shrinks
with our

own

insignificance

as

to a

“mere

rill

cells

life in

of comic

real options.

which the

tit-bits,”

or

We can either

fertilizing

we

can

come

stream

to terms

of the social organism” and “recognize a

higher business than [our] own... a generalized conception of duty which
completes

[one

s]

personality

he chooses the

by melting

“man

latter,

joyful Nirvana in

it

into the neighboring parts

prepares himself for transmutation into a

which the discontinuities of his

The suggestion here

is that

of the universal cosmos.”

man

will shall

have

all

If

new form of life,

but disappeared.”

the

54

has the freedom to choose between subjective

individualism and objective truth, between the habits of greed and the habits of social
cooperation. In recognizing his duty to something larger than himself and becoming an
integral part

in

54

of the unlimited community, man has the power

terms of knowledge and ethics, and

Collected Papers

,

1

make

to transform himself, both

his personality complete.

.673.
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III.

The mutability of law and human nature may
seem
will, but Peirce

claimed that

to

imply

that

men have

free

this is not necessarily the case.

[T]he propositions that laws of nature are
not absolute and that important
physical events are due to human reasoning
are far from proving that
human action is (in any important degree) free, except
in the sense that a
man is a machine with automatic controls, one over
another, for five
grades, at least.

freedom than

I,

for

that...

This passage, taken from a
that Peirce

was

my part, am

55

letter to British

or six

very dubious as to man's having more

pragmatist

F.

C. S. Schiller, seems to suggests

actually a determinist. Indeed, in a letter to William
James, Peirce also

said that he did not think “the will

is

any appreciable measure,” because

free in

occurrences of chance variation or spontaneity “can only amount
to
things closely approximating to unstable equilibrium”—
as

work and we
state

are irritated with doubt.

of stable equilibrium, long

after

The

in,

much

when our

in a state

habits cease to

exercise of will, on the other hand, occurs in a

we have

alleviated

any doubts. In other words,

exercise will in a largely mechanical or habitual way. That said, Peirce

still

found.”

56

will.

is

We exercise freedom during those moments of doubt when we must make

term “free will”

is

a

new

habits.

Peirce suggested here that the

misnomer and should be replaced with

understanding, the will actualizes those choices

56

lies in the

There a state of nearly unstable equilibrium

conscious choices in our struggle to develop

55

we

upheld a

doctrine of limited freedom. In his letter to James he continued: “The freedom

choice which long antecedes the

of

Ibid, 8.320.

Ibid, 8.311.
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we made

at

“free choice.” In his

an earlier time. These

actualizations do not always reflect our
earlier choices perfectly, in large
part because

habit often gets in the way. There

no avoiding the ongoing

is

battle

between conscious

choice and pre-established habits—hence,
Peirce’s doctrine of limited freedom.

A
more

discussion of Peirce’s three categories and
their relation to his ethics

light

admirable” and then investigates

how we

“what

should bring

state

of the world

this ideal

one as counter-intuitive, but we must

we must

recall that,

This becomes clear when

act.

creation of any general idea requires that

and then react

in particular

perceiving and acting,

ways

(seconds).

we grow aware

arrive at general ideas (thirds) out

world about.

we would

bring about those

first

we

57

may

strike

only think

recall the three categories.

experience sense perceptions

As we make

Logic,

The
(firsts)

sense of the world around us by

of connections between the two and eventually

we have

like to experience

firsts.

we

to Peirce,

of which habits emerge. At

habits have not yet been established,

firsts

we

according

most

[is]

the study of how to reason correctly, emerges
out of ethics. This last point

which

shed

on the subject of freedom. Ultimately concerned
with human action or

volition, ethics turns first to aesthetics to
identify

because

may

a choice to

that

make.

moment when

We are free to decide

and choose which seconds

Our choices have important

ultimately shape our ideas and beliefs which in turn

we

will

ethical implications

become

our

employ

to

because they

rules (or habits) for future

actions.

According
person

who

practices

the ethical person.

57

to Peirce, there are

good

The

logic

such things as good and bad habits. Just as the

must engage with the “unlimited community,” so must

ethical person will exercise self-control

Knight, Charles Peirce 94.
,
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and develop good habits

Which promote
to

social cooperation

and deliberation. As these good

good reasoning, the suggestion here

person. Peirce

Etlucs

is that

the logical person

would probably have agreed with
the study

is

adopt. That

social habits are vital

by definition an

is

simple formulation.

this

He

of what ends of action we are deliberately prepared
which is in conformity to ends which we are

is right

ethical

wrote:

to

prepared

deliberately to adopt... The righteous

man

controls his passions, and

them conform to such ends as he is prepared to
adopt
were in the nature of man to be perfectly satisfied
to

makes

as ultimate. If

make

it

his personal

comfort his ultimate aim, no more blame would
attach to him for doing so
than attaches to a hog for behaving in the same
way. A logical reasoner

is

who

a reasoner

exercises great self-control in his intellectual
operations;
and therefore the logically good is simply a particular
species of the

morally good.

58

Cntics have often assailed pragmatism for promoting
moral relativism, but they have

obviously misread or overlooked the work of Peirce. Doing
the right thing, acting
morally,

was not

a matter of subjective opinion for Peirce.

Peirce rejected subjectivist

morality, such as the ethos of hedonism, on the basis that there
are
lives

when simply

really desire to

do

— and

certainly not

make

or logic to ascertain what

is

The goal here

us that

we

morally

right.

to

The

Acting solely on the basis of
is

why we must

turn to reason

ethical person “deliberately. .controls his
.

such ends as he

of individual

gratification.

is

prepared to adopt as ultimate.”

Ethics teaches us

how we

can do

this.

It

can have a power of self-control, that no narrow or selfish aim can ever

prove satisfactory, that the only satisfactory aim

58

to do.

what we

not to satisfy temporary passions but to find an objective morality that

exists independently

“tells

what we ought

us very dissatisfied, which

makes them conform
is

times in our

satiating our instinctive desire for sensual pleasure is not

sensual instinct will often

passions, and

many

Collected Papers 5.130.
,
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is

the broadest, highest, and most general

possible aim.

To do

cultivate a sense

of community and wider

power

to

right in this world,

we must

control our individualistic habits
and

social responsibility.

It is

well within our

achieve this highest of aims.

Although human beings do not enjoy radical
freedom

do have the capacity

to alter their habits.

happiness and wisdom

if

He

in Peirce’s estimation, they

firmly believed that

men

could find greater

they could only learn the virtues of thoughtful
reflection and

public deliberation, engaging with the larger

community

to solve problems.

Whether

they would ever learn these virtues was another
question to which he conceded there was

no easy answer.

The question whether
individuals

is

the genus

homo

has any existence except as
is anything of any more dignity,

the question whether there

worth, and importance than individual happiness, individual
aspirations,
and individual life. Whether men really have anything in common,

so that

the

community

is to

be considered an end in

.is the most
fundamental practical question in regard to every public institution
the
constitution of which we have it in our power to influence. 60

Even

if

come

is

unmistakable.

its

He was committed

to the idea that

people

together and achieve a higher ideal than American individualism. While the

house of participatory democracy had yet

down

.

Peirce never fully considered the political implications of his philosophy,
the

democratic tone of his hopes
could

itself.

to

be

built, Peirce

most

certainly helped to lay

foundation.

59

Ibid., 1.611.
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8.38.
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CHAPTER

III

THE LONELY COURAGE OF WILLIAM JAMES

In 1898,

California

untoward

at

the University of

Berkeley, in which he credited his friend
Charles Peirce for introducing

at

pragmatism

William James (1842-1910) delivered a paper

to the

lifestyle

world over twenty years before. Peirce’s

difficult personality

prevented him from ever landing a permanent academic
position, and

his inability to finish

most of the projects on which he worked

tirelessly left his

philosophical contributions largely unnoticed. James,
whose professorship

and well-received publications gave him a celebrity
forgot his friend and tried

many

times to

Although certainly appreciative of his

James

s

lift

status in

academic

him out of philosophical

at

circles,

tact,

Peirce

James and others were taking pragmatism

He

faulted

James

was so dismayed by

that

he sought

his philosophy “pragmaticism,” a term “ugly

kidnappers.”

never

obscurity.

for being imprecise

and unsystematic, relying too heavily on psychology and not enough on logic
formulation of pragmatism. In

Harvard

friend’s generous efforts, Peirce did not treat

philosophical works with equal kindness.

by naming

and

the direction in which

to distance himself

enough

in his

to

from them

be safe from

1

Without a doubt, James’s version of pragmatism differed considerably from
Peirce's.

will,

He

initially

turned to pragmatism as a means to justify faith in

and he often presented

metaphysical crises

—

this school

as, in fact,

God and

of thought as a way for individuals

free

to avert

he did for himself. The virtue of pragmatism, as he saw

1

Peirce, Collected Papers, 5.414.
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it,

was

that

it

provided a harmonious balance between
the “tough-mindedness” of

materialism and empiricism and the
“tender-mindedness” of spiritualism and
rationalism.

2

It

could meet the factual and methodological
rigors of science and

same time appeal
in

our

lives.

to

at

the

our subjective need for something more
meaningful and permanent

The end

result

was

a philosophy that placed considerable
emphasis on the

dignity of the individual and his freedom to
change himself and the world around him.

At times James seemed

to neglect the

and his philosophy seemed
truth

amounted
But, as

to nothing

we

to languish in radical subjectivism

more than

shall see, critics

not subscribe to liberal

importance of community in the search for

and relativism,

in

truth,

which

the desires of each individual.

of James have overstated his individualism. James did

dogma which

delineated a clear divide between the individual and

the collective; he understood that they shared a symbiotic
relationship. James’s

philosophy proved friendly to democratic principles, for which he often showed
public
support, and his

Not

work helped

surprisingly, then,

all

lay the

groundwork

for participatory democratic theory.

three democratic tenets are recognizable in his writings. In

arguing that people can only acquire knowledge experientially and socially, that their
truth claims are

He

always working hypotheses, James espoused a democratic epistemology.

also revealed a democratic psychology in maintaining that

and subject

to social construction

and

that, as

human

nature

mere bundles of habits, people

is

flexible

are

transformable. And, finally, he held faithfully to a democratic theology, the belief that

human

2

beings have free will and can thus choose their destiny.

See James, Writings 1902-1910 487-504.
,
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Unlike Peirce, James understood more
clearly that

political lessons

denved from pragmatist philosophy. Though
he did not match Dewey

could be

in calling for a

participatory democracy, he struck a
decidedly democratic tenor not only in
his

philosophical writings but also in his approach
to teaching, his personal relationships,
and
his political

commitments. He was an exceedingly magnanimous
and

whose reputation
Harvard.

W.

for

tolerant

open-mindedness attracted the more unorthodox students

E. B. Dubois, Alain

Locke

(the

first

man,
at

African-American Rhodes scholar),

and Gertrude Stem were among his most enthusiastic
students. James was a champion of
the underdog, the lost soul and the nonconformist,
and he held large and elite institutions
in

contempt for trampling on even the most unconventional
expressions of individual

genius.

It

should

come

as

no surprise

that

James was one of the few who was able

to

overlook the eccentricities and appreciate the mind of Charles Peirce.
Walter Lippmann
called his former professor "so very

after his death that “[i]t is an

perhaps the most tolerant

much of a democrat” 3 and wrote just

a

few months

encouraging thought that America should have produced

man of our

generation.”

4

Forever concerned with the plight of others, James ardently opposed reckless

American intervention abroad and saw the moral bankruptcy of colonialism, imperialism,
and excessive militarism.

In the

wake of the Spanish-American War and

the occupation

of the Philippines, he became the vice president of the Anti-Imperialist League and wrote
countless letters to the editor denouncing American foreign policy. His opposition rested

3

Lippmann, “An Open Mind,” 801, quoted

in Cotkin, William

James, Public

Philosopher 172.
,

4

Lippmann, “An Open Mind,” quoted

in

Myers, William James: His Life and Thought

424.
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,

.

primarily on his belief that American
imperialism betrayed a blindness to
alternative
perspectives and

at

home, blaming luxuriant

SUCCESS”
that

a

ways of life. He was just

for

men who

“man

for

equilibrium,

living and “the exclusive worship

of the bitch-goddess

our “moral flabbiness.” 5 Sinking almost
a Marxist tone, James claimed

are enthralled

whom

poor led him

as critical of excessive greed and
materialism

by luxury

are corrupt, cowardly, and morally
lethargic.

Only

poverty has no terrors becomes a freeman.” 6
His sympathy for the

to support the re-distribution

but he adamantly opposed

of wealth and moving toward a “socialist

all

things big, including big government.

Indeed, his political philosophy grew increasingly
anarchistic, and he

came

to believe that

only small communities could govern themselves justly and
sanely and provide ample
opportunity for the exercise of civic courage.

While Peirce's democratic temperament appeared most strongly
epistemology, James displayed his democratic colors brightly in

placed a great deal of weight on his belief that truth
deliberative communities.

not just

With

far

elite,

control of their destinies.

civic action.

5

James

to H.

downplay

more pomp, he

members of the

probabilistic, best

approximated by

and

The

his

the importance of communal learning in his

stressed an ardent faith in the educability of all

in their

immense capacity

men,

for strenuous action and

heart of James’s democratic thought lies in his call for

We turn now to James's pragmatist philosophy to identify the origins of this

G. Wells, Letters of William James 259-60, quoted in Cotkin, William
,

James, Public Philosopher 91
,

6

three tenets. Peirce

James agreed with Peircean epistemology, but

individualistic streak tended to

thought.

is

all

in his

Cotkin, William James, Public Philosopher 92.
,
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political orientation

and see

how he

played a crucial role

in this story

of participatory

democratic thought in America.

I.

Surprisingly enough, the story begins with a
metaphysical

crisis.

Throughout the

1860s and early 1870s James suffered from intermittent
bouts of depression. Some
evidence suggests that these dark periods

may have stemmed

in part

from

either his

upbringing or a genetic predisposition tor melancholia, 7
but the prevailing philosophical
doctrines of the Victorian age, determinism and materialism,
seem to be the primary
culprits.

As

a

young man trying

frustratingly indecisive.

universe (or both)

choose his vocation

to

The prospect of living

made choosing

in life,

in either a

James proved

preordained or

a vocation rather pointless to him.

He

nihilistic

finally settled

teaching psychology and philosophy almost accidentally after dabbling for
chemistry, anatomy, medicine, and even

Harvard

in

1

art.

A

temporary teaching appointment

years in

at

872 awoke within him unknown reserves of energy and confidence. But his

experience did not suddenly

lift

him out

paralyzing self-doubt throughout his
funk, perhaps not a calling so

have a particular

talent

much

his crisis, for

life.

he would suffer from relapses of

Teaching represented James’s way out of his

as a respectable career for

which he happened

and also received just compensation. But finding

rewarding and lucrative vocation was not sufficient

7

many

on

to prevent those

to

a fairly

nagging specters,

See Simon, Genuine Reality and Allen, William James for detailed accounts of James’s
life and its relation to his thought.

private

See Cotkin, William James Public Philosopher and Myers, William James: His Life
,

and Thought.
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determinism and materialism, from haunting
him. James gravitated

to

psychology and

philosophy in particular because they helped
him challenge these paralyzing doctrines,

gave him the resolve
into a vigorous

to fight

back and find meaning

in life,

and ultimately turned him

9
and admirably
productive person.

But before he could become that man, James had

to

contend with determinism, a

doctrine which ‘professes that those parts of the
universe already laid

down

absolutely

appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The
future has no ambiguous
possibilities

hidden

eternity is impossible."

of

womb. ..Any

in its

other future complement than the one fixed from

Determinism comes

which was satisfactory

to

James. In

1

in

two forms, material and

869, he wrote his old friend

spiritual, neither

Tom Ward

in

despair over the bleakness of materialistic (or mechanistic) determinism.
If this vision

were

own
that

he observed,

true,

we

inhabit a universe of “instable molecules trembling in their

preappointed way.” “I feel,” he continued, “that

we

we

are Nature through and through,

are wholly conditioned, that not a wiggle of our will happens save as the result of

physical laws.

1

While

Hegelian universe,
Spiritual

this vision

which our

in

was hardly

lives

uplifting, neither

was

a Calvinist or

were preordained by an all-powerful Absolute.

determinism provided no comfort for James.

Beauty and hideousness, love and

cruelty, life

and death keep house

together in indissoluble partnership; and there gradually steals over us,
instead of the old warm notion of a man-loving Deity, that of an awful

power

9

that neither hates nor loves, but rolls all things together

Writings 1878-1899 569-70.
,

10

James

to

Tom

Ward, Letters of William James, 152-153, quoted

James, Public Philosopher, 54.
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in Cotkin,

William

2

meaninglessly to a common doom. This
nightmare view of life... 11

Whatever

its

is

an uncanny, a sinister a

form, determinism suggested a chillingly
amoral universe, for

powerless to control his

own

destiny, subject to the caprice

man was

of matter or god, each equally

insensitive to his plight and the evils he
endured.

The problem
metaphysical

of evil

crisis in

was

a particular sticking point for James. In
the throes of his

February of 1870, James wrote

in his diary:

Can one with

full knowledge and sincerity ever bring
one’s self so to
sympathize with the total process of the universe as heartily
to assent to
the evil that seems inherent in its details?... though
evil slay me, she can’t
subdue me, or make me worship her. The brute force is all at her

command,

but the final protest of

existence gives

me

still

my soul

as she squeezes

a certain sense of superiority.

James could not passively accept the existence of evil
fathom a benevolent and loving god

humankind

if

who would

he had the power and knowledge

me out

of

12

in the universe.

abide the

many

to prevent

them.

Nor could he

evils that befell

God

as traditionally

understood, both omniscient and omnipotent, could only include evil in his plan of the

universe if he were profoundly indifferent to our pain and suffering. 13

philosophers

— including James’s eventual colleague and

—posited

Royce

11

1

~

a higher truth that mattered far

rival at

Many

absolutist

Harvard, Josiah

more than our temporal experience and

Writings 1878-1899, 487.

James, from his diaries, quoted

in

Moore, William James 21.
,

13

James's unwillingness to accept such a god is reminiscent of the character of Ivan in
The Brothers Karamazov by Dostoevsky. Ivan refuses to love and worship a god that
created a world in which innocent children are tortured to death. This god may indeed
exist, but on principle Ivan rejects him and his promise of eternal harmony and salvation.
As Ivan sees it, a future perfect harmony cannot vindicate the tears and suffering of even
one child, and if given an invitation to partake in this harmony, Ivan would “most
respectfully return

Him

the ticket.”
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made known

that, it

to us, could explain

how

evil

into

fit

God’s scheme. But the only

explanation open to them, according to James,
was an unsatisfying form of subjectivism

which the preordained untolding of the universe

in

is

understood as “a contrivance for

deepening the theoretic consciousness of what
goodness and
are.

Not the doing
14

them.”

mere

James thought

It

transforms

exhibition.”

its

many

good or of evil

is

what natures cares

15
It

trials

for,

but the knowing of

this explanation trivialized earthly
experience

Such an unconscionable philosophy “wrenches

theater.

wrote.

either of

evil in their intrinsic natures

life

from a

and miseries,

is

my personal

tragic reality into an insincere

has the audacity to suggest that the world
not real

,

when

it

is

we

and reduced

it

instincts,”

to

he

melodramatic

experience day to day, with

the only reality

we

can be sure

of.

[Wjhile Professors Royce and Bradley and a whole host of guileless
thoroughfed thinkers are unveiling Reality and the Absolute and
explaining away evil and pain, this is the condition of the only beings

known

to us anywhere in the universe with a developed consciousness
of
what the universe is. What these people experience is Reality. It gives us
an absolute phase of the universe. It is the personal experience of those

best qualified in our circle of knowledge to have experience, to

what

come

is.

to,

are dealing in shades, while those

it,

the world

dealt; our job here

quietly but to fight

it

on

we

experienced, with

earth,

Ibid.,

16

all its evil

live

and

feel

and pain, was the

however brief our time might

with every ounce of energy

Writings 1878-1899, 581.
15

who

16

truth.

As James saw
were

us

what does thinking about the experience of these persons
compared to directly and personally feeling it as they feel it?

The philosophers

know

tell

Now

590.

Writings 1902-1910 499.
,
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we

be,

could muster.

was not

to

reality

we

acquiesce

The problem, however, was

that a deterministic universe did
not

the free will to engage in this fight.
Passive acceptance

found

this

world view profoundly pessimistic because

endow men with

seemed our only

it

at

once reduced

man

ineffectual spectator, eliminated the possibility
of hope or redemption, and
irrelevant.

them or
will],

As mere

spectators,

to ameliorate the

who

men do

problems and

say that individual

men

is

evils they face.

man

can find no hope

inevitability

in the

we

observe

may

better

[free

this creative capacity,

be.

moral judgment, no matter how repugnant and hideous the

As he saw

it,

we

cannot pass judgment on anyone and hold

that

have chosen

to act differently.

make an ounce of difference

Though

even a determinist universe should awaken our moral
evil,

James simply could not

reconcile determinism with ethics. For determinism meant that

human

effort

does not

in the future.

While determinism made James increasingly despondent
difficulties grappling with materialism.

18

Some of James’s

as a

young man, he

537.

See Cotkin, William James, Public Philosopher.
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also

contemporaries, including

the English philosopher Herbert Spencer, claimed that materialism can

18

who deny

day and must resign himself to the

sympathies and deepen our knowledge of good and

Ibid.,

ethics

are so small an expression, diminish man.

for his behavior if he could not

Royceans would suggest

17

made

of what the future holds. Perhaps most disturbingly, a universe devoid
of

him accountable

had

an

originate nothing, but merely transmit to the
future the

dawning of a

free will requires us to reserve

behavior

“Determinists,

of this creative principle/’ 17 Without

less admirable, stripped

to

not have the capacity to reshape the world
around

whole push of the past cosmos of which they

He

James

option.

still

inspire

one

to

appreciate, even worship, the sublime
and

wondrous creations of nature. The

fact that

they originate from blind physical forces
and not a grand designer makes no
difference.

they said, for nature remains just as fascinating
and refined. But James understood
intuitively that a universe

structure.

As

composed

solely of matter had no intrinsic

a seasoned philosopher

succinctly what

was

the moral order

is eternal,

at

many

meaning or moral

years later, James would articulate quite

stake in this debate: “Materialism

means simply

the denial that

and the cutting off of ultimate hopes; spiritualism
means the

affirmation of an eternal moral order and the letting
loose of hope... spiritualistic faith in
all its

forms deals with a world of promise, while materialism's
sun

disappointment.”

of the

1

''

In a

sets in a sea

number of publications James found occasion

of

to offer a “picture

of the universe" 2 " by quoting Arthur James Balfour, an English

last state

philosopher and politician

who would become Prime

of Belief { 1895), an introduction

to the study

Minister in 1902. His Foundations

of theology, pulled no punches

in its

portrayal of the materialist abyss.

The energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be
dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race
which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the
and

The uneasy consciousness which in
obscure comer has for a brief space broke the contented silence of the
universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. ‘Imperishable
pit,

all

his thoughts will perish.

this

monuments' and ‘immortal

deeds,' death

itself,

death, will be as if they had not been seen.

Nor

and love stronger than
will anything that

is,

be

worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of
man have striven through countless ages to effect. 21
better or

IV

20

9

|

Writings 1902-1910, 533-34.

Ibid, 531.

Balfour, Foundations of Belief James cites this passage

many

times, including in his

essay “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results” and in Pragmatism. See
Writings 1878-1899, 1086 and Writings 1902-1910 531-32.
,
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For James, Balfour captured what
is

but an accidental interruption, a

cold and indifferent universe.

triumphs and ideals, the

unremembered,
meaning,

is

It

nihilism

this

many

momentary

When
evils

we endured and
Evoking

image proved intolerable

when he devoted

flicker

is

felt it

men who had

and God and

that

James was drawn

critics

of James have accused him of flirting with

would enable men

James scholar George Cotkin argues

of depression and

to lives

of this class of thinkers.

trouble

at the

making

same time remain

to

their

way

in

debility,

“

in either

that the

God

doubt and ennui.

Certainly identifying with

out of this philosophical thicket,

to restore their faith in free

accord with science.

It

was

for this reason

both intellectual and emotional. Whereas Peirce saw the pragmatist method as an

Unbeknownst

to the

its

psychological roots.

young and angst-ridden James,

his first experience with the

pragmatist method occurred in 1870 after he read the second volume of Charles

“

i

or

pragmatism, which he saw as a method of finding satisfactory

outgrowth of logic, James tapped into

22

our

a universe devoid of morality and

was incumbent upon him and any philosopher

will

truths,

all

for James.

in life.

them

to reach the hearts

those thoughtful

James

an otherwise

age to reconcile their empirical impulses with their need for
something

free will confined

James wanted

in

man

inflicted, will disappear

philosopher “was convinced that the failure of individuals to believe

own

implies that

extinguished,

his career to constructing a philosophy that

more meaningful and permanent

their

It

of consciousness

the last light of humanity

as if we never were.

exceedingly ironic that

in a scientific

so unsettling about materialism.

is

•

Cotkin, William James, Public Philosopher 79.
,
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Renouvier's Essais de critique generate.

determined universe,

to

embrace

it

He argued

while

that

would be absurd given

its

we may

implications.

rational choice is to believe in our free will
and act accordingly.

know

for “[cjertainty is not

and cannot be absolute.

action of human beings. ..Properly speaking, there

who

are certain.''-

is

no

The only

Of course, we

for sure that our belief is true, according
to Renouvier, but

from our doubt,

indeed inhabit a

we

should not despair

is.. .a

It

can never

condition and an

certainty; there are only people

1

Renouvier’s defense of free will was a revelation

to

James,

who

overnight became a believer in free will even though there
was no definitive proof of its
existence.

I

On

April 30, 1870, he wrote in his diary:

finished the

first

part of Renouvier’s 2

his definition of free will

when

rate

far

will

My first

illusion.

Going

I

assume
act

Essays and see no reason

why

the sustaining of a thought because I choose to

might have other thoughts

I

At any

nd

—need be
—

for the present

of free will

shall

be

the definition of an illusion.

—

until next year

that

to believe in free will.

beyond "next year,” James would sustain

it

is

no

24

his belief in free will for a lifetime.

This affirmation helped James ascend from the depths of his depression and, though he

would

suffer

of an idea

from melancholy and doubt on and off throughout his

that

would serve

as both a personal coping

method. James learned from
for

which there

experience that

mechanism and

we have

planted the seeds

a philosophical

every right to embrace beliefs

are no definitive proofs, so long as they are reasonable, given what

know, and more

satisfactory to us than the alternatives.

he would draw for the

23

this

life,

rest

of his

It

was an object lesson on which

life.

Renouvier, quoted in Menand, The Metaphysical Club 219.
,

Perry, Thought

and Character of William James 323.
,
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we do

Over twenty-five years

after

belief in free will as he did in his

James experienced

870 diary

1

entry.

his revelation,

he

still

Echoes of it can be heard

justified the

in his

discussion of free will in The Principles
of Psychology (1890).

meanwhile, the

If,

will

be undetermined,

it would seem only fitting
that
indetermination should be voluntarily chosen from
amongst other possible beliefs. Freedom’s first deed
should be to affirm
itself.
ought never to hope for any other method of getting
at the truth

the belief in

its

We

it

indeterminism be a

Doubt of this

fact.

probably be open

to us to the

free-will can ever

do will be

particular truth will therefore

end of time, and the utmost

to

show

that a believer in

that the deterministic

arguments are

not coercive.'

In the

“Dilemma of Determinism,” an

(1895), he reiterated this sentiment

we

are free, ought in

all

article

published in his book The Will to Believe

when he maintained

inward propriety

to

be

that

to affirm that

“our

we

first act

are free.”

of freedom,
26

if

James was

well aware of the empincist dictate that a rigorous thinker should
never accept a belief

based on insufficient evidence.
called

it

“sinful.”

A

contemporary of his, William Kingdon Clifford, even

But James argued

that

when

faced with a “living option”

— an

inescapable choice between two or more beliefs which intellect alone cannot resolve

have the
reality,

right to accept the

we

all

most

satisfying one as true without sufficient evidence. 27 In

make assumptions and

accept beliefs for which

we have

not received

conclusive evidence. The empiricist, for example, assumes there are truths and

which we can discover by
His

25

26

27

life's

work

rests

—we

realities

testing hypotheses with data collected from our experience.

on an unprovable belief in the existence of objective

reality.

Principles of Psychology, 2:573-74.

Writings 1878-1899, 566-67.

James makes

Believe” in

argument time and again, but see especially the essay “The Will
Writings 1878-1899, 457-79.
this

90

to

You believe in objective evidence, and
we are certain: we know, and we know

I

do.

that

Of some things we feel
we do know. There is

that

something that gives a click inside of us, a bell
that strikes twelve when
the hands of our mental clock have swept
the dial and meet over the
meridian hour. The greatest empiricists among
us are only empiricists on
reflection: when left to their instincts, they
dogmatize like infallible
popes.

As James saw
that

we

it,

we

all

exist

on ‘“dogmatic' ground,” embracing those belief
systems

find intuitively appealing and vital to our

as the believer in free will or

way of life. The

The

intellectually honest thing to

and come clean about those unsubstantiated beliefs

James, tor

was

it

moments

in

much

God, believes certain foundational ideas which can be

neither proven nor disproven.

at certain pivotal

scientist, just as

our

lives.

The

do

is to

—our dogmas—

free will

dogma was

to

admit as

which we

much
all

cling

especially important for

functioned as the basis of his philosophical system and a world view
that

satisfying

on

a personal level.

It

was

a platform

from which everything else would

spring.

James found
possibilities

free will a liberating belief,

and unseen vistas

that

Free will implies that the universe

opening the universe

remained forever closed
is

in a deterministic universe.

subject to novelty and spontaneous change, that

can expect the unexpected, including valiant efforts on our part

problems and

evils

we

to infinite

face in this world.

It

means

to ameliorate the

that life is a “real fight, in

we

many

which

something

is

theatricals

from which one

distinction

between pessimists and optimists, the former believing the world’s salvation

28

Ibid.,

466.

Ibid.,

502.

29

eternally gained for the universe

may withdraw

by success,” not
29

at will.”

91

In

a

“game of private

Pragmatism James made the
,

is

impossible and the

This

may be

believing

latter

surprising to those

it

is

inevitable,

who assume

that

and finds neither one

when James’s

whose

universe

means

a

story

if salvation awaits us, the

arise.

The only

It

treats

it

as a possibility...”

31

salvation, far

a melioristic universe, in

more comforting than

all

the

amount

and disjointed

parts,

with

many

was

a

to

meliorism led inexorably

a universe with

we went

make our mark. James understood

to the

was

many uncertainties

Darwinian universe with no Author or

the actors wrote the stories willy-nilly as

outcome but determined

that the universe

unpredictable, even thrilling, stories that bear no

particular relation to each other. His

we

meant

role in

the parts interconnected and unified.

Embracing chance and spontaneity, James envisioned

30

we make, on

that the

which humanity can play an active

the alternatives. This

not a block, a pristine geometric shape with

Designer;

left,

bring to the cause.

James found
its

alternative

Meliorism means

world’s salvation ultimately depends on us, on the free
choices

we

same old questions

the doctrine of meliorism, which “treats salvation
as neither

inevitable nor impossible.

of grit

sunny valley

foretold from the beginning of time.
Optimism, like pessimism,

is

about the existence of evil and the dignity of man
is

to the

either option represented a closed
system, a “block

pre-determined world, and even

according to James,

30

belief in free will

unshackled him from the dark dungeon of
pessimism, he ran straight

of optimism. But, for James,

satisfactory.

along, never sure of the

that faith in free will

conclusion that the universe was pluralistic.

Writings 1902-1910, 612.

31

Ibid.

92

and

Indeterminism thus denies the world to be
one unbending unit of fact.
says there

is

a certain ultimate pluralism in

it;

and, so saying,

It

it

corroborates our ordinary unsophisticated
view of things. To that view,
actualities seem to float in a wider sea
of possibilities from out of which
t
ey are chosen; and, somewhere, indeterminism
says,
exist,

A

pluralistic universe

does not accept the possibility of absolute

be true in one part of the universe

many

such possibilities

and form a part of truth. 32

may be

contends for," James wrote in a

purpose."

33

pluriverse

In

keeping with

segments of the universe, and

and universal way. “All

in a neat

letter to a friend, “is that there is

complete gathering up of the universe

in

this spirit

,

because what

may

decidedly false in another. Instead, there are

truths being created independently in various

have no way of reconciling them

truth,

that

my

we

pluralism

nowhere extant

a

one focus, either of knowledge, power or

James often

said that the terms “multiverse” or

were more precise reflections of the diverse and complex world

in

which we

lived.

Unfortunately, solving the

dilemma of determinism

door to his fear of nihilism and godlessness.
world. But James found a
to believe in god, but a

pluralism cannot

way

god

out of this

—

it

seemed

As he saw

his right

accommodate. Although

traditionally understood

34

the

view of the

conundrum by once again exercising

god

can certainly make room for a god

dark and inscrutable limitations.”

manner opened

to invite a Balfourian

his pluralistic universe could

make sense of a

powerful, and -loving

It

in this

—

at

that

once all-knowing,

-

“works under some

it.

Writings 1878-1899, 570.
33

34

James

to

Maxwell Savage, quoted

James

to

Mrs. Glendower Evans, quoted

in

Cotkin, William James, Public Philosopher, 123.

in

93

Moore, William James, 21.

way to escape from the paradoxes and perplexities
that a
consistently thought-out monistic universe
suffers from as from a species
of auto-intoxication the mystery of the
‘fall’ namely, of reality lapsing
into appearance, truth into error,
perfection into imperfection; of evil, in
short, the mystery ot universal
determinism, of the block-universe eternal
and without a history, etc.;—the only way
of escape, I say, from all this is
to be frankly pluralistic and assume
that the superhuman consciousness,
however vast it may be, has itself an external environment
and
the only

consequently

power

in

is finite... that

knowledge, or

As mentioned

earlier,

human misery

if

in

there

both

James believed

is

at

a

God, but

once.

that

he

is finite,

either in

35

that an all-powerful

God

could only abide evil and

he were amoral, completely unmoved by our experiences.
This god

does not deserve our reverence.
tolerant of evil or

its

A

“finite

creator; in fact,

successfully, to defeat

it.

“If there

we

God,” on the other hand, does not have

can imagine him working

tirelessly, if not

be a God," remarked James, “he

is

no absolute

36
experiencer, but simply the experiencer of the widest conscious
span.”
This

undoubtedly a wise and just god

some unknown

But, for

whom we must

hands"

in the battle against evil.

17

human

James described our

god quite succinctly: “He helps us and we can help him.” 38

This

is

the only

Writings 1 902-1 910, 771-72.

37

38

39

891-92.

James

to

Mrs. Glendower Evans, quoted

James, quoted

in Perry,

in

Moore, William James 21.

Thought and Character of William James

Writings 1902-1910 687.
,

94

all-

is

kind of “God worthy of the name.” 39

Ibid.,

always

exercise of

higher being, whose finitude makes our role in the universe far more crucial,

36

be

often turn for strength and guidance.

reason, he also requires our assistance, the

free will to “strengthen his

relationship with

to

to

,

,

vol. 2, 443.

Of
there

is

a

course,

god

James could never demonstrate

in the first place.

He was once

that

god has limited powers, or

again faced with a “living option,”
this time

a choice between three reasonable but
unprovable beliefs—that there
is

an all-powerful god, and that there

is

a finite

God-and,

in

this

way, he knew

is

no god,

that there

accordance with what he

considered to be his right, he embraced the most
satisfying belief as

could quite comfortably justify his faith in

that

true.

While James

that persuading a larger

audience would require him to develop his idea farther
and engage in a systematic study
of the nature of truth.

religion,

Hoping

James devoted the

of truth. He asserted

to reconcile the age-old tension

last

decade of his

that ideas or beliefs are

life to

between science and

developing his pragmatic conception

only true insofar as they work for us in our

concrete experience. Even our unsubstantiated beliefs, including
faith in
will, are true

if

they work for us,

if

they prove

somehow

God and

free

beneficial in our day-to-day

life.

After the release of his book Pragmatism in 1907, James would have
to endure an endless

onslaught of criticism from a wide range of philosophers and intellectuals—
including

even the friend from

whom

he borrowed most heavily, Charles Peirce— and would spend

the rest of his life defending this rather curious understanding of truth.

II.

In 1898,

James introduced pragmatism

to the

world

in a

paper entitled

“Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” in which he credited Peirce for

making
saw

a simple but profound formulation: ideas are really just rules for action.

in the last chapter, Peirce

was especially

an object. Our concept of an object

is

interested in

how we

nothing more than the

95

total

As we

derive the meaning of

sum of the

practical

consequences of our experiences with
example.

Our preliminary

it.

Some of these

actions produce.

in

our mouths that

we

we

sensory experiences, especially the more
satisfying ones,

are inclined to taste

it

may produce

we

associate with

it

Our

If we believe that a pear is

habits and act accordingly.

in its existence, will

James

In other words, the idea

evoke certain

final idea

we

will eat

it

are

it

hungry

we

will

sitting before us,

manner
obey those
our belief

rules for action.

called this the “the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism.'’
In his

paper from 1898, he wrote:
Beliefs, in short are really rules for action; and the

whole function of
but one step in the production of habits of action. If there were
any part ot a thought that made no difference in the thought’s practical

thinking

is

consequences, then that part would be no proper element of the thought’s
significance... Thus to develop a thought’s meaning we need only
determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its
sole significance... To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object,
then, we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind

the object

may

—what

involve

sensations

we

are to expect

from

it,

and

what reactions we must prepare. 40
Ideas or beliefs are only significant insofar as they have concrete and perceptible

consequences. This

Writings

to

induces in us.

in a certain

indeed before us,

of a pear

we

of a pear, then, points

and the habitual actions

pear will have a particular feel and appearance, and

and on certain occasions.

such a pleasurable experience

again. Eventually, every time

will automatically take a bite.

both the sensory experiences

quantity of sensory

idea of it will be tantamount to the
percepts our

inspire habitual action. Tasting the pear

and see a pear,

A

both real and imagined. Take a pear,
for

We act on the pear in a variety of ways, gaining a large

information about

may

it,

is

1 878-1 899,

why James

maintained that “there can be no difference which

1079-80.

96

doesn't

make

a difference-no difference in the
abstract which does not express itself
in a

difference of concrete fact, and of conduct
consequent upon the fact, imposed on

somebody, somehow, somewhere, and somewhen.” 41
a

wrench while

in precisely the

my less verbal
same way,

friend calls

it

may

I

a thingamajig, but if we both use the
object

to tighten loose bolts

and assemble bicycles and futon frames,

our ideas of the object are identical. The abstract
distinction
bearing on

To

how we

relate to the object,

this point,

refer to a particular object as

on what

it

really

is

means

nominal and has no
to us in practical terms.

James and Peirce shared similar ground, but James began

to diverge

from his friend when he derived meaning not only from our
percepts and actions but also
from our subjective feelings and emotional responses. James
found
justifiable,

his

arguing

in his

1884 essay “What

Is

this perfectly

an Emotion?” and developing further

two-volume opus, The Principles of Psychology

( 1

890), that our emotions consist of

nothing more than the physical changes or responses a particular stimulus

Often called the James-Lange Theory of Emotion

—named

after

to accept.

response.

sad;

we

we

It

stated that

Take

idea

was

this

startlingly simple yet difficult

we

cry.

We cry and feel

We do not cry because we are

a constriction in our throats not because

are in a state of sadness beforehand but rather because, for

some unknown

have developed the habit of producing these physiological responses

41

Ibid.,

theory around the

emotions do not trigger a physical response; they are the physical

the emotion of sadness as an example.

are sad because

may induce.

William James himself

and another psychologist, Carl G. Lange, both of whom formulated

same time and independently of each other—the

in

1081.
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reason,

in certain

we

-

mstances.

when we

All this .mplies that emottons and
feelings are merely percepts,
awakened

A tulip may evoke joy in the same way that

confront certain objects.

the color red; the

full

meaning of a

tulip has to include

Once he equated emotional experiences with
of pragmatism down a more subjective path,
individual.

But James believed

for

evokes

both these sensory experiences.

percepts,

James

steered his version

emotions are variable, unique

that introducing this

it

element of subjectivism

to

each

to the

pragmatic method sometimes helps us understand what
an object really means to

us.

Consider the idea ot God. The difference between
materialism and theism, according
James,

is

the former denies the existence of an eternal moral
order and

practical:

us feel depressed or anxious, while the latter gives us
hope and gives us joy. For
us, the idea

of God becomes

tied

many people have embraced

it

up with the emotional feeling of joy, which

for millennia.

Indeed,

its

it

is in fact

true

43

The

4

“

much

many of

why

come

subjective element in James’s pragmatism led

this next step, too, eventually declaring,

makes

so

meaning has generated such

wellspring of good feeling that people have naturally taken the next step
and
believe

is

to

him

a

to

to take

to his friend Peirce s chagrin, that ideas or

352. James says here (in Psychology: Briefer Course ): “Our natural way of
thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites
Ibid.,

the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the
bodily expression.
theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly

My

the perception

of the exciting fact,

IS the emotion.

Common-sense

bear, are frightened

and run;

we

and

says,

that our feeling

we

of the same changes as they occur
we meet a

lose our fortune, are sorry and weep;

are insulted

by

a rival, are angry and strike.

The

hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one
mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must
first

be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry
we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we

because

strike, or

43

Ibid.,

tremble because

we

are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case

1087-91.

98

may be.”

cry,

beliefs are true insofar as they prove
satisfactory-er, as

idea

determined by

is

satisfactoriness

us emotionally. 45

satisfies

critics

its

It

” 44

come

should

it

as

no

then, can be true if

this criticism betrays a superficial

conception of truth. James never said that

James subscribed

new

belief in

truths

God

is

in part to

surprise, then, that James’s harshest

that truth is

whatever

as

true not just because

the other

we

can assert any truth that

truths” to

call a

many old

it

is

suits

our fancy.

coherence theory of truth, the notion

truths as possible. This

means

that

our

satisfactory emotionally but also in every other

The “hypothesis of God"

working

understanding of James's pragmatic

what philosophers

must accommodate

aspect of our lives.

all

it

to be.

But

with

Our belief in God,

-the truth of an

it,

accused him of radical relativism or subjectivism,
suggesting

we want

that

James put

is

only true

if

it

which we adhere. 46 This

can “combine satisfactorily
is

why James

maintained

that

the greatest

enemy of any one of our

Truths have once tor

all this

truths may be the rest of our truths.
desperate instinct of self-preservation and of

desire to extinguish whatever contradicts them.

based on the good
beliefs.

The

belief in

because

it

it

My belief in the Absolute,

does me, must run the gauntlet of all

47

God may do me good

fails to

emotionally but

may prove

my other

unsatisfactory as a

whole

appeal on an intellectual level. James could never accept the

Writings 1902-1910 905.
,

45

Ibid.,

true,
46

47

518. “If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete

for pragmatism,

in the

sense of being good for so much

Ibid, 618.

Ibid, 521.

99

.”

life,

they will be

conventional understanding of God, either
emotionally or intellectually, but he
eventually

amved
all

truth— the existence of a

at a theistic

his other beliefs

adopting

new

and values.

We are all “extreme conservatives” at heart, only

truths that preserve “the older stock

modification."

4

*

God— that could "run the gauntlet” of

finite

of truths with

a

minimum of

Failure to understand this, said James,
accounted for a large portion of

the criticism leveled against pragmatism. 49

It

important to note that James combined his
coherence theory with a

is

correspondence theory of truth. His correspondence
theory did not suggest, as some
philosophers do, that truth
that

it

is

is

a

mere copy of the object under consideration, but

an ongoing verification process to

test

rather

whether our idea agrees with both our

sensory and intellectual experiences. James liked to
describe pragmatic truth in
metaphorical terms, sometimes calling
times an idea that has

profitability

sometimes vague and open

an idea that “works” or proves “useful,” other

it

or

cash-value.

to misinterpretation,

Though

his

metaphors were

James was actually expressing

a fairly

simple concept. All truths have specific consequences that can be verified
experientially.
In

Pragmatism he wrote:
,

The

great assumption of the intellectualists

essentially an inert static relation.

is that truth

means

When

you’ve got your true idea of
anything, there's an end of the matter. You’re in possession, you know;
you have fulfilled your thinking destiny. ..and nothing more need follow
on that climax of your rational destiny. Epistemologically you are in stable
equilibrium.

Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks
idea or belief to be true,”
true

48

49

make

in

it

says,

any one’s actual

its

usual question. “Grant an

“what concrete difference

life;

how

Ibid, 512.

Ibid, 513.

100

will

its

will the truth be realized?

being

What

experiences will be different from those
which should obtain if the belief
false? What, in short, is the truth’s
cash-value in experiential
terms?”

were

The moment pragmatism

asks this question, it sees the answer:
True ideas are those that we can assimilate,
validate, corroborate and
verify. False ideas are those that we
can not. That
is

difference

it

of truth, for

makes
it

is all that

have true ideas; that, therefore,
50
truth is known-as.

James’s pragmatism drew heavily on science and
the

sounds a

lot like

positivism, as indeed

perspective, the virtue of pragmatism
truths

only

it

is that

verify factually.

is

the

meaninu

method and

scientific

at

times

does in the preceding passage. From a positivist
it

from dogmatic assertions or immutable

know what we can

the practical

to us to

resists excessive abstraction,

first

deducing

principles, and instead asserts that

we

Pragmatism has the additional virtue of not

standing for any particular results, for being “a method only.” 51
But unlike positivists,

James (and

his fellow pragmatists, Peirce and

Dewey) believed

that truth acquisition

involves projecting observations of past experiences into the future
and making
predictions based on that information. In other words, truth

is

prospective rather than

retrospective.

For James, a true idea was simply a successful prediction, a belief that turns out

be right some time

in the future.

It

escorts us directly to those sense experiences

to

we

believed our actions would produce. This means that

we

world around us and absorb

actively test whether our predictions

Based on

are correct.

business,

50

51

I

its

many

truths;

we must

cannot passively observe the

my observations of how meter maids on

may have good

campus go about

reason to believe that unpermitted cars parked in the

Ibid, 573.

Ibid, 508-9.

101

their

lot

near

my building never receive tickets
demands

prediction,

in a

much more.

by

events.

Its

illustrates

verity

itself, its veri -fication."

my initial

make

is in fact

it.

of this hypothesis, of this

to park in the lot at 2:3

I

I

confirm

may begin

to

1

for several days

my hypothesis

park in the

hypothesis a true

what James meant when he

not a stagnant property inherent in
true

need

two of success,

or

literally

This example

I

leave the lot without a ticket,

I

month

After a

without thinking and
action.

my part.

action on

row, and each time

after 2:30, but the verification

idea— a

said,

Truth happens to an idea.

“The
It

that

lot after

2:30

rule for habitual

truth

becomes

of an idea
true, is

is

made

an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying

52

important to stress

It is

which

tells

future,

he accepts that his

that, for

the pragmatist, truth

is that

us something about what the future holds. Never entirely
certain about the
truths are fallible— always probabilistic affairs.

It is

always

possible, for example, that parking services will instruct meter
maids to alter their routes

so as to bring them to
status, they

my lot

later in the day.

must be constantly

verification process;

it

demands vigilance on our

truth

still

James blamed the
mistaken, view that truth

“truth

as the

verification,

If

I

part

and will quickly dissipate without

stop parking in the lot for a while,

I

will not

of our language for the conventional, and

a static entity preceding our experience.

noun form of the verb

and he compared

it

“verify,” as another

to other

rather than entities. “Truth for us

52

always have a provisional

holds.

peculiarities

is

truths

verified and re-verified. Truth cannot abide a hiatus in the

our active and persistent participation.

know whether my

Because

is

nouns ending

word

in “th”

He saw

the

word

for the process of

which describe processes

simply a collective name for verification processes,

Ibid, 574.

102

just as health, wealth, strength,
etc. are
life... Truth is

mu*, just

experience.” Although
abstract concept or an

names

for other processes connected
with

as health, wealth and strength are
made, in the course of

we sometimes make

a priori condition

intuitive sense that health is a process,
a

the mistake of thinking that health

that precedes life experience,

way of life which

an

is

we have an

requires eating right, taking

regular exercise, and getting an adequate
amount of sleep. 5 ' Quite similarly, Jamesian
truth is a

way of life,

actively nurture

a process that continues to

grow throughout our

lives, so

long as

we

it.

This notion ot truth as growing toward the future,
always becoming and never just
being,

is

what separates pragmatism from positivism and empiricism.

In 1875, long

before he fully developed his pragmatist philosophy,
James scratched out a note in which

he defined truth along these
destiny, that

lines:

“The

of a thing or idea

truth

which grows out of it. This would be

empiricists that the

meaning of an idea

is that

that the truth is not only prospective but also

is its

meaning, or

its

a doctrine reversing the opinion of the

which

it

has grown from.”

dynamic. This was

54

This implies

why James

believed that

truth-building sometimes requires leaps of faith, exercising our will to believe
in

unverified truths and acting on them.

most

crucial step in

our faith has
climber

34

Ibid.,

54

making

made them

who must

The very

that belief

come

act

true.

of believing could be the

Such

so,” wrote James, citing the

believe he can

make

beliefs “cannot

first

become

in Perry,

true

a dangerous leap to safety if he ever wants to

Thought and Character of William James

103

till

example of a trapped mountain

581-3.

James quoted

and

,

vol. 2, 450.

do

so successfully and avert his imminent
doom. This example illustrates perfectly
that
there are

‘

cases where faith creates

Crities of

made

its

own

verification ,”

James were especially troubled by the
dynamism of his

the familiar accusation that a changing
and

believe whatever

55

we

man-made

They

truth.

truth gives us license to

want. In addition, they detected a
Nietzschean moral relativism in

which truth-making becomes a bloodsport. Rather
than

a noble quest for something

higher and more permanent than ourselves,
James’s search for truth seems to devolve into
a violent struggle for power, the victor
rising

certainly did not help his case

when he

from the ashes

said that the pragmatist

and “turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards

Nor did he make

power.

as

things better

facts,

when he equated

James thought the charges leveled against him were

its final arbiter.

eschews

In a

James

“first principles”

towards action and towards

truth with expediency.

baseless.

He blamed

both misreading his work and conflating the concepts of truth
and

gave them the fodder for

56

reality,

58

But

his critics for

which

in turn

their accusations.

seemingly willful misrepresentation of his work,

James with nominalism, denying the existence of a

reality

critics

mistakenly charged

independent of human

experience. But he was most assuredly a realist and took pains to clarify his position
on

”

Writings 1878-1899 528-29.
,

56

See especially the chapters entitled “Pragmatism” and “William James’s Conception of
Truth” in Bertrand Russell’s Philosophical Essays.
57

Writings 1902-1910 509.
,

58

Ibid.,

583.
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countless occasions. 5

''

Like Peirce, James accepted fully
that the universe

of

is full

external realities, including objects
and relations between objects, that
exist whether or

not

human

beings

force themselves

come

in contact

with them.

All

concepts, not the reality underlying them.

does not change the

fact that

significant constraints

it

we

ever really

Still,

know

is

our percepts and

our inability to experience reality directly

exists independently of us and, as a result,
places

on the truths

we

can create.

point leads to the second mistake of which James
accused his

conflating the concepts ot reality and truth. In James's
view, reality
irrefutable tact,

something

that

something with which
can be true or

false.

Meaning of Truth, James made
true-,

window

a

and then our concepts bring us even closer.
Unfortunately, however,

we cannot know any reality directly.

last

confront these realities, they

upon us through our sensory experiences. Our
percepts open

to this brute reality,

This

When we do

we must

was simply an

contend whether or not

Only our ideas about

it

critics:

we

like

it,

are true or false. In

not

The

the distinction as simple as possible: “Realities are not

they are- and beliefs are true of them.'’ 60 The “useful” ideas

we have

about

reality,

those ideas that prove satisfactory in our experience, are our truths, and these,
of course,

evolve over time. But reality

itselt

remains what

it is,

no matter what we

may know

or

think about them.

All our truths are beliefs about ‘Reality'; and in any particular belief the
reality acts as something independent, as a thing found, not

manufactured... ‘Reality

59

For example, he says

in

carefully posited ‘reality’

'

is in

general what truths have

to take

account

of,

The Meaning of Truth, “This is why as a pragmatist I have so
ab initio and why, throughout my whole discussion, I remain

an epistemological realist.” Writings 1902-1910, 925.
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and the first part of reality from

this point

of view

is

sensations.

the flux of our

Sensations are forced upon us, coming
we
Over their nature, order and quantity we
have as good

know

not whence
no control. They
are neither time nor false; they
simply are. It is only what we say
about
them, only the names we give them, our
theones of their source and nature
and remote relations, that may be true
61
or not.

Arriving

we

take

at

it

useful or satisfactory truths

seriously.

We ignore

it

at

demands

our

that

“Woe

peril.

we
to

as

“take account of’ reality, that

him whose

beliefs play fast

and

loose with the order which realities follow
in his experience; they will lead
him nowhere
or else

make

false connexions.”

wish them away nor make them
reality, not to

62

We cannot

avoid the affects of reality;

With such

different.

mention those enforced by our old

impunity" when constructing our

beliefs.

63

constraints

truths,

“we can

we

imposed on us by
not be capricious with

Our hypotheses must pass through

checkpoints before they can ever reach the kingdom of
truth

in order.

All this goes to

Every

show

must accommodate both our

that

Jamesian truth

prior truths

fact.

reality,

Ibid.,

593.

Ibid.,

376.

Ibid.,

580.

is

not whatever

we want

is

both

man-made and dynamic,

This distinction can help us solve,

which we experience

it

and the oblique but unmistakable

any number of epistemological puzzles. Take,
given

if their

papers

truth requires the occasional reality check.

continually experience. Although truth

independent of us, a given

countless

— and even when they have

reached that glorious land, they always face the possibility
of deportation

do not remain

can neither

for

to be, for

realities

we

reality is

at least provisionally,

example, the problem of god. Our

indirectly through our sensory and conceptual

106

it

expenences, provides no definitive evidence
of god’s existence.

Some

people point

to

nature and see evidence of design,
while others see only blind chance.
But the
satisfaction

many

people get from believing in

him— after they have run the “god

hypothesis’ through the gauntlet of old
truths and reality as they
belief in god a legitimate truth. Obviously,
this does not

makes him pop
real,

into existence.

mean

know it— makes

that

Pragmatists acknowledge that god

our believing in god

may or may not be

but this unsettled issue should not prohibit
us from embracing a belief that

enrich our lives substantially and

who may some day

may

become

also

reveal himself to us.

To deny

the

god

the truth of god outright will only

universe halt-way. Truths will slowly unveil themselves
test their

may

step in reaching out to a

first

“block the road of inquiry.” As truth-makers, James
often

badger them, and continually

their

usefulness in our

said,

if

we

own

we must meet

the

seek them out, cajole and

lives.

Otherwise, they will

remain forever hidden.

Another way

to

look

at the distinction

between

James's stream of consciousness, a concept he

first

truth

and reality

devised in the

1

is

to consider

880s when he was

writing The Principles of Psychology. Although James admired the great
British
empiricists, including

human

consciousness. Both argued that

minds then

we

this thesis

linking function,

how

it

because

it

of the world appears continuous.

leaves unexplained

can unify a world

like their account

experience the world in fragments that our

link together so that our consciousness

James rejected

64

John Locke and David Hume, he did not much

how

our minds perform

initially sliced into little bits.

64

this

James’s

Rationalists usually claimed that our souls, or perhaps god or the absolute, assembled

our discrete experiences into a uninterrupted

train

107

of thought, but James was not

of

solution to the problem of consciousness

expenence consciousness not

in

was ingenious. He argued

fragments but

in a

we

that

confusing flux or

a

initially

rushing stream of

percepts. This initial (or pure) experience
resembles that “immediate flux of life"

only to "newborn babes, or

Now
from
this

the trick

this

was

men

in

to explain not

semi-coma from

how we

sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows.” 65

get from fragments to unity but

that

we select,

get

or focus our attention

on, those things in our experience that interest
us most. In so doing,

“buzzing confusion"
relations to

into a coherent

which we

turn that

world consisting of recognizable objects and

this

process to carving a block of marble into a statue.

represents this rush of pure experiences out of which

successive cuts until

The

we

attach names.

James enjoyed comparing

make

how we

confusing flux to a coherent continuity. James
maintained that making sense of

"blooming buzzing confusion” 66 only required

The block

known

we make

it

becomes something

we

sculptors proceed to

quite recognizable.

If my reader can succeed in
conceptual interpretation and lapse back into his
immediate sensible life at this very moment, he will find it to be what

cuts

abstracting from

someone has

are purely ideal.

all

blooming buzzing confusion... Out of this
muchness attention carves out objects, which
conception then names and identifies forever— in the sky ‘constellations,’
on the earth ‘beach,’ ‘sea,’ ‘cliff,’ ‘bushes,’ ‘grass.’ Out of time we cut
called a big

aboriginal sensible

’

days and nights,’ ‘summers and winters.'
sensible continuum

comfortable with

is,

and

all

this solution to the

We say what each part of the

these abstracted whats are concepts. 67

problem because

it

led to a

monism,

universe” to which he was so averse.
65

James quoted

in

Myers, William James: His Life and Thought 312.
,

66

Writings 1902-1910 1008.
,
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the “block

The world of pure experiences

stands before us, monolithic and
inscrutable, but

we

then

take our chisels and go to work,
carving out shapes that prove most
pleasing to us. Out of

we

these shapes

forge our conceptions and ideas, even
our truths. This block of marble

represents a given reality that will remain
forever enigmatic to us.

block, perhaps even touch and smell

our

first

brush with

But

reality.

more knowledge of reality, we
begin to realize that knowing
parts of our experience for

interesting sections.

must also

act

on

reality better.

the

it.

The

block—but

it

it,

and these

initial

We look upon this

sensory expenences constitute

has no intrinsic meaning for us. So that

cut into

it

and divide

it

into

this reality better requires

can acquire

manageable chunks. Soon we

making

choices, discarding those

which we have no use and focusing our

In order to get closer to reality,

we

we must

on the

attention

not only

let it act

on

us,

we

We create conceptions and truths so that we can understand this
truths are

always ours

—

indeed, they are the shapes

they always serve to increase our knowledge of a given

we

carve out of

reality, the

enigmatic block of marble.
In

our

own

James

lives,

s

view, to

know

reality ultimately

meant making

creative use of it for

standing in satisfactory and harmonious relation with

it.

He

wrote:

In our cognitive as well as in our active life

we are creative. We add both
of reality. The world stands really
touches at our hands. Like the
,

to the subject

and

to the predicate part

malleable, waiting to receive

kingdom of heaven,
68
truth upon it.
James found
truths that

Ibid.,

suffers

in

its final

human

violence willingly.

Man engenders

an exciting proposition, endowing people with the freedom to construct

would give them more

saw danger

68

this

it

useful

knowledge of reality. But

James's epistemology, wherein

truth

599.
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was

his critics

subject to the

still

only

whims of each

He may have

individual.

posited a given reality, but he
rejected the possibility of our

ever acquinng direct knowledge of
it.
Truth, for James, would always
be “a human

device and not a

literal transcript”

portraying truth as a mere

of reality. 69 His

“human device” turned

critics

believed that so crudely

reality into a plaything, a

must endure "human violence willingly,” no
matter the

cost. After all,

world that

pragmatism could

only offer a “method” for ascertaining truth
and, though results-onented, had no

way of

distinguishing good ends from bad. Deciding
on ends seemed to remain solely within the

purview of each individual. He alone
dutifully serve.

settled

independent reality

in

we

all

how

to

would then

truth could not provide a

must adhere. There may have been an

James's pluriverse, but there was no given

trom wrong, instructing us
all

his truths

Woefully subjective and instrumental, Jamesian

higher or independent standard to which

not deflect

on ends which

truth telling us right

behave toward our fellow man. James’s realism could

charges that his philosophy invited moral relativism and
radical

subjectivism.

But

to a large extent critics

have overstated James's emphasis on the subjective

choice of individuals in truth matters. Although

it

is

true that

James devoted much of his

philosophical energy to extolling the dignity of individuals, his epistemology

more Peircean
blame James

69

Ibid.,

—more democratic—than

for this misunderstanding.

it

may

An

appear

at first

glance.

is in fact

70

In part

we

can

enviably gifted writer, he cultivated an

860.

must acknowledge James Kloppenberg whose Uncertain Victory was particularly
insightful on the social aspect of James’s epistemology. I must credit him for opening
my eyes to this reading of James, with which became increasingly sympathetic as read
more and more of James’s work.
I

I
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I

access, ble style and illustrated his
ideas with powerfitl metaphors.

more enjoyable

reading,

it

sometimes compromised precision and

hand, had cnttcs given James's work
the close reading
the social aspect of his epistemology.

it

While

this

clarity.

On

made

for

the other

deserved, they might have seen

They would have found

that

James considered

truth-making a probabilistic, social, and moral
enterprise-a process that must draw on a
large

number of verification experiences

in the

community, involve ongoing discussion

and persuasion, and require an enlarged capacity
for tolerance, social inclusion, and

sympathy
In

for others.

Pragmatism James revealed
,

arguing that truth

is

as

much

in

an often overlooked caveat. After

an ongoing verification process, he wrote:

For the sake of simplicity have written as if the
verification might occur
of a single philosopher which is manifestly untrue,
I

—

in the life

since the
face each other, and the facts of the world give
countenance
to both. Rather should we expect, that, in a
question of this scope, the
experience of the entire human race must make the verification,
and that
all the evidence will not be fin’ till the
final integration of things, when the
last man has had his say and contributed his share
to the still unfinished x.
Then the proof will be complete ... 71
theories

still

James said quite
as

some of his

clearly here that the verification of a hypothesis

simplified examples

draw on the experience of the

may

entire

imply, for

human

race.

it

is

man

that

71

complex process which must

we must

has had his say and contributed his share to the

James did not pursue
truth-making

is

this

not a solitary activity,

Undoubtedly echoing Peirce

argued that verification must continue indefinitely, that
“the last

a

is

theme with the same amount depth

here, he

collect evidence until

still

unfinished

While

as Peirce, the implication

an inductive process, drawing on a number of particular concrete

Writings 1902-1910 536
,

.

Ill

is

expenences

to arrive at general

equally Peircean,

is that

and more abstract principles. The
other implication,

truth is probabilistic, a

should have some doubt until every
truth

may work

has contributed his expenences.

it

will

work

for

everyone— not,

expenence. Consider once again the parking

lot

my truth claim—that parking services does not ticket
2.30

only

if

draw on

I

when

the experiences of other people

the last man' has had his say,

population of illegal parkers, can

work

for

some people

will

and verification will reveal
a pennit for another

James
In reality,

A

particular

you and me, and perhaps hundreds of others,
but we cannot be

tor

completely certain that
their

man

working hypothesis about which we

I

compel
that

my truth

example.

I

everyone has shared

can be more certain of

in the lot near

who

my building

refine

after

park there without a pennit.

when my sample encompasses

be certain of my

me to

at least, until

truth.

my truth.

The

failure

And

the entire

of this truth

to

Perhaps further investigation

only works on certain days or

if

one already has

lot.

also suggested that truth acquisition involves social
interaction and trust.

we do

not have the time to personally verify every truth claim

we

put to use.

We often trade verifications with other people whose claims have proven useful to us in
the past.

We know intuitively that other people have verified this truth in a more

systematic way, so

James compared

we

accept

it

as long as

this to a “credit system.

it

works

for us in our lives.

In

Pragmatism,

’

"Indirect as well as direct verifications pass

muster," he wrote.

Truth

lives, in fact, for the

most

part

on a

credit system.

Our thoughts and

beliefs ‘pass,' so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass

nobody refuses them. But all
verifications somewhere, without which
so long as

the fabric of truth collapses like a
no cash-basis whatever. You accept my verification
yours of another. We trade on each other’s truth. But

financial system with

of one thing,

I

this points to direct face-to-face

112

beliefs verified concretely

by somebody

are the posts of the

whole

superstructure.

While

this “credit

system" does not completely resemble
a deliberative

community, which was the core of Peirce’s
epistemology,

it

scientific

does share some important

elements with one. Both Peirce and James
argued that our systems of truth rely on
accepting precedents established by the
verifications of others. The element
of trading
truths in James’s epistemology suggests
that truth acquisition involves

ongoing

discussion with others in our community, convincing
each other that our verifications
will

I

work

for

may have

them

as well.

A

self-proclaimed expert on the parking situation on
campus.

collected a sufficient

claim and share

it

with

amount of evidence

my colleagues.

In turn, they

to

be confident about

may

supply

my truth

me with much

needed

information about the placement of radar traps in our town.
The scientific community
operates in a similar way: confined to a narrowly specialized
area of expertise, each
scientist contributes

modestly

to a large

body of research

pioduct of proper verification procedures
Interestingly,

James maintained

contributions from every person in the

truth.

i.e.,

convinced

is

the scientific method.

that scientific

and ethical beliefs alike require

community before one can be

certain

of their

a great philosopher.

can only arrive

As

at ethical beliefs

if

channeling Peirce once again, James argued that

inductively and socially. In his essay “The Moral

Philosopher and the Moral Life,” he argued that

72

the

Utterly useless are those abstract ethical principles emanating from the scholarly

chambers ot

we

—

that they are

no such thing possible as an

there

is

up

advance.

in

We all

ethical

philosophy dogmatically made

help to determine the content of ethical philosophy

Ibid, 577.
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so far as

we contribute

to the race’s moral life. In
other words, there can
be no final truth in ethics any more
than in physics, until the last man
has
had his experience and said his say. 73

Like science or any other area of inquiry,
ethics must draw on the experience
of the entire

human

race before

our

expenences. After

life

for ethics.

Only

it

in a

can arrive

to

robust truths. Notions of good and
bad cannot precede

said James, a universe devoid

become

is

could satisfy

all

more

the

real feelings

difficult situation.

is

and

good, and anything he

by many people with competing demands
It

would be impossible

demands of every person;

satisfying

to devise a

some demands

certainly leave others unfulfilled. In the end, an ethical
system has to

trying to satisfy as

has no need

James, a universe with only one sentient being would
have the

bad. But a world inhabited

finds itself in a far

life

necessary.

beginnings of an ethical system: anything that person
wants

does not want

of sentient

world comprised of sentient beings, with

experiences, do ethics

According

all,

at

many demands

as possible.

will

system that

most

make do

with

James posed the question:

Since everything which is demanded is by that fact a good, must not the
guiding principle for ethical philosophy (since all demands conjointly

cannot be satisfied in

many demands

as

this

poor world) be simply

we can ? That

which makes for the best whole in
of dissatisfactions. In the casuistic
,

written highest
least possible

defeat there

which prevail

by whose

ideals are destroyed.

be, the victory to

—

scale, therefore, those ideals

at the least cost , or

number of other

must

to satisfy at all times as

must be the best act, accordingly,
the sense of awakening the least sum

act

must be

realization the

Since victory and

be philosophically prayed for

is that

more inclusive side of the side which even in the hour of triumph
will to some degree do justice to the ideals in which the vanquished
the

party’s interests lay.

74

Writings 1878-1899 595.
,

Ibid.,

610.
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of

This formulation

may sound

a lot like Bentham’s utilitarianism,
but James took pains to

differentiate his ethical system.

Bentham and

his followers equated the

pleasure and then claimed that the
most ethical system

good

for the greatest

ethical

number of people. James

the

rejected

that

which provides the

hedonism

He was

at

justice to the ideals in

The operating

some

in

that

can

any immediate

which might maximize

the great cost of a minority’s enslavement.
For James, ethics

involved a delicate balance, satisfying as

at

be pleasurable

also loath to reduce his ethics to a simple
formula

amount of good but

everyone

may not

greatest

as the basis for an

system and instead focused on satisfying
demands, a much broader tenn

include pleasure but also other ideals which
sense.

is

good with

many demands

which the vanquished party’s
principle here

basic level.

The

is

as possible while doing

“some

interests lay.”

inclusion, creating an ideal that appeals to

goal

is

not to maximize the amount of pleasure in

society but rather to give everyone an opportunity to have
their voice heard. Ethics

cannot be reduced to a mere calculation because

it

is

an ongoing process, a drama that

has unfolded throughout history and will continue to reveal

new

insights as

more people

contribute their perspectives. Said James:

The course of history

is nothing but the story of men’s struggles from
generation to generation to find the more and more inclusive order. Invent

some manner of realizing your own ideals which will also satisfy the alien
demands that and that only is the path of peace! Following this path,
society has shaken itself into one sort of relative equilibrium after another
by a series of social discoveries quite analogous to those of science.

Polyandry and polygamy and slavery, private warfare and liberty to kill,
judicial torture and arbitrary royal power have slowly succumbed to
actually aroused complaints; and though someone’s ideals are

unquestionably the worse off for each improvement, yet a vastly greater
total number of them find shelter in our civilized society than in the older

savage ways.

75

Ibid.,

75

610-11.
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As

the preceding passage suggests,

may

realize

others.

my

James envisioned the creation of a

particular ideals while

it

also strives to

accommodate

social order that

the

demands of

For this to happen, every person must
have the chance to challenge the ethical

hypotheses of others by sharing their experiences.

We must pay heed to every voice in

the social chorus and listen attentively
for the discordant sounds of
complaint. That our
civilization has

made any moral

progress

at all

has been due to our ability to remain

sympathetic to the voice of complaint— even when
reactionary forces sought to mute
them. Someday,

have reached

when

the voice of “the last

man”

is

finally heard, the social order will

that inclusive ideal.

What becomes

clear in James’s

work

is

that his ethics

were closely

tied to his

epistemology. In his view, learning the truth required
individuals to enlarge their
capacities tor

sympathy and

unlikely places.

He warned

to see the

world from varying perspectives, even

“On

his readers, in

that the inability to feel for the plight

of others,

through, accounts tor ethical shortcomings.

preoccupied with practical

affairs, that

a Certain Blindness in

to truly appreciate

He was

in the

Human

most

Beings,”

what they are going

quite aware that most people are

our manic lives do not afford us the time to ponder

deeply the experiences ot others and to derive any meaningful insights from these
Indeed, he conceded that only “your mystic, your dreamer, or your insolvent

reflections.

tramp or

loafer,

can afford so sympathetic an occupation.”

profound musings
success.”

76

James

may make someone
cited

A

lifetime dedicated to these

a “prophet” but certainly not a “worldly

Walt Whitman as one of those rare men whose heart

Ibid, 851.
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felt

with

acute sensitivity the joys and suffenngs
of his fellow men.
entire

day observing with indolent rapture the
mundane

neighbors.

What most would

The

great poet could spend an

activities

of his Brooklyn

consider time wasted was a sublime and
treasured

afternoon for Whitman. For the rest of us,
James claimed

we

could

all

do with

less

worldly success. Cultivating a poetic
consciousness, an ability to reflect with great

sympathy on the human condition and
abject,

paved the road
If

you say

at

once,

I

to truth.

to love

He was most

that this is absurd,

merely point out

to

and that

you

humanity

at its

likely thinking

we

most glorious and

its

most

of Whitman when he wrote:

cannot be in love with everyone
matter of fact, certain persons

that, as a

do

exist with an enormous capacity for friendship
and for taking delight in
other people s lives; and that such persons know
more of truth than if their
77
hearts were not so big.

People with bigger hearts

narrow

lives

know more of truth simply because

and tap into a larger

set

of experiences

to glean

they look beyond their

own

knowledge and

understanding. Selfish and uncaring people will only have knowledge
of their limited
experience. Thus, James admonished his readers “to tolerate, respect,
and indulge those

whom we
these

to

see harmlessly interested and

may be

to us.

Hands

happy

off: neither the

in their

whole

truth,

own ways, however

nor the whole of good,

any single observer... Even prisons and sick-rooms have

People

in

is

revealed

their special revelations.”

78

even the most dire or peculiar situations can provide invaluable insights from

which we can

Ibid.,

unintelligible

all

learn.

862.

Ibid., 860.
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III.

While James held

to a

democratic epistemology, arguing that

men

acquire

provisional truths best in a social context,
he also subscnbed to a democratic
psychology,

Like Peirce, he maintained that
clay, malleable

human

habit.

hardly a finished product but rather
a lump of

and moldable. Rather than human nature,

We all

it

is

more accurate

to

speak of

can be described as “bundles of habits,” 79
mere collections of

learned behaviors which

earlier,

man was

we can

execute without conscious thought.

our verified truths eventually translate into rules for
action;

continue to work for us,

we

will

perform them repeatedly

until

they

As was

discussed

if these actions

become

habits.

Habits, then, are time-tested truths, hardened rules for
action that have proven to

again and again. James maintained that
habit in our daily lives.

Our

it is

impossible to overstate the significance of

ability to function at a

cultivate habits, for those things

we do most

work

most basic

efficiently

level

demands

that

we

and competently are automatic.

Said James:

The

great thing, then, in

all education, is to make our nervous system our
of our enemy. It is to fund and capitalize our acquisitions, and
ease upon the interest of the fund. For this we must make

ally instead
live at

automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we
can, and guard against the growing into ways that are likely to be
disadvantageous to us, as

we

of the details of our daily life

should guard against the plague. The more
we can hand over to the effortless custody of

automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be
80
proper work.

set free for their

own

The implication here

is

that education is really just the process

repeating a practice over and over until

it

becomes second

/v

Ibid, 751.
80

Ibid, 146.
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of habit formation,

nature. That

which we do

with

difficulty the first time” will “with
sufficient practice”

mechanically, or with hardly any consciousness
us:

at all.”

81

be accomplished “semi-

These habits ultimately define

they manifest the ideas, or rules for
action, that help us cope with

life.

This process ot defining ourselves through
repetition applies to both good and
bad

Whether we

habits.

are taking

activities are typically fraught

smoker fumbles with the

up smoking or

with awkwardness and halting movement.
The novice

and coughs violently

lighter

unpracticed flosser will feel like he
frustrating.

flossing, our first forays into these

is all

thumbs and

between

his teeth

on a nightly

introduced to something

life,

find the

so far as

it

new

in

our

has definite form,

is

in lighting cigarettes

or in dexterously wedging the

Save for those occasions when

basis.

lives,

star,

while the

whole process exceedingly

But before long the novice achieves fluency, whether

and inhaling smoke with the grace of a 1950s movie
floss

after inhaling,

almost everything

but a mass of habits

—

we do

is

we

are

habitual. “All our

practical, emotional,

intellectual— systematically organized for our weal or woe...” 82 Even though

our habits are bad for
difficult

us,

we

still

become

attached to

them and

find

it

moment our habits

cease to work for us,

conscious that they contribute in some

into us after years

way

to

our “woe,”

we

750.

82

Ibid.
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acutely

immediately search for new

Though hard-wired

of repetition, our old habits always remain vulnerable

habits can be launched,” said James,

Ibid.,

increasingly

when we become

habits that will restore our ability to function in the world around us.

81

some of

over time to renounce them.

But the

“New

and

to erasure.

on condition of there being new stimuli
and excitements Now life
abounds in these, and sometimes they are
such critical and revolutionary
experiences that they change a man’s whole
scale of values and system of
i
eas. In such cases, the old order
of his habits will be ruptured- and if the
new motives are lasting, new habits will be
83
formed...

While James conceded

that habit often serves as a “conservative
84
agent,”
preventing us

from recklessly changing course when our
current behavior seems

to

work well enough,

he believed that the “plasticity' of our “nervous
system” allows human beings to change
their

modes of behavior
The

plasticity

in

accordance with the demands of experience. 85

of man notwithstanding, James also claimed

inherit certain instincts at birth.

man

Within every

undoubtedly influence his behavior, but he

is

that

human beings

dwell impulses or tendencies which

never a slave to them. Our learned

behavior can always work to counteract these impulses, either
inhibiting them completely
or, at the

with

very

least, restricting their

contrary impulses

’

— such

habits ultimately mediate.

habits will determine

I

range of influence. In most cases nature endows

—between which our

as friendliness and belligerence

may be

inclined to both friendliness and belligerence, but

which impulse emerges victorious

reflective creatures with the

power of memory and

we

first

757.

Ibid., 145.

Ibid.,

750.
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my

As

we remember the

time.

Depending on what we

cultivate habits that either inhibit or reinforce these

impulses. In other words, our habits can strengthen our

Ibid.,

in a given circumstance.

inference,

consequences of our having acted on our impulses the
thought of these consequences,

man

more laudable

instincts

and

weaken

the

transitory.

more shameful ones “ James

They may

slowly wane

in

also pointed out that

many

instincts are

figure prominently at an earlier stage
in a person’s life and then

potency over time-or the reverse. The
transitoriness of some

instincts

only adds to the variability of human nature. 87
But, according to James,

human

nature

are neither transitory nor easily contained.

on them, they prove alarmingly

No

recalcitrant.

is

not always so variable.

Some

matter what inhibitive habits

we

instincts

unleash

Especially troublesome to James was the

imperial impulse of man, the “bellicose constitution
of human nature” which makes

“people want war.” 88 In a

letter to a friend,

everywhere the same... at the
everything before them."*

9

least

He

James declared

temptation

all

that

“human

nature

is

the old military passions rise and

asserted in a letter to another friend that

essentially an adventurous and warlike animal.” 90 According
to James,

man

sweep

“is

human beings

inherited these warlike characteristics through the evolutionary
process. At one time in

man

s

evolutionary development, bloodlust was a necessary

man, however, has no use

Ibid.,

369-73.

Ibid.,

375-77.

87

James, quoted
89

James

survival. Civilized

for this ancient instinct; he has reached the point, both

technologically and socially, where

86

trait for

in Cotkin,

it

can only lead to his destruction.

William James, Public Philosopher, 147.

to Francois Pillon, Letters,

quoted in Cotkin, William James, Public

Philosopher, 135.
90

James quoted

in Perry,

Thought and Character of William James, 2:199.
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Fortunately, James
that the first step

was

to

be

saw

a

way

realistic.

out of this dangerous predicament
and suggested

We should acknowledge that the imperial impulse is

a deep-seated part of human nature,
an evolutionary characteristic that
has taken root in

the heart ot

man.

In a

number of talks, including

his

pacifists for

men

War,” James ridiculed
imperial impulses.

dreaming

all,

man and

James argued

find

ways

that

we

it

out of us.”

change and renounce

will

“Our ancestors have bred pugnacity

thousands of years of peace won't breed

and for

that

famous “The Moral Equivalent of

91

into our

their

bone and marrow, and

Dashing these naive hopes once

should embrace the bellicose and aggressive
nature of

channel this energy in socially constructive ways. The
problem

to

with the pacifists, according to James, was that they
refused to see any virtue in man’s
martial spirit.

the

same

They saw only death and

destruction, while

instinct that fostered heroic action

—

“intrepidity,

James understood

that this

contempt of softness,

surrender of private interest, obedience to command...” 92 Abolishing
the martial
it

were

would mean the elimination of these

at all possible,

humankind would never achieve anything noble or

was

heroic.

virtues without

The

spirit, if

which

pacifist's utopia

championed mediocrity.

To

the contrary,

James envisioned

reaffirmed as ‘absolute and permanent

a society in

human goods

which martial

virtues

were

but were expressed in something

other than a warlike form.

Patriotic pride

and ambition

specifications of a

form, but that

91

is

in their military

more general competitive

no reason for supposing them

Writings 1902-1910 1283.
,

92

form

Ibid, 1290.
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are, after all,

passion.
to

be

They

its last

are

only
its first

form.

Men

w

are proud of belonging to a
conquering nation, and without a murmur
they lay do wn their persons and their
wealth, if by so doing they may
fend
otf subjection. But who can be
sure that

other aspects of one s country
not with time and education and
suggestion enough, come to be
regarded with similarly effective feelings
of pride
’

may

should

men

not

some day

collectivity superior in

so

far;

feel that

any

it

is

ideal respect?... The war-function
has graspt us

but constructive interests

may some day seem no

and impose on the individual a hardly

now, men had committed the martial

Until

case forever. James suggested that

and shame? Why
worth a blood-tax to belong to a

men

lighter burden.

less imperative

93

virtues to war, but this did not

have

to

be the

can sublimate their warlike instincts and redirect

them toward more constructive ends. This process of
rechanneling our

martial spirit

involves the formation of new habits—requiring
“time and education and suggestion

enough ’—that would “inflame the

He

temper.

called for the creation of a

would promote the “manly
lor a

war “against Nature'

be the

first

young not

civic temper as past history has inflamed the
military

mandatory national service program, which

virtues” in the country’s youth but

rather than other

men. His hope was

to battlefields but to the sites

of working-class

December,

window-washing,

and tunnel-making,

to road-building

frames ol skyscrapers.

Having “done

warfare against nature," our young

93

Ibid.

Ibid.,

that this

1292.
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—our

program would

summoning our

“coal and iron mines,

to dish-washing, clothes-washing,

their

men would

toil

own

to foundries

part in the

and

and stoke-holes, and

immemorial human

return to society like the soldiers of yore,

proud and strong, but also “with healthier sympathies” for

94

enlist their energies

step in redefining the civic virtues that animate heroic action,

to freight trains, to fishing fleets in

to the

would

their fellow

men from

other

walks of life.

'

Through hard and painstaking labor our
young men would become

heroes and learn to appreciate the

many unsung

heroes already walking amongst

These experiences would be transformative,
toughening our young men

many

to face life’s

challenges with silent courage, instilling
in them a strong sense of moral and
civtc

responsibility at

which working

James

s

home, and providing them an invaluable education

class people struggle

on a daily

in the

hardships with

basis.

moral equivalent of war" resembles programs
organized by the federal

government many years

New

us.

after his death, including the Civilian

Conservation Corp of the

Deal and the Peace Corps and AmeriCorps of today.
Granted, none of these

programs has done much

to abate the lust for

war or

to

broaden our sense of civic

but James envisioned something far

more ambitious

in

scope and

the viability of his specific program

is

man

s

still

less important than the idea

virtue,

untried. Besides,

he sought

to express:

pugnacious instincts need not always manifest themselves so destructively.

can harness those energies and dedicate them

which strengthen human
contrary,

we

ties rather

to a

new

set

than tear them asunder. Despite

should never resign ourselves to the idea that

nature and, instead,

we

of civic and

man

is

He

patriotic principles

all

evidence to the

a slave to his wretched

should rejoice in his unlimited potential for transformation.

IV.

The

fact that

man

is

a

mutable mass of habits does not necessarily mean

has the free will to adopt those habits himself.

product of invisible forces, either material or

95

Ibid.,

It

is

always possible

spiritual, in a

1291.
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that

he

that his habits are the

preordained universe. But, as

we have

already seen, James supported
indeterminism and free will on faith
alone,

reveal, ng a robust democratic
theology.

He

exercised his nght to believe
in an idea that

provided more satisfaction and
relief than the detennin.st
alternative. The overriding

concern for James was ethical:

we

we

cannot hold people accountable
for wrongful action

think they had no control over
what they did, and

meaningless
actions.

if

we have no chance of altenng the

Positing a world

impact on future events,

full

made

life

becomes

course of events through our willful

life

worth living for James.
acts

It

vested in

result.

The only

He found

this quite

comfortably with, and even supported, his

accommodate
by a cosmic

Darwin

crisis.

s

fit

quite

faith in free will.

The Origin ofSpecies contributed

Depending on how one looked

either the doctrine

roll

trick, for

easy to do. His reading of Darwin and

study of human psychology and cognition
provided useful insights that

metaphysical

a creative

sure that he could firmly situate this
belief within the constellation of

other truths he held dear.

Initially,

man

of beneficence or the most dastardly

of deeds, the world becoming decidedly
better or worse as a

make

rather bleak and

of possibility, where individual
choices have a significant

power with which he could perform wonderful

James, was to

if

at

it,

a

to the

younger James’s

Darwinian universe could

of complete randomness, where events were determined

of the dice, or the doctrine of materialistic determinism, where
homo

sapiens represented just another species in the chain of life
which began eons ago in a

pond of primordial slime. While the former gave
denied

Darwin

>6

human

life

neither form nor meaning, the latter

beings freedom. But, eventually, James saw that he could appropriate

to support his faith in a finite

god and

free will.

See Cotkin, William James, Public Philosopher.
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6

What most

excited

James about

Darwinism was

that

it

welcomed indeterminism and novelty
and

notion that the universe

is

teemtng with

possibility.

lent

credence to the

Spencer and other detenninists

argued that human beings, great
and small, are the produet of
the, r environment and
biology, and thus are not free
to defy the inevitable

Darwinian

logic,

James believed

sweep of history. Drawing on

that the universe supplies
an array

of evidence to the

contrary. Constantly observing
physical events that occur without
warning or

explanation, scientists must modify
their theories and laws in
compliance with these

unexpected findings. The spontaneity
of events seems to suggest

that

we

inhabit an

evolving universe where things are
probable but never certain. Said James:
then, to speak

to discover,

avert.

Why,

of the ‘laws of history,' as of something

and whose consequences any one can
then

inevitable,

that

feel

do nothing

the very laws of physics are conditional,
and deal with

conscious

deeply

which science has only

foretell but

laws of physics are not subject to the doctrine
of necessity, there

human

regretfiil

beings,

who

“It is folly,

If

ifs

is little

to alter

or

even the

reason to believe

often agonize over the decisions they
must

make and

about choices that have bad results, cannot
act with spontaneity and

inspiration.

According

men” whose

to

James, chance variation can account for the emergence
of “great

actions have a profound impact on history and the
development of

humankind. People of all stripes—rich and poor,
perform novel acts every day, and those

environment will have the opportunity

brilliant

elect

and slow-witted, young and

few who are selected by

their social

to put their individual genius to significant use.

Writings J 878-1899, 638.
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TMs means

tha, so-called “great

men“

are merely fortunate

enough

to possess certatn

qualities their soctety finds
important; accordingly, they
are catapulted into post.
ions of

authority and prestige with
whteh they can mfluence
generations of their fellow men.

The causes of production of great
men

lie in a sphere wholly
inaccessible
simply accept geniuses as
Darwin accepts his spontaneous
variations. For him, as for
Darwin the
ls these data being
Y pro
given, How does the environment
affect
tll
W
environment? Now, I affirm that
the
m environment to the great
relation of the visible
reiaTi^onh
man is in the main exactly
at it is to be variation
in the Darwinian

to the social philosopher.

^m

>

^

STw*

He must

^^

philosophy. It chiefly adopts
or rejects preserves or destroys,
in short selects him. And
whenever h
adopts and preserves the great
man, it becomes modified by his
influence
in an entirely original and
peculiar way. He acts as a ferment,
s

cons

and changes
advent of a new zoological species
changes the
98
equilibrium of the region in which it
appears

ltution, just as the

faunal and floral

.

In

James’s mind, the individual and society
shared a symbiotic tension. Society
could not

progress without the input of great
individuals, and great individuals
could not emerge

without the sympathies of their community
to
important to note

that, for

make

their genius

known

99
.

But

it

is

James, the individual drives social progress,
while society

merely serves as the vehicle.

The expression of individual

genius, whether selected

by

the

community or

not,

begins with man's ability to pay attention to
the world around him. As was discussed
earlier in this chapter,

James believed

that

people

make sense of the

rushing stream of

sensoiy experiences with which they are deluged by
focusing their attention on what
interests

them and ignoring the

rest.

play the part of a sculptor, cutting

Or

away

to

draw on the now familiar metaphor, we each

the irrelevant chunks of the block and preserving

vs

"

Ibid.,

625.

Ibid.,

630.
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those sections that are

more meaningful and

selection, attending to that

part.

If the anticipated

which

this

the idea of it,

We are then aware of nothing between the conception
and

it is

done.”

For instance,

contemplate enjoying

its

to

cases, this process

see

I

warmth and

of

of movement on our

our liking,

we

process ideo-motor action:
“Wherever a

and immediately follows upon

100

many

interests us, will lead to
an idea

consequences of this movement are

without pause. James called
unhesitatingly

useful to us. In

will act

movement

we have ideo-motor action.

and execution... We think the

my cup of freshly-brewed

coffee on

act,

my desk,

deliciousness, and then reflexively
pick

it

up and

take a sip. These reflexive actions,
which can be instinctive or habitual,
represent the

normal

state of affairs.

competing

So long

is best.

will

ideas,

as

we

we

most

we succumb

familiar, but

choosing among

that

it

is

we

will prevail over the others,

difficult choice.

we

This process of

is

what James

the very basis of free will.

summon

a particularly difficult object,

such

reserves of mental energy dwelling deep

savor the thought of watching the Red Sox-Yankees

an unfinished dissertation awaits

100

Ibid.,

which idea

our attention on only one of

attending to one at the expense of the others,

as a doctoial thesis, requires us to

know

are undecided about

to focus

There are times when focusing our attention on

also

two or more

and focus our attention on the idea with which

sometimes we must make a

many ideas,

I

we

At some point, one idea

to habit

called “voluntary attending”— and

within us. While

turn our attention to

continue to entertain two or more of these
conflicting ideas,

will act accordingly.

usually because

we

cannot act automatically because

be paralyzed with indecision; once we are
able

these ideas,

are

we

But on those occasions when

394.
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me

game

tonight,

I

and will continue to loom ominously

in

my life until

because
to

it

,

fin.sh

it.

Attendmg ,o

does not prov.de immediate
gratification

James, the ability to focus

essence of free

will.

In

achievement of, he mil,

in short,

when

which

if

we

let it

go would

in

is

most voluntary,

0'

paralyzed

In

man who
most

focus

my d.ssertat.on

is ,o

'

the

is

in the

attend to a difficult

the flat. .Effort

of attention

.

then,

tries to

a psycholog, cal

is

“is a

a mental difficulty, a difficulty
with an ideal

away, but which

move

is

mind. "The whole drama,” said
James,

which our

to

we

will applies itself, an idea

will not let go.”

fact,

The essence of will

James argued

his leg but never succeeds in doing so.

that

example of a

102

cases, however, if we can attend to this
elusive object long enough, hold

dove out any competing

ideas, the ensuing action

conclusion. Despite the strong appeal of watching
a baseball
I

does. According

act then follows or not is a matter
quite immaterial,” citing the

firmly in our minds and

rivals,

especially difficult

game

like

The exercise of will,

one word, an idea

slip

is

occurs in the mind, before any actions
are performed. In

whether the

is

'

The so-doing

of will.”'

mental drama. The whole difficulty

It is,

it is

the mind.

must be resolved

object ot our thought.

case

like a baseball

my attention on a difficult object

thus the essential phenomenon
affa.r, a struggle that

this

The Principles of Psychology,
James wrote: "The essentia,

and hold it fas, before

object

my dtsserta.ion in

my attention on

the task at hand and here

I

is

a foregone

game between

the historic

am, organizing

my thoughts

and

typing these words into the computer. Exercising free
will always involves attending to

an idea that

is less

agreeable than

some

alternative.

hazardous than writing a dissertation.

Ibid.,

417-18.

Ibid.,

416-17.
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Sometimes the idea

is far

more

it

The

strong-willed man, however,

U

“aS

comes loohs
and holds

is

Wh °’ When

at its face,

consents to

the

^

its

man who

heard the still small
dea,h - brin 8 i '’8 consideration

presence, clings to

it

affirms

it

fast, in spite

of the host of exciting mental
images which rise
revolt against it and would
expel it from his mind.
Sustained in this
way by a resolute effort of attention,
the difficult object erelong
begins
to
8
call up its own congeners
and associates and ends by
changing^
disposition of the man's
consciousness altogether. And with
his
consciousness his action changes, for
the new object, once stably
in
5 '""
W ° f h S th ° UghtS nfambly roduces its
P
motor
,t

'

’

‘

effecTs

This passage shows that the
“strong-willed man" must only
sustain his attention long

enough so

that

he expenences a change of “consciousness”
which

“infallibly produces”

the desired “motor effects.”
Possibly faring a "death-bringing”
task, the average person
will not

be able to expel terrifying images of
a pamful death and other unpleasantries,
but

the strong-willed person will
a courageous act,

courageous

stamp out

feat to

control our emotions

feels.

man who

The reader

his fear.

which he put

James argued

that the

overcome

this instinctive reaction and,

And

before he

knows

it,

focusing his mind on

he will perform the

his mind.

that a direct corollary

of his theory of emotion was that

by changing our behavior, and the implication

in this

we

can

example

is

can ignore his fears and act bravely has successfully
changed

how he

will recall that, according to James, our

to certain

emotions do not lead

physiological responses; our physiological responses
are our emotions.

merely habitualized physiological responses

to certain objects or events,

Our emotions

are

which means we

can always change our emotions by cultivating new habits.
“Action seems to follow
feeling, but really action

and feeling go together; and by regulating the action, which

under the more direct control of the

Ibid.,

will,

we

is

can indirectly regulate the feeling, which

419.
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is

not.

By

refusing to run

equanimity, a

away from

man consumed

who embodtes

pernicious situations and
facing them with

with fear and trembling can
transfonn himself into a

man

daring and courage. In other
words, he can exerctse his will
, 0 change his

habitual response to these
situattons, and instead of
acting cowardly, he can
act bravely

and thereby become a brave and
fearless man. Said James:
“So

^

fear.’’

braVe USe
’

lw

° Ur Wili 10

,hat

end and courage-fit will very
likely replace the
'

fit

of

After acting bravely a few times,
the former coward will find
that courage

comes more
to

a"

to feel brave, act as if
we

easily to him.

What

at first

required a resolute concentration
of will begins

become automatic.
According

and

effort to

to

James,

an idea that

so until the response

it

this

was the essence of free

yields the desired response

becomes

habitual.

Forming

will: to dedicate

on our

habits

part

is vital

and

enough thought

to continue to

do

not only because they

change our emotional responses but because
they also determine who we are on a
deeper
level.

In the Principles
,

James wrote: “Sow an

action,

and you reap a

and you reap a character; sow a character and
you reap a destiny.”

habit;

When

a

sow

man

a habit

exercises

his free will to develop habits, he has taken
the first step toward forming his character

and ultimately sealing his

fate.

Though

habit implies reflex and will freedom,

James

could never easily separate his discussions of these two
concepts because they
represented opposite sides of the same coin.
habits which in turn liberate

him

Man

further to focus

The more

has the free will to formulate

more

attention

new

on other concerns.

ot the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless
custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be
set
free tor their own proper work. There is no more miserable
human being
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.

m

e
Wh ° n ° thing is habi ' ual bu < indecision,
and for whom the
h ting of
f every cigar,
the drinking of everv cun the tim<* r»f
gomg to bed every day, and the
an

r

tg

•

•

beginning of every

subjects of express volitional
deliberation.

The -miserable human betng” who

fails to

hi,

of work

105

,

«

.

fonn any useful habits

in his life

might well

allude to James himself as a
younger man. His years of acute
depression were

accompanied by periods of abulia-or
“obstructed wilf’-which rendered
him unable

make choices
for

James, the

without hesitation or painful
deliberation.

man

without habits

is

and the only way out of this pnson

What becomes apparent

enthralled—to either his

is to

develop

instincts or his

his atrophied will

and

to

to

is that,

indecision-

make

a habit

of

using this faculty. 106 Once a person
has developed a sufficiently robust
will and made a
habtt of exercising

habits.

Toward

James advised

it

regularly,

lus reader

reflex action requires

whereby, through an

on how

become

one

to cultivate

help him do so.
to initiate

initial effort

ingrained.”

not cultivate our

own

good

He

maintained

107

The degree

to

down

that turning

a

number of

an idea into a

which we perform our action with

how deeply the tendency become
habits,

and they

habits willfully and instead

,U3

Ibid., 146.
106

Ibid., 150.
07

habits, laying

of Psychology,

what Cotkin describes as a training “regimen

Each one of us embodies these ingrained

1

forming other useful

of attention and repetition, a new, more
efficacious

uninterrupted frequency determines

we do

his attention to

the end of his chapter entitled
“Habit” in The Principles

maxims he thought would

habit might

he can then devote

Cotkin, William James, Public Philosopher 69.
,
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ingrained in us.

in turn define

let

them grow

who we

are.

willy-nilly, or

If

leave

we

them

to wilt and die,

exist at the

we

fail to live

mercy of our physical and

up

our capacity a S

to

social

human

beings. Instead,

environment or our biology-an

unacceptable option for James.
In his

for a life

essay entitled

“What Makes

a Life Significant,”

devoid of vigorous and willful
action

in his

James revealed

desenption of Chautauqua,

York, a small town he visited on
his “Talks to Teachers”
lecture tour
utopia in which not even a hint
of squalor or injustice

represented a "foretaste of what
suffering and no dark

human

comers”-but,

was

society might be,

to his

own

Ins distaste

evident,

were

it

in

1

A

894.

New
model

Chautauqua

all in

the light, with no

astonishment, James found this "middle-

class paradise, without a sin, without
a victim, without a blot, without
a tear,” so stifling
that

he longed to escape and return to "the
dark and wicked world again.” After
just

week of enjoying

the

many

pleasantries and

wholesome

activities the

James could no longer abide the "atrocious
harmlessness” of it
desiring something “primordial and savage,
even though

massacre .”

108

He

it

all

town had

a

to offer.

and caught himself

were as bad as an Armenian

preferred to take his chances in the wicked
world, replete with

all

"the

heights and the depths, the precipices and the
steep ideals, the gleams of the awful and
the infinite," than to spend another minute in
"this dead level and quintessence of every

mediocrity.” In a letter to his wife, he revealed an even
darker side of his reflections,

wishing for the

flash

of a

pistol, a

dagger, or a devilish eye, anything to break the

unlovely level of 10,000 good people, a crime, a murder, rape,
elopement, anything

would do.”

109

What Chautauqua

lacked was drama, the extremes which could indeed

108

Ibid.,

109

863.

James quoted

in

Simon, Genuine Reality 266.
,
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.

make

life

friend

of civilization and

reaction.

really

painful and treacherous bu,
also exhilarating and
invigorating. Supposedly
a

Why could

need exposure

social progress,

James was profoundly disturbed
by

he not apprectate the social
hannony on
to the violence

and savagery of life

d, splay before

to feel alive,

even

his visceral

him? Did he

if

it

came

at

the expense of human suffering?

Atter meditating on his
Chautauquan experience for a while,
he realized what was

mtssmg

there.

This idyllic town seemed to
prov.de no opportunities for
strenuous action

against the forces of evil and thus
deprived

its

inhabitants of a meaningful

What

excites and interests the looker-on
atues celebrate the grim civic

at life,

life.

what the romances and the

monuments remind us

battle of the

of, is the everlasting

powers of light with those of darkness;
with heroism, reduced
to its bare chance, yet ever
and anon snatching victory from the
jaws of
death. But in this unspeakable
Chautauqua there was no potentiality for
death in sight anywhere, and no point
of the compass visible from which
danger might possibly appear. The ideal
was so completely victonous
already that no sign of any previous
battle remained, the place just resting
on its oars. But what our human emotions
seem to require is the sight of
the struggle going on. The moment
the fruits are being merely eaten
things become ignoble. Sweat and
effort, human nature strained to its
uttermost and on the rack, yet getting through
alive, and then turning its
back on its success to pursue another more
rare and
arduous

the sort of thing the presence of which
inspires us.

For James, Chautauqua represented a world

of evil and were free
sounded

to

enjoy the

fruits

men

in

this is

still

10

.

which men had already defeated the forces

of heroics long

delightful, the notion that the very

the efforts of great

in

1

past.

While

at first

it

may have

image of justice and harmony emerged from

an earlier age, a closer look revealed a sickeningly insipid

world, a world so complete that

it

no longer demanded vigorous action

dangers or even to remedy the most minor social

Writings 1878-1899, 864.
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ills.

Sadly, this

was

to

ward off

a world without

heroes, wtthou, the need
for heroes. James
feared that Chautauqua
foretold the future for
all

of human, ty,

that its

bourgeots ntedioenty and
blandness would creep slowly

every confer of the world,
eventually tunttng

enormous

scale.

Much

to his alarm,

it

he saw

into “a ntere

that

i„, 0

Chautauqua Assetnbly on an

an “irremediable flatness

is

coming

over the world. Bourgeotsie
and mediocrity, church soctables
and teachers' conventtons,
are

takmg

the place of the old hetghts
and depths and romantic
chtaroseuro.” Observing

the eagerness for fairness
and

compromise within

his

own

country,

the “higher heroisms and the
old rare flavors are passtng
out of

witnessed

dunng his bnef stay

world order

On

Wha, James

a

tune

scarce.

James could not despair over these

that true acts

of heroism occurred

America. Looking for heroism

wonderful displays of it exhibited

modem trends

for long.

all

the time and in every

in its traditional forms,

James had

failed to see

right before his eyes in the

111

Ibid.,

865.

12

Ibid.
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it

town and

daily lives of the laboring classes. Not
in clanging fights and desperate
marches only is heroism to be looked for, but on
every railway bridge and
fire-proof building that is going up to-day.
On freight-trains, on the decks
of vessels, in cattle-yards and mines, on
lumber-raffs, among the firemen
and the policemen, the demand for courage is
incessant; and the supply
never fails. There, every day of the year somewhere,
is human nature in
extremis for you. And wherever a scythe, an axe,
a pick, or a shovel is

1

when

the tram heading toward Buffalo,
he experienced a kind of revelation, in
which

dawned on him
in

12

heroism and vigorous action,

became increasingly

eternal optimist,

1

life.”

that

Chautauqua was the dawning of
modernity, a new

that foreclosed opportun.ties
for

the exercise of free will

An

in

James lamented

city

H |S

ear ier observati
'

°^

notwithstanding, James

came

herotes abound in this world,
even in Chautauqua.

to realize that

working-class

We so often overlook

these daily

displays of heroism, sa.d
James, because they do not
follow a vocalized ideal,
as a
soldier's sacrifice so clearly
does.

wage. no.

The laboring hero w.elds

to realize a larger vision,
for

the

manly vigor performed

who

regularly

axe to earn a

he lacks the imagination and
the education

devote arduous action to something
higher.
educated man, refined and effete,

his shovel or

On

the other end of the spectrum

has plenty of ideals bu,

by the laboring

class.

fails to

is

to

the

support them with

A truly significant

life,

according to James, must achieve a
marriage between our strenuous actions
and our
ideals.

"Ideal aspirations are not enough,

neither are pluck and will,

dogged endurance and

taken alone. There must be
significant to result.”

own

sake.

14

He adheres

must carry with
facts

1

and

it

that is

conventions.

to

when uncombined with pluck and

some

sort

of fusion.

The hero always
an ideal that

that sort

is

of outlook,

somewhat

1

866.

Ibid.,

877.

Ibid.,

875.

.

“intellectually

uplift,

But

danger enough, when

for a life objectively

acts with “pluck

and thoroughly

and will” but never for

their

conceived”— which means

and brightness

that

go with

115

14

136

it

all intellectual

novel, challenging preconceived notions,
routines, or

113

Ibid.,

.

insensibility to

will.

Unfortunately, the most

common

display of ostensible heroism
in our world

involved ill-adv.sed and
unconscionable acts of tmperialtsm
by

opponent of American imperialism,
James considered

it

a

modem

modem

states.

A

great

expression of our

ancient impulse for war, no,
a true display of heroism.
True herotsm could no, res, on

outdated .deals about martial
valor, national glory or
Mantfes, Destiny, and

something other than the courage
James, an hero had to

James expressed
at the

at the

resist the prevailing social

this idea

unveiling of a war

Shaw who

led the

to face mortal

most eloquently

monument

order in the

name of a

dedicated to the slain Civil

famous black F.fty-Fourth Regimen,.
Before

Boston Music Hall, James declared

that

required

danger with vigorous action.
Indeed, the

May of 1897 when

in

i,

we

higher ideal.

he delivered an oration

War

hero Robert Gould

a large

crowd assembled

should not honor Shaw for his military

valor on the battlefield— especially
since the “survivors of one successful
massacre after

another are beings from whose loins

we and

all

our contemporary races spring”—but

for

the

lonely courage which he

showed when he dropped

his warm commission
head your dubious fortunes, negroes of the FiftyFourth. That lonely kind of courage (civic
courage as we call it in peacein

'

t

le glorious

times)
of

all

Second

to

the kind of valor to which the monuments
of nations should most
be reared, for the survival of the fittest has not
bred it into the bone
is

human beings as it has bred military valor; and of five hundred
of us
who could storm a battery side by side with others, perhaps
not one could
be found who would risk his worldly fortunes all alone
in resisting an
of

enthroned abuse.

We should

116

exalt and admire

his comfortable

commission

Shaw because he

resisted conventional practices

for an ideal, that black

and gave up

Americans should enjoy the same

opportunities as their white brethren and not be denied the
honor of serving in the war

116

“Robert Gould Shaw.”
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agams, slavery.
their

own

In

many

cases, the

most heroic actions

be recognized as such

time because they cu, against
the gram of popular
opinton, bu,

our best to lionize those

who perform

Whtle Shaw was immortal, zed
Wagner,

will no,

his

them, even

we

in

should do

if posthumously.

for his martial feats

and his unhmely death

most significant achievement
resembled what the many heroes

do every day. Great nations are
saved no, by martial

valor, a

common

in

at

For,

our midst

trai, that

has been

bred “into the bone of human
beings,” but rather by lonely acts
of “civic courage”

performed with

little

The nation

fanfare.

above all nations is she in whom the
civic genius of the
people does the saving day by day, by
acts without external
blest

picturesqueness;

by speaking, writing, voting reasonably;
by smiting
corruption swiftly; by good temper
between parties; by the people
knowing true men when they see them, and
preferring them as leaders to
rabid partisans or empty quacks.
Such nations have
no need of wars

save them.

We should always

lavish

do not seek publicity

men

like

Shaw

with everlasting praise, said James,
because they

for their actions but instead quietly
perform their duties as citizens

of a democracy. Shaw was “faithful”
democratic belief that “that a

common

man

to

what James called “the American religion”-the

requires no master to take care of him, and that

people can work out their salvation well enough
together

We honor him

and his compatriots

complexions and conditions can go forth

need be,

I

in order that this religion

if left free to try .”

in the Fifth-Fourth for fulfilling the

of participation and brotherhood, reminding
“us that in such an
all

to

like brothers,

of our native land

17

Ibid.

118

Ibid.

138

democratic ideals

emergency Americans of

and meet death cheerfully

shall not

118

become

a failure

on

if

earth

From James’s

point ofview,

understand them as mere pawns

in the

we

dimin.sh

Shaw and

his

comrades

in

arms

if

grand sweep of h, story. For
there was nothmg

necessary or inevitable about
what they did. Their deeds
exemplified the great extent

which men can transcend

soctal

and

political

nonns-and, through then

herotc actions,

redefine them.

James’s personal and philosophical
democratic ethos.

He

and remaking the world

truths

stultifying institutions

truth

believed that

and method.

in

all

men must

to

embrace a strong

participate in the process

of acquiring

accord with their ideals, and he had
great disdain for

and self-proclaimed experts

He was

him

travails led

who

especially disdainful of the

claimed to have a monopoly on

modem

trend toward the large

bureaucratic organization, which he believed
undermined the open search for truth and
individual autonomy.
I am against bigness
and greatness in all their forms, and with the
invisible
molecular forces that work from individual to
individual, stealing in
through the crannies of the world like so many

soft rootlets, or like the
capillary oozing water, and yet rending the
hardest monuments of man’s
pride, if you give them time. The bigger the
unit you deal with, the
hollower, the more brutal, the more mendacious is
the life displayed. So I
am against all big organizations as such, national ones first and
foremost;
against all big successes and big results; and in
favor of the eternal forces
ot truth which always work in the individual and
immediately

unsuccessful way, under-dogs always, till history comes,
after they are
long dead, and puts them on the top. 120

119

Ibid.
120

James

to

Mrs. Henry Whitman, Letters, quoted

Philosopher, 141.

139

in Cotkin,

William James, Public

we

James found such

large organizations to
be hopelessly “mendacious”
because they

worked against the

“eternal forces

of truth,” subjectmg individuals

winch prevented them from
expressing

democrats communities

in

their genius.

which people were

government and business and also
empowered
themselves. In a
ideal [of

freedom]

kept pure,

It

letter to a friend,

lies

is

to

free

Instead,

from the dominating forces
of

line

commonweal

to sharing affinities

found smaller communities.”
After

one most promising

James favored small

to contribute to the

James admitted

rigid procedures

all,

with “lovers of the

“through small systems,

of betterment and salvation”' 2

'

important to note that James did
not see an inherent tension
between the

individual and his

community

as liberals often do. His
enthusiasm for individualism

was

often mistaken for a de facto
contempt for groups and communities,
but James actually

believed that individual freedoms
were best protected within a nurturing
community that

gave people the opportunity

to exercise civic

courage and work to put their ideals into

practice.

Indeed, only a small

diversity,

and a certain amount of chaos could provide
the

community

that

tolerated— even
right

incessant challenging of all truth claims
and social conventions.

welcomed— eccentricity,
atmosphere for the
It

might be

fair, if

not

paradoxical, to characterize James's political
philosophy as “individualistic

communitarianism

2

for

its

antipathy toward centralized bureaucratic
organizations,

friendliness toward the small and motley

James

to Ernest

Howard Crosby,

community, and

its

its

ultimate championing of the

Letters, quoted in Cotkin, William James, Public

Philosopher 174.
,

1

22

George Cotkin misleadingly characterizes James’s political philosophy
as “anarchist
communalism” (174). While James welcomed diversity and favored smaller
social
systems, he never advocated the abolition of all forms of
institutional organization,

only

those large and faceless bureaucracies that stunted individual
action.

140

individual. Providing a

method

for

amving

a, useful iruihs
socially

and a

support

environment for the exercise
of civic courage, mdividualistic
communifarianism would
pave the way for a eonstderably
deepened democracy where
citizens engage freely i„
an
endless process of social
experimentation and verification.

Because he believed
equipped

to

make wise

that self-governing

decisions,

communities of this kind were best

James had no doubt

that they

would move toward the

kind of ‘-socialist equilibrium”
he envisioned for any just society. 123
cntic of the Gilded Age,

A

James was acutely aware of the
“abuses which

contemporary
the institution of

pnvate property covers” and lamented
“that one of the prime (unctions
of the national

government
progress

to

is

to help the adroiter citizens
to

demanded our accepting

property— and recognizing

equilibrium ot

human

rich.”

that “there is

nothing

ideals,” for our “present laws

If

we were

final in

all

will in their turn

to challenge

likelihood, this

justice, but at the very least

when

the last

man

it

dogmas

would take us one

has his say.

Writings 1878-1899, 611-12.

125

Ibid.,

understood that social

611.

141

any actually given

be overthrown by any newly
like the

to

nght to property,

make way

new equilibnum would

Writings 1902-1910, 1289.
'~ 4

He

and customs have fought and

only be a matter of time for the capitalist
equilibnum
equilibrium. In

124

the provisionality of all sacred
truths— such as the right

conquered other past ones” and “they
discovered order.” 125

grow

would

it

for a socialist

not be the final

word on

social

step closer to that truth that emerges

There
anti-e'itist

is

a distinct element

of participation^

in

James's

democrat

ethos, an

claim that the peop.e are
capable of governing
themselves without the

assistance of technical expertise
and bureaucratic institutions.
Bu, James did no, go so
far as to

formulate a theory of participatory
democracy per

se.

Unlike partrdpatory

democrats today, he maintained
a strong belief in the
importance ofw.se leadersh.p

democracy.
.he

mam

In his essay entitled the
“Social

purpose of a college education

is to

Value of the College-Bred," he
argued

then,

is

must "be able
that if our

to

is to

succeed

e,ther be college-educated or
persuaded

By drawing a
that the

line

vital in a

126
divine the worthier and better
leaders.”

democracy

in

democracy,

The

choosing the best leaders,

by those who enjoyed

between the college-educated and the

former were the "only permanent
presence

that

rest

On

make

their influence felt for

in

which

clear implication,

its

citizens

this educational

must

advantage.

of society, even suggesting

corresponds to aristocracy in

older countries," James seemed to accept
the notion of class difference.
bred, he insisted, must

that

prepare students to judge the
character and

competence of other men. Our colleges
become especially
citizens

in a

democracy

The

college-

to prevail.

the other hand, he also contended
that the college-bred must broaden
their

outlook and embrace a larger number of
perspectives. For this to occur, our colleges
and
their

127
progeny must adopt a message with a broad-based
appeal.
This means

colleges must open their doors to

produce graduates

As

1-6

who

more than just

children of the

elite,

can persuasively communicate their ideals

that

our

and they must

to the

wider public.

colleges open their doors wider, they will necessarily
enhance their ability to reach a

Writings 1902-1910, 1246.

127

Ibid.,

1246-48.
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larger aud.ence and
influence the broader culture.
ils

institutions, educational

and otherw.se,

In short,

move toward

a

democracy can only work

if

-more inclustve order ” This

requires the gap between the
eollege-bred and the labonng
class to narrow.

As

the

college-bred are introduced to
the hardsh.ps and heroics
of phystcally demanding
work

through a national service
program, the labonng class will
broaden their horizons
educationally and

become more

idealistic.

The former

will learn to

back up their ideals

W.th manly action, and the latter
will see that their hard
work can achieve something far
higher than a meager wage.

What becomes
of his

from a close reading of James

clear

political philosophy, for

it

removes

bamers

all

society promotes the fluid exchange
of information

is

that inclusion is at the heart

to the road

of inquiry.

among people with

An

inclusive

a diverse range of

perspectives and, arousing our
sympathies for others and their alternative
perspectives,

enhances our knowledge about each other
and the world around

more

inclusive order provides

will, to

The

engage

in the

its

action-or what James called

of a citizenry engaged
civic courage.

These

in strenuous but enlightened

civically

will (or abulia)

truths.

engaged citizens constitute a

and an overactive

will,

between

and blind imperialism. James often praised religion
for being

especially effective at inspiring

forms often led

religion of democracy,

to

men

to act strenuously, but

he understood

that its

more

chauvinism and foreign aggression. His alternative was the

whose

future

was uncertain but held

...democracy
failure.

a

citizens the ever-important opportunity
to exercise free

happy medium between an obstructed

traditional

At the same time,

process of truth acquisition and to act
decisively on those

final result is the creation

effete intellectualism

us.

great promise.

is a kind of religion, and we are bound not
to admit its
Faiths and utopias are the noblest exercise of human reason,
and
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S3
Though we may

not call

- *» James

building on the founda.ton
laid

whtch Dewey would go on

128

Ibid.,

a participatory democrat,

down by

we

can certainly credit him for

Petrce and erect,
ng a skeletal structure with

to flesh out a full-fledged
theory

1245-46.
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of participatory democracy.

CHAPTER

IV

JOHN DEWEY'S PRAGMATIST
JUSTIFICATION FOR DEMOCRACY

Will, am

its

James boasted

impact on the

way people

that

pragmatism would

rival the Protestant

think and understand their
place in the world.

Reformation

By

the

in

first

decade of the twentieth century,
as James and Peirce were
reach, ng the twilight of their
careers,

„ became obvious

that

John

Dewey (1859-1952) was

would assume the mantle of the
pragma!, s,
deb, to his pragmatts, forebears,
for

revolution.

much of his

Dewey owed

scholarly

what they said before him. Petrce
and James taught him

humankind
authonty.

a

He

method of solving problems
readily

malleability of

human

embraced

method

to

call

that

a serious intellectual

restates or

expands on

pragmatism gave

of truth claims and the

optimistic about the potential

social progress.

truths so

and

absence of a universally accepted

was equally

promote

do not uncover pre-existing absolute
truths-or what he would

work

their ideas about the fallibility

nature, and he

application of scientific

in the

their heir apparent

much

as

They convinced him

that

we

we make and remake provisional

“warranted assertions”— through the endless
process of

experimentation and deliberation; and that

this process, to

work

effectively,

must involve

every competent person in the community
whose experiences proved relevant to the
particular question or problem.

for putting

Although Peirce and James deserve much of the

credit

pragmatism on the map, the nascent “school of thought”—
as James

enthusiastically hailed

it

in

1903

—would come

notoriety) largely under the labors of

to

achieve universal recognition (or

Dewey. Perhaps
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the

most renowned and important

Philosopher in Anrencan history,
career,

wnting voluminously

Wha,

distinguished

the pragmatist promtse

Dewey

for a stretch

Dewey from

more

of nearly seventy years

hi, predecessors

by taking philosophy down
from

concrete political and social
problems.
contributions to

enjoyed an extraordinarily
long and

was

make good on
it

to

and original

of ph.losophy, espec.ally
ep.stemology,

endunng questions which have continued

chapters on Peirce and James have

his ability to

the clouds and applying

metaphysics and ethics, but the true
significance of his work
real-world yet

1
.

He undoubtedly made important

traditional subfields

illustrious

shown how

to

lies in its

relevance to those

vex humanity. The prev.ous

the classical pragmatists laid
the

philosophical foundation for a strong,
if somewhat inchoate,
democratic ethos in

American thought. Both subscribed
Peirce was especially instrumental

democracy by arguing

that

to

in

what

I

have called the three democratic

tenets.

laying the epistemological groundwork
of

communities can arrive

at better truths

and inclusive process of inquiry, and James
can be credited

through a deliberative

for highlighting the

transformative powers of willful participation
in the community. But neither
of them

explored fully the political implications of
their ideas. Dewey, on the other hand,
was the
first to

that

see the logical connection between pragmatism
and democracy.

pragmatism called

for a

Dewey’s complete works comprise

unpublished writings and

recognized

widespread application of scientific method, and

democracy represented nothing other than the

1

He

thirty

scientific

method writ

that

large, the

ongoing

seven volumes, which do not include his

letters.
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socal expenmen, conduced
no, only by
the community.

No,

scientists

and other experts bu, by
everyone

The pragma, ie approach culminated

surprisingly,

Dewey believed

that

i,

in parttcipatory

democracy. 2

was incumbent on him

to live

up

to the

pragmatts, ideal and part, pate
in the ongoing social
c,
expenmen, no, merely observe
,

from a safe distance. Writing
prodigiously on a wide range of
topics

that

had a direct

impact on the lives of average
Americans and devoting considerable
time and energy
social

and

political causes,

Dewey's importance
Steele

that

in the

Dewey came
American

Commager wrote: “So

to

personify the term “public
intellectual.”

intellectual

faithfully did

and

cultural landscape, histonan

Dewey „ve up

to his

own

scarcely an exaggeration to say
that for a generation no issue
was clarified until

had spoken."

Indeed,

Dewey voiced

the world.

was

a co-founder)

causes, even helping to found the

active in a

2

it

is

Dewey

New Republic

number of political organizations and

American Association of University of Professors

for a time), the

American

social

(for

Civil Liberties Union, the

National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, and the
list

Henry

and giving public lectures throughout the
country— and

He became immensely

which he served as president

Of

opinions on nearly every important
issue of the

day, publishing hundreds of articles
in mainstream periodicals such
as The

(of which he

to

philosophical creed

he became the guide, the mentor,
and the conscience of the American
people;

3

i,

New

School.

The

of the organizations with which Dewey became
involved makes one wonder how he

Dewey

never used the term “participatory democracy”— if the
reader recalls, Arnold
I use the term frequently in
this chapter because, as I will go on
to argue in considerable detail, it accurately
and succinctly reflects his conception of
democracy.

Kaufman coined it— but

3

Commager, The American Mind

,

19.

147

could possibly have found
the time to

fulfill his

teaching obligations and
wnte so

many

scholarly books.

Deweys

social

and

political

commitments were many, usually

progress, ve propensities on
display. Tins

cv,c

activity, but a

compelling.

He dedicated

beginning in his days

to

Dewey found

education reform throughout
his career,

University of Chicago where he
founded a laboratory school,

and continuing during his long
tenure
at

sense of the kinds of .ssues

a

himself tirelessly

a, the

generations of scholars

not the place for a detailed
account of his

is

few examples will give

putting his

at

Columbia University, where he
influenced

Teachers’ College.

He

expressed his firm belief that the
future

of Amencan democracy depended
on significant educational reform:
schools had
treating students as

empty and passive

vessels in

to stop

which teachers poured knowledge, and

should, instead, sharpen students’
critical thinking and problem
solving skills and

promote learning by doing, not

when he

first

the labor

his

4
life.

moved

movement

Ch.cago

to

in

The growing

just

memorizing. Deeply affected by the Pullman

in the

summer of

1

894,

America and would champion
inequality in

its

Dewey became

5

reliant.

4

sympathetic with

causes publicly for the rest of

America during the Gilded Age alarmed him

and he not only advocated greater government
involvement

became involved

in efforts to educate the

strike

greatly,

to alleviate poverty but also

lower classes and help them become

self-

His sympathy for the downtrodden notwitsthanding,
he actively opposed

See Menand, The Metaphysical Club; Martin, The Education
of John Dewey.

Most notably, Dewey volunteered to deliver lectures at Hull House,
founded in
s westwide by Jane Addams to help poor immigrants
acclimate to American
society, provide them skills necessary for life and work,
and introduce them to the
Chicago

refinements of education and high culture. Dewey’s relationship
with
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Addams and

communism

for its ideological

for he believed

state

i,

ngid„y. Nor was he an
advocate of New Deal
liberalism,

undermined democracy by promoting
the growth of an
administrative

whose bureaucrats and

country-s c.tizens with

little

experts would

make

or no accountability.

crucial decisions

He

on behalf of the

never endorsed the candidacy
of

Franklin Delano Roosevelt
in Ins four presidential
elect, on bids, throwing
his support

behind the socialist candidate

Dewey's

civic

in

World War

bandwagon, justifying

his position

means by which

instead.

engagement also extended beyond
domestic concerns. When

America's involvement
the

Nonnan Thomas

to spread the cause

I

seemed a foregone conclusion, Dewey
jumped on

on the grounds

that the

of democracy abroad and

engagement and democratic sympathies

at

home. But

war could be an
to

effective

galvanize civic

the overly punitive Versailles

Treaty, which merely handed the
spoils of war to the victors, and
the violations of civil
liberties in the

United States dunng and after the war,
often inflamed by

against immigrants, proved bitterly
disillusioning for

him

that

war could never be

a

means

Dewey. This experience convinced

to foster peace, understanding,

could only serve to encourage narrow-mindedness
and reactionary

he took a leading role
received

his

life,

much

in the

Outlawry of War movement

(and probably just) criticism.

He

at

in the

1

and democracy and

politics.

Accordingly,

920s, for which he

stayed true to this cause for the rest of

even opposing American entry into World

volunteer work

nativist reactions

War

II

because he feared, as he

her famed settlement house deeply influenced his thinking on
social

issues.
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6

expressed
shall

have

in

an op-ed

in effect if

article, that “if the

not in

Dewey's opposition

name

a fascist

to all

war-even

morally obligated to f,ght-was
naive

proved somewhat prescient.
to its

new

role as a

mass destruction.

United States

the

at

is

government
a

drawn

in this

war we seem

into the next war,

we

country.”

in retrospect to

have been

best and obtuse a. worst.
Nevertheless, his fears

wake of World War

II,

Amenca would have to

adjust

superpower whose military possessed
an unparalleled capacity
In his

for

1961 farewell address. President
Eisenhower would want his

fellow Americans of the
encroaching powers of the
“military-industrial complex" which

could "endanger our liberties or
democratic processes"

if not held in

and knowledgeable citizenry."’
Most Amencans would argue
rth the rise

check by “an

alert

that defeating fasctsm

was

of the military-industrial complex,
and perhaps Dewey would have agreed

in retrospect, tor

once American involvement became
inevitable

threw his support behind the war
concern that animated

tnumph and become

all

of his

effort.

political

after Pearl Harbor,

he

Nevertheless, his anti-war stance highlights
the

and social commitments:

Amenca would

fa, I to

a worldwide beacon of freedom if its
citizens did not actively

partake in the democratic

life

and

resist the forces

should not be surprising, then, that as

much

as

of absolutism and intolerance.

It

he supported those causes and policies he

believed would promote participation, he staunchly
opposed anything he thought stymied
it.

Some

traditionalists

may have

seen his

diversions from his scholarly work, but

6

7

“No Matter What Happens

many

extracurricular activities as

Dewey saw them

—Stay Out,” Later Works

Eisenhower, “Farewell Address to the Nation.”
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,

as natural or logical extensions

14:364.

Of pragmatism, the truly
democratic philosophy. The
pragmatist understood that

emerged not from the scholarly
hemritage of a great phtlosopher
bu,
public debate and social
inquiry.
in that

To be

philosopher did no. have the
capacity

to

dtscover or unvetl a priori
truths,

aocal pursuit of knowledge. His
role was more

why our soctety

those standards

more

in political theory,

more

failed to

had

critical

to participate

going. Because the
professtonal

i,

hts chief purpose, besides
acting as just another participant,

and

rather from sptrited

true to his creed, the
pragmatist

conversation and do anyth,
ng he could to keep

truth

was

to gu.de

Dewey

and

thought

facilitate the

than revelatory, explaining

how

meet the standards of seien.tfic
method, and delineating

precisely. This role as social
critic

became an

invitation to engage

and most of Dewey’s work, even
his writings on education and
on

esoteric philosophical topics, can
be read in this way.

They

offered philosophical

support for his participatory democratic
enterprise and penetrating critiques
of the current

system and liberalism.

political

difficult to achieve,

attainable goal.

Dewey understood

that the

perhaps more an ideal for which

Democracy, he

we

democratic enterprise was

should forever stnve than an

said.

an ideal in the only intelligible sense of an
ideal: namely, the tendency
and movement of some thing which exists
is

carried to

viewed

its final limit,

as completed, perfected.

Since things do not attain such fulfillment but
are
in actuality distracted and interfered
with, democracy in this sense is not a
fact and never will be.
Unfortunately, our current political and social system

he feared that our failure

to

approximate

it

came nowhere near

this ideal,

and

could have grave consequences. In The

Republic Plato compared the polis to a sailing vessel whose
“true captain” (or
,

philosopher king) would possess superior navigational

£

The Public and

Its

Problems Later Works 2:328.
,

,
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skills to lead his

men

safely to

their deS,mati0n

'

°n

Dewey

the destination or the
best

'

s sh 'P- there is

way

to ge, there, for there
are

or stars or compasses to
gutde us. Together

modernity, and the philosophers
job

workmg

no “true captain” No one
person ean choose

is to

we are cast

no pre-existing maps
adrift in the vast

remind us of the democratic

to consul,

ocean of

ideal, that

together and acquinng knowledge
from our shared expenence
can

we

only by

possibly

avert catastrophe.

It

there

predicament

The

crisis

were any doubts

man

faced in the

at

the beginning of the twentieth
century about the

modem

of modernity was upon

us:

world. World

in the

hands of a child

I

dispel

them

our knowledge of ourselves lagged

knowledge of nature and technology, and
dynamite

War would

(or, to

this

was

like putting a lighter

far

and

for

good

behind our

a stick

of

continue the analogy from the preceding

paragraph, giving a child sole control
over the rudder and throttle of a
powerful speed
boat).

Many critics blamed

would stem

science for our plight and called for
an ethics and politics that

the tide of modernity

Dewey argued

that this solution

way

to close the

was

to

by invoking

traditional values

only exacerbated the

modem

and ancient

predicament, that the only

gap between our knowledge of ourselves and
our knowledge of nature

understand

human

experience as part of nature. This required a
radical expansion

and redefinition of what he called the “scientific

attitude,” applying

its

methods of

inquiry to social, political, and ethical problems.
This meant, of course, that
reject all foundational truths, sacred

only
also

in truth

meant

definition of

we had

we had

myths, and dogmatic assertions and to put our

claims that hold up to the rigors of empirical testing.

that

But

truths.

to reconceptualize

More

to

trust

importantly,

it

our notion of scientific method as the very

community, as the embodiment of social cooperation and
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intercourse,

open

mindedness and tolerance, mutual
sympathy and compassion.
Dewey
sc, emit', e

method

is

merely refined the
with our fellow
not, on

not an eso.enc

fiuitfu.

man on

ways

art that

inststed that

the average person could
no. master, for

m which we already think, solve proh.ems,

and assoc, ate

a daily basts.’ Hardly
cold-blooded or Vulcan-like,

of scientific method evoked the

Pe,rce and James hinted

a, the

spirit

of community

life

i,

Dewey's

and shared values. Both

connection between science and
ethics, bu,

Dewey

explicitly advocated a value-laden
understanding of science.

Indeed,
facts

Dewey

assailed positivism for endorsing
the specious distinction
between

and values, equal,
ng any

desire.

He argued

dual, sms. Values

of the

facts, out

that

ethical or political position
with

we must

mere subjective opinion or

not separate the world into
simplistic, ready-made

do not have an existence independent
of the

of our concrete experiences. Social

facts but rather

grow out

scientific inquiry could yield

reasonable ethical positions and political
solutions so long as the process remained
deeply
democratic, both inclusive and fraternal.
referred to

democracy

as a

a

Dewey

constantly

form of government, Deweyan

fabric of our culture, tapping into the
experiences of

community, reshaping our

in the

for this reason that

“way of life.” More than

democracy penetrated the very
everyone

It is

habits,

and transforming the way

we

understand ourselves, our social relationships, and
our obligations to the community.

This democratic
face ot

modem

that afflicted

faith

allowed

bleakness.

man

Dewey

He saw

in the twentieth

to maintain an unflagging

the carnage

optimism even

and destruction, the ennui and alienation.

century as problems to be solved in a

communal

See "Science as Subject-Matter and as Method,” Middle Works,
6:78; and
Think Middle Works.
,
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in the

spirit.

How We

not as the inevitable
consequence of modernity.

had no method of intelligence
by wh.ch

beheved he had found

this

method

to

Insist,

ng on the distinction between

ameliorate the problems of
modernity.

in participatory

democracy, and he sough,

to

facts

Dewey

defend

i,

on philosophical grounds.

Dewey's philosophical defense of
democracy
democratic tenets, which he was
able

to

relied heavily

on the three

bring together in a more
cohes.ve whole than his

pragma!, st predecessors had ever
done. Like Peirce and James,
he believed that truth was
both probabilistic and
socially-constructed, that

man enjoyed
social

the freedom, at least

some of the

method by which

the

most useful

He

nature

was malleable, and

that

time, to exert his will independently
of

and biological forces. Drawing on
these

Part’cPa'ory democratic theory.

human

tenets,

Dewey would

construct his

argued that participatory democracy
sen-ed as both

truths could

emerge and

as a school in

which

a

its

students could best learn these truths
by subjecting them to a rigorous and endless
process
of venfication. Moreover, he maintained
that this democratic education

produce more learned individuals but also
transform

its

would not only

participants, instilling in

them the

value ot scientific inquiry, communicating
and deliberating thoughtfully with one’s
peers.
Finally,

Dewey

insisted that

human

beings enjoyed the freedom to choose a
democratic

way of life and would undoubtedly do

so if they were exposed to

its

many

delights, for

collaborative and intelligent effort further liberated
individuals to act in useful and

productive ways. Hilary Putnam, Richard Bernstein,
and James Kloppenberg have
called attention to the tact that

Dewey justified

epistemological grounds, and their work

is

participatory

of considerable
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all

democracy on

help.

But they seem

to

have

pa,d insufficient attention
to the other two key
ingredients-, he denroerafic
psyehoiogy

and theology

which are also necessary

democracy. This oversight leads

to

to

concoct a coherent theory
of participatory

an incomplete understanding
of Dewey’s

participatory democratic thought.

But before discussing Dewey’s
reliance on the democratic
tenets,
to lay out a succinct

it

will

be useful

exegesis of his political theory-his
cntidsm of the assumptions

underlying individualism and of
the inadequacy of merely
safeguarding negative
liberties, his

state,

liberty, his

search for a coherent public
and the

and, finally, his participatory
democratic solution. After examining
the house of

Dewey
which

conception of a posit.ve

s political

his

thought,

house was

we may descend

into the cellar to inspect the
foundation

upon

built.

I.

Like

many of the

participatory democrats

a great critic of liberalism, exposing

nature.

Interestingly,

find a liberal with

Dewey

whom

allied

of John Locke and

the utilitarian liberalism of Jeremy
the idealist liberalism of T. H.

Adam

him,

Dewey was

would be

great contempt

Stuart Mill, and greatly admired

Green but could not abide

a liberal, he represented a curious variant,

its

one

of liberalism by placing them under the glaring

he saw

the history of freedom illustrated that

we

He had

difficult to

Smith, recognized the deficiencies in

Bentham and John

155

it

himself completely.

traditions

it,

after

specious assumptions about humankind and

often called himself a liberal, but

he could have

for the classical liberalism

Dewey was

its

who would come

Hegelian overtones.

that tried to

light

If

demystify the

of historical context. As

could not say someone was free just

because the state successfully
protected an a priori
traditional liberals .ha,

we

of rights. Though he agreed
with

list

could indeed locate freedom
in the individual, the
nature or

quahty of that freedom depended
on the kinds of associations
(or relationships* in
which
that individual

was engaged, on

these consequences

the very consequences
of those associations. Testing

mean, constantly redefining freedom,
which

vigilance and a supple intelligence
on the par, of the state.
colors most brightly

when he equated

Dewey

Dewey

s

would become

betrayed his radical

liberty not with protection
or security bu, with

power, anticipating the idea with
which postmodern thinkers
twentieth century

in tun, requtred constant

in the

second half of the

fixated.

radical conception

of freedom began with a critique
of liberal

assumptions that he considered woefully
ahistoncal and insensitive
him,

liberal

thought

first

went astray

in its specious

have us believe

that this solitary creature

autonomous creature with

in his natural state. Liberals

only associates with others

sphere because he fears he cannot protect
himself on his
threaten his

life

for

men

saw

we have

would

those

who may

own

life (i.e.,

every reason to suspect others of such treachery,

are vainglorious, acquisitive, aggressive
and despicable creatures who, if they

profit in

it

and thought they could get away with

soon as look

at

you.

respect the

whose

own from

little

in a larger social

or encroach upon the “natural” means of
sustaining his

pnvate property). Accordingly,

To

assumptions about the human

condition, positing each individual
as an isolated and

need or desire for contact with other human
beings

to social realities.

life

would

stab

We associate with others by means of a social

and property of everyone

sole function

it,

is to

in society,

you

in the

back as

contract, agreeing to

and creating a limited government

ensure that no one violates this agreement. Eventually,
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we

come

to

recogmze

life

and property as natural
“rights” or

no, even the soveretgn
state, can rightfully
impinge, and
construct, a necessary evil,
from

which the individual

he can. Invoking nature once
again for

liberties

we

upon which nothing,

eonstder society an

will naturally

infallible guidance,

artificial

withdraw whenever

we grow

to believe an

overactive state saps the
competitive and acqutst.ive
tmpulses of man which unleash
his

innovative energtes and, in turn,
fuel economte

Having experienced, or

at least

gam and

prosperity for

all.

heard about, state abuse of
power in the

past-

including arbitrary executions,
torture, and expropriation
of land-we regard warily any

government or

social

movement whose designs grow beyond

securing our nghts. No, surprisingly,

by the

state

and seek

we

the

modest function of

are suspicious of nearly

to limit its role to the protection

of negative freedom-freedom

from bodily harm, intrusions on our property,
and constraints on our
state held in check,

we

meliorative action

all

activity.

With the

unleash the hounds of radical individualism,
self-interest run

amok, the dogged pursuit of material wealth
no matter the
flaw in this liberal model, according
to Dewey,

is

that

it

social costs.

The

principal

always searches for universal

causal forces or truths within nature from
which to derive political pnnciples, and
to

acknowledge the

varieties

of human experience throughout

Liberalism would have fared

much

conceptions of man leading a solitary

better, said

life in a state

understand him in his actual social context.
associated

life,

He

Dewey,

we

fails

history.

if

it

had eschewed abstract

of nature and, instead, sought

thought

it

are literally

bom

to

into

immediately dependent on other human beings for succor and
love, and

our relationships continue to nurture us and shape
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who we

are for the rest of our lives.

.

1

Likewise, our behavior has
a profound effect on
the lives of others.
individual imagined

by

Such thinking

liberals

treats

was

The

solitary

a complete fiction.

individualism as if it were somethino ct-m

i

.

^erS
artistic

tes

or educational, are
monstrosities.

’

It is

absurd to suppose

that the
which hold them together are
merely external and do nm
react into"
C ' er Pr° dUCinS tHe
framework of Personal
’

disposition.

Dewey descnbed
•‘monstrosity" to

being

is

'»

the individual

make

unencumbered by any fomr of assoetahon
as a

his point clear

and unmistakable. The notton
of a solitary human

absurd, because despite idyllic
descriptions by Locke of man
subsisting quite

contentedly ,n a state of nature (not
to mention Rousseau's
primitivist delusions), such a
creature does not and cannot exist,
and if it did,

with organic metaphors,
cell in the

Dewey compared

it

interacts, so the

human

would not be human. Ever smitten

an individual

body. Just "as the activity of each

with which

it

cell is

being... is

human being

to an individual

conditioned and directed by those

moved and

regulated

by

his associations

with others; what he does and what the
consequences of his behavior are, what his

experience consists

It is

of,

cannot even be described,

important to note here

not swing too far the other

that,

way and

much

less

accounted

for, in isolation.”

organic metaphors notwithstanding,

argue that the individual was a

fiction,

external social and historical forces over which
he had no control. That

him

guilty

Individualism Old

and New, Later Works

,

5:80-81

The Public and Its Problems Later Works 2:353.
,

,
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did

shaped by

would have made

of embracing another abstraction, “society” or “history”
rather than “the

10

1

Dewey

11

3

individual.”

Dewey identified two

types of political theories-,
hose that exaggerated the

importance offerees denved
front the native capaeit.es
of .ndiv.duals, and those
exaggerated the "conditions
prov.ded by the envnonmen,”
situated

and he found both inadequate
and

in

which .ndividuals are

far too simplistic.' 2
Classical liberalism,

course, represented an example
of the former, assuming that
each ind.v.dua,

was

a completely self-eon,
ained and self-activating unit

require nurturing from society.

Wh.ch,

The

best

that

m its most horrify, ng manifestations, regarded

human being

whose ach.evements did

example of the

latter

of

no,

can be found in Marx.sm

individuals as insignificant and

dispensable eomponents of a
eollect.ve and inexorable march
towards the end of his, ory.

Between these two extremes Dewey
offered

considered a more accurate understanding
of the
individual

and society

transactions.'’

media

a via

human

(a

middle way) which he

condition. In his view, both the

are real, each sustaining the
other in a never-ending series of

We cannot speak of one

without referring to the other, for they
are

inextricably connected.

Once we

accept that

man

cannot understand himself outside a
social context and

cannot achieve anything without support
from, or interaction with, other people,
our
notion of individuality changes.
individuality;

We come to realize that we are not bom

we achieve our individuality

through our associations. “Individuality

cannot be opposed to association,” said Dewey.
acquired his individuality and

12

is

For more on

this,

“It is

through association that

through association that he exercises

Freedom and Culture Later Works
,

1

it

,

13:117.

see Bernstein, John

with our

Dewey
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,

71

,

8

1

-84.

it.

man

has

The theory

,

Which

sets the individual

why Dewey
structure

over against society, of
necessity contracts

maintained that the

liberal state

of human assoctahon. For
the

itself.”

14

This

is

“must be deeply concerned
about the

latter

operates to affect negattvely
and positively,

.he development of individuals.Thts mean, tha,

human beings were

not inexorably

flawed creatures. They were
no, thrown into this world,
ready-made and complete, their
characters etched in stone from
the outset.

wtcked as

their associations

with others,

To

the contrary, they were
as wonderful or

allowed them to be.

As

human beings grow and change over

Class, cal liberals

acknowledged

time.

that society

advances, but they argued that only
individuals
the world could drive progress.
Unlike those

who

who

a result of the, r ongoing
interaction

evolved and often
are left alone to

made

make

state

bitter

of uncertainty,

this

who

their

way

in

are forced into cooperative

arrangements which offer no incentives
to compete, the solitary individual
assiduously to defeat those

significant

work

will

challenge his chances for success. Living
in a perpetual

lonesome figure

will

never slacken his resolve

lest

he suffer the

consequences of failure, especially of the material
kind. This lingering

unleashes a natural competitive drive and
the energy to create

new

fear

innovations,

technological breakthroughs, and other
novelties that contribute to social progress.

According

to conventional

wisdom, the virtue of private markets

reproduce the natural conditions

in

is that

they effectively

which the competitive impulses come

alive

and thus

14

"Lecture Notes: Political Philosophy,

and American Democracy,
15

1

892,” 38, quoted in Westbrook, John

44.

Liberalism and Social Action, Later Works 11:31.
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Dewey

serve to drive innovation
and social progress.
irrefutable

Many

liberals

came

to accept this as an

economic law.

Dewey

considered (his ,o be hogwash.
Classical

liberals,

he

said,

“ascnbe

all

(he

material benefits of our
present civilization to this
individualism-as if machines
were

made by

the desire for

money

profit, no,

dnven by money alone “<* "ot
by
’

technology.quest for

In his view,

money

profit.”

we

He

by tmpersonal

sctence; and as if they

were

electncity and steam under
the direction of collective

are mistaken to attnbute our
capacity for mnovation to the

instead credited “impersonal
science” for the advent of

machines, suggesting that social
progress stems from the collective
efforts of scientists

who

seek answers to hypotheses for
their

own

sake and only

later

dtscover the possible

applications of their discoveries.
That said, even the profit-minded
innovator, perhaps
the scientist

who

applies his research to design
marketable products, cannot

work

alone,

unaffected by external influences,
including his education and professional
relationships.

He would never accomplish

his goals if he did not interact
with the right people,

exchanging information, learning from them,
and receiving assistance when needed.
The
classical liberal

but he

would consider them

view, this

that

would agree

is

human

that these experiences help the
individual achieve his aims,

incidental to the

power of individual

initiative.

In

Dewey’s

an incalculable mistake. If anything, social
progress provided more evidence

relationships are a given, a reality from which

we

cannot abstract the

individual.

The problem with

social contract theory

the specious assumption that

man came

into,

was

,

and New, Later Works

,

it

and continues

16

Individualism Old

that

5:78.
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did just that:

to

It

operated under

pass through, the world

7

W,.h his individuality solitary
and intact. Front this
assumption liberals have
concluded
that

man

has no innate interest in
cultivating social relationshtps
bu, does so for the sole

putpose of protecting his
self-contained
property represented the
“natural"
individuality,

rights.

tnd, vidua,

means-or

the

„y from harm. A man’s

natural rights. “Natural rights

exist only in the

and natural

Dewey who had
liberties,”

kingdom of mythological
thC y th

f

theSe laws

and

nghts-by which he could preset

and he grudgmgly entered the
social compact

This was an absurd proposition
for

life

he

his

to safeguard those
natural

little

use for the concept of

said.

social zoology.

--

Men

do not

accord with a scheme of
atural rights. They obey
h
because they believe, rightly or
wrongly, that
he consequences of obeying are
upon the whole better than the
consequences of disobeying If the
consequences of existing rule become
too intolerable, they revolt. 17

The

struggle for freedom throughout
history has not been a search for

condition

we enjoy

universal way;

in

we can

our “natural”

state.

We cannot

precisely

some

abstract

defme freedom

in a

only experience freedom under certain
conditions— meaning,

at

a

certain time, a certain place.

Applying the “concept of historic
relative to forces that at a given time

relativity” will

show

that “liberty is

and place are increasingly

felt to

always

be oppressive.

Liberty in the concrete signifies release from
the impact of particular oppressive
forces;

emancipation from something once taken as a normal
part of human
experienced as bondage."

1

'"

Dewey

freedom and always remember

suggested that

that oppression

and

we must
its

1

Liberalism and Social Action, Later Works 11:15.
,

18

Ibid., 35.
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life

but

now

historicize our notion

of

harmful consequences will forever

change and assume different
forms. That which once
emancipated us from oppression
can betray us and become
our worst

enemy

ourselves vulnerable to this
betrayal

when we draw on

«o construct universal
truths about liberty,

as social conditions
change.

and then

pas,

insist

expenses

We leave
with oppress.on

on abiding by these

truths for

time immemorial.

Dewey

liked to cite the

example of early

liberalism.

In the seventeenth,

eighteenth, and early nineteenth
centuries, people understandably

only senous threat to

liberty.

saw

the state as the

Indeed, the church had been
vanquished, and the large

corporation was yet to be known,
wh.le the state was developing
a long and distinguished
record of oppression, seizing
property and torturing and executing
In the early nineteenth century,

force

of oppression but also as

people also grew
a mainstay

its

subjects arb.tranly.

to see the state as no,

of economic stagnation and

only a potential
injustice.

Liberals

attacked the old feudal economic
relationships and political customs
which the state

continued to support out of deference
to the landed aristocracy, arguing
rightly that these
archaic institutions, with their unintelligible
mass of customs and laws, unfairly erected
barriers before those

who wanted

to invest their capital in

This system denied people an opportunity

economic growth more generally.

deemed

It is

to

manufacturing or banking.

prosper economically and inhibited

no surprise

that in this historical context

many

the state an arch-villain, a violator of
individual rights and a roadblock to

progress.

The

solution at the time

seemed quite simple:

thereby enabling individuals to flourish and reach
their
artistically,

and economically, and opening the doors

163

to

create a limited government,

full potential, intellectually,

unprecedented social progress.

1

Unfortunately, wha, ntay have
been the ngh, solut.on to
partteular problems in the
past

morphed

into

umversal truths about indtvtdual
and economic

Thts story took on tragic
proportions

when

1

rights.

’

the late nineteenth
century introduced

a slew of problems .ha, no
one could have foreseen, the
most stgniftcan, ofwhtch was
the

nse of the corporate. Liberals
of an
control of the

new

earlier

age “had no glnnpse of the

forces of production, forces

operate in the same

way

as

which

affect the life

fae, that prtva.e

of every one, would

pnvate unchecked control of political
20
power.”
But by the

end of the nineteenth century, the
power of economic forces was
unmistakable.

The forms of associated action
characteristic of the present economic
order are so massive and extensive
that they determine the
most
significant constituents of the
public and the residence of power
Inevitably they reach out to grasp
the agencies of government;
they are
controlhng factors in legislation and
administration. Not chiefly because

of deliberate and planned self-interest,
large as may be its role, but
because they are the most potent and
best organized of social forces
In a
word, the new forms of combined
action due to the modem economic
regime control present politics, much
as dynastic interests controlled
those
of two centunes ago. They affect thinking
and desire more than did the
21
interests which formerly moved
the state.
Faced with the consequences of these
burgeoning economic forces—urban squalor,
abject poverty,

growing

inequality, dangerous

working conditions

exploitation of child labor, uprooting of local
communities, etc.

reassessed their conceptions of freedom, but

about individual and economic

Ibid.

rights.

many

“The tragedy,” lamented Dewey,

This paragraph draws heavily on the

first

chapter, pp. 5-22.

Ibid., 28.

The Public and Its Problems Later Works 2:302.
,

liberals should

,
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have

clung stubbornly to outdated notions

20

2

—

in factories,

“is that

although

these liberals were the
sworn foes of political absolutism,
they were themselves
absolutists in the social creed
they formulated/’ 22

The good news, aecordmg

to

Dewey, was

that liberalism did not

consequences and exalt untversals.
He credited the
being the

first

philosopher to declare that

“all

utilitarian liberal

organized action

is to

have to ignore

Jeremy Bentham

be judged by

for

its

consequences, consequences that take
effect in the lives of individuals,”
no, by whether

conforms

to

some

abstract political principle. 23

of his time demanded a

would endorse positive

laissez-faire state,

Though Bentham believed

he opened the door for

state action to redress

emerging

i,

the condittons

a future liberalism that

social problems.

While Bentham personally was on the
side of the classical economists
his
principle of judgment by consequences
lends itself to opposite
application... When he disallowed
the doctrine of inalienable
individual
natural rights, he removed, as far
as theory is concerned, the obstacle
to
positi ve action by the state
whenever it can be shown that the general

24
well-being will be promoted by such
action.

Eventually, the term liberalism

became disconnected from

its

laissez-faire origins

and

associated instead with positive governmental
action to assist the poor and other
unfortunates, thus giving them the opportunity
to realize their

mean

that the old liberalism

had withered away and died.

assuming different names, such as

Much

to

Dewey's dismay,

It

full potential.

was

alive

This did not

and well, merely

classical liberalism, conservatism, or
traditionalism.

the old liberalism continued to resonate in
the

first

halfof the

century, persuading people that the state should
not respond intelligently to specific

~

22

Liberalism and Social Action Later Works,
,

23

Ibid., 14.

24

Ibid.,

1

7.
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problems but should instead
accord with universal laws
about man,

society,

and

economics.
Defeating the old liberalism
once and for

conception of what

i,

means

to

be an indtv.dual

bus, ness and industry. Global
in
ot societies everywhere.

its

reach, the

now

existed at the

in a

required that

we embrace

a

new

world increasing dominated
by big

modem

The age of subsistence

days of feudalism. People

all

corporation was changing the
face

was long gone, and so were

living

the

mercy of a technology-driven
economy,

inconceivably vast and byzantine,
and relentlessly fast-paced. They
had only the faintest

knowledge about where they

was

that their society

mynad

had grown

,t

the grand

far

beyond

scheme of things.
their local

All they

knew

for sure

communities and provided them

opportunities and access to information
and goods and services, of which they

would not have dreamed
that

fit in

increased the

in years past.

The irony behind

this corporal, zing society

number and complexity of associations

was

in society, connecting

millions upon millions of people in
an unimaginably vast network, but
“its animating

motives and compensations are so unmitigatedly
25
private.”
In other words, pnvate
individual gain fueled corporatization but

its

effects

were unmistakably public.

Feverishly driven to acquire a stockpile of
material goods for his
the individual

became

ot which he

a part.

is

He

felt lost in

the crowd, aware of his

economic

25

Ibid., 69.

Ibid.,

private enjoyment,

ill-equipped to navigate the interconnected and
integrated society

vicissitudes of impenetrable social and

26

own

66-76.
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forces.

26

own

helplessness before the

'

People would regam their
bearings and

feel

more secure

in a society that

discarded the exclusively
solita^ and profit-mmded
conception of indtvtdualtsm
and

replaced

it

with an mdividualism that
restored the “enduring"
but temporarily

that liberty

capacities."

meant giving the individual an
opportunity
27

A

foe of communism.

to

develop his “inherent

Dewey never supported

providing equal shares of

wealth to everyone in society,
but he did favor redistributing
wealth

would promote equality of opportunity,
which meant

to the extent that

He must have

opportunities provided for him. He
must have just the
a
e
e
1Pment
enab '

an ytody eL7has

While old

^

mS Wm

equality

'°

liberals cautioned that guaranteeing
equality

of individual freedom, Dewey dismissed

was

this as a false

§e ‘ ""

develop

same provision
hlm that
'

must always come

dichotomy and

at

the expense

insisted that

actually a necessary precondition for
the exercise of liberty. Merely

lives.

obstructions

necessary

,hat is in

people with the tools to develop fully their
“inherent capacities” and

own

is

to

certain

securing negative liberty, as old liberals
proposed, did not suffice, for

their

i,

that

each individual would of necessity
be provided with whatever
or his realization, for his
development, whatever is necessary
him to enable him to function
adequately...

^

lost idea

is

“The freedom of an agent who

formal and empty. If he

is

is

it

failed to provide

to take

merely released from

without resources of personal

charge of

direct external

skill,

without

control of the tools of achievement, he must
inevitably lend himself to carrying out the
directions and ideas

of others."

29

Negative liberty has

little

meaning

for

someone without

27

Ibid., 25.

28
‘

Lectures on Psychological and Political Ethics: 1898. Quoted

Dewey and American Democracy,
29

r>v

Dewey

93.

(with Tufts), Ethics, Middle Works, 5:392.
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in

Westbrook, John

.

.he skills or resources to
direct his

life

as he destres.

affect our lives so profoundly,
people need

a world

where economics forces

more than jus, empty promises,
formal

guarantees that hold no more
strength than the ancient
paper on which they were
written,

To

the contrary, they require
“a social organization that
will

liberty

and opportunity for personal
growth

will guarantee

mind and

in

everyone sufficient “matenal
secunty” so

wealth of cultural resources that

now

exist

make

spirit in all

that they

may contnbute,

and

possible effective

individuals” and that

can “share

each in his

in the

own way,

to

them further enrichment.”’" Faced
with a bew.ldering world, people
need a helping hand
that will assist in their
“personal

growth

in

mind and

to partake in existing “cultural
resources” that

This called for

Dewey

do

to the

s

conception of positive— or what he often
here.

Freedom

for

when he

to grant

Dewey

that the free person

argued that a person

is no such thing as liberty in
general; liberty, so
one wants to know what the condition of liberty
is

to speak, at large.

at a given time, one
has to examine what persons can do and what
they cannot do. The
moment someone examines the question from the standpoint
of effective
action, it becomes evident that the demand
for liberty is a demand for
power, either for possession ol powers of action not
already possessed or
31
lor retention and expansion ol powers already
possessed.

30

Liberalism and Social Action Later Works
,

31

“Liberty and Social Control,” Later Works

,

,
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1

1

:41
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“effective”— liberty

exercises the power to do what he wants.

There
11

were loath

lives.

“power, the effective power

would have us believe

enjoys protection from harm, intrusion,
or restraint; but

only free

calls

Dewey simply meant

specific things.” Classical liberals

empower them

“enrichment” of their

a far greater role for the
state, a role old liberals

becomes apparent
to

add

spirit” and, in turn,

is

Th,s suggests that

we

can understand the hearty
defense of negative nghts
by “the

beneficianes of the existing
econonttc system..,s a dentand
for preservation of
powers

hey

already possess.- In other
words, their ostensibly
pnncipled stand

ve.Ied attempt to retain the

economic system.

way

find a

A

immense power they have enjoyed
under

liberal soctety,

to dtstribu.e

which

power throughout

person, class, or clique to
monopolize

After

all,

power

it

a,

ms

to

is

a ruse, a

the current

guarantee freedom for everyone,
must

soctety equitably and no. allow
a particular

for themselves or hold a
disproportionate share.

“the possession of effective
power

that exists at the time,” for
“there is

is

always a matter of the distribution
of

no such thing as the

liberty or effective

power

ot an individual, group, or
class, except in relation to the
liberties, the effective powers,

of other individuals, groups and classes.” 33
For Dewey, the

relationality

of power

suggested that one person’s power to
accomplish certain things relies heavily
on the

power of others. "No one can do anything
except
cannot do.”

34

Whether we

like

,t

or not,

we

in relation to

live in a

what others can do and

world teeming with associations and

interdependencies, and other people have
powers that affect our lives, and vice versa.

We all

stand to benefit from cooperating and
working together to understand the

intricacies

power
if

to

every

32

of our interconnected

lives.

do things, requires collective

man embraces

Ibid.,

360-61.

Ibid.,

361.

In short, this

effort.

means

that the

Society cannot distnbute power equitably

the old individualism and decides to go

33

34

Ibid.
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cause of freedom, the

it

alone.

Dewey

summarized

his

argument succinctly when he

and he can possess power only
as he acts

in

sa.d:

“Man

is free

only as he has

accord with the whole.” 35

II.

What remains

unclear

a. this

point

is

the specif.c role that the

Deweyan

state

must

Play to effect this equ, table
distribution of power and to
promote cooperative effort

among

the people. That the state
had to play a far

a given, but understanding

Dewey's position more

more

active role than

i,

did before

clearly requires a discussion

of

perhaps his most important work
on political theory, The Public and
Its Problems

which he discussed
that

most

at

length the state and

political theorists in the

its

relationship to society.

was

in

,

Dewey maintained

Western canon have made the mistake
of trying

to

locate the origins of the state in
primeval causal forces. Christian
theologians believed
that

state

God

authorized the state to

embody

his will and direction. Hegelians
said that the

manifested the dialectical unfolding of
history and the logic of the Absolute.

Marxists also subscribed to a dialectical
understanding of history but argued that

changing economic relationships, not some
unseen Absolute, determined statehood.
Classical liberals, of course, called attention
to the social contract out of which
the state

emerged

to protect the natural rights

identified a different cause, they

universal cause.

35

all

of isolated individuals. Though each group

attributed the

emergence of the

36

“Philosophies of Freedom,” Later Works 3:102.
,

36

The Public and Its Problems Later Works, 2:247-49.
,
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state to a single

Dewey found

far

it

more

useful to understand the
state as an institutional
response

«o specific conditions
experienced

the secret to local,
ng the state

by the public. As with the
attempt

was no,

to

to define liberty,

look backwards for untversal
causes bu,

forwards to spectfic consequences
of human association.

were two kinds of consequences,
public and

Dewey maintained

that there

private.

We take then our point of departure from

the objective fact that

human
have consequences upon others,
that some of these
consequences are
perceived, and that their perception
leads to
acts

subsequent effort to control
action so as to secure some
consequences and avoid others.
Following
8
us clew, we are led to remark that
the consequences are of two
kinds
diose which affect the persons
directly engaged in a transaction,
and those
htch affect others beyond those
immediately concerned In this
0 " We f,nd tHe 8emi ° f " le distinc, '
on be,ween th e private and the

publto”

When two

or

more people engage

in a

private transaction, each of them
does so

willingly, expecting to experience
certain consequences in the process.

transaction,

some people may

"externalities.-

problems.
indirect

The

suffer unintended consequences-tor

These people constitute the public, and the
public,

'

said

to

such an extent that

have those consequences systematically cared

37

state.

Ibid.,

243-44.

Ibid.,

245-46.

38

emerges

is

to address their

affected

by the

deemed necessary

Officials are those

call

who

to

look out for

interests thus affected." 38 Theoretically,
if private transactions never

had indirect consequences of this
need tor a

for.

it

a result of this

what economists

Dewey, "consists of all those who are

consequences of transactions

and take care of the

state

As

But

Dewey

sort, the

public would not exist and there would be no

believed externalities are inevitable in the

171

modem

world.

and the public will de m and
alleviate their

undue pain and prevent

same thing

unelected,

from occurring

it

and work

tirelessly to

in the future.

important to understand, however,
that the government
and the state were not

It is

the

.ha, officials look ou,
for their interests

for

Dewey. The government comprises
various

who work on

government

the behalf of the public.

and the public they

offietals

serve.

The

state

officials,

both elected and

encompasses both these

“Government

is

not the state, for that

includes the public as well as
the rulers charged with special
duties and powers. The
public, however,

The

interests.

is

organized

role

articulate the needs

in

and through these officers who

of governmental

of the public, and

offic.als is to give

to

form

act in behalf of its

to the state, to ascertain

and

ensure that these needs are met.
According to

Dewey,

The lasting, extensive and serious consequences
of associated activity
bnng into existence a public. In itself it is
unorganized and formless. By
means of officials and their special powers it
becomes

articulated
1S

™

St

public.

te

?0

The implication here

who

is

that the

Over

the years

buildings they occupy.

we come

to

may

recognize

many of the

By necessity government

conditions with which the public

is

253.

Ibid.,

277.

people in government and the

takes on a familiar form. But

it

40

172

we

can

depends on the changing

confronted. Because society always faces

39

officials

enjoy a certain degree of continuity and

never say upfront what form the state should take, for

Ibid.,

A public

government, consisting of many bureaucrats
and

serve for a considerable length of time,

stability.

a state.

and operating through representative officers
is the state- there
wlthout a government, but also there is
none without the

new and

unforeseen externalities that
demand attention, the state
continuity transforms

assuming responsibilities and
tasks which may have
been ineonce.vable
generations. In other words,
In

Dewey's view,

the great mistake

of past

Asenbing a permanent form

environment where only violence could

political theorists

by timeless

to the state

directed change;

is

it

new

effect real change.

its

government, the

usefulness.”

would

identify

officials

its

behalf.

officials

by

lie

Ibid.,

257.

Ibid.,

278.

its

is

officials

and

way of orderly and
state.

and made sure

that

organized into a state through

be maintained

dormant or
ft

in integrity

rest assured that

had

to take

and

government

officials

an active stance and hold

they failed to address emerging social problems. In
other

41

255, 256.

in the

fathers

Only through constant watchfulness and

citizens can a state

problems and remedy them,

when

on

Because “a public

state is as its officials are.

accountable

Ibid.,

of our

quick to point out that the state would
only remain dynamically

The public could not
its

efforts

political fixity,

function in society, could adapt and
respond intelligently and

they continued to work on

of public

forms and august

“The belief in

one of the stumbling-blocks

attentive to externalities if the public
kept a close eye

criticism

institutional

challenges.

Dewey was

its

to cast the state in a

an invitation to revolt and revolution.”42
Only a dynamic

continually redefining

vigorously to

said, “is

was

impeded progress and created an

of the sanctity of some form of state
consecrated by the
hallowed by tradition,” he

to pas,

the State must always
be rediscovered” and “re-made.” 41

particular mold, as a fixed
entity enshrined
traditions.

itself,

42

43
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words, the state had to be a
tr.net.onal de.noerac
y

engaged citizenry voted

in frequent elections 44

earth-shattering or orig,nal
solution,

engaged cit.zenry was a

tall

Dewey

order-a very

in

which an informed and

Though

this

felt

tall

order.

An

.nfonned public had to acquire

age.

Indeed,

we

live in a soc.ety

it,

and

this

proved more

where “many consequences are

rather than perceived; they
are suffered, bu, they cannot
be said to be

are not,

by those who expenence them,
referred

identified the

its

modem

hardly sounded like an

recognized that creating an
infonned and

a sophisticated understand,
ng of the externalities affecting
d.fficul, in the

civicaiiy

known,

for they

to their origins.” 45 Until
the public

ongins of its suffering, government

officials

could continue to capitalize on

ignorance and govern without
accountability. This was the problem
of modernity.

According
external, ties

was

Dewey,

were so remote,

the public had

modem

to

little

this

its

problem stemmed from the

workings so complex, and

chance of acquiring knowledge about

its

fact that the

ongins of

effects so dispersed, that

them—or of itself.

In the

world of transcontinental connections
and complex interdependencies, the
public

inchoate, difficult to pinpoint with any
degree of certainty.

[T]he machine age has so enormously
expanded, multiplied, intensified
and complicated the scope ot the indirect
consequences, has formed such
immense and consolidated unions in action, on an
impersonal rather than a

community
itself.

And

basis, that the resultant public cannot
identify
this

discovery

effective organization

on

is

and distinguish
obviously an antecedent condition of any

its part.

46

44

Ibid.,

334.

Ibid.,

317.

Ibid.,

314.

45

46
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The primary

,ssue

was

that the

innocuous pnva.e transaction

were

far

shared

machine age had made

to

i,

possible for a seemingly

have a profound affect on the

lives

of many people who

removed from the source of their
suffenngs and from others
with

common

in

they

concerns. In other words, the
indtrec, consequences
were becoming

more and more remote from

busmessman

whom

New York

thousands of workers

the initial transaction.
Hence, the proverb, ai example
of the

City who, by pressing a button
or placing a phone

in Detroit

and creates just as

many jobs

in Indonesia.

call, lays

off

In addition,

having “expanded" and
“complicated the scope of the indirect
consequences,” modem,
ty

had tom society asunder into

To

of the public

talk

convent, on

we

many

in monolith, c

“publics” that are “amorphous and
unart, culated.” 47

terms was a misnomer, an ,mprecise
linguistic

use for the sake of simplicity and
48
elegance.
Externalities abounded

in

modernity, affecting various groups of
people, often with vastly different
and even
conflicting concerns. Finally, these
various publics experienced further
disintegration at

the hands ot a radical individualism
that had set root in

know

their next

door neighbors anymore,

across the country with

of all
itself.

its

this

An

was

they

may

eclipsed public

awakened from

meant

officials to

its

we

society. People did not

alone the thousands or millions of people

share a

the "eclipse" ot the public:

governmental

Ibid.,

whom

let

modem

common

cannot find

a dysfunctional

grievance. Sadly, the end result

it,

or, rather,

and undemocratic

wreak havoc with the power vested

in

it

state,

cannot find

and

this

allowed

them. Until the public

slumber, democracy would remain but a dream.

317.

48

plead guilty of continuing to use
discussing its inadequacy.
1

this

convention throughout
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this

work, even

after

Dewey argued

that reinvigorating

democracy

in

America demanded the

transformation of our Great
Society into a Great
Community. The Great Society

contained a vast network of
undeftned publics whteh
connected people together
in a

number of ways bu, faded
"by steam and

to foster

electricity,"

communtty.

was responstbie

relatively impersonal and
mechanical

the picture appeared bleak,

Community. Even
found hope

in

in

various

1

Dewey

927,

,f anyth, „g, the Great
Society,

for uprooting

communities with "new and

modes of combined human

believed there was

Med

still

hope

behavior.”*’

for the

when The Public and Its Problems
was

means of mass communication which

,n his

Though

Great

released,

Dewey

mind could help fonn

coherent publics in American society.

We have the physical

tools of communication as never
before. The
thoughts and aspirations congruous
with them are not communicated,
and
hence are not common. Without such

communication the public will
remain shadowy and formless, seeking
spasmodically for itself, but
seizing and holding its shadow rather
than its

substance. Till the Great
converted into a Great Community, the
Public will remain in
eclipse. Communication can alone
create a great community. 50

Society

It

is

these "tools of communication" could

would be

a Great

Community

that

work as Dewey hoped they would,

remained national

in scale

and enormous

the end result

in

scope and

complexity but recaptured the intimacy of local
communities. The printing press,

and film

all

held great potential for linking isolated

human beings

radio,

together, raising

awareness about the many disastrous consequences of
private transactions and
stimulating a nationwide conversation about these
problems and the various solutions

proposed.

49

Ibid.,

296.

Ibid.,

323-24.

50
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Though
on so

i,

large a seale,

had democracy

in

"Regarded as an
life.

may seem odd

I, is

i,

Dewey would

clear that

envision the crealion of
a community

when Dewey spoke of community,
he always

mind. Quite simply, democracy
was the very defimt.on of
community.

idea,

the idea

becomes

that

democracy

is

no, an alternative to other
principles of assoc, at ed

of community itself.”

of the community was an
democracy, a cooperative

issue.

To

spirit in

It is

clear that for

merit the name, a

which

citizens

Dewey

neither size nor seope

community had

to foster

communicate shared concerns, work

together to find solutions, and
share the burden of their joint
actions.

Wherever there is conjoint activity
whose consequences are appreciated
as
good by all singular persons who take
par, in it, and where the
real, zahon
he good is such as to effect an
energetic
eing just because

community. The

it

is

a

good shared by

desire and effort to sustain
all, there is in so far
a

clear consciousness

of a communal
implications, constitutes the idea of
51
democracy.
Bu,

Dewey

instated

democracy could only

it

in

life, in all its

fiinction properly if its citizens
no, only shared

concerns and worked together but also had
access to good information, free from
distortion

and

bias.

A democratic society had

inquiry and of distribution of

without

lull

its

to

promote both "the freedom of social

conclusions,” said

publicity in respect to

all

Dewey,

for the public cannot

consequences which concern

it.

emerge

Whatever

obstructs and restricts publicity, limits and
distorts public opinion and checks and
distorts

thinking on social affairs.” 5 - With this
illuminating information

can develop informed opinions, and they stand

government

officials to

remedy

existing problems.

51

Ibid.,

328.

Ibid.,

339.

in a

52

177

at its disposal, the

powerful position as voters

to

public

compel

Dewey lamented

the fact that our eurren.

democraey faded

to harness its

techno, ogtcal capaeit.es and
disseminate accurate informa,
.on on which public
op.nion

could be fonned.

He

many democratic

considered this the principal
reason for our democrats
woes. Bu,

reads, s and

ma.ntained that vesting too
view,

we

much

responsib.iity in the public

irrational,

and emotions-when forming

modem

whom Dewey squabbled throughout
his
was

the problem.

In their

gu.ded by then basest instincts-,
heir passions,
political opin.ons.

The growing complexity of the

world demanded expanding the
authority of experts

.ssues of public policy and

who can be expected

dispassionate reason and acquired
knowledge.

to

make

who have

current state

The public, on

of affairs and the out-party when things
seem

words, the public should not rule so
do, preventing

government

much

officials

mastered complex

decisions based on
the other hand, should only

be entrusted with the responsibility
of supporting the in-party when

who

career,

could no, expect intelligent
and rat.ona, dec.s.on-making
from the publ.c

because most people were
fears,

with

elitists,

to

it

is

happy with the

be going badly

53

In other

.

as they should function as a check
on those

from straying too

far

and abusing their power

egregiously.

Dewey maintained
intellectual class.

that this elitist position

Although the public

was an unfounded conceit of the

may not have

had the

sophisticated social inquiry, they did have the
capacity, in
intelligent

the

many

judgments with the knowledge furnished by

should have the knowledge and

skill to

skills to

engage

Dewey’s view,

experts. “It

is

to

in

make

not necessary that

carry on the needed investigations; what

53

Walter Lippmann is probably the most famous democratic
argument. See especially The Phantom Public.
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realist to

make

this

" reqUired

15

‘

hat ‘ hey ha

™

*

he

abi "'y *o

by others upon common
54
concerns.”
capacity for intelligent
judgment,
the public so quickly.

Judge of the bearing of the
knowledgee supplied

In reply to those skeptics

Dewey

argued that

we have no

We live in a soc.ety where “the data

lacking,” and until that day

comes when

who doubted

for

evidence to dtsparage

good judgment are

“secrecy, prejudice, bias,
misrepresentahon, and

propaganda as well as sheer ignorance
are replaced by inquiry
and

way of telling how

may be.” 55

masses

the public’

publicity,

we have no

apt for judgment of social
policies the existing intelligence
of the

For the time being,

we must

withhold our mistrust of the
public and

focus our criticism on the media
and other purveyors of grossly
distorted informa, ton

upon which the public has based

its

opinions. While

Dewey had

to

contend with the

“yellow journalism” of his day, one
can only imagine wha, he would
have though, of
today’s cable

news networks and

pundits.

Having defended the public from groundless
aspersions
took the offensive against expert

rule.

experts could have dire consequences.

He argued

Though they have

It

is

power could become

assumed

that the policies

benevolent, that

The

is,

framed

final obstacle in the

of an

to

way

upon them, Dewey

that delegating too

much

a track record

unbiased research and looking out for the
interests of society
significant political

cast

at large,

authority to

of conducting

experts vested with

as corrupt as any other ruling

elite.

of the experts are

in the main both wise and
conserve the genuine interests of society.
of any aristocratic rule is that in the absence

articulate voice

on the part of the masses, the best do not and cannot
remain the best, the wise cease to be wise. It is impossible
for highbrows
to secure a monopoly of such knowledge
as must be used for the
regulation of common affairs. In the degree in
which they become
a

54

The Public and

55

Ibid.,

Its

Problems Later Works 2:365.
,

,

366.
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specialized class, they are
shut off from knowledge
of the needs which
they are supposed to serve. 56

Dewey

suggested

in this

and well-intended they
heed ,o

common

expenences

may be

at the outset,

officials.

its

no matter how knowledgeable

remain effective only so long
as they pay

concerns and are ultimately
answerable

identify the publtc and

its

passage that government

,o the public.

Experts canno,

needs on their own. The
public must find a votce
and articulate

to each other

and

to experts

who

will then use this
infomta.ton to conduct

research and formulate tentative
policy solutions, which they
undoubtedly will have to
revisit at a later date.

communication with

In short, expert

the public.

knowledge

Dewey

relies heavily

on constant

argued that the vtrtue of democracy

is

that

it

involves “a consultation and
discussion which uncover[s] social
needs and troubles.”

Experts can only put their fancy
techniques and vast reservoir of
knowledge to effective

use

it

the public talks to them.

employed
that

it

a vivid

metaphor

pinches and where

the trouble

is to

perhaps one of his more memorable
passages,

make

his point:

pinches, even if the expert shoemaker

soliciting input

Dewey

“The man who wears the shoe knows

be remedied." 57 The shoemaker cannot
improve

new customers without
adjustments.

it

to

In

is

best

the best judge of how

his product

and

attract

from the wearer and then making the
appropriate

58

56

Ibid.,

364.

57

Ibid.

58

Dewey

shoemaker metaphor seemed to be a reference to Max Weber,
who expressed
his wanness of popular sovereignty in a letter
to a friend in 1908. He wrote: “It as if one
were to speak of the will of shoe consumers which should
detennine the technology of
shoemaking! Of course the shoe consumers know where the shoe

know

s

pinches, but they never

it

can be improved.” Quoted

in

Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory 390, 394.
,
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III.

To

this point,

government

we have

seen that the public

in a

Deweyan democracy must

officials accountable for
their acfions. For this
to happen, experts

media must provide the public
accurate and useful mfonnation
with which
sensible judgments about the
best course of action to solve

does not end here.
polifics.

Dewey

argued that the public needed

to rouse

it

from

its

not just

demands of the public can only be met
elites, particrpate directly
in

Participatory

common

fully in a

can make

play a far more active role
in

slumber. Though the Great

rehed on experts and government
officials to address

and the

problems. But the story

its

Keeping current on the rssues and
voting every two years

were not sufficient

that the

to

i,

hold

in

November

Community

concerns,

certainly

Dewey

democracy where

electrons

believed

all citizens,

the democratic decisron-making
process.

democracy represented

the best

public good and individuals could reach
their

means by which
full

human

potential as

The political and governmental phase of
democracy
means so tar found, for realizing ends that lie in

the state could promote the

is

beings.

a means, the best

the wide

domain of

human relationships and the development of human
personality. It is, as
we often say, though perhaps without appreciating
all that is involved in
the saying, a way of life, social and
individual. The key-note of
democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it
seems to me, as the
necessity ot participation of every mature

human being

in fonnation

of the

values that regulate the living of men together:—
which
the standpoint of both the general welfare
and the full

human beings

as individuals.

is necessary from
development of

59

This passage captures in large measure the
view, democracy was a

59

“way of life"

in

spirit

of Dewey’s democratic theory. In his

which “every mature human being” participated

“Democracy and Educational Administration,” later Works
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,

1

1:217-18.

ation of the values that
regulate the living 0 f men
together.”

democrat, e participation was
that

i,

The upshot of

promoted “both the general
welfare and the

full

development of human beings as
individuals.” While society
and the individual were
forever a, odds in the liberal
paradtgm, participatory democracy
demonstrated that

rumors about

this conflict

Dewey

had been greatly exaggerated.

believed participatory democracy
created a win-win situation.

democratic community embodied
a social intelligence

group of people could ever achieve,
and
social

and

political matters.

intelligence, bu, “the value

final

this is the

Each person

far greater than

First, the

any one person or

ktnd of intelligence that counts

may contnbute

a different

in

amount of

of each contribution can be assessed
only as

i,

enters into the

pooled intelligence constituted by
the contributions of all.”
This “pooled

intelligence”

or what

Dewey has

also called

“embodied intelligence”—is "much more

important for judgment of public
concerns than are differences in intelligence
quotients.”

60

commonweal

Participating citizens are far

more

likely to find solutions that

promote the

than a single person or a select group
ever could. Secondly, each

individual participant in the democratic

community

also has something to gain from this

expenence. In the process of working cooperatively
toward democratic ends, he
discovers within himself vast reserves of energy
and joy, and he begins to associate his

own

well-being with the good of the whole. The
idea

likely to find happiness

60

it

that

an individual was far more

from active participation, working with others

agreed-upon ends. “There
happiness, that

is

is

to achieve certain

no way,” said Dewey, “to escape or evade

this

law of

resides in the exercise ot the active capacities of a
voluntary agent; and

The Public and Its Problems, Later Works, 2:366-67.
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nence no

way

to escape or evade the
law of a

common

happiness, tha,

it

the congruous exercise
of the voluntary activities
of all concerned.” 61

well-m, ended a leader
person.

Many

beneficence

stir

to help.

democracy.

No

he cannot confer happ.ness
or the good

mailer

life

in

how

on another

leaders and philanthrop.sts
are often surpnsed to
see that their acts of

•‘resentment,” bu,

g.ven that they failed

wanted

may be.

must res.de

to

Dewey

argued that this

engage the “freely cooperative

is

an understandable response

activities”

of the very people they

"This cooperation must be the
root pnnciple of the morals
of

People can only find happiness
and the good

participation: “the

good

is

the act.vit.es in which

all

men

life

from

their

own

participate so that the

powers of

each are called out, put to use, and
63
reenforced/’

Dewey's emphasis on community and

participation demonstrate

how

far afield

he

had ventured from orthodox liberalism.
Far more concerned about individual
alienation
from community and the need to
create more opportunities for
democratic participation,
he could not possibly sympathize with

of majority tyranny. Indeed,

democracy
had

to

is

liberal

wariness of collectivities or with their
fear

Dewey famously declared

more democracy.” 64 To become

a

way of life

Dewey

and

religion.

65
Still

more,

it

had

to penetrate

(with Tufts), Ethics , Middle Works 5:277.
,

62

Ibid.,

276.

Ibid.,

286.

63

The Public and Its Problems Later Works 2:327.
,

,

65

Ibid.,

for all citizens,

325.
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of

democracy

reach every nook and cranny of our culture,
including the family, the school,

industry,

64

that “the cure for the ailments

our souls: “unless democratic

hab,,s

of though, and action are

insecure.

It

can no, stand in

democratic methods

par,

isolation.

i,

firs,

It

fiber

of the people,

political

democracy

is

must be buttressed by the
presence of

in all social relattonships.” 66
It is

Dewey, democracy was more
than
constdered

of the

important to stress

that, for

a political procedure or
type of government; he

a cultural, even a moral,
approach to solving problems
and interacting

wtth our fellow man. But,
of course, the pofitical implications
of democracy ran deep.

The

extent to which democratic
habits seeped into the fiber
of our culture determined

whether the problems of the public
could be identified and resolved.

These “democrat, c habits”
approach found

was

that

in scientific

welcomed

i,

insisted that

all

to

which Dewey alluded so often resembled
the

communities. The virtue of scientific
method, he claimed,

diversity of opinion, called for the
free exchange of information,

truth inquiry should

conclusions be subject to

draw on observable

fiirther testing

facts,

and demanded that

under public scrutiny. Though

Dewey

all

readily

conceded

that

method

deciding upon policies,” this was an ideal
to which democracy should aspire:

in

no democracy had ever "made complete
or adequate use of scientific

the "freedom of inquiry, toleration
of diverse views, freedom of communication,
the
distribution

of what

is

found out to every individual as the ultimate

are involved in the democratic as in the
67
scientific method.”

intellectual

consumer,

He wholeheartedly

believed that the exercise of scientific method
did not have to be confined to experts.

Even

66

67

if

citizens

do not acquire the specific knowledge and technical
expertise of

"Democracy and Educational Administration,” Later Works

Freedom and Culture Later Works
,

,

13:135.

184

,

1

1

:225.

scientists, they

can

still

adopt their general
approach-tolerating other viewpoints,

exchanging infonnation freely
with others, basrng

truth claitns

evidence, and accepting the
provisionally of any truths

While

,t

would be absurd
a S

^Mer

nt

r r °“fH em
e fb

to believe

" Sde " Ce
° Cracy

it

iS

on the available enrptncal

we happen

to embrace.

desirable or possible for
every one
fr °
the s,de ofsubject

m

defined

allied

with s P rea d of the scientific
attitude
fitude. Tt
It is
b the
he sole guarantee against
wholesale misleading by
propaganda More important still,
it is the only
assurance of the
° P ' ni0n intell, gent enou h to
P
meet present social
8
15

lrob!ems“

The implication here

is

challenges of modem

life

the scientific attitude in

resemble the scientist

quite clear: In order for their
“embodied intelligence” to meet the

and address the concerns of the
public(s),

all

aspects of their live. This

in his

approach to

and deliberative characteristics of a

life,

scientific

means

than anything else in the

modem

age,

every citizen must

community.

Dewey

a

more profound

Dewey

democracy”),

until the

the floors of our factones and shops,

worker played a

Dewey opposed

hard-line

communism

of any kind, the forceful expropriation and

68

Ibid., 168.

185

the

a

managing

means and ends of

Though he supported democratizing

measures as expropriating property and redistributing
a solution

on

“industrial

significant role in

making decisions about

production, democracy would never truly flourish.
the workplace,

by G. D. H. Cole,

and leading advocate of “guild socialism”
(or

argued that

effect

stressed the importance of extending

the scientific attitude to business and
industry. Deeply influenced
British political theorist

must adopt

and society must assume the
participatory

Because economic relationships and
associations had

man

that

citizens

or socialism, especially such crude

it

equally to the proletariat. Hardly

radical redistribution

of wealth only

served ,o transfer ownership
from one group of people
,o another without
addressing the

more important

tssue

of how cap,, a, can be pu,

to intelHgen.

use for collective ends

d moral passivity and
perversion as that in which he

Dewey

now

lives.

»

70

favored guild social, sm because
„ placed more emphasis on governance
than on

ownership, socializing intelligence
instead of capital. Rather
than giving workers an
equal share of ownership,

decision-making process

i,

at

proposed afford, ng them equal
opportun.ty to partake
work.

71

A democratized

conception of the “planning society,”

good and
social

in

workplace

which workers pool

fit

well with

ends

their efforts should

Dewey's

their intelligence to

creative use of the capital at
their disposal, determining on
their

in the

own

to

be devoted. While they would certainly
keep the

make
what
interests

of owners in mind, workers also had
the power to broaden the concerns
of bus, ness,

paying specific attention

to the

many

externalities for

accept responsibility, such as worker
alienation,

wage

which

their

coloration should

inequality, environmental

degradation, and the uprooting of local
community.

The problem with

structure of the capitalist system

communism,

society'

was

much

like

A

Five-Year Plan.

cultivate a flexible environment in

71

sustained a “planned

healthy society, according to Dewey, must

which ends continually change

Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of Liberalism 112,1
80.
,

70

it

and only served the preconceived ends of a
particular class— i.e., the owners’

profits or the Party's

69

that,

the hierarchical

“Creative Industry,” Middle Works

,

1 1

:335.

Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of Liberalism

186

,

1

80.

to

meet new and

unexpected problems; he
endorsed guild socialism
because he believed
scientific attitude to the

intellectually

applied the

world of business and industry.

Dewey lamented
inflexibility bu, also

i,

the hterarehical structure
of capitalism no, only because
of

because

i,

prevented workers from reach,
ng their

and creatively. Den.ed the
opportunity

to

its

full potential

use their minds or imagination,

they were also subject to the
stupefying monotony of
routiniza.ion favored by profit-

minded managers and owners.
Because workers sold
themselves

at the

mercy of owners who exercised

the production process.
Th,s
are not the ends

freely

and

of their

in, ell, gently,

means

sole control over the

72

wage

earned.. .The activity

Though Dewey never had
,

English, he echoed Marxist alienation
theory in suggesting that

and not just a means

to an end.

an ever-growing share of our

lives,

72
‘

not free

yet

been translated

into

work should be an end

in

75

In a

man

world where work and economy represented

could only be a free and complete person

could participate in the decision-making
process
responsibility

is

the occas.on to read

Marx's Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts which had not

itself

means and ends of

of their employers. They do what
they do, no,

but for the sake of the

,n.”

wage, they put

that the “results actually
achieved [in the workplace]

actions, but only

because not freely participated

their labor for a

at

work,

if

if he

he could share the

of managing the workplace.

Democracy and Education, Middle Works,

9:269.

73

Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of Liberalism, 1 7.
3
According to Ryan, only a
handful of American scholars had read the Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts
before the 1960s. Erich Fromm was the first to introduce
these
early writings

American readers

in

1961 in a book entitled

Marx

187

s

Concept of Man.

by Marx

to

The importance of workplace
democracy notwithstanding,
Dewey argued
the only

way

sustam a flourishing participatory
democracy was

to

communities as

sites for civtc

to revive

our local

engagement. Though citizens
must always remain mindful

of those concents affecting the
Great Community, they can
only recetve
democratic experience-engaging

in face-to-face interaction

listening attentively to other
points-of-v,ew,
efforts to address the
concerns

that

practical

with fellow cittzens.

working side-by-side with
neighbors

of the common, ty-in the

localities they

in

spend most of

their time.

deepest and richest sense community
must always remain a matter of
intercourse. This is why the
family and neighborhood with
their deficiencies, have always
been the chief agencies of nurture the

“

all,

means by which
tree
free

and

possess

work

fi°il
full

all

^

dispositions are stably formed and
ideas acquired which

° fchaMa

The Great Community,

-

,
inter-communication,

the qualities

is

conceivable. But

it

in the sense of
can never

which mark a local community. It will
do its
and enriching the experience of local

associations... Vital and thorough
attachments are bred only
intimacy of an intercourse which is
of necessity restricted

in the

in range.

In his writings

participating.

final

in ordering the relations

on pedagogy, Dewey argued
That which remains abstract

that people learn best

to us,

74

by doing and

remote from our palpable experience,

can never be completely understood. Though
reading publicized information

to stay

informed, voting in elections, and co-managing
our places of work with fellow

employees provided opportunities for action and

participation, they

Dewey’s view. There was no

communal

individual

s

life,

for this

sufficient in

was where an

dispositions are stably formed and ideas acquired”
and where deep

attachments are bred.

74

substitute for local

were not

The Public and

Its

More

than anything else, the local

Problems Later Works 2:367.
,

,

188

community

nurtures and

ton™

the individual, his
personality, his ideals, hts
worldvtew. Aecordingly,

i,

ls

the best

Place to cultivate democratic
habits. In addition, the
local community, of
necessity
'restricted in range," enjoyed
the kind of intimate
“intercourse” required in a

participatory democracy.

From

afar,

many

larger-than-life figures

“may

inspire

admiration, emulation, servile
subjection, fanatical part.sanship,
hero worship; but not

love and understanding, save
as they radiate from the
attachments of a near-by union.

Democracy must begin

Dewey
ties

at

home, and

its

home

often expressed concern that
the Great Society threatened
to tear

and communities asunder, and he
believed

made
to the

local

that the reality

democratic participation more necessary
than ever.

forces

He saw

whose

Dewey,

interactions with one another

impersonality of the sweep of present forces.” 76
participation

was

that

ground on which

resisted

it

as an antidote

in the grip

of

whose workings and consequences they
have no power of affecting. The

situation calls emphatic attention,"
continued

associations,

human

of these centrifhgal forces

problems of modernity. Increasingly,
people “find themselves

immense

solid

the neighborly community.” 75

is

it

“to the need for face-to-face

may offset

One of the

if not control the

dread

virtues of local democratic

fought against the impersonal forces of
modernity, providing

to lead meaningfiil lives.

the dread impersonality of the

At the same time

sweep of present

forces,”

local

it

democracy

also discouraged

withdrawal into a state of narrow provinciality and
raised consciousness of the Great
Society to which citizens were inextricably connected.
Not surprisingly,

Dewey

expressed his admiration for Jeffersonian democracy, which
fostered the “development of

75

Ibid.,

76

368.

Freedom and

Culture, Later Works

,

1

3:

1

76.
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local agencies

of communication and
cooperation, creating stable

loyal attachments, to

militate against the centnfnga,
forces of present culture,
while a, the

of a kind
In

to

same time they

are

respond flexibtly to the
demands of a larger unseen and
indefinite public.””

other words, local participatory
democracy offered the best of
both worlds:

our fives by teaching us

how

to

communicate and cooperate with our

neighbors and by strengthening
our intimate

friends and

within the community, bu,

ties

US to address those concerns
tha, affected the larger
public of which

ennched

i,

it

also trained

we have become

a

part in the Great Society.

This

last

thriving local

point was especially crucial
for

democracy was necessary

to

make

Dewey. He

strongly believed that a

the larger national public
visible and

coherent.

Whatever the future may have in store,
one thing is certain. Unless local
life can be restored, the
public cannot adequately resolve
its
most urgent problem: to find and identify

communal

it

will manifest a fullness, variety

itself. But if it be reestablished
and freedom of possession and

enjoyment of meanings and goods unknown
of the past. Font will be alive and
the
it

complex and world-wide scene

will not

be isolated.

Its

in the contiguous associations
flexible as well as stable, responsive
to

in

which

it

is

enmeshed. While

local,

larger relationships will provide an

inexhaustible and flowing fund of meanings
upon which to draw with
its drafts will be honored.

assurance that

Dewey praised
were able

local

democracy communities because, without

to cultivate a sophisticated citizenry,
“flexible”

and world-wide scene

emerge

in

fully if citizens

which

came

it

is

and “responsive

enmeshed.” As he saw

it,

to the

The Public and Its Problems Later Works 2:370.
,

,
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complex

the public could only

together regularly, face-to-face, to share ideas and

Ibid., 177.
78

sacrificing stability, they

expenences, express concerns,
and „s,en
nationa,,

Dewey believed

local

each other-regard,
ng matters of local,

and even tntemat.ona,
tmportance. Readtng
pub.ications

always be crucial tor the public
bu,

,o

that the

to

many

become aware of the

to stay

infonned wi„

externalities affecting their
lives,’

conversations in which

we engage within

a vibrant

democratic community will serve
to reinforce and enrich
our understanding of these

complex

issues.

No

one

man

can understand hilly

how some remote

transaction affects

the public until he has talked
to other people and
learned from their insights
and unique
perspectives.

Dewey maintained

print is a precondition

accomplished

that although the social inquiry

of the creation of a true public,”

in face-to-face relationships

fulfillment recurs to the pnmitive
sense

the

meanings

take.

Logic in

its

result, the public

purveys pass from mouth

it

will

know no

limits

and

we

will

become

it.

The

faith in the

power of local democratic community

intelligence and transform

human

nature

lies at the heart

to

augment

of Dewey’s

social

political thought.

wrote:

The foundation of democracy
faith in

human

experience.

is faith in

the capacities of human nature;

and in the power of pooled and cooperative
not the belief that these things are complete but
that if
they will grow and be able to generate progressively
the
intelligence,

It is

given a show

knowledge and wisdom needed

to

guide collective action. 80

79

80

into

to

After talking with others in our
community, sharing experiences and insights,

“embodied intelligence” of our community

Ibid.,

way

7 '1

better for

He

by means of diree, give and

until the

its

“final actuality is

of the word: dialogue.” As a

remains “partially infonned and formed

mouth.”

its

which made

371.

“Democracy and Educational Administration,” Later Works

191

,

1

1:219.

1

As

this

passage nd.ca.es,
,

Dewey

argued .ha, democracy res.s
on ,wo foundat.ona, truths

m which he had unwavering faith: “the
psychology, and

''the

capacities of human nature”
(the democratic

power of pooled and cooperative
expenence”

intelligence” (the democratic
epistemology).*'

great contempt for

he assailed both

first

principles”

class, cal liberal, sm

specous assumptions about

the

committing the same enme, basing

from the pragmatist

tradition.

condition. Yet

Dewey

political

democrats ethos on contestable

Indeed, fairly late in his career,

com P re hcnsive

preferences."

82

philosophy, seems to

me to

ideas derived

Dewey argued

now

As Dewey would have undoubtedly conceded,
pragmatism

the faith that participatory

to the

is

ongins of that

democracy would

faith, first to

tha,

"any

not grounded

be only a projection of arbitrary
personal

the "comprehensive philosophy”
in which his democratic theory

Inm

systems on

appears guilty of

theory of activity in social and
moral matters, liberal or otherwise,
which
>n 3

Dewey had

a prescribed set of ideas
can be built, and

and Marxism for basing then

his

enhance "human

Ltke his pragmatist forebears,

upon which

human

to

represented

was "grounded.”

flourish “if given a

show.”

It

gave

We turn

Dewey’s democratic epistemology, and then

to his

democratic psychology and theology.

8

Though Dewey does

passage,

human
82
~

we

not mention freedom of choice (the democratic theology)
in this

will see that

he most certainly assumed

condition.

“Nature

in

Experience,” Later Works 14:150.
,

192

this

was an

essential element

of the

,,

IV.

Dewey’s epistemology began with

the plural, Stic premise
that

we

live in a

-un, verse” fraught with
"real uncertainty and
contingency, a world which

and never

which

will be, a

world which

in these respects

and labor.”

83

He

may

in

some

be made

this

respect

way

is

not

or that according as

men judge,

in the

that

it

old sense can hardly be called
a universe at

cannot be

Although he saw within

summed up and

this multiverse

infinitely variegated

all;

so multiplex

grasped in any one formula.” 84

an opportunity for humanity to
make and remake

truths in accordance with its
ideals, he also understood that
throughout history

more

prize, love,

could never abtde the monistic
picture of the universe,
seemlessly

one, a world which

had good reason

all in,

incomplete and in the making,
and in

connected and whole. Like James,
he welcomed "an open world,
an

and far-reaching

is

to fear this contingent world,

often than not, deliver

man

teeming with hazards and

great suffering.

men have

pitfalls that,

To defend himself against

the caprices

of fortune,

man

has searched for certainty, a set of
universal principles on which he could

anchor his

life.

Philosophers have aided this quest for certainty
with unabashed

enthusiasm, invoking reason and logic

to

discover absolute truths. But

his mission to convince his readers and
listeners that this

was

Dewey made

a quixotic quest.

it

“Upon an

empirical view,” he said, "uncertainty, doubt,
hesitation, contingency and novelty,

genuine change, are tacts,” and no timeless principles
or absolute truths can wash these
facts

83

84

away.

85

“Philosophy and Democracy,” Middle Works
Reconstruction

in

1:50-51.

Philosophy Middle Works 12:1
,

85

1

Human Nature and Conduct, Middle

14.

Works, 14:.213.
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Insisting

world and will

on

this quest,

warned, will not help us
cope with a contingent

heap more unhappiness
upon

in tact

makes man suscept.ble
cult:

Dewey

to ‘•.he frozen intelligence

frozen because arrested in
dogma.” 86

The

us.

belief in absolute truth

of some pas, thinker, see,
and party

When men

hold

fas, to their

disagreements with others turn into
violent conflict. Without
means

dogmas,

their

to resolve their

differences of opinion peaceftilly,
the final arbiter of them
dispute over the truth

is force.

What upholders of absolute

principles always forget is the
vulnerability of
that the principles which
they advance are the
absolute principles which any
can accept. The claim to
possession of first
and final truths is, in short, an
appeal to final arbitrament by
force For
when the claim to possession of the
truths by which life should
be directed
’ aVe " S
° UtSide ° f any,hing in ac,ual
experience, and
wheTth
l‘°
hen the claim
is asserted to be incapable
of being tested by anything in
experience, and nevertheless different
systems are asserted to possess
ultimate truth, there is no reasonable,
no practicable way of negotiating
their differences. Stark and
absolute opposition and conflict covers
the
°le sltua tion. The only way out
is trial by force, the result
of which
will give the side having
superior force the
eir implicit

assumption

w

i

s

dogmas,

This passage

is

at least for as

long a time as

especially interesting because

Bertrand Russell,

who

it

it

ability to impose acceptance
of
has superior forces. 87

appears to be a direct response to

declared that pragmatism was culpable
of eliminating any

objective standard of truth to which

we

can appeal and simply equating truth with

expedience or working successfully. “In the
absence of any standard of truth other than
success

,

he warned, “ironclads and

Maxim

guns must be the ultimate arbiters of

“The Economic Basis of the New Society,” in Ratner, ed.
John Dewey’s Philosophy
43
This essay was written especially for Ratner’s edited
volume, which mainly
1

.

comprises excerpts from
87

“Lessons from the

Dewey

War— in

s

published works.

Philosophy,” Later Works 14:321-22.
,
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,

.

metaphysical truth.” 88 Russell
believed that reason
represented

which could

settle

our disputes authoritatively.

A

this “standard

of truth”

proponent of the analytical
school of

philosophy, Russell maintained
that author,, a.ive
settlement of any dispute
simply

demanded

strict

adherence

to logic,

bu, fixed system of rules
on

winch he understood

how one must

think to

in

amve a,

algonthmic terms, a complex
tmth. Bu,

Dewey maintained

obedience to one

se,

of rules creates the conditions
under which “stark and
absolute”

conflict anses. After

all,

many

that

people’s concrete experiences
would belie the “truths”

deduced through reason, and,
pointing
people would quite rightly stand
firm

Luke Peirce and James,
final arbiter

inquiry.

of truth

to the empirical

in their

Dewey

oppos.tion to the

at their disposal, these

dogma of ra, tonal

inqu.ry.

maintained that reason could not
function as the

such a formulaic way, because there

is

not just one

For Dewey, the study of logic was
no, an exercise

in

mathematical thinking bu,

in

rather a descriptive and nonnative
endeavor.

actually use their

most successful

minds

to

Its

business was to

tell

us

method of

first

how men

solve problems and then identify
those methods that prove

in their experience.

The

inquiry-deductive, inductive, etc.—just
entymologist does with insects. 89

what

evidence

logician should collect and study
like the geologist

His aim should be

effect inquines actually proceed,
genetically

to

methods of

does with rocks and the

“analyze and report

and functionally

how and

to

in their experiential

88

Russell, Philosophical Essays, 109.
Russell’s criticism of pragmatism.
89

See Introduction for

Moore, American Pragmatism 201
,
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a

more

detailed discussion of

the

method of inquiry when

.ntlh is absolute

the

station

calls for

and divorced from concrete

way of accessing

that truth.

As Dewey

put

immutable order of nature,
superempirical
'

hiS U " iVerSal ° rder

"

8raSped

reality,

it,

is

inquiry.

rational

means;

tha, there is

only one fonnulatc

and the organ ofmind by
which

-son is w„h respect to chang,
phenomena obey,

the

ng things

noon human

act, on

For Dewey, truth inquiry was a
never-ending process, continually

a progressive matter; there

As

and

‘-reason destgna.es both
an inherent

both

drawing on new emptncal evidence
as
behefs

„ works under the assumphon
that

in eharacter,

the ultimate fixed standard-,!*
law physical

should obey.

it.

a result, truth

rather,

it

was

i,

becomes

available.

no belief so

is

“The attainment of settled

settled as no, to

was not an immutable idea waiting
a provisional

to

be exposed

to further

be uncovered by

and eminently malleable means of
addressing

specific problems.

Dewey was

attracted to pragmatist epistemology
because

not as a grasp of truth or reality but
as a method of serving

human

hostile universe, and solving concrete
problems. Unfortunately,

mistakenly concerned themselves “with ultimate
(i.e.,

completed) whole: with the

real object.”

reality, or

it

understood knowing

ends, coping with a

most philosophers

with reality as

a

complete

They expended untold energy on

solve abstruse philosophical puzzles that had
no bearing on the world as

trying to

men expenence

Knowledge and Value; A Rejoinder” in Schilpp, ed.. Philosophy
ofJohn
Dewey, 533. Dewey wrote this essay to respond to the
various commentaries
Experience,

included

Schilpp’s edited volume.
91

The Quest for Certainty Later Works 4:170.
,

92
“

,

Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Later Works 12:16.
,
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in

Dewey declared

it.

satd,

would begin

it

the

was high time

moment

“i,

for ph.losophy ,o

change

its

ways.

Its .‘recovery,'’

he

ceases to be a devtee for
dealing with the problems
of

philosophers and becomes a
method, culttvated by philosophers,
for dealing with the

problems of men.”’ 1 Dealing with
the problems of men,
according
.he exercise of tntelligence.
In his dtscussions of tnqutry,

superior alternative to reason.

He saw

intelligence as a

Dewey

to

Dewey, required

offered intelligence as a

way of knowing

things in a

universe without certainty, a
method of exercising “judgment,”
choosing which ends our
actions should serve and

He

detemrinmg the best means by which

to

bring about those ends.

added:

A man is intelligent not in virtue of having reason which
indemonstrable truths about fixed principles,
deductively from them to the particulars

grasps

first

and

in order to reason

which they govern, but in virtue
o his capacity to estimate the
possibilities of a situation and to act
in
accordance with his estimate. In the large
sense of the term, intelligence is
as practical as reason is theoretical. 4

Judgment

work

may

in

is

none other than the

ability to devise rules for action

our concrete expenence, offering solutions

face in our lives.

A

to a

which are most

likely to

whole number of problems we

person does not put his intelligence on display
when he deduces

absolute truths from a set of fixed principles.
Instead, exercising intelligence requires

one

to

draw on

his

immediate sensory experiences

which he can fashion provisional truths— truths

93

94

“The Need

for a

to gain practical

that help

him cope with

Recovery of Philosophy,” Middle Works

The Quest for Certainty Later Works
,

,

4:

1

70.
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knowledge with

,

10:46.

this world.

Knowng means

putting ourselves in an
act|ve re|at , on

intelligence to verify
empirically

we make

truth.

Dewey gave

^^^^^

any hypotheses we may
have about

I„

it.

,

he process,

a lucid example:

a n

Se in he Street “ Suggests
as ,ts mean ing a street-car
To test
l
go to the
window and through listening and
looking
intentlv—
the listening and the
looking being modes of
behavior—organize into a
n e
6 n ' S ° f eX
enCe and meaniHg
-re previously
'

his Jdea

r°'
I

t“

f

connected. In
hi way an idea
,„ this
or hypothesis is no longer
merely
.

reacted in a

way

made true; that which was a proposal
propounding or a guess If had
not
the idea it would have
remained a mere
is

a

I

appropriate to

ea at most a candidate for
truth that, unless acted
upon upon
would always have remained a theory. 95
i

According

to his critics, the fact that
the street-car

Dewey never bothered

to

look out the

window

made

the spot
^ ’

the noise remains true, even
if

to verify his hypothesis.

Bu,

thought that this reply betrayed
their misunderstanding of
knowledge and

Dewey
He

truth.

never

questioned the reality of the street-car
making a noise, and he would have readily

conceded

known

that this

event actually occurred.

He only

insisted that

he would never have

the truth about the source of the
noise unless he had taken pains to
confirm his

hypothesis. Calling on his intelligence
to

make sense of his immediate sensory

expenences, he identified a connection between
the noise and the
point here

is

that this sensory data enabled

question that piqued his interest, but

it

told

him

to solve a specific

him nothing about

The

street-car.

vital

problem, to answer a

street-cars in

and of

themselves (or the essence of street-cars). His
knowledge of the street-car will always be
limited to his relations with

it:

the noises wafting through his apartment

disturbing his thoughts, the various routes

departure times, and anything else which

95

it

may

take throughout the city,

may prove relevant

to his life.

‘The Intellectuals Criterion for Truth,” Middle Works 4:67.
,
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window and
its

He

arrival

will

and

ground

.

any

firture truths

know
in this

about the street-car in these
kinds of eoncrete expenenees,
and he will

the street-car only to the
extent that he interacts
with

As Dewey hoped

it.

to

show

example, truth-seeking (-making)
must serve the more modest
function of solving

the immediate

problems of men" and no longer
indulge the ethereal
speculations of

philosophers.

Dewey believed
example,

in

that intelligent inquiry
occurs in a

which a person turns

years, but

humanity had

failed to

maintained that politics and

embrace

The

scientific

solution to

attaining truth.

method

method long ago and put
apply this method

ethics,

if they

still

to

often

we

Machiavellian approach

method and means upon
exclusively to ends." %

it

to effective use for

in other aspects

tired

of life.

hold truths as self-evident and then
resort to any means

to politics

we have

blindly accepted.

and ethics,

Dewey

So

as to avoid this kind of

instructed that

we

should "place

the level of importance that has, in
the past, been imputed

As he saw

of scientific method,

to

it,

the principal mission of pragmatism

convince people

that its techniques

stands for carrying the experimental notion of truth
that reigns

The Quest for Certainty Later Works 4:222.
,

97

to

us to concentrate more on the means
to

technically viewed, over into political and moral
practices,

%

Dewey

dogma, needed

was

,

“The Problems of Truth,” Middle Works

,

6:3

199

1

to spread

had general

applications. "If the pragmatic idea of truth
has itself any pragmatic worth,
it

many

meet the challenges posed by modernity.

many of our woes merely required
Too

similar to his street-car

facts to substant.ate truth

adhering stubbornly to

wanted

necessary to bring about those ends

the gospel

emptneal evtdence and

to

claims. Science had adopted
this

manner

among

it

is

because

the sciences,

humanly viewed.” 97 Indeed.

Dewey believed

«ha« scientific

method was no, jus,

usetb, in pursulng an
abstruse subjec ,

for purely technical
reasons.” Instead:

equipment indispensable for
success
Stiemific method

in pursuit.

was not an arcane technique,

specialized and technical concerns;

it

expenmen, a, ion. -There

useful only to a select few
with highly

was an approach

ascertaming truths of any kind, and
required a

98

spirit

to

solving problems and

of cooperation, deliberation and

bu, one sure road of access
to truth-, he road of pa,
ten,,

is

cooperative inqutry operating by
means of observation, experiment, record,
and
controlled

whether

it

reflection."''''

was

No

matter the question or problem
with which

ethical, political, or

man was faced-

social— scientific inquiry had the best
chance of

finding answers.

Though they
denied

that

certainly

made odd

humankind could apply science so broadly. But
Dewey saw

refusal to allow

human beings any

solutions to social problems and to
there are "any natural and

evil will

98

bed-fellows, both traditionalists and
positivists

work

intelligent

means by which

make judgments

about good and

of those who hold

that they

have

“Science as Subject-Matter and as Method,” Middle Works
6:78.

A Common

Faith Later Works 9:23.
,

,
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evil.

as to

in their

,

99

to devise practical

human means of determining judgments

to the benefit

the danger in this

Denying
what

is

that

good and

possession super-

human and

super-natural

troubling, the stakes

means

for infallible ascertainment
of ultimate

become much

advances winch the powerfiil
use

humankind remamed dim

larger as sctence
continues to

to

make

ends.”™ Most
technological

serve their “ultimate ends.”
Indeed, the hopes of

if scientific

method continued

to

play an mcreasingly
important

role in producing and
regulating the “concrete
conditions of life,” while the
social

consequences of these technological
developments were
habits, institutions, and a class

left “a.

to itself and not just nature.

The only cure

conceded there were many, was more

Dewey's
from

praise of scientific

traditionalists

who charged him

nothing to say about the ends

Dewey’s pragmatism seemed

mercy of iirational

and sectarian distribution of
power between the stronger

and the weaker.'""' For Dewey,
society could only be saved

method

the

scientific

method

ills

it

began

to

apply scientific

of scientific method, and he

method.

elicited an onslaught

of criticism, especially

with extolling a philosophy of
means which had

we ought

The waves of invective crashing

to seek.

become more

to

to the

if

intense during times of

a sudden, these philosophical disputes
ceased to be parlor

against

war— when,

games and seemed

to

all

of

have

real-world consequences. Robert Hutchins,
the renowned president of the University
of

Chicago who

instituted

Dewey's pragmatism
the fact that

we

100

to

Great Books curriculum, proved an especially
animated foe of

in the late

live in a

which humanity should

method

its

1

930s and early

1

940s. In his view,

Dewey

overlooked

world where people cannot agree on values, the ultimate
ends for
strive.

It

we could

all

agree on ends, resorting to the scientific

achieve those ends would make sense. But the rise
of Nazism and Soviet

"Some Questions

about Value,” Later Works 15:107.
,

101

“

The Problems of Men and

the Present State of Philosophy,” Later Works

201

,

15:160.

.

communism showed

us

all

too clearly that

humankind had not come close

kind of consensus about
values, and science had
no

way of resolving

Hutch, ns wrote: -The deference
between us and Mr.

Dewey’s goals and Mr. Dewey
cannot.

Dewey

All he can do

is

is

say he

that

is

say why, because he can only
appeal to science, and science
cannot

should be for science or for
democracy or for

Hutchins

may have

shared

many of the same

human
values.

ends.”

102

any

these conflicts.

we

for

to reaching

can defend Mr.

them.

tell

He

cannot

him why he

Though Dewey and

Dewey embraced

a philosophy that

provides only a method by winch
to reach cetfatn ends, no,
a justification for those
ends.
In the end, said Hutchins,

only moral philosophy and religton
could supply

this

justification.

Dewey endured
World War

I.

similar assaults after he publicly
supported

in a journal called

in a series

The Seven Arts. Bourne suggested

peace-time philosophy, a reasonable approach

But he declared

that

Dewey and

to life

that

of articles originally published
pragmatism was an adequate

when

society

was not embroiled

his fellow pragmatists laid the

chillingly amoral instrumentalism,
greasing the engines

moment’s

into

His former student and acolyte,
Randolph Bourne, unleashed the most

compelling tirade against Dewey’s
pragmatism

cnsis.

American entry

groundwork

in

for a

of an unjustified war without a

hesitation.

The war

has revealed a younger intelligentsia, trained
up in the pragmatic
dispensation, immensely ready for the executive
ordering of events,
pitifully unprepared for the intellectual
interpretation or the idealistic
focusing of ends... The formulation of values and
ideals, the production of

1

02

Hutchins, “Education for Freedom,” 1315. Quoted in Ryan,
John

Tide of Liberalism, 341
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Dewey and the High

articulate
to

and suggestive thinking,
had not
any extent whatever, with
their technical

Bourne accused Dewey of inspiring
impressive technical

abilities but

a

new

little

aptitude.

103

generation of intellectuals

no moral preparatton

unwittingly prepared his
“disciples” to
technique, accepting with

in their education,
kept pace,

become

mg ends. Dewey

“efficient instruments

quest, on the ends as

disciples never anticipated
that instrumentalism

for formula,

who developed

of the war-

announced from above.” His

would lead

to the apotheosis

of

technique, for they embraced
a se, of progressive values-or
“private utop,as”-to wh.ch

they sincerely believed their
technical skills would contnbu.e,
bu, their exclustve focus

on means

Dewey

to support,

meant

also

values.

them

led

with

immense energy and

his philosophy,

when taken

as a philosophy of

But there was always that unhappy
ambiguity

values were created, and
justified

it

became

say about

to

answer the questions
had nothing

to

how

that

say about

in his

easier and easier to

and almost any activity valuable as
long as

had much

it

instructive.

It

life, to start

doctnne as

assume

that just

how

any growth was

to achieve certain ends, applying
the scientific

method

why we

should embrace those ends, the values that
guide our

much

about

help wondering

if

Dewey

felt

how

but nothing

failed to

be morally

the sting of betrayal from his

former student, for he responded, quite out of
character for the usually unflappable

Bourne, “Twilight of Idols,” Radical Will 342-43.
,

104

Ibid.,

to

vex us and carrying out our mission with
great efficiency, but

produced wonderful technocrats and functionaries
but

One cannot

to jus,

with

achieved ends.” 104 Pragmatism

actions and give our lives meaning.
Pragmatism told us

about why.

gusto, an unnecessary war.

343.
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it

philosopher, by using his
mfiuence t0
for

The

New Republic and

to

make

sure

remove him from

^^

^^^

the editorial board

of The Dial

105
.

Perhaps Bourne aroused
Dewey’s anger to sueh an extent
because his words resonated
so
powerfully.

Ironically,

virulence.

He

Bourne would become a victim
of the war he opposed
with such

contracted influenza from

C.ty after the war, dying
prematurely

at

of his career, Dewey would
have

to

soldiers

who

the age ofthirty-two in

untimely death notwithstanding,
Bourne
res.

Amencan

left

returned to

December of

1918. His

behind a fotmtdable legacy.
Throughout the

contend with his powerfully
resonant criticism in

one form or another, often emanating
from the most renowned public
country, sueh as Lewis

New York

Mumford, Waldo Frank, and Morttmer
Adler,

Hutchms. The upshot of this barrage
of criticism was

that

it

intellectuals in the

as well as Robert

impelled him to clarify his

philosophical position, showtng his
skeptics that pragmatism actually
did have something
to

say about values and moral ends,
about

His

critics

why we

should do some things and not others.

dismissed the notion that science could
say anything about moral

Dewey begged

to differ.

truth, but

Indeed, scientific method was our
only hope of attaining moral

truths that addressed the actual

problems with which

But the crucial point to understand was

that, for

men

Dewey,

solve the problems of men if applied
properly— that

is,

dealt in their daily experience.

the scientific

method could only

democratically. In order to create

adequate moral values, societies must replicate
on a large scale the methods of
intelligence and cooperation

employed

in scientific

communities.

See Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy
203-12; Menand, The
Metaphysical Club 401-407.
,

,
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a

A number of scholars have recently

identified

Dewey’s democratic epistemology.

The contemporary pragmatist
philosopher, Htlary Putnam,
argues
explicit -epistemological
justification

Dewey’s democrats epistemology

of democracy."™ He suggests

rested

on three crucial

to arrive a, provtstonal
truths (’’warranted assertions”)
state

of doubt)

Second,

this

is

method of science could be expanded

including in the conversation

all

experiences to share, determines

which

is

fix

further that

First, the best

way

our beliefs (alleviate our

as "not just

to other areas

ethical

and

of inquiry, including

political inquiry is

members of the community who have

how

effective

its

finds this last point a particularly
original insight

it

assert, on.

an

through scientific inquiry by a
community of competent inquirers.

ethics and politics. Third, the
degree to

democracy

and

Dewey made

that

one form of social

life

democrat,,

relevant

provisional truths will be.

Putnam

on the part of Dewey, who saw

among

other workable forms of social

life;

the precondition for the full
application of intelligence to the solution
of social

problems.”

107

The public good can only emerge when everyone

in the

community

contributes their insights and experiences
to a larger discussion about the
social good.

Even

the

most benevolent despot

public welfare because, no matter
his subjects,

will never succeed in

how

hard he

may try to

sympathize with the plight of

he can never truly know of their circumstances,

implication of this argument, according to Putnam,

community which wants

to

know what

is right

accordance with democratic standards and

106

promoting the social good and

is

H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, 180.

107

Ibid.
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needs and desires. The

that “an an ethical

and good

ideals, not

their

community—

—should organize

itself in

only because they are good

in

themselves (and they

are),

but because they are the
prerequisites for the application
of

intelligence to the inquiry

James Kloppenberg reads Dewey

community

replicates the

similarly, suggesting that his
“democratic

community of broadly conceived

scientific enquiry... Free

and

creative individuals, in democratic
as in scientific communities,
collectively test

hypotheses to find out what works best. These
communities
determine their

own

0

He

cooperation.

for science

’

as a

tests,

and evaluate their results

argues that Dewey's

considerations,” but insists that

Dewey

in a spirit

critics often

“narrow concern with technique

set their

own

goals,

of constructive

“misinterpreted” his “enthusiasm

to the exclusion

of ethical

actually

valued the scientific method because

it embodied an ethical
commitment
open-ended inquiry wherein human values shaped the
selection of
questions, the formulation of hypotheses, and the
evaluation of results.
Dewey conceived of the ideal scientific community as a democratically

to

organized, truth-seeking group of independent thinkers
who tested their
results against pragmatic standards, but those
standards always

reflected

moral, rather than narrowly technical, considerations.
It

is

clear

from Kloppenberg

analysis that, for

s

Dewey,

1

10

scientific

method and democracy

were nearly indistinguishable. They embraced the same values of
“open-ended inquiry”
and constructive cooperation

and employed the same means of formulating and testing

hypotheses with the available empirical evidence. Both communities promoted

108

H. Putnam, Words

and Life

,

175.

109

Kloppenberg quoted in Westbrook, “Pragmatism and Democracy: Reconstructing the
Logic of John Dewey’s Faith.” In Dickstein, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism, 130.
Kloppenberg, “Pragmatism:

An Old Name

for

Morris, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism, 101.
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Some New Ways of Thinking?”

in

deliberation and discussion

among

-free and ereat.ve
individuals”

whose standards

for

inquiry always met “ethical
considerations.”
In

drawing the connect, on between

.hough,, both

scientific

Putnam and Kloppenberg htghligh,

epistemology

the notion tha, intel.igence

Whtle Dewey conceded

that

is

method and democracy

the fundamental

in

Dewey's

component of his

a social, no, an individual,
endowment.

some people may have

superior nat.ve intelligence
to others,

he maintained that a handful
of brill, an, people, with the
highest intelligence quotients
imaginable, cannot devise truths
that would prove most
benefidal in social matters.

may be

recalled that

Dewey did

not consider intell.gence the
ability to think logically
or

solve mathematical puzzles bu,
rather the capacity to

make judgments based on our

expenences. But exercising judgment
required one to look not only
experiences but to the expenences of
everyone else

in the

points-ot-view with others. For this
reason,

rejected the rule

Dewey

at his

some unwise judgments because of their
removed from common

and private knowledge, which
implication here

is that

limited experience.

interests as to

in social

matters

experts, their technical

is

become

not

own

community, sharing ideas and
of experts, whose

raw intelligence would undoubtedly
exceed most people's, but who would

inevitably so

I,

“A

likely

class of experts

make
is

a class with private interests

knowledge

1

a, all.”"

knowledge and pure

The

intelligence

notwithstanding, do not have the knowledge
necessary to address political and ethical
questions, because they are isolated from the
experiences of everyone else in society.
similar grounds,

Dewey

argued

that paternalism

of any kind, no matter how well

intended, could not work.

111

The Public and Its Problems Later Works 2:364.
,

,
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On

3

.n

ways which leave passive those

be benefited

to

welfare can be advanced only
by means which

~=:v
poS^r^p

hose ,o be ben
a

then confer their

advanced,"

all

their fellow

men

Dewey
time

when

citizens

all

to

the

good

life

positive merest
•

a

is that

powers of reason and technical

wtsdom about

elicit the

ed ° r “ ,mproved ”
in carry,ng ,hem ° m
,here

f

For Dewey, the epistemologtcal
lesson here
super, or intellects,

"
Tert isTmoral

on

must become engaged

is

n°

few wtse men, drawtng on

skills,

others.

cannot arrive

So

at

their

moral truths and

in the process

that the “social welfare

can be

of actively cooperatmg with

formulate and implement their goals,
both political and ethical.

did not consider this such a
far-fetched idea.

individuals

may

He looked

"forward

to a

share in the discoveries and thoughts
of others ” Because

smaller and specialized scientific
communities functioned this way, he saw no
reason

why

larger

No

economic or

political

communities could not do so as well.

scientific inquirer

can keep what he finds to himself or turn it
to
merely private account without losing his scientific
standing. Everything
discovered belongs to the community of
workers. Every new idea and
theory has to be submitted to this community
for confirmation and test.
There is an expanding community of cooperative
effort and of truth. It
true

enough

that these traits are

now

limited to small groups having

somewhat

technical activity. But the existence of such
groups reveals a
possibility of the present
one of the many possibilities that are a
challenge to expansion, and not a ground for retreat
and contraction. 113

—

“

Dewey

(with Tufts), Ethics, Later Works 7:347.
,

1

1

Individualism,

Old and New, Later Works,

5:1 15.
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is

miS

V,S '° n

,0

read ' frUito a

democracy would

>

of guild socialism, workers
adopting .he

community
method

that

promotes communication and

writ large, tor -freedom

consumer, are involved

As we have seen
that

men

in a radically

to attain

such

political relations.

the

community had

and methods of sconce,
and creating a

tolerates dissent.

is

in the

would be the

seientific

found ou, to every mdividual
as the ultimate

democratic as

in the scientific

Dewey was

method

to

about nature but also about
the

first to

method.”" 4

adopt the attitude of the
testing

and

scientist, contributing their

everyone

Dewey

could not

skills required

community.

Freedom and Culture Later Works

,

13:135.
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make

to lead

this leap

of them

in

inexorably

without also

men and women

in

experiences to

of hypotheses. As Putnam and Kloppenberg
have

addressing the issue of human nature, whether
average

,

his social and

political matters,

Dewey's decidedly democratic epistemology
seemed

improve themselves and leam the

man and

take these ideas a step further and
suggest

to yield truths in ethical

toward participatory democracy. But

14

It

contingent world; that the scientific
method represented the best

ongoing discussion and

suggested,

1

he form

chapter and those on Peirce and
James, pragmatism held

truths, not just

But

that for the scientific

the

,

arrived at provisional truth
in their attempts to answer
questions and solve

problems

means

in this

m erge

of inquiry, toleration of diverse
views, freedom of

communication, the distribution of
wha,
intellectual

attitude

e

could

in fact

an enlarged scientific

7

V.

W.thou, question, Dewey
embraced a democrat,
c psycho, ogy.
Culture, he dec.ared ,ha,
“democracy needs a

humanism, with the
every

faith in the potentialities

man bnmmed

new psychology,- one

of human

nature.”'

that is “allied

that

That he believed

with potent.al was evident
throughout his career, and
he oceas.onally

argued .ha, “in every ind.vidual
there lives an

of being a king and

display,

Dewey

priest.”'

elicited attacks

capable of mastering the

m self-governance.
Merriam and

skills

In the

his students

were inherently

1

in his career,

and uni versa!

infinite

possibility;

16

Putting his faith in the promise
of human beings on

from

critics

who

maintained that most people were
no,

necessary to think like scientists
and participate effectively

920s, a

new crop of political

scientists, including

Harold Lasswell and Harold Gosnell,
believed

irrational and, consequently, they
argued that

we

that

Charles

most people

should not encourage

the increase of citizen participation
in our democracy. If anything,
they thought
limit citizen participation

dependable experts.

1

17

it

and reconceive democracy as rule by
enlightened and

Wrote Lasswell:

Familiarity with the ruling public has bred
contempt.

upon democracy

boil

down

to the propostion,

more or

Modem

reflections

less contritely

expressed, that the democrats were deceiving
themselves. The public has
not reigned with benignity and restraint.
The good life is not in the mighty
rushing wind ot public sentiment. It is no organic
secretion of the horde,
but the tedious achievement of the few. 118

115

Ibid.,

150-51.

“The Ethics of Democracy,” Early Works,
1

1

:246.

1

Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, 28
1

18

Lasswell,

with

15

indulged in hypberole on that
point. In an article he wrote
fairly early

Dewey

Freedom and

Propaganda Technique,

4-5.
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1

-82.

best to

The public have not ruled with

“benignity,” according to
Lasswell, because their
political

actions “derive their vitality
from the displacement of
pnvat e affects upon pubhc
objects,

and

political crises are

complicated by the concurrent
reactivation of specific
primitive

motives, ’"’in other words,
citizens panic, paling in
our democracy cannot help
but

express their most base and
primal psychological instincts
when they engage
action.

In

Moral Man and Immoral Society,
Reinhold Niebuhr

and secular

who

liberals

in civic

assailed both religious

believed, quite naively, “that
the ego.sm of individuals

is

being

progressively checked by the
development of rationality or the
growth of a religiously
inspired goodw.ll and that nothing
but the continuance of this
progress
establish social

Dewey

harmony between

in particular

all

the

human

societies

of not acknowledging the “predatory

and

is

necessary to

collectivities.”

He accused

self-interest” that dictates the

behavior of most people, and “the
brutal character of the behavior
of all human
collectives,

relations .”

and the power of self-interest and
collective egoism

120

and believed

A

theologian by training, Niebuhr took
the concept of original sin seriously

that

a naive faith in

we denied

the wretched nature of

man's capacity

political enterprises

Nazism or

for rational action

man

at

Stalinism,

we should

temper any attempts

He

maintained that

to achieve social perfection with a

Ibid.

Niebuhr, Moral

peril.

with disastrous consequences. To avoid
future manifestations of

119

20

our

and benevolence can lead to ill-advised

heavy dose of reality about what can be expected
of man.

1

in all intergroup

Man and Immoral Society

,

211

xii-xxiii.

Lasswell and Niebuhr would
have us believe that
creatures

by

Dewey had
According

difficulty abiding thtnkers
to his

exasperatton

acts like one,

certainly

h, story

nature, that our instincts
define

who

who we

“to believe that every

and regardless of why and

have adnutted

that

are .rral.onal or cruel

are and limit our
capacities. Bu,

could only expect the
worst of human beings.

former student, Sidney Hook,

why he had

we

Dewey
man

asked in a rare

bom

is

moment of

a sonofabitch even before
he

how he becomes one?-' While
Dewey would

humankind has

a

poor traek reeord, displaying
throughout

an uncanny aptitude for cruelty,
injustice and destruction,
he denied

that

our

natures are responsible for our
shameful past. Indeed, he blamed
not our instincts but our
hab'ts:

We are not

Though men have

inherently irrational;

instincts (or

we have been

what Dewey often called “impulses”)
hard-wired

them, these alone cannot account
for our

whole host of conflicting
instinct for both

the other. Said

habituated to behave this way.

irrationality, selfishness, or
cruelty,

instincts constitute a person.

sympathy and

Dewey: “The

cruelty, but this

instincts,

For example, he

does not explain

why he

into

because

a

may have an
acts

one way or

whether named gregariousness, or sympathy,
or

the sense of mutual dependence, or
domination on one side and abasement and
subjection

on the
James,

other, at best account for everything
in general and nothing in particular.” 122
Like

Dewey believed

must activate those

that

Even when we
elements

in

that

man

become

harbors countless instincts, but a process of
habituation

manifest.

refer to tendencies

human

nature

we

and impulses

find, unless

that actually are

genuine

we swallow whole some

current

opinion, that of themselves they explain nothing
about social phenomena.

121

Dewey

quoted

in

Hook, Out of Step: An Unquiet Life

in the

Twentieth Century 66.
,

122

The Public and Its Problems Later Works 2:242.
,

,
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Mos, of our

instincts

He dormant, awaking a ca„

to action front the
conditions

socal environment. Our
instincts cannot on their

own

of our

explain our behavior,
for they

cannot take shape and “produce
consequences’- un.i! our socta,
environment instiUs
“dispositions" (or habits) within
us. In add,,, on,
.ha,

man had

Dewey

agreed with James in
suggesting

the ability to sublimate
his instincts, channel,
ng them in soetally productive

and psycholog, cally healthy
ways.

He even wen,

so far as to take issue
with Freud,

agreeing with the famous
psycholog, s, that suppress, on leads
to

and moral pathology" but denying
his assertion
affairs.

Instead,

he believed

that sublimation

that

,t

“all

ktnds of intellectual

represented the natural state
of

was the “normal or desirable
fitnchoning

of impulse.” 125

The
Dewey.

role

of our

We often

social

environment

thmk of habits

seemingly endless repehtion so as
thought.

more

in cultivating

as individual patterns

to

our habits was crucial for

of behavior, developed by

perform relatively mundane tasks
without couscous

Though Dewey appreciated

the importance of these kinds of
habits, he

was

interested in those habits that onginated
from, and had an impact on, our social

relationships.

Habit

He beheved

that,

by and

large,

human beings were

social construchons:

the mainspring of human action, and
habits are formed for the
most part under the influence of the customs of
a group. The organic
structure of man entails the formation
of habit, for, whether we wish or

1

23

is

Freedom and Culture Later Works
,

124

,

13:140.

Human Nature and Conduct Middle Works
,

Dewey and American Democracy
1

25
’

Human

,

,

14:108-109. See also Westbrook John

291-93.

Nature and Conduct Middle Works 14:108.
,

,

213

.

attitude

and

a

set

Society shapes then habits,
and, in turn, their
habits define
instincts

and behaviors to

we sometimes
or “natural” to

custom,

that

life.

Our

who

"“^cation of

they are, bnng.ng
eerta.n

habits can becotne so
deeply engrained within
us that

confuse them with our natural

descnbe those depositions

instincts.

We often

use the terms “nature”

we have become so

that

“used

to,

imagination can hardly conceive
of anything different. Habit

is

inured to

second

nature and second nature
under ordinary circumstances
as potent and urgent as
nature .”

127

have

of the

all

habits defined

acknowledge

inevitability that belongs to
the

who we

are.

we

to

“When we

that a habit has this

has a hold on us because

movement of stars”' 2 * The power of
habit

Dewey, and he even went so

power because

is

it

man

we can

to this kind

to

do

,

Freedom and Culture Later Works

,

13:108.

128

Ibid., 96.
29

Human Nature and Conduct

,

because his society

of behavior-so much so
identity.

Middle Works

214

,

1

4:2

1

It

should never forget that

so, but rather

The Public and Its Problems Later Works
2:334-35.
,

1

we

always change.

completely "natural” to him, an intrinsic part
of his

,

“we

acts selfishly or generously,
cruelly or kindly, not

because his genes or his soul have
impelled him

and culture have habituated him

claim that

so intimately a part of ourselves.

are the habit.” 12 ’ Nevertheless,

All of this implies that

far as to

are hones, with our ourselves,”
he said,

our habits are acquired characteristics
that

127

firs,

Indeed, “[w]hen habits are so
ingrained as to be second
nature, they seem to

can hardly be overstated,
according

126

by

that

it

Though he may

appears
not be

aware of the
the

way

he has e q ua, potential for
wickedness and

society teaches

economic
grounds

fact,

him

to relate with others.

liberals call the eompet.tive
instinct.

that

it

accommodates our competitive

as to foster social progress.
But

prem,se-the not.on

that

men

Dewey

They

are competitive

depending on

used the example of wha,

often praise capitalism
on the

instincts

Dewey mamtamed

virtue, his fate

and channels them

that their

argument

by nature and. except

in

rests

such a

on

way

a false

in rare instances,

cannot hope to transcend this
inborn characteristic. ‘Neither
competition nor cooperation
can be judged as
relations

among

community.
their defense

traits

of human nature,” sa.d Dewey.
“They are names for certain

the actions of indivtduals
as the relat.ons actually
obtain in a

Economic

liberals

have also invoked the inherent
selfishness of man

of capitalism, but once again

supposedly immutable

Dewey

in

pointed to the social origins of this

attribute.

A1 special privilege narrows the
outlook of those who possess it, as
well
as limits the development of
those not having it. A very
considerable
portion of what is regarded as the
inherent selfishness of mankind is
the
product of an inequitable distribution
of power-inequitable because it
shuts out some from the conditions
which direct and evoke their capacities
while it produces a one-sided growth in
those who have privilege. 13
'

Human

beings only behave selfishly, according
to Dewey, because of inequitable
social

conditions perpetuating the idea
person, if he wants to get

by

among both

in this world,

the haves and the have-nots that each

must consider

his

and only then, perhaps as an afterthought, should
he extend

man. But Dewey

130

insisted that this does not

Freedom and Culture Later Works,
,

131

Dewey

have

to

13:142.

(with Tufts), Ethics, Later Works, 7:347.
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own needs and

a helping

hand

desires

first,

to his fellow

be the case. More cooperative social

arrangements wou.d habituate
us to regard the needs
of others jus, as soon
as our own
and to act accordingly.

Dewey maintained

that serial re, a, tons
could

shape

intellectual as well as

behavioral habtts. Ltberals
and democratic realms, such
as Merriam or Lippmann,
often

spoke about the stupidity of the
masses,

their tnabth.y to think
rahonally

judgments on objective informal,
on. To posit

method and democratic

scientific

Bu,

Dewey though,

otherwise: “1,

that they could

participation

is

and base then

develop the capacity for

was out of the question

satd that the average citizen

is

no,

for these thmkers.

endowed with

the

degree of intelligence that the
use of i, as a method demands,”
but such arguments rested

"wholly upon the old notion
In

that intelligence is a

ready-made possesston of individuals.”

most cases, people have the intelligence
necessary “to respond

knowledge and the

moves and has
ability to

skill that

his being.”

rich store

human

in the social condittons in

to

use the

whtch he

lives,

Unfortunately, they have no, on the
whole exhibited an

apply the methods of science

to

solve social problems because they
have not

to learn these skills. Current
social

of the accumulated wealth of mankind

purposes. There does not

average

embodied

and

132

been given the opportunity

them “the

are

,o

now

exist the kind

in

arrangements have denied

knowledge, ideas and

of social organization

that

even permits the

beings to share the potentially available
social intelligence.” 133 While our

society has failed to distribute social
intelligence of the political and social kind,

succeeds in

many other,

usually technical, areas.

Dewey believed

testament to his faith that average people can
achieve

132

Liberalism and Social Action Later Works
,

,

133

Ibid.
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1

1:38.

much more

it

these successes were a

than so-called elites

Wi " 6Ver admit
average but

Lve

'

^ 8aVe "

who becomes

in a soetal

the trade, including

become

a veteran

is

eMm P' e of ‘he mec hanic whose native

in

embodied.” Surrounded by
experienced meehantcs who
teach

its

many methods and

procedures, the novice will
eventually

to the social intelligence

.he average citizen enjoyed
a similarly nurturing
envtronment,

he might achieve: “Given
a social medium

rise to

comes,

art

It

will

>s

considered

remain “useless

to talk

hardly surprising that

it

the only

whose

in

political mtelligence.”

about the

fa, lure

Dewey devoted

means by wh.ch we could

in the broadest

so

in

and use ideas and information as tools
Its

aim was

1

"

can only imagine wha,

But

much energy

until that

time

to education, for

he

average individual to reach

filling the

Dewey

which people

for solving

understood

vacant minds of children

in reading, writing,

long process, education cultivated habits
of mind

cooperative environment.

If

of democracy.” 135

assist the

terms poss.ble, not just as

with information or prov.ding them
the basics

analytically

cars.

institutions the avatlable

those “undreamed heights of social
and political intelligence.”

educahon

we

of fixing

of human, ty were incarnate, and
the average ind.vidual
would

undreamed heights of social and
it

is

which the cumulative mtelligence
of a multitude of

and contnbute significantly

knowledge, ideas and

tn.elhgenee

quite skilled in his trade
beeause he has the good
fortune to

“environment

cooperating individuals

him

,e

and arithmetic.
learn

problems

how

A

to think

in a socially

to instill in its students a scientific
attitude

which

prepared them for democratic participation.
Unfortunately, the American educational

system came nowhere close

to

achieving this goal. Schools employed pedagogical

134

Ibid., 50.
135

Ibid., 39.
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life-

methods

that

encouraged individualism and
competitiveness, no. sociability
and

coopera, ton. Never expected
to think critically to
prove mastery of a subject,
students

only had to

re,

am

arcane informatton which
teachers expected them

to regurgttate

from

time to time. The end result
was that teachers and students alike
saw educatton as largely
a solitary endeavor, a

information

way of serving narrow

commuted

to

memory

self-interest,

and they learned

to regard the

as unassailable truth. In other
words, the prevailing

educational system in America
perpetuated individualism and
absolutism, both of which

were anathema

Dewey

to science

and democracy.

thought the best

way

to forge scientific

and democratic habits

in

our

schools was to require active participation
in real-life enterprises-or
what he often
called “learning

of knowledge

by doing."

for its

own

In this approach, learning ceased
to

sake and became a goal-oriented and
social

way, students would acquire information and
learn concepts
least

be the passive acquisition

bore some relevance, to the task

at

hand. At the

activity.

in the process

geography.

is

He

made between

their

Dewey

School, for example,

own

described learning

at his

school as follows: “Absolutely no separation

the ‘social’ side of the work,

its

concern with people’s

this

for physical facts

approach of “learning by doing” reconciled the

activities

Menand, The Metaphysical Club 323.
,

137

School and Society Middle Works
,

,

1

:98.
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and

and forces.”

traditional

progressive theories ot education. The former group, led by advocates
such as

136

meals,

they would learn arithmetic, chemistry,
physics, biology, and even

mutual dependencies, and the ‘science,’ regard

Dewey believed

the

that applied directly, or at

students spent considerable time in the kitchen,
preparing and cooking their

and

Along

137

and

W.

T.

Hams, argued

that students

must expend

Johann Herbari represented the
students’ interest.

Dewey

effort

latter in his

memorizing information

suggests

that learning

in order to learn,

must always sustain

believed that the chief advantage
of his method was that

it

accomplished both: always starting
with a problem or a challenge,
students engaged
actively in long-tenn projects
that they considered meaningful
and relevant to their
lives.

All the while, students
developed their capacity for intelligent
thought and

problem-solving.

According
University,

we

to

Max

Eastman, a former teaching student for

Dewey’s pedagogical method “saved our

almost did

in school.”

ambitions that have

still

139

While

this

at

Columbia

children from dying of boredom,
as

may have been

not been realized.

Dewey

He meant

true,

Dewey had

far greater

for schools to function as

incubators tor democracy, where students
would develop the skills and habits conducive
to civic

engagement. Education, he

and adapting them

said,

to social service.'''

was “the

art

of giving shape

to

human powers

40

Further, he believed that schools had to
cultivate

an

interest in the

community

welfare, an interest

practical, as well as emotional

—an

which

is

intellectual

interest, that is to say, in

and

perceiving

whatever makes for social order and progress, and for carrying
these
principles into execution— is the ultimate ethical
habit to which all the
special school habits must be related if they are to
be animated by the
breath of moral life. 141

138

Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of Liberalism 141-45.
,

1

39

Eastman, Great Companions: Critical Memoirs of Some Famous Friends 250.
in Diggins, The Promise of Pragmatism, 305.
,

Quoted
140

“My

Pedagogic Creed,” Early Works, 5:86.

141

“Ethical Principles Underlying Education,” Early Works, 5:64-65.
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Hav,ng promoted an

interest in the

commonweal, schools

tor cooperative undertakings
with other
institution in

whtch

the child

is,

members of then community,
becoming '‘an

for the time, to

m which he feels that he participates,

also had to condition
students

live-to be a member of a
community

and to which he contributes.”
This school will

"have a community of spirit and end
reaped through diversity of powers
and

Dewey. ‘‘Only

in this

way can

same presumed attainments

much emphasis on

placed so

acts,” said

the cooperative spirit involved
in the division of labor
be

substituted for the competitive
spirit inevitably developed

the

life

are

working

to

when

a

number of persons of

secure exactly the same result.” 142

education throughout his career
because he saw

it

Dewey

as a

unique opportunity, a process of
rehabituating self-absorbed individuals
into enlargedthinking citizens

But

produce

hope

in

will

who worked

Dewey

alongside their fellow

men

understood that education did not end

schools a projection in type of the society

“modify the larger and more

to serve the

in the school.

we would

recalcitrant features

institution that

“made

is

“ail

like to realize,”

it

command of the

which we
will not be

industrial

general,” permeating every social

can conceivably shape our dispositions.' 43
Indeed,

bring about a “more equitable and enlightened
social order”

reaches

While “we may

of adult society,”

able to contend with those oppositional
forces "entrenched in

machinery” unless a democratic education

community.

if a

we

can only hope to

democratic education

agencies and influences that shape disposition,” including
“every place in

which men habitually meet

—shop,

—

club, factory, saloon, church, political caucus

is

Plan of Organization of the University Primary School,” Early
Works 5:224, 225.
,

143

Democracy and Education, Middle Works

,

220

9:326, 328-29.

perforce a school house, even
though no, so labelled.”-

The

implication here

was

that

education was a life-long
process, perhaps beginning
in the school house
bu, continuing
tnto adulthood, shaping
our habits

us to democratic practices,
there

your

we, and engaging

fee,

in

i,

of mtnd and conduct. While
the sehool may m, reduce

was no

substitute for actual ctvic
part.cipation, getting

The concept of “learn,
ng by doing”

directly.

here: participation represented
the best

way

to

develop and sustain democratic
habits. In

other words, the best school
of democracy was democracy

Dewey maintained

a faith throughout his life
that

participants both intellectually and
morally.
firs,

itself.

democracy could transform

Because Dewey did not subscribe

to

its

any

principles or fixed ends, the only
moral aim for which the educated
person should

strive

was growth or development

itself,

the process of learning

new

ideas throughout our lives and engaging
in creative activities for our

We should never rest comfortably at a particular end, as
life,

applied

the

if

it

perspectives and

own

self-realization.

were our ultimate goal

Holy Grail of our quest. The process of
developing ourselves

is

in

the end.

The process of growth, of improvement and
progress, rather than the static
outcome and result, becomes the significant thing...
The end is no longer a
terminus or limit

existent situation.

to

be reached.

It

Not perfection

the active process of transforming the
as a final goal, but the ever-enduring
is

process of perfecting, maturing, refining
itself is the only moral “end.” 145
Critics

have often suggested

could meet

this standard.

and add new techniques

144

Dewey

A

that

is

the

aim

growth of any kind, no matter

to his repertoire.

But

Dewey

145

Philosophy Middle Works, 12:181.
,

221

morally repugnant,

improve his

skills

argued that individual growth

,

in

how

burglar, for instance, could continually

(with Tufts), Ethics, Middle Works 5:426.

Reconstruction

in living... Growth

demanded

creative and ennehing
activity that releases the
partictpan, from pas,
problems,

and his success depended on
the degree

winch he connected with
nature and other

to

people. Burglary could never
promote indtvidual growth because

between the perpetrator and the
society

him
tf

to address

fundamental problems

i,

severed connections

which he operates, making

in

in his life.'*

i,

impossible for

People could only enjoy true
growth

they lived in a community in
which people shared a variety of
interests with others

then social group and also
communicated openly with people
groups.

Dewey described

the growth standard thusly:

the interests which are consciously
shared?

forms of associaton?"
for

i,

has few

isolates

A

common

In

Its

interests that tie

members

comparison

full

“How numerous
and free

will never

members

its

and varied are

the interplay with other

grow

together, and the nature of their

the education such a society
gives

in the true

to the criminal band,

is partial

Dewey gave

the

its

example of a family

that

material, intellectual, aesthetic interests”
to such an extent that “the progress of

it

is not an isolated whole, but
enters intimately into relationships with
business groups, with schools, with all the agencies
of culture, as well as
other similar groups, and... it plays a due part in the
political organization
and in return receives support from it. In short, there
are many interests
consciously communicated and shared; and there are varied

and free

points of contact with other

modes of association. 148

Moore, American Pragmatism 232-33.
,

147

and

members. This family

one member has worth for the experience of other
members,” and, furthermore,

146

work

sense of the word. 147

does meet the standard and thus promotes
growth among
shares

is

to other

criminal band, he argued, did not
meet the standard very well,

them from other groups. “Hence,

distorted.”

How

who belonged

in

Democracy and Education, Middle Works

,

222

5:89.

As Dewey saw
to

democracy."

it,

149

this

example showed

that the

“two elements

A despottc state fails to foster growth

alienates citizens from each
other and their leaders,

extensive

number of common

members of the

mterests; there

is

no

in

our eriterion both point

because the

whtch means
free play

official

use of terror

that “there is

no

baek and forth among the

social group. Stimulation
and response are exceedingly
one-s,ded.“

members of a group can only share
equable opportunity to recetve and

a large

number of interests

if

they

all

The

enjoy “an

from others. There must be a large
variety of

to take

shared undertakings and experiences.
Otherwise, the influences which
educate some into
masters, educate others into slaves.” 150
nations,

which leads

institutionalization

to

despotic state also isolates itself
from other

hardened dispositions—or to the “rigidity
and formal

of life."

collective action for

A

all its

151

Democracy, on the other hand, ensures

members and promotes

participation in

inter-group communication to

introduce fresh perspectives in the community.
Thus, democracy was the ideal social and
political order in

Dewey,

“is

which

more than

a

its

members could experience growth. “A democracy,”

form of government;

of conjoint communicated experience.” This
remain suppressed as long as the incitations

it

is

primarily a

mode of associated

results in a “liberation

to action are partial.” 152

149

Ibid., 92.
150

Ibid., 90.

151

Ibid., 92.

152

Ibid., 93.

223

said

living.

of powers which

In the end,

parttcipation.

A

Dewey's psychology speaks

soctety .ha,

period, cally readjusts

its

makes provisos

eustoms and

to the transformative
for

power of democratic

widespread civtc part.cipatton
and

institutions releases energies
within its

members

and develops their moral and
intellectual capacities to
untold heights. “Democracy
has

many meanings
the

supreme

”

test

Dewey

said,

“bu,

if

i,

has moral meantng,

i,

ls

found

in

of all pohtical mstitutions and
industnal arrangements

contribution they

make

to the all-around

resolvtng that

shall

be the

growth of every member of society."

Necessarily a product of social
relationships, the individual can
never reach his
potential and fashion a complete
tdentity in solitude.

achieve selfhood

does not leave us

in this soctal context,

at

That

is

the very

the

in

life to

“mode of associated

In

living" that

political forces but instead

making of this world of which we

meaning of democracy.

compared associated

Because each of us can only

for a

mercy of remote economic or

the

empowers us partake

we search

foil

are an inextricable part.

one of his more memorable passages, Dewey

cultivating a garden:

To

gain an integrated individuality, each of
us needs to cultivate his own
is no fence about this garden:
it is no sharply markedoff enclosure. Our garden is the world, in
the angle at which it touches
our own manner of being. By accepting the
corporate and industrial world
garden. But there

in

which we

with

we

it,

we,

live,

who

create an

and by thus

fulfilling the pre-condition for interaction

are also parts of the

unknown

The garden metaphor captured

future.

moving

153

present, create ourselves as

perfectly the condition of the associated

achieve individuality and freedom, a person must “cultivate
his

though

it

own

human

being.

To

garden,” even

cannot be enclosed and completely protected from outside
intrusion.

He must

learn to accept the entire corporate and industrial world
as his garden, even if shared, and

1

53

Individualism Old
,

and New Later Works
,

,

5:
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1

22-23.

make

his coninbuiions to

working collectively

its

cultivation,

to “create an

however .nodes, they nray

unknown

be.

the proeess of

future," he will create
himself.

VI.

That

man

will pick

up

his shovel or

hoe and begtn worktng

in his garden

almost took for granted. Indeed,
his democratic theology
was robust.
attention to the question of
free will or choice,

obvious

to him.

He

was because

understood intuitively that his

unthinkable without the belief that
their intelligence to

i,

shape their

faith in

destiny. Ltke James,

the answer

he devoted

seemed

all

little

too

democracy would be

human beings could make

own

If

Dewey

free choices,

drawing on

Dewey found middle ground

between the atomism of empiricist
philosophy and the monism of various
mechanistic
and

idealist thinkers.

Particularistic empiricism rested

universe have the capacity to act solely
from their

on the notion

own powers and

that entities in this

initiative.

From

this

view, the universe appears completely
indeterminate and chaotic, teeming with
spontaneity but lacking any coherence or
meaning. Monism, on the other hand, posited
that entities are part of a large interactive
system, acting not with self-initiative but in
a

predetermined way. Whether the system was
mechanistic or
block universe

in

which human freedom was sheer

outlook very appealing as a

way

to describe the

could survive, save by sheer accident,

if its

idealist, this

illusion.

human

implied a

Dewey found

neither

condition. “For no living creature

experiences had no more reach, scope or

content, than the traditional particularistic empiricism
provided

225

for.

On

the other hand,

it

‘

S

,mp ° ssible

alternative,

un, verse

10

ima 8 ine

a

“ving creature coping with
the universe

once."

154

As an

he offered "a via media
between extreme atomistic
pluralism and block

monisms.” 155 He saw experience

as a transaction, a
back-and-forth exchange

between human betngs who take
on certain functions within a

Human

all at

beings enjoyed freedom to

make

larger social organ, sm.

choices and exercise influence,
but always in a

social context.

The

social aspect

of free choice notwithstanding,
Dewey argued

deliberate choices and plans are
finally the

individual

human being

work of single human

that “all

beings.”

156

Every

has the capacity to transcend
biological and social influences,
act

with a certain degree of spontaneity,
modify his habits, and perhaps even
have an effect

on

his social environment.

Darwinism, suggesting
choice.

On

the subject of free will Peirce
and

that the doctrine

Though Dewey agreed with

insights to the discussion.

Most

of chance variation could explain
spontaneous

this idea in principle,

human freedom,

actually liberted us: “Impulses are the
pivots

their quality.

7

Once unleashed,

A

Rejoinder”

Ibid.

157

The Public and Its Problems Later Works 2:249.

Human

thought that they

to old habits

instincts obliterate crusty old habits in

,

,

Dewey

upon which the re-organization of activities

155

156

but

of deviation, for giving new directions

Experience, Knowledge and Value:
544.

Dewey

he contributed some original

thinkers regarded instincts as a set of
biological

conditions that placed severe constraints on

turn, they are agencies

James often invoked

,

Nature and Conduct Middle Works 14:67.
,

,
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in Schilpp, ed..

and changing

which we have

Philosophy ofJohn

become mired. Without

the liberal,
ng energy of instinct.

we would remain

slaves to our
habhs. But our “impulses are
too ehaot.c, tumultuous
and confused” if left on
them own.
for they rush “blindly
into

an “outlet.”

any opening” they find and
show no discrimination

In order to

intelligence, giving

make our

instincts

them direction and

using them.”

step in this process

first

make

it is

the

for us,

we must

As Dewey

said:

harness them with our

“Breach

work of intelligence

is

in the crust

to find the

of

ways of

deliberat.on, rehearsing in our
imagination various

either in accordance with
“prior habit” or

a “choice”

when “some

and impulse, finds a way

habit, or

folly open.”

“newly released impulse.”

160

Reject, ng James’s belief that

Dewey

why he

A

person

who wanted

we could

simply

argued that free choice was a

matter of careful reflection, employing
intelligence (scientific method)

between our habits and impulses.

We

some combination of elements of habits

break old habits through the sheer
exercise of will,

discover

seeking

159

ways of acting,
finally

work

structure.

the cake of custom releases
impulses, but

The

in

158

to

mediate

to exercise free choice

had

to

has acted in certain undesirable ways in
the past and then devise means

of releasing those

latent impulses.

This involved creating the right social
conditions

under which he could break his bad habits and forge
new and better ones.
his impulses to fuel novelty, but

He

relied

on

he used his intelligence to turn them into viable action.

What intelligence has to do in the service of impulse is to act not
as
obedient servant but as its clarifier and liberator. And
this can be

its

accomplished only by a study of the conditions and causes, the
workings

158

Ibid., 124, 175.
159

Ibid., 118.

160

Ibid., 132, 134.
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and consequences of the
greatest possibile variety
of desires and

Dewey

argument was s.mple: we are free

s

scent, tic method in our daily

and harness his unpulses

Faihng

to

engage

to

lives.

lives at the

man

I,

act in the spirit

mercy of his

with the social organisms, he

prophecy and follows the orders issued
from
that

we

his society.

social environment.

fulfills

the detenninist

The implicate, of course,

problems alongside his fellow

citizens.

Dewey made

connection between free choice and
power quite explicitly: “There

is

is

intelligently manifests individuality
enlarges the range

enlargement

in turn

of action, and

A

choice

this

confers upon our desires greater insight
and foresight, and makes

choice more intelligent. There
spiral.”

the

an intrinsic

connection between choice as freedom
and the power of action as freedom.

widening

habits

berates himself further in a
democracy, whtch gives him the
power to exercise

his intelligence and solve

which

of the

A person who does not challenge his
extant

modify them

in a transaction

to the extent that

is

a circle, but an enlarging circle, or, if
you please, a

162

For Dewey, sublimation represented prima facie
evidence
intelligence to harness instincts. In dealing
with his instincts,

that

man

man had

used his

three options

explosive action, sublimation, and suppression— and
more often than not, according to

Dewey, he chose sublimation.
In the career of

any impulse

possibilities.

may

It

activity there are speaking generally three

find a surging, explosive discharge

lt

” Ibid., 175.

1

62

“Philosophies of Freedom,” Later Works 3:104.
,
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—

blind.

unintelligent. It may be
sublimated— that is become a
intelligently with others in
a continuing cour’se of

^acLn“

g^of
nger may, because of its
dynamic incorporation into
disposition be
converted into an abiding
conviction of social injustice
to be remedied
and furnish the dynamic to carry
the conviction into execution
Such an
outcome represents the normal or
desirable functioning of
impulse- in
ich, to use our previous
language, the impulse operates
as a pivot or

reorganization of habit. Or again,
a released impulsive action
may be
neither immediately expressed
in spasmodic action, nor
indirect
employed in an enduring interest. It
may be “suppressed ” 163

Dewey’s

analysis of sublimation suggests
that free choice rests

betewen impulse and

intelligence.

which we become trapped, and the
cleverly puts

our society.

it

to

good

The fonder breaks through
latter

tames

anger

at the

of energy and

of new habits with “enduring

may become

nexus

the thick layer of habits in

that “explosive discharge”

use, toward the creation

A man overflowing with

somewhere

interest” to

a tyrannical husband, father, or

boss. But a growing awareness of
his predisposition and of potential
sublimation
strategies can help

injustice,

for

him

redirect his anger in

which both

his

63

Human

positive ways, such as fighting “social

immediate family and colleagues would be
thankful and

from which society as a whole would

1

more

benefit.

Nature and Conduct Middle Works
,

229

,

1

4:

1

08.

VII.

In this chapter,

have presented Dewey as the

1

essential link

between

classical

pragmatism and participatory
democracy. Dewey said himself
that “any theory of
activity in social

and moral matters,

comprehensive philosophy, seems
preferences.'-

164
I

liberal or otherwise,

to

me

have simply taken him

to

Of his

political theory.

in the

A

lives,

at his

word and sought

to

striking irony emerges:
pragmatists swell with

human beings can

lead

devoid of intolerance and social injustice,

three

first

way of life

for

pnde over their

more productive and

if they reject first

life;

I

have called the democratic

tenets.

It

may

rested

on

This irony suggests— at

Mark Twain's phraseology— that rumors about

lsm of pragmatic thought has been greatly
exaggerated.

pnnciples

but the

which Dewey showed so much preference
actually

principles— what

the risk of abusing

uncover the

My analys.s shows that the three

and fixed truths and focus more on the
means to achieving a better
democratic

no. grounded in a

thought of Peirce and James were
crucial to the formation

anti-foundational ism, their belief that

meaningful

is

be only a projection of arbitrary
personal

philosophical foundation of his
political theory.

democratic tenets found

whtch

the anti foundational-

also point to a tension

within participatory democratic thought whose
advocates criticize liberalism for making

specious assumptions about the

human

condition but cannot avoid doing the same. In

their attempt to construct a politics without
foundations, they

absolutes for old ones.

As we

will see, this raises serious questions about the
viability

and theoretical coherence of participatory democracy.

164

“Nature

in

have merely subsituted new

Experience,” Later Works 14:150.
,
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Deweys

faith in

method sounds almost quaint

after

an emerging philosophy
of

sctence began to challenge
the idea that setenttfie
communities are sure to arrtve
provisional truths through a
process

human betngs

are

a,

even

of validation and experimentation'”
His belief that

emmently educable

also

seems dubious, especially
gtven the ample

supply of contradictory ev.dence
to which democratic

realists

have often pointed and of

which even the most casual
observers of the American electorate
have been aware
Fmally, Dewey’s unwavering
democratic theology, his complete
confidence in

agency,

may

men would
tree

in fact

date him as a thinker.

He had no doubt

human

that, if given the resources,

not hesitate to use their intelligence
to solve problems collectively.

Man

and thus poised for civic action. But
enthusiasts for partictpatory democracy

is

in the

second half of the twentieth century
and the early twenty-first century
have betrayed a

weaken, ng democratic theology.
forces pose grave threats to

problem.

In

In their view,

emerging bureaucratic and technologtcal

human freedom, and

chapters five and six,

we

they see no immediate remedy to this

turn to the legacy

of participatory democracy, as

has retreated to the margins of academia
in the forty or so years after the

enthusiasm from the
legacy, Sheldon

democracy

far

New

Left

began

to recede.

We turn

its

wave of

next to two inheritors of this

Wolin and Benjamin Barber, whose admiration

exceeds their hope for

initial

it

for participatory

realization.

16

See especially Kuhn's The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions.
thought can be found in chapter seven of this work.

A

discussion of his

See Pinker s The Blank Slate which provides an excellent
synthesis of recent
psychological, anthropological, and biological research that
suggests human nature does
in fact have significant limits. A discussion
of Pinker can be found in the seventh chapter
,

of this work. Incidentally, one of the more acerbic observers of the
American electorate,
H. L. Mencken, famously quipped that no one ever lost money
underestimating the
intelligence of the American people.
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CHAPTER V

SHELDON WOL1N AND MELANCHOLIC
DEMOCRACY

Sheldon Wolin, an ementus
professor
influential political theorists
in the
fuller

at

Princeton University and one
of the most

American academy, has devoted

his life to gaining a

understanding of -the pohttcaP-an
ideal and perhaps illusive
condition of

poht.cal engagement in which the
participants act toward
political stands in opposition
to politics, or

which participants grapple
I

for

power

shall take the political to

common

what most would

ends. For him, the

call politics as usual, in

to serve private goals.

be an expression of the idea that a
free society

composed of diversities can nonetheless enjoy
moments of commonality
when, through public deliberations,
collective power is used to promote
or

protect the well-being of the collectivity.
Politics refers to the legitimized
and public contestation, primarily by

organized and unequal social
powers, over access to the resources
available to the public authorities of

the collectivity.

Perhaps most importantly for Wolin, the
political requires deliberative participation
on
the part of not only elected politicians or
other elites but of the “public” as well.
Politics,

on the other hand,
competition

is

something with which we are

among “organized and unequal

social

all

quite familiar, involving

powers”

for positions of authority.

Of

course, only an elite tew, those selected to represent
a particular social power, are able to

become

“public authorities of the collectivity” and thus

well-being. Attaining

power

is

decisions that affect

its

often an end in itself for the contestants, and although

their decisions aftect the well-being

good so much

make

as they carry out the

of the

collectivity, they

agenda of the

1

Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy,” 3

1
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do not promote the

common

social power(s) they represent.

Because

these social powers are
“unequal,”

some

than others do to realize
their objectives.

groups from

political

Because

contestants have

By

its

more resources

decision-making and distributes
power unequally.

politics is inherently exclusive,

participate, can successfully

Wolin made

He does

democratically.

political,’'

2

work toward common

fails to

it

it

promote the

common

good.

It is

no

all

ends,

citizens to

surprise, then, that later

clear that the political can really
only manifest itself

suggest that democracy “is one

among many

versions of the

probably because he hesitates to deny
the possibility of other
manifestations

he has not envisioned.

“Democracy

is

Still,

a political

remembered and

re-created.”

democracy must be
he sometimes

democracy represents the

moment, perhaps the

vanants that have emerged

work

disposal

very nature, polities
excludes certam

according to Wolin. Only an
inclusive political process, which
allows

in his career

a, their

3

political

political

moment, when the

Pure democracy for Wolin

in the last

two thousand

par excellence

years.

is far

different

To deserve

for Wolin:

political is

from any of the

the name, a

inclusive, participatory, and deliberative.
In his conception of what

calls radical

democracy,

all

citizens share in political decision-making
and

collectively and painstakingly to find solutions
to social problems.

Power

is

decentralized and diffuse, resting in the hands of
the many, who, though diverse and

heterogeneous, seek to understand other points of
view and to reach mutual agreements

on disputed matters. Anything short of
and threatens
private, not

to consolidate

common,

ends.

power

this vision

in the

compromises the power of the people

hands of a few who ultimately work toward

Our politics— with

2

Ibid.

3

Ibid., 43.
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its

periodic elections, endless campaigns,

and

political

because

1,

parties-amounts

fails to

nothing more than a sham
or a mockery of democracy

accommodate deeply panic, pa.ory
modes of political expenence.

the Wolinian spirit,

Wohn

to

I

shall coin the

s vision ot

term “shamocracy”)

democracy

is

so

uncompromising

formalization or institutionalization
brings about

democracy becomes co-opted,

anathema

to

its

death.

a domesticated servant

participatory characteristics.
This helps explain

picture of what

(In

democracy might look

that

Once

of the

why Wolin

like in practice.

he believes any
institutionalized.

state,

and

it

quickly loses

its

hesitates to provide a clear

Blue prints and plans are

democracy because they immediately
place

limits

on the possible and

necessarily guide politics in particular
directions.
Institutionalization brings about not only
settled practices regarding such
matters as authority, jurisdiction,
accountability, procedures, and
processes but routinization, professionalization,

and the loss of
spontaneity... Institutionalization depends
on the ritualization of the
behavior of both rulers and ruled to enable
the formal functions of statecoercion, revenue collection, policy,
mobilization of the population for

war, law making, punishment, and
enforcement of the laws
conducted on a continuing basis. It tends to
produce

—

to

be

internal hierarchies,
to restrict experience, to associate
political experience with institutional
experience, and to inject an esoteric element
4
into politics.

Contrary to the democratic
politics,

which

spirit, institutionalization

in turn creates hierarchies

and

introduces structure and routine to

restricts access to

power. Formless,

spontaneous and even anarchic, Wolinian democracy
has no “settled practices” and thus
can manifest

4

itself in a variety

“Norm and Form,”

of ways. Though democracy

36.
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may temporarily occupy

institutions, those institutions

structure

should never take hold of
it and impose a
particular form or

5
.

Undoubtedly

frustrating for

somewhat nebulous concept,

some

readers, Wolinian

we

but perhaps

democracy remains

can best understand

it

a

as a rationally

disorganized reaction against
formal institutions and power
structures. Says Wolin
Instead of a conception of
democracy as indistinguishable from
its
I propose accepting
the familiar charges that
democracy is
nherently unstable, inclined toward
anarchy, and identified with
SlnS theSe traitS as the basis for a
different - constitutional

const, tu ton,

Z^Z^

conception of democracy.

we might think of democracy as resistant
to
the rationalizing conceptions
of power and its organization which
for
centuries have dominated western
thinking and have developed
constitutionalism and their legitimating
.

.

rationale.

be

summed up

Accepting the accusation

Wolin
liberal,

is free to

that

etc.—clouding our

vision.

He

without the familiar qualifiers—
constitutional,

it

seeks to understand democracy unadulterated,
and

unlike most political theorists, old and
new, he argues that

According

its

domestication (or

unnecessary, based on unwarranted fears.

Wolin, though democracy

to

finds coherence and

is

6
.

democracy has anarchic and revolut.onary
tendencies,

examine and illuminate

constitutionalization)

This democracy might

as the idea and practice of rational
disorganization

commonality

may be

disorganized and anarchic,

in a shared place, history,

located in a certain place. Place

and

culture.

Every person

geography and vocations. (Vocations:
This means that subjectivity and
historicity are connected. Our place in the
double sense of geography and
7
vocations is known only by its history, so, therefore, is
our identity

what we do

in

and

is

to the world.)

.

5

“Transgression, Equality, and ¥0106,” 63.
6

7

“Norm and Form,”
“On

the

37.

Theory and Practice of Power,”

198.
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it

is

Every person

located in a p.ace in ,1ns
world where his expenences
with nature and

is

Cher people shape

his identity.

We must situate a person

in his cultural

and

historical

context to understand hint.
Like nrany cnttcs of liberalism,
includ.ng communitarians.

Wolin has
individual

use for a politics tha, reduces
the citizen

li„le

whose

to

an unencumbered self-.o
an

identity is completely
independent of the culture and
history tha,

produced him. “A

political

being”

is

not "an abstract, disconnected
bearer of rights,

privileges, and immunities,”
but rather a “person

whose existence

particular place

and draws

friends, church,

neighborhood, workplace, community,
town,

being

political

is

its

is

located in a

sustenance from circumscribed
relationships: family,
city.”

8

The

identity

of a

contextual, inseparable from the
expenences he shares with others in his

community.
Shared experience—past, present, and
future— is an important element of

Wolinian democracy, but one must not
assume he endorses homogeneity or uniformity.
In

eschewing

use his terms

institutionalization and formalization,
Wolinian

“localized" and “feudal," comprising a
complex

a diversity ot interests

(i.e.,

the

come

modem

and

traditions

common

purpose,

resist the current organization

a

which

state or corporation).

together tor a

become

democracy remains—to

resist forces

When

web of relationships and

of centralization and uniformity

people of various interests and experiences

when they engage

collectively in political action to

of power, and when each individual participates

demos. Wolinian democracy, then,

is

and diverse, but geography and history create a

236

they

spontaneous, loosely organized, complex

common

can organize and become animated.

“What Revolutionary Action Means Today,"

fully,

27.

identity around

which the demos

L,ke individuals, the demos

enhance

power. In

its

ind,v, duals:

i,

is far

fact, the

is

capable of hero, political
c
action and strives to

demos has

a cons, durable advantage
over political

more powerful and fearsome.
The demos has an .mmense
capacity to

challenge ex, sting laws and
political insftutions, even
to transgress or
subvert them. In a
clever inversion of Nietzsche’s
master and slave moralities,
Wolin argues that the
transgress, ve tendencies of
the

power

is

insatiable yet never

however,

that

demos resemble those of the supennan,
whose

will to

grounded in resentment or mahce. 9
Wolin concedes,

unchecked demotic power can exceed
mere transgression and become

horrifyingly destructive, annihilating
not only political, social and
economic institutions

but also, in the end,

For

itself.

this reason, political theorists

threat to the political order

aristocracy,

have long disparaged the demos as a
grave

and the rule of law and have defended
other

monarchy, republicanism,

liberal

democracy—on

political

forms—

the grounds that they can

contain demotic power. Liberals have
been especially concerned about individual
rights.

Time and time

again, liberals

have invoked the familiar Tocquevillian
phrase, “tyranny of

the majority,” to justify institutional
obstacles to citizen participation.

Wolin would
institutional

faction

call obstacles, liberals

checks and balances serve

from trampling on the

argues, represents

rights

to

political action

and

It

as

safeguards— the idea being

that

fragment power and thus prevent a majority

of an unfortunate minority. But liberalism, Wolin

more than just an attempt

through institutional safeguards.

meaningful

would regard

Of course, what

to attenuate the excesses

of majority factions

constitutes a concerted effort to derail

to redirect

human

9

“Transgression, Equality, Voice,” 75.
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any kind of

energies toward economic pursuits.

The

task, as

Madison and

later liberals saw it
was to encouraoe
would control the effects of
politics not
Citizens would be engrossed
in private

institutional devices that

reconstitute politics.

given fre dom ,hey use h
,o
be U "JUSt and
ressive
to
limit
°PP
namTof
name
of encouraging common action
for common ends

«if-

;

Because they consider any kind
of “common action

for

to

acho Is for

that pursuit in the
10
.

common

ends”

to

be

“oppressive,” a threat to individual
nghts, liberals seek to disassemble
the demos.

encourage citizens to withdraw into
their

own

private lives and pursue solely
what

They
is in

their self-interest.

In

Wolin's estimation, liberalism has
been especially complicit

growth of the administrative
the

many

state,

whose chief purpose

that constitute

threats to

encouraging the

assuage our anxieties about

sources of pain and suffering in the
world. The unencumbered self is an

ahistorical fiction that uproots each
individual

customs

is to

in

its

him and connect him

right to life, the

unencumbered

from the

to his

histories, traditions,

mores, and

fellow men. Primarily concerned with

self voluntarily contracts with equally

worried people. This imaginary contract,
according to Wolin, provides justification
for
the hyper-rationalized, bureaucratized,
and centralized liberal state

function

augment
leaves

is to

its

little

protect individual rights but

own power and
room

to nurture

for political action

whose

actual objective

and support capitalism

and puts individuals

at

at the

whose

is to

ostensible

centralize and

home and

abroad. This

mercy of a labyrinthine

bureaucratic state, enormous faceless corporations, and
the ebb and flow of the economy.

The

10

result is the withering

of freedom and power for individuals and

“What Revolutionary Action Means Today,”
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20.

their

communities.

Preoccupied with profit margins
and the acqu.sition of worldly
goods,
iS

liberal

man

aCU ‘ ely SenS " iVe 10 ' he pa,n
caused b V the 'oss of wealth,
and feeling vulnerable to

whimsical

shifts in the

Plagued by anxiety,

market economy, he weakly turns

liberal

power; he measures the
successfully apply wha,

minimize

The

pain.

improve our

lives, to

man

legit,

J.

S.

to the state for protection.

does not care about shanng the
exercise of political

macy of a regime by

the extent to

which the

state

can

Mill called the pleasure prine,
pie-max, mtze pleasure and

political, then, gives

way

to increasing reliance

on the

guarantee our safety and provide
services, and liberal

portion of his humanity as a result.

The

modem

state has

state to

man

made almost any

loses a

kind of

democratic action nearly impossible by
turning citizens into consumers,
active

political

participants into passive political
spectators, socially-connected beings
into atomized
individuals.

It

is

destructiveness:

democracy pale

not surprising that Wolin shows

it is

in

little

concern for demotic

highly unlikely to occur in modernity.
The dangers of unfettered

comparison

to the palpable evils

of political passivity and disaffection.

Assisted by bureaucracy and centralized
administration, and nurtured by social

and economic

elites,

political matters

the

modem

state effectively depoliticizes

and transforms them

assumption becomes

what were once considered

into administrative or technical issues.

that the large political questions

have

all

The

been answered,

fine-tuning or a few slight adjustments to our current
economic policies can

that a bit

make

everything right again. This means, of course, that most
of us can abandon politics and
leave

it

to the experts to fix

any glitches

in the

system.

Our

political

engagement need

See Chapter 9 of Politics and Vision especially the section on Mill’s pleasurable
,

principle.
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of

no, extend beyond period.c

evaluates of these

material results of their actions
or replactng

grows apace, providtng
accustomed and

feel increasingly entitled,

slump or should the

who espouse

a

a plethora of goods

state fad to

experts, re-electing then,
if we like the

them

if

we do

and services

we

no,.

to

So long

as the

economy

which we have become

accept the status quo.
Should the economy

provide servtces «o our satisfaction,

few alternative policies but
never entertain more

we

rad, cal

elec,

new people

solutions-such

as fundamental changes to
the system. In today’s
political economy, says
Wolin,

cease to be eitizens-to be fully

we

human-and become docile rectpients of the

technocrat’s expertise.

In recent years,

postmodern

Wolin has ascribed

far

capitalist state that lays claim
to

States-bears resemblance

to the

more

sinister designs to the state.

The

“superpower” status—i.e, the United

Nazi regime

suggests that the totalitarianism against
which

in that

it

too “aspires to totality.”

we always

Wolin

thought the “free world” had

enjoyed a series of stunning and decisive
victones has merely assumed a new and
inverted

form— a

form that appears

far

more benign than

earlier incarnations,

Stalinism or Nazism, but has similarly terrifying
features. This latest threat to

freedom

is

what Wolin

calls “inverted totalitarianism.” 12

Wolin

obvious differences between the Nazis and the
postmodern

is

such as

human

quite aware of the

capitalist regime:

while racial

hatred inspired the Nazis, the "ideology of the
cost-effective” and economic efficiency

motivates the postmodern
support their

"promote

12

Politics

state.

initiatives, the

a sense

and

While the Nazis sought

postmodern

state

of weakness, collective

“works

futility that

Vision 591.
,
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to

mobilize the citizenry to

to depoliticize its citizenry”

and

culminates in the erosion of the

1

democratic faith.” Whtle “big
bus, ness” in Naz, Germany
ultimately served the

of the

state,

“corporate power has

these differences only go to
nefarious aims as

its

show

become predominant”
that

,

in the

postmodern

state.

averted totalitarianism can
achieve the

earlier incarnations.

Though

their

means may

tnteres.s
13

But

same

differ, totalitarian

regimes of all stripes are fiercely
ideological and aggressive on
the world stage, and
perhaps most disturbingly, they
create a “general climate of
fear and suspicion” which
reduces “the cttizen” to a “nervous
14
subject.”
The recent war on terror in the wake
of
lh

September

lends credence to Wolin’s
alarmism.

1

One

only has

to

constder the Patriot

Acts which sanction intensified
domestic surveillance, as well as the
torture and
indefinite detention

of "enemy combatants” which exemplify
the Bush administration’s

brazen defiance of the Geneva Convention
and the invocation of a new doctnne
of pre-

emption

to justify the invasion

On

the surface,

World War

II

veteran

generation,” he

Wolin

bom

of Iraq. Things could not be much gloomier

an unlikely candidate to advocate radical
democracy.

is

what has been popularly referred

into

was nevertheless

Speech Movement

at

radicalized later in life

He then

Berkeley.

for Wolin.

by

his

A

to as the “greatest

involvement with the Free

adopted a decidedly anti-institutional, almost

anarchic, understanding of democracy. But in
the years following this experience,

especially after the

melancholy note
participatory

Ibid.,

591-93.

Ibid.,

592-93.

14

He seems

in his writing.

moments which he

This melancholy

13

Reagan Revolution reached

may not seem

to

its

high point, he has increasingly struck a

be almost eulogizing those deeply

believes modernity has taken

away from

us for good.

consistent with the optimism of his pragmatist forebears,
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bu, if anything

Wolin has rematned too

faithful to the first

two pragma!, s, tenets-the

democrats epistemology and
psycho, ogy-and taken them
result is

an uncompromising view
of democracy

that ultimately

the faith that people will
engage in c.vic act, on. While
a transformative activity,

to their logical

extreme. The

undermines his theology,

Wolin believes

that

democracy

is

promoting the general welfare and
the moral development
of

each individual, he cla.ms these
expenences are

modem

fleet, ng, for

forms of power

foreclose opportunities for
meaningful political participation.

I.

Like the classical pragmatists,
Wolin adopts a democratic epistemology.
believes that people learn socially
and experientially, that the truth

reached after painstaking discussion
and deliberation
experiences are relevant to the question

at

and employs the postmodern notion

that

not believe that truth corresponds to

some

idea that truth

is

relationships.

Deference

them

a

among

is

an agreement

those people

monopoly on

whose

hand. In support of this idea, Wolin
accepts

power generates knowledge
fixed,

a priori

reality,

(or truth).

He

does

but instead embraces the

a social construct and grounded in our
experience with
to an elite

He

power

group of experts, for instance, only serves

the truth and thereby disempowers the majority
of people

to give

whose

experiences could contribute considerably to the
discussion and to the creation of

knowledge and

truth.

so as to promote the

Empowering
and practices

But an inclusive and participatory

common good

— and

politics will reconstitute

power

a radically different conception of truth.

the entire citizenry, not just a fraction of it, will yield political
knowledge
truths,

if

you must

— from which

242

the collectivity as a whole benefits.

Democracy organizes power

in this

way, and Wolin believes

it

is

“c
crucial to

human

dignity and realization.”

Democracy involves more than
participation in political
processes' it is
tm8
y
Wer Democracy ls com ™»ed
to the claim that
exp eriencrwith
experience
d°access to, power is essential
with, and
to the development
'

the capacities of ordinary
persons because

gmty and
something

Foucault,

power

in

last

whose

it

world

is

it.

i„o’

unavoidable, according to Wolin,
but there

When power is “shared”

becomes

point

and “used

career

clear in Wolin’s criticism of
French philosopher Michel

was devoted

to illuminating the configuration

view

that

power

may be true much of the

is

time,

always deployed

Wolin suggests

and deployment of

to

is

ubiquitous but

oppress and dominate.

that

power directed toward

ends can actually be liberating. In Foucault's
writings, “the emphasis

which humans are caught within imprisoning

He

arrangement

is

repressive. There

of power are ultimately

Presence of the Past

,

is

futile in the

1

no

is

upon

“gives us a vision of the world in

structures of knowledge and practice, but

he otters no hope of escape. Every discourse embodies

16

of

not merely something to
be shared but
in order to initial, to
bring

16
the repressive, dominating quality of
power.”

15

“

modernity. Wolin accepts the Foucauldian
notion that power

this

common

crucial to

„

can “initiate” or “bring about” a
better and more just society.

rejects the pessimistic

While

in this

wrong ways of organizing

collaboratively,”

This

is

is

be used collaborative,
y

That people exercise power
are right and

Power

realization.

to

power

'

exit...”

17

Any

a

power drive and every

attempts to transcend the structures

Foucauldian universe, and

54.

“Theory and Practice of Power,” 198.

17

Ibid., 186.
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this futility is the

“consequence of having accepted
an unqualified Nietzschean
conception of knowledge

a

generated by power dnves that
leaves no rootn for conceptions
of theoretic vocafion and
civic

commitment.

Foucault

civ,c action offers an escape

came

to the conclusion that
neither political theory nor

from the structures of power,
says Wolin, because he

“confused politics with the political.”

The problem of the
deny power uses

political is not to

that destroy

deny the ubiquity of power but

common

ends.

The

to

political signifies the

attempt to constitute the terms
of politics so that struggles fof
power can
be contained and so that it is
possible to direct it for common
ends such as
,eqUa ity’ and CU " Ural Va ' UeS
Commonali, y is w hat the political is
'

atou?

Wolin even suggest

common
narrow

that

people

who engage

in the political,

harnessing power “for

19
ends," develop a “critical vantage
point”

-a perspective that transcends both

self-interest

and dominating systems of power.

Because Foucault believed
rejected the possibility

validated

inquirers .”

of a

critical

all

truth claims are really just attempts
to dominate,

he

vantage point. Truth, he claimed, can never
be

by procedures and conventions recognized
by some appropriate community of
20

assertions of

Thus there

is

no

truth in this world, only “truth” with
scare

quotes—

which we must forever remain wary because they are
necessarily

contaminated by some discourse of power. But, of
course,

this assertion, that all truth

claims are attempts to dominate or repress,

itself,

is

a truth claim

18

Ibid., 198.

19

Ibid., 199.

20

Ibid., 191.
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suggesting that Foucault

"repeated the

same

error

of totalise thinking with
which he taxed

Wolin, on the other hand,
avotds

this pitfall

inquirers” can often validate
truths.

by mamtaining

that a

class, c theory.’*2 '

“community of

People are no, impnsoned
within Foueauldtan

"discursive formations” whtch
prevent them from ever sharing
experiences with other

people

in their

community

to arrive at truths.

with power shape our identities
socially cons, me, ed truths. 22

m

a direct and tangible

truths.

To

the contrary, our shared
expenences

more than anything

else and thus serve as a
basis for

Change (he organ, zatton of power,
which

affects our lives

way, and you will reshape the
prevatling discourse and create
new

Real truths without scare quotes
are not objective or independent
of power

relationships, according to Wolin,
bu, they

do stem from a

critical

vantage point whtch

only political theorizing or demotic
action can provide. People have
the capacity

imagine a better world for their
communities
realize their

dreams

(civic action).

(political theory)

Never privileging the

and

to act collectively to

desires of a particular individual

or group, theorizing and civic action
can together promote a “participatory,

oriented politics”

that ultimately red, reels

community

judgment

—and

power-and hence truth-, oward common

at

the sole jurisdiction

—of

their experiences, all citizens in a

is

best for the whole. Truth

is

the

the demos.

faith in the

the liberal fear of majority tyranny.

21

Ibid., 186.

22

Ibid.,

upon

deliberate and then decide what

That Wolin has an unfailing

he scoffs

community-

23

ends. For Wolin, truth emerges when,
drawing
political

to

199.
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demos becomes even more apparent when
Even

Aristotle, an antidemocrat to the

core,

few.”

conceded

that

-.Ire

demos was

better a. deliberating
public polices than

Despite the famtliar warnings
from the liberal

camp

that the

threat to individual property
nghts, there is really nothing
to fear.

Athenian democracy, which
“was gutlty of few,
importance of this point

is that

the

of social recognition as creating
a
shared. In short, the ideal

wtsh

were the

24

to

engage

was

no, so

to

distinct political place

with gaining forms

where power was equally

The Wolinian demos does

and butcher the bourgeotsie;

i,

human

not

merely wants to broaden

and diffose power. Moreover, the
democratic impulse tends

can heal a society ravaged by

a grave

excesses against the wealthy.
The

restorative, not destructive or
tyrannical, according to Wolin.

The

Wolin points

much concerned

political, not social.” 25

in class warfare

political participation

demos was

if any,

demos poses

It

to

be

restores the political and

or ecological degradation:

possibility

of renewal draws on a simple fact: that
ordinary
individuals are capable of creating new
cultural patterns of commonality at
any moment. Individuals who concert
their powers for low income
housing, worker ownership of factories,
better schools, better health care,
safer water, controls over toxic waste
disposals, and a thousand other
common concerns of ordinary lives are experiencing a
democratic moment

and contributing to the discovery,

care,

and tending of a commonality of

shared concerns.

Wolin

is far

more sanguine about what

detractors of democracy.

concerns”—of which

He

collectivities

suggests here that their capacity to address “shared

there are thousands of examples,

warnings about majority tyranny.

24

“Transgression, Equality, Voice,” 66.
25

Ibid., 83.
26

can accomplish than liberals or other

“Fugitive Democracy,” 43.
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however modest— belies

liberal

Rumors of democracy’s

tyrannical , endenc.es

his recently-published
tome, Tocqueville

democracy may have two opposing

may be

greatly exaggerated, but
i„

Between Two Worlck, Wolin
concedes

propensities,

one toward

that

diversity, particular.,
y

and

decentra, , zed power, the other
toward uniformity, homogene,
ty and totaling statism.

Accord, ng

akm

to

to the fifth-century

The only cure
democracy
the

Wolin, Tocquevrlle believed

to the ills

Athenian

of “democracy”

citizen, political

only partrcipatory democracy,
someth, ng

pofitical experience,

is real

failed to cultivate participatory

ordmary

that

could offset this

latter propensity.

(or deepened, democracy.
Bu, “if

forms that engaged pofitically the
energies of

populism would be displaced by a cultural
populism of

sameness, resentment, and mindless
patnotism, and by an

anti-political

fonn

27
[Tocqueville] labeled ‘democratic
despotism.’”
Despite paying considerable

to the idea, Tocqueville did not
fear majority tyranny so

ot

democracy wherein

much

lip

as an “anti-political

service

form”

citizens did not play a decisive role
in decision-making and

instead a culture ot apathy, passivity,
and social alienation prevailed. This
“democratic

despotism

leaves individuals isolated and powerless,
resentfully withdrawing into

private

and mindlessly conforming

life,

This was

why Tocqueville

township was not so much the
qualification,

Participatory

making,

Politics

praised the

its

and

England town meeting: “The
of democracy as

its

crucial

closer to the implications of political decision-

a respect for the exercise of power, and cultivating a wariness

Vision 595.
,

Tocqueville Between

of state and economy.

conformist and socially leveling tendencies. 28

democracy brings people

them

New

faithful reproduction

serving to redirect

instilling in

"7

28

’

to the dictates

Two Worlds

,

220.
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Of s, m ple, impetuous solut.on.
As Tocqueville saw
for petty politics

politics

it,

the township represented
an arena

on a small scale-and accordingly
was able

directly to social concents,
eliciting their moral
sympathies and
"political

showing them

involvements made a difference.-The immediacy of its

inconsiderable virtue of restrain,

ng the democratic

to connect citizens

politics

that their

has not the

appet.te for generalization.

A politics

geared to immediate concerns has
a natural respect for limits
because the implications of
a law are

more

readtly grasped” 30 In them
consideration of "immediate concerns,”
the

demos understands
result, exercises

readily that

power

far

its

decisions affect the lives of other
people and, as a

more judiciously than

liberal alarmists

would ever give them

credit for.

Judicious and deliberate, the Wolinian
usually characteristic of individuals.

He

demos demonstrates

sees the

demos

a self-consciousness

as a political actor which, like an

individual, can form a coherent and critical
perspective. Hardly an unthinking

merely reacts against oppression, the demos has
the capacity
and make astute decisions on important
democracies

in history,

political questions.

to

If

we

There have been few true
relies heavily

are to believe Wolin’ s historical

account of Athenian democracy, the demos certainly sounds
impressive:

Athenian democracy of the fifth century was shaped by class
conflicts,
between the rich and the well-bom, the ambitions of politicians,
and the struggle for empire. It developed as the demos became a selfrivalries

conscious actor. Democracy began as a demand for a “share” of power
the institutions for making and interpreting the laws and deciding

29

Ibid.,

215.

Ibid.,

213-14.

30
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that

wield power responsibly

according to Wolin, so his portrait of the demos

one shining example— fifth-century Athens.

mob

in

on

——
Portraying the

demos

as a “self-conscious actor”
with a capacity for “interpretmg
the

laws and deeding questions
of dtplomacy and warfare”
understanding, for

we

we saw

conception of the demos.

common
that

earlier that truth

are to take this epistemology
seriously,

experiences,” the

over

Drawn from

demos develops

powerlessness and

its

Wolin’s

political

emerges from the judgment of
the demos.

we must

accept a radically dtfferent

whole wtth

The demos

is

a “self-consciousness about

created from a shared realization

powerlessness comes from being shut out
of the councils where power’s authority

located.”

32

unity from

Now aware of its exclusion
common

political, not

needs, but

when

emerge, to

make

whose

it

it

seeks to

make

this struggle, the

a system of governance

demos “becomes

more responsive

to its

attempts to shape the political system in
order to enable itself to

possible a

new

actor, collective in nature.” 33

political struggles contribute to its maturation

The

rag-tag collectivity,

and development, turns into a

self-

conscious political actor with an unprecedented
capacity for governance.

The Wolinian demos displays not only self-consciousness

but also the heroic or

agonistic qualities usually attributed to individuals.

Because the heroic has been claimed as an individualistic category,
the
demos seems not only unfamiliar but oxymoronic.

idea ot an agonistic

31

32

is

from the corridors of power, the demos
finds

experience and demands. From

simply when

If

a diversity of individuals
with “scattered

into a coherent

causes.

is essenttal to

“Norm and Form,”

36.

“Transgression, Equality, Voice,” 64.
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Why should it seem

intuitively

absurd that an agonistic
demos like „„
agonistic Alctbtades, might
be driven by the needs of
its nature
o'
constnuriona, restraints? Or
that the relationship
AicibTadJs

m

-

’

,o

Atheman democracy was vexing
because two overreachers were
nfr
"

™

18 ® ad* other? Tl

« problem that democratic action poses for
'

'° n ° ti<>nS

anon^it'^ 4

° f heroic 0r "dividual actors

'

'

is its

Ltke Alcibiades or other political
heroes throughout history, the
demos strives

sometimes transgressing established

The

heroic action of the

demos

power.

for

rules or “constitut.onal
restraints” in the process.

often manifests itself in the form
of “revolution or

popular uprising, collective disobedience,
and mass protest” and, as a

result, is “typically

regarded as destructive or disruptive
of established order and as anticonstitutional
or
threatening to

become

as such .”

35

Wolin suggests

that

it

is

unfatr to interpret the

agonistic behavior of an Alcibiades
as heroic and to view similar behavior
from the

demos
the

as destructive and threatening, for
both individual and demotic agonism stem
from

same primal urge

to

acquire power. If anything, demotic
agonism

suggests Wolin, for the former serves private
ends while the

power

inequalities,

Unequal treatment
Unequal power
all.

is

is

less a

consequence of unequal

rights than

more

heroic,

attempts to redress

which Wolin believes are the primary source of
injustice

in the

world:

of unequal power.

often, although not always, related to an inability
to act effectively or at

Thirsting for power, the

demos can

certainly

—

seeks to redistribute power more equitably

Wolin

latter

is far

also prefers demotic

a far

35

Ibid.
36

Ibid., 65.
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in the short term, but

more heroic aim than

power because he sees

Ibid., 64.

be destructive

it

it

individual glory.

as an expression of Nietzsche's

master morality. The demos
exerts
relentless,

even joyful, drive

its will to

power not ou, of resentment bu,

to expand, to create

new

ou, of a

opportunities for partie, patron,
to

transgress boundaries. Elite
power, on the other hand,
manifests a slave morality,
exert, ons

stemming from

long conspired

Wolm

to

fear

and resentment of the demos.”
As a

persuade us that democracy threatens
the

concedes, however, that there

agomsm. After

the

demos has consolidated

is

its

result, elites

common

challenging

its

own

may be directed

finitude.

The

power domestically,

not at assuring duration to

the Athenian assembly to carry
out their imperial designs.

it

its

may

To

channel

demos

at

would be the

the contrary, the "empire

of the

Many and

to an

whose agon goes mostly uncelebrated by poets and
philosophers and only

can become all-consuming, leading to imperial
designs
its

exists as

existence but

ambivalently by ancient historians.” As with an
Alcibiades or an Alexander,

from

its

demagogues convinced

a testimony to both the transgressive
and aggressive impulses

epical hero

good.

tangible expression of that problematic

leap from polis to empire .” 38 Wolin
does no. believe that a few

was

have

a darker, self-destructive
side to demottc

surplus energy outwardly, beyond
the borders of its homeland.
“The
striving, but that drive

its

polis. Alcibiades left his

this desire

that literally uproot the

beloved Athens to fight for

its

demos

archenemies, the

Spartans, but he considered his act not a betrayal of his
city but rather an attempt to

recover what had been

Athenian

in spirit.

demos uprooted

lost.

Though he no longer

Similarly, after having suttered

itselt

horn the

city

its

was

still

an

second invasion, the Athenian

and took to the high seas. The polis might have been

37

Ibid., 75.

38

inhabited the city, he

Ibid., 74.
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lost, said

Fences, bu, the Athenian detnos
eould sus.atn

The demos,

like Alcibtades,

os.ens.bly retained

demos

will

its

abandoned

its

ttself a, sea, as a nava,

polis to further

its

imperial designs, but

Athenian identity .» What becomes
apparent here

undoubtedly redistnbute power
more equitably

charactenstics of a tyrant in
repress strangers abroad, the

its

at

home,

contact with the outside world.

demos might overextend

itself,

power.

And

it

in

is that

may
its

it

while the

display the

attempt to

leaving itself vulnerable to

military defeat, social disarray,
and ultimately the loss of identity.

The dangers of democratic excess and

surplus energy are even

modernity. Should the demos ever
harness the power of the
telling

what the damage might

modem

be.

Wolin says

that

state,

democracy

choice of the state as the fixed center
of political

life,”

be both an unlikely and undesirable
occurrence. “Democracy

is

more senous

says Wolin, there

in

no

is

“incompatible with the

which means

in the late

that

modem

would

it

world

cannot be a complete political system, and
given the awesome potentialities of modem

tonus of power and what they exact of the
social and natural world,

hoped or stnven

tor.”

40

Wolin does not pursue

military

itself

ought not

the matter further, but once

incorporates his discussion about democratic
imperialism,
fears that the

it

it

seems obvious

to

one
that

Wolin

demos could perhaps misuse modem forms of technologically
enhanced

power

currently at the state’s disposal. Put bluntly, the

from using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons

demos may

not restrain

to destroy its adversaries

abroad. Wolin suggests that there are limits to the epistemological
authority of the

demos, whose knowledge of the

39

Ibid.,

40

be

truth cannot extend

81-83.

“Fugitive Democracy,” 42-43.
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beyond the

polis, the center

of

common
some

h.slory and experience.
This

imphes

that

even Wolin thinks democracy
requtres

constraints, though hardly
the constitutional Hmits
currently

Wohman demos
concerns,

its

The

can

somehow remain

localized and contain

its

imposed on

energy

issue of democratic
imperialism aside, Wolin’s
epistemology must be

calls “the methodist."

There are some obvious

similarities

and inductively constructed.
generalization

drawn from

It

would hardly be

a large

that

a stretch to

is

all

citizens share

inclusive the process, the better. But

methodism, which he argues

is

it

desenbe

power and

procedures to

test

he

Wohman
all,

truth as a

the truth

deliberate collectively—

should be understood that Wolin bitterly

a “proposal for shaping the

mind”

reinforces an uncritical view of existing
41
political structures.”

creativity, imagination

whom

probabilistic and socially

sample of democratic participants. After

emerges, according to Wolin, when

rejects

scientist,

between Wolin and the

methodist, for they both accept
implicitly the idea that truth

more

domestic

epistemological authority will
remain unassailable.

squared with that of his professional
nemesis-the behavioral social

the

to

,f the

it.

in

such a

Having

little

way
use for

and spontaneity, methodism applies fixed
techniques and

hypotheses. Since Descartes, those with a
methodological disposition

have eschewed anything

that

smacks of disorder, doubt, or diversity and have embraced

whatever bears the mark of regularity, uniformity, and
homogeneity. They gravitate
toward the familiar and summarily dismiss any alternative
approaches or creative
solutions to problems.

Furthermore, Descartes argued that the methodical person had

to erase all

“acquired habits, beliefs, and values” until he “stood divested of [his]
cultural heritage

41

“Political

Theory

as a Vocation,” 28.
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in

an ahistoncal silence.

and values,

is

In theory, th.s ahistorical
being, uncorrupted

by received

beliefs

an impart, al observer of
politics and approaches
the subject with a

scientific detachment, bu,

Wolin argues

that this is no, so.

In rejecting tradition

and the

past and always searching
for regularities in political
behavior, the methodist can
only

draw on current

practices as his reference
point for

what

is

normal.

43

Accordingly, he

betrays a conservative bias
against fundamental change and
an unrefleet, ve penchant for
the current system of power.
science, for that

Wolin believes

matter— relies on

that

an insightful political theory-any

careful consideration of the
past

and our

traditions.

Erasing the past putatively serves
the requirements of objectivity
but actually destroys

any possibility of gaining a
reflect

shaped

on-and come
who we

so doing,

are,

to

critical perspective.

terms with-the myriad of experiences
and ideas that have

no matter how shameful, contradictory, or
muddled they may

we draw on what Wolin

suggestive and illuminative

Not
political.

surprisingly,

In the

Theorists and political actors alike
must

calls

our

“tacit political

knowledge,” which

than “explicit or determinate.”

Wolin

is

project.

s

method and democracy

tradition,

Ibid., 37.

Ibid.,

in a chapter partially

who

power of science and technology

42

43

specifically on

devoted

to

treatment of Dewey reveals a qualified sympathy for
his overall

Unlike theorists of the Baconian

state to harness the

more

not optimistic about the application of
science to the

,

John Dewey. Wolin

is far

In

44

expanded edition of Politics and Vision Wolin
comments

the link between the scientific

be.

38-41.

44

Ibid., 45.
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believed

it

was incumbent on

to serve the interests

of progress.

the

Dewey was

susp.c.ous of this marriage.
L.ke Wolin, he understood
that the state and the

agents of advanced capitalism
could deploy science and
technology to augment their

power. So, instead,

Dewey proposed

proposed a conception of science

emphasized the

that not

intellectual affinities,

and everyday practices.”' 5

a marriage

Dewey

own

between science and democracy:
“[He]

only placed

it

at the d.sposal

even the contimuties, between

of democracy but

scientific

method

understood democracy as nothing
other than the

scent, tic method writ large.
Science represented the paragon
after which true democracy

must pattern

itself:

Science

Dewey

insisted,

was

moral undertaking. Scientists not only
practiced cooperation but presumed
a community to which they could
present their findings and count on
unfettered discussion... Dewey’s
ultimate ideal was a society in which
scientific values permeated the
culture and shaped human desires
towards more cooperative and
egalitarian ends.

Dewey

believed that every

a

human being

is

capable of learning from the laboratory of
life,

formulating hypotheses, testing them with
empirical data, and sharing the results with
others in the “scientific" community.
This democratic laboratory

which participants

is

the classroom in

(or students) receive an education, learning
collectively

problems through experimentation. Dewey also stressed

that

how

to redress

only face-to-face

participatory democracy, local in character, could
adequately replicate the scientific

method so

as to

promote what he called “the general

Though Wolin seems

Dewey

finds fault with

45

Politics

and

to agree with the tenor

of Deweyan democratic theory, he

for “evading questions about power.”

Vision (expanded edition), 505.

46

Ibid.,

social welfare.”

515.
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Dewey was

so “fixated on

.he findings of method, the
conduct of experiments, and
the communication of
result”
.ha,

he largely ignored “[q]ues,ions
of how problems become

identified,

who

controls the

communications of results, and who
evaluates the consequences.'- 7
Dewey assumed
every democratic parttctpan,
would be the equivalent of a
the

sc, ends,

who

is

familiar

that

w„h

methods of expenmen, a, ion, and he
never explored the possible
asymmetnes of

power and knowledge

intrinsic to the scientific culture.

Accord, ngly, Wolin challenges

the democracy-as-method
metaphor, suggesting that science
employs fairly esoteric

“concepts and language

incomprehensible
here that

"

that

to the vast

some people

perhaps “exceeded the

common

understanding as to be

majority of citizens.” Wolin does not
haughtily suggest

are too stupid to understand
science. Rather, he maintains that
the

cult(ure) ot science is inherently
elitist

information in the ideal

way

and

fails to

promote the equal exchange of

described by Dewey. Grafting this scientific

way of life

onto the greater populace would not bring
about democracy and instead would only
maintain the inequalities already

in place.

Dewey

science and, as a result, failed to recognize that

it

held naive, romantic notions about

was susceptible

even perpetuated hierarchies of knowledge and
power.

modem

state

Now

to interest politics

heavily financed by the

and big business, science has been properly exposed
as impure and

corruptible, vulnerable to co-optation. For Wolin,
this only reinforces

along: science and

demos simulates

Ibid.,

517.

Ibid.,

514-19.

what was true

all

democracy do not mix. 48

While Wolin may subscribe
that the

and

to a

the scientific

democratic epistemology, he does not believe

community
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in

any way. Democracy

is far

too fluid

and anarchic, resisting any
form or procedure one might
impose on

“

wha, allows democracy

also important to

remain egalitarian, tnelusrve,
and deeply partierpatory.
„

to

remember

This formlessness

it.

that the

Wolinian demos

is

a peculiar

community, taking on

the characteristics of an
individual, including
self-consciousness and willfulness,
in

The demos coheres around

struggle.

immense power

to

achieve

.ts

its

protocol,

As

it.

let

a result,

it

and marshaling

wake. The scientific commun.ty,
on the other hand,

has embraced institutionalization
and
with

this nascent political identity,

all

the hierarch.es, routines, and
procedures that

has a far more conservative disposition
and will rarely defy

alone follow a revolutionary course
of action.

H,s sharp cnticisms notwithstanding,
Wolin does not disparage
unequivocally.

theories,

when

its

aims, will not hesitate to transgress
boundaries, sometrmes

leaving a path of destruction in

come

He acknowledges

demands

a higher order

that “the invention

of creativity and

is

of methods,

scientific

methods

like the invention

of

entitled to the highest praise,” but

that discovery is institutionalized in
a training

program,”

it

impoverishes

education and

poses a threat not only to so-called normative or
traditional political
theory, but to the scientific imagination as well.
It threatens the meditative
culture which nourishes all creativity. That
culture is the source of the
qualities crucial to theorizing: playfulness, concern,
the juxtaposition of
contraries, and astonishment at the variety and subtle
interconnection of
things. These same qualities are not confined
to the creation of theories,
but are at work when the mind is playing over the factual
world as well.

An impoverished mind, no matter
an impoverished world. 49
Wolin suggests here
science, tor

49

Ibid.,

it

is

how

resolutely empirical in

that behavioral social science

institutionalizes

—

i.e.,

and routinizes the search

50-51.
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methodism

for

spirit,

—

is

sees

not even

knowledge, spuming

good

all

creativity

and imagination

in the process.

Good

scientists

employ method when

appropriate, but they do not limit
themselves to tins approach.

They always remain

mindful of histoncal context and
the messy confluence of
traditions, and they must
playfully acknowledge contradict,
ons and nuances in then analyses
of the empincal

world.

that

Like the pragmatists before him,
Wolin believes

any community, even a

scientific

discussion and meditation, sharing
another. This

to

is

all

in the intersubjectivity

community, constructs
relevant

of truth-

a truth after painstaking

knowledge and experiences with one

not always a neat process, often
requiring participants to break the
rules,

improvise unique solutions

fruitful contributions

of others

admonished, the search for

to social

problems, and to abide patiently the not
always

(or themselves, for that matter).

As William James

must remain an open universe and never
foreclose

truth

imaginative approaches or intrepid forays into
the unknown. Celebrating the regimens
of
training and technique, the professional
methodist shuns both the past and the

imagination and has no patience for what he considers

can understand him better as a technician, not
a

fruitless digression.

scientist, for

Perhaps

he practices method

we

stolidly

and predictably.

What most

separates

Wolin from

his pragmatist forebears epistemologically

treatment and understanding of power. The

demos has

because

common

it

re-organizes

power so

as to serve

the inside track

ends, not because

on
it

is

his

political truth

adopts superior

methods of inquiry. Though Wolin’s formulation draws on postmodern notions
of power
to

which the

in his

classical pragmatists

epistemology. After

statistical

all,

were not privy, the metaphor of statistics

statisticians praise larger

power. One might rephrase

his democratic
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still

resonates

sample sizes for enhancing

epistemology as follows:

Increasing the sample size of
participants changes the dynam.cs
of power which in turn

generates truths that serve the

common

good. In the end, Wolin's
epistemology

resembles closely that of the pragmatists:
both argue that truth

is

consensual, the product

of painstaking discussion and deliberation
among people who draw on
experiences.

And

as

we

shall see in the next section,

construction, the product of power
relationships, and

man

their relevant

himself is a social

democracy becomes

the ideal

school in which to receive a proper
education, to develop the capacity for
empathy and
understanding.

II.

Like the pragmatists, Wolin also subscribes
notion that

man

is

democratic psychology, the

an educable and mutable creature, capable of
moral development. The

idea of an unwaveringly flawed

political

to a

“human

nature”

is

really just a defeatist myth, justifying

apathy and compliance with the status quo.

Man

will

remain stagnant

continues to embrace political passivity and the predominance
of the

modem

if

he

state,

but

should he become a political animal, share power equitably,
and engage with his fellow

men

to

make

a better world,

section, but also himself.

experience

is

Because democracy

the school in

affords

its

narrow

self-interest, to

he will improve not only society, as

which one receives

is

common

a proper education. For Wolin,

concerned with the

them

to think

have empathy for people unlike themselves, and
ends.

Wolin

says: “In

political potentialities

my

to

citizens, that

is,

democracy

beyond

work with

understanding, democracy

of ordinary
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in the previous

the fountainhead of truth, the democratic

participants a transformative experience, teaching

others toward

we saw

is

with their

a project

.

possibilities

of becoming

political beings

through (he self-discovery
of common concerns

and modes of act, on for realizing
50
them.”
Democracy

becoming,"

is

a

way of life,

that turns an alienated creature
into a fully-realized,
authentic

To make sense of Wolin's democratic
psychology, we must
of

human

“a process of

51

nature. Briefly stated,

ingrained habits.

The

man

is

not

bound by

political constitution, or the

his nature; he

way

in

first

is

human

turn to his

betng.

view

a collection of

which society organizes power,

disposes people toward certain patterns
of behavior and demands of them an
obedience to
the status quo.

Over time

this organization

capable of doing and accomplishing in
identity.”

this

of power circumscribes what man thinks
he
world;

it

is

“determines” his “political

52

The
its

particular

ways

in

which

a society

is constituted to generate
power is
The historical project of most societies, including
members so that they do more than obey or

political constitution.

our own,

is to

submit: they

shape

its

become disposed

, inclined in such a way that political
authorities can count on their active support
most of the time. These
dispositions have to be cultivated if power is

to be generated and
continuously available. Power depends importantly
on an historical
accumulation of dispositions. But dispositions are not
something so trite
as learned behavior.
They are inscribed demands of the kind that the
village laborer has to ‘learn’ in the factories and
slums. Power is not,
therefore, an exchange or a transaction but an exaction.
It is had on terms
that exact over time and become cumulative... 53

Wolm

describes these dispositions which constitute every person
as “inscribed demands”

or “exactions”

50

Politics

53

effect strengthens “over time and

“Fugitive Democracy,” 3

51

5^

whose

and

“People’s

1

Vision 596.

Two

,

Bodies,”

1

1.

Ibid., 10-11.
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become[s] cumulative.” What

we

believe are unassailable truths
about politics and humanity
are really just demands

have internalized unwittingly and
embraced as our own. Our
acquiescence

demands

reinforces our

own

In turn, these authonties

become so accustomed
inequities.

human

dispositions and secures the

power of political

can count on our support because
over the years

to the

way power

is

organized

in soctety that

We assume the organization of power reflects

nature and

fixed once and for

claimed space.”

54

life itself,

all:

we

to these

authorities.

we

have

blindly accept

is

a

its

inexorable realities about

but Wolin reminds us that "power
and identity are never

they are histoncal projects being
worked out over time and

Man

we

mutable creature whose character

is

in a

not circumscribed by the

laws of nature but rather habituated over
time by power relationships. Power, not
nature,
places limits on the possible; power, not
nature, determines
political constitution, then, will transform

The
education,

because

and

are.

tor

are.

it

teaches that “the

first

duty

is

to support the self-interest

politics is nothing but a struggle for advantage.” 55
This kind

losers.

Changing our

current political constitution, says Wolin,
gives us “an essentially anticivic

works on the assumption

politics

who we

who we

It

that life is necessarily a

“dissolves the idea of the citizen as one for

of the group

of interest group

zero-sum game with winners

whom

it

is

natural to join

together with other citizens to act for purposes related to a
general community” and
replaces

it

interests.”

55

with

56

the idea ot individuals

One

who

are grouped according to conflicting

gets the impression from reading

“Revolutionary Action Today,” 21.

56

Ibid.,

20-21.
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Wolin

that the

system adopts a divide-

and-conquer strategy.

by preexisting
the

same

ties to

fate.”

I,

condtfions us to believe that

who

those

Instead, each

share the

same

we

are no. “civic erea.ure[s]

history, the

same general

bound

association, and

of us defines himself by a group
or vocational identity-“a

business executive, a teamster, a
feminist, office worker, farmer
or homosexual”-that
“naturally divides [us] from others.””

of resources, serving only

its

own

As

a result, each group competes
for a finite share

interests

and never entertaining the
possibility of a

broader perspective.
In addition to dividing us,
the

system also teaches us

to identify

our

own

being with the growth of state power,
both domestically and internationally.
surrender our

worthwhile

own

political

after receiving

The American experience

power

in the process,

but

many

is

We may

(not all) of us find

unprecedented economic and material benefits

well-

it

in return.

58

especially instructive, as most of us have
profited from both

the rise of the welfare state and aggressive
imperialism.

The former has provided

social

security benefits and corporate subsidies, for
instance, while the latter has afforded us

cheaper consumer goods and low

oil prices.

so long as the state and the political
in these

As

far as

economy can

very materialistic ways. But despite what

does not require us
people to

this

to

be

this

we

deliver the goods and improve our lives

we

are led to believe,

way, suggests Wolin. The

way of thinking, which means

there

are concerned, things are fine

is

modem

state

human

nature

has habituated

always the possibility

that a

new

organization of power can re-educate them and broaden their perspective. Wolin
calls for

3/

Ibid, 21.
58

“People’s

Two

Bodies,” 17-19.
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revolution to challenge extsting
habits of

structure

mind and

action:

power

structures and thus

“No, lung short of a long revolution”

of power" and change the way
people think;

same human depositions toward
power-passivity by
serve as well for a

we

can

all

new

change our dispositions, our

it

“is illusory to believe...tha,
the

the

many,

soc.al order as for the current
one.”

become “new

will subvert “the current

w

control

Under the

by the few-wil]
right conditions

beings' —citizens in the true sense
of the word.

Unlike the “groupie,” says Wolin, the
citizen transcends

this “stage

of

unreflective self-interest” and, learning
to “think integrally and
comprehensively rather

than exclusively,” develops a “perspective
of commonality.” 60 Participatory democracy
is

the school in

citizens

recent

who

which groupies acquire

this

education and transfonn themselves into

think beyond narrow self-interest and
consider

work on Tocqueville sheds considerable

light

common

concerns. Wolin’s

on the importance of political

education in modernity. In addressing this issue,
Tocqueville identified the paradoxical
nature of democracy:

its

participatory character “promoted solidarity” but

popular sovereignty... taught that each

According

to

is

the best judge of his

own

its

interests

“idea of

and needs.”

61

Wolin, the chief problem of modernity was that the pendulum
had swung

too far to the individualistic side of the spectrum, where people
are isolated from others,

and away from the collective

side,

where people

feel

connected to their community.

Tocqueville said that modernity has increasingly conditioned
into the private sphere and to lead a life

of crass

59

Ibid., 24.

60

61

“Revolutionary Action Today,” 21.
Tocqueville Between

Two Worlds

,

216.
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self-interest

man

to

withdraw inwardly

and materialism, and argued

that participatory

democracy was the

individualism and soctal alienahon.

best antidote to reverse this
trend, to defeat rampant

The

New

England townships show by
example

participation can re-habituate
or re-educate people, teach

actually coincide with the

cooperating with others.

common

them

interest, that they enrich
their

that the citizen

of the

New

common

circumscribed”

good. After

politics.

in the

realm of theory, but

fifth-century

this case, the

all,

the township

But he thinks

imperfect model of democracy,

only

is

this

is

margins of society

by

interests unequivocally give

the stage for petty or

form of participation, undoubtedly an

a step in the right direction.

this

does not detract from

its

Athens provides us an example of participatory

demos

lives

interests

England township never

undergoes a complete moral transformation
in which private
to the

own

own

62

Wolin readily concedes

way

that their

that

Pure democracy

may

exist

value as a model. Besides,
politics

on

a grand scale.

In

did not limit itself to questions of local
governance or emerge on the

to rebel against the existing system.

and transgressed convention,

it

engaged

in

While

it still

resisted boundaries

mainstream and large-scale

politics, taking

control of the city's most important political institutions
and addressing the most pressing
issues of the time, including even foreign policy. In the
process

and turned them

the

is

to

have evolved

civic: a full-fledged citizenry

numerous

institutions in

somehow become

which

it

into a different

whose being

is

its

denizens

a deliberating citizen.

Ibid.

“Transgression, Equality, Voice,” 74.
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63

being whose

validated through

takes an active part.

62

63

educated

into “deliberating citizen[s].”

The Athenian demos seems
essence

it

The beast has

Wolin argues

that “the self-transformation

subject into citizen"

of the demos
3S into the citizen body,
of the

was confirmed by observers who
w decidedly antidemocratic.
were

Despite their hostility to democracy,
they revealed in their writing,
sometimes
unwittingly, the transformation
of the

Though

political theorists

demos

into a “politically

have often waxed

lyrical

committed

class.”

64

about the importance of civic

education for the general health of the
polis, they have usually argued
that a group of
elites or

God

even

should be responsible for this task.
Even Rousseau,

who Wolin

considers a pseudo-democrat, could not
“conceive of a self-fashioning people,” so
he

devised “a deus ex machina, a Great
Legislator

Wolin maintains
process.

that

Democracy

who

is to

transform

human

people can transform themselves by participating
is

the school in

wield power collectively.

As

which

its

participants learn

how

nature.”

in the

65

democratic

to deliberate

and

the Athenian experience testifies, citizens
undergo a

profound transformation when they engage

in

democratic

politics.

[Deliberative politics was the crucial element in the
experience by which
a demos constructed itself as a political actor.
Deliberative politics
for the

demos

a

mode

of political development, and by the

certain other types of politics

—

representative government

arrest that

egalitarian politics that

demos.

Now

66

is

bureaucratic, charismatic, or even

A participatory and

demos have

learned to transcend narrow self-

empathize with their fellow men, and focus on the long-term implications of

their actions.

Citizens develop “a

mode of thinking

64

Ibid., 66.
65

Ibid., 73.
66

development.

deliberative serves the political education of the

self-conscious political actors, the

interest,

was
same token

Ibid., 66.
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that deals in considerations

and

categones different from those used
fttture

more than

gratifications."'’

becomes a
But

for the present,”

which

a, the

affairs.”

They

del, berate “for the

very leas, “requtres repressing
immediate

7

Interacting with others in his

different kind

why

own

one’s

of human being, future-minded
and

does democracy transform

that “transgression

was

community, the democrats

crucial to the

its

self-less.

participants in this

making of a democratic

citizen

way? Wolin maintains

actor.”

68

As they

resist

conventional norms and boundanes in
their struggle for power,
participants open
vistas,

new

possibilities not only for the distribution

understanding. Democratic citizens

come

to realize that

themselves and society as a whole, that their
society they seek to remake. Wielding
natural or

normal— about

of power but also for
it

is

to resist

self-

within their power to alter

own development

power

feeds back into the

what we often consider

both ourselves and society— this

is

new

the

key

to

to

be

demotic

transformation. “Democracy,” says Wolin, “is
committed to the claim that experience
with, and access to,

persons.”

“the

power

To make

norms of nature

is essential to

his case,

to set

up

Wolin once again points
their

own

political

presence that had succeeded

effect ot

democracy on

its

the development of the capacities of ordinary

in

standards,” the Athenian

developing

Ibid., 71.

68

Ibid., 75.

r

Presence of the Past 154.
,

70

its

own

“Transgression, Equality, Voice,” 75, 76.
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Defying

demos became

political culture.”

participants can be so powerful that there

0/

69

to fifth-century Athens.

is little

70

a

“new

The

wonder why

Plato, an

Athenian

citizen, believed

it

be “an invasion of the psyche,

to

contest, ng for

nothing less than the ‘soul’ of
71
all citizens.”

Wohn’s democratic psychology does

not rest

on

his readings

of the

New

England

township and fifth-century Athens
alone. Wolin also draws from
personal experience.

As

a professor at Berkeley in the

Movement,
forever.

“ WaS

1

960s, Wolin became involved in the
Free Speech

a radicalizing experience that

“The

intensity

,he ex P enence of

protected status with

changed him and many of his colleagues

of the experience... changed everyone
involved. For many of us

moving from an

known boundaries

In resisting the university’s

of existence, fraught with
His experience taught him

apolitical to a

deeply political existence, from

to a condition that

was

risky and unfamiliar.'’ 72

draconian speech laws, Wolin was introduced
to a

risk

and variability but enriched by deep

that to

political

new

kind

engagement.

be folly and authentically human one must

collaboratively in defiance of political

a

act

norms and forms.

III.

Wolin’ s theory seems

to lack a robust democratic theology, a faith that
people, if

given the opportunity, will awake from their slumber of passivity
and act to

world

a better place.

political action,

he

is

Though Wolin claims

that real

make

change demands meaningful

hardly sanguine about the prospects of this ever happening.

71

Ibid., 76.

1"

Look Back at the
“Momentary Democracy,” 34.
Wolin,

’‘A

Ideas That Led to the Events.” Quoted in Xenos,
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the

.

Occurrences of the

political or

democracy, according

politics as usual "is continuous,
ceaseless,

The modem
in

the state

fugitive,

makes

any serious

democracy

and endless.” 73 He ssays:

uprisings does

Wolin

find

any kind of hope. Democracy has

the necessary adjustments to
domesticate political action and suppress

critical opposition.

rests

on

a

The hope

for a marriage

profound misunderstanding:

modem

state apparatus.

that

between the

modem

people can engage

This

is

In the process,

the state and our reliance

No wonder Wolin
Though

on

it

it

and

meaningful

set

of procedures

serves to contain spontaneity and promote
passivity.

emergence of the

modem

is

a contradiction in terms.” 75

state has foreclosed opportunities for

democratic action, Wolin argues that democracy has always been
a fragile enterprise.

Wolin

73

offers a possible explanation for this:

Fugitive Democracy,” 3

democracy

1

74

Ibid., 39.

75

The Presence of the Past

,

As

grow, the opportunities for democratic moments
diminish.

believes “the idea of a democratic state

the

in

state

impossible because the state by

very definition seeks to bureaucratize and
mechanize, to establish a

and protocols.

only

surfacing episodically in reaction
to crises, rocking the boat a bit
until

political action within the

its

Wolin, are “episodic, rare,”
while

state has so effectively
foreclosed opportunities for political
action that

momentary democratic

become

to

149.
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is

an inherently unsettling

expenence

make

for

its part, c, pants,

who

attempts to impose a form on

will eventually betray a
“conservative

He

it.

temper” and

potnts to the demise of true
democracy toward

the end of the fifth-century
in Athens:

The crucial moment occurred in 403
or 402 B.C. when
democracy rejected a proposal to limit
the

the restored
franchise to property owners

thereby preserving

its egalitarian conception
of citizenship. At the same
refused to extend citizenship to
those slaves who had
assisted in the revolution against
the Thirty. Each of the
proposals, from
opposite directions, struck at the
Athenian conception of democracy
one
would contract it, the other enlarge it.
The double rejection was
symptomatic not simply of a determination
to defend democracy against
o igarchy— which it was but of a
conservative temper indicating that

ime however,

it

—

democracy had
plus

“settled

down” and found

its

constitutional

form

its

ne

ultra.

Wolin argues

that before this settling

moment, Athenian democracy could be described

as

a succession of popular uprisings that
succeeded in transforming the so-called ancestral

constitutional and

its

various boundaries.” 77

It

was

a “culture not only of participation

but of frequent rebellion,” in which boundaries
were challenged and never clearly
delineated.

clearly

78

But

drew these

participate.

this rebellious spirit

came

lines, distinguishing

to

an end when the Athenian assembly

between those who could and those who could not

Athenian democracy adopted a “constitutional form,” which
marked the

beginning of its domestication and institutionalization

At times, however, Wolin waxes
action wherein

finding

76

77

78

new

life

citizens

withdraw and

43.

43.
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death.

about the prospect for revolutionary

mode of thinking

“Fugitive Democracy,” 39.

“Norm and Form,”

its

direct their energies

forms” and their “whole

“Norm and Form,”

lyrical

—

and civic commitment
[is]

to

turned upside-down” such

that they

"renounce the

state

paradigm.”™ These glimmers of
optimism may seem

inappropriate given what Wolin
has said about the “fugitive"
character of democracy.

But

it is

important to understand that Wolin's
democratic theology rests ultimately
on his

democrat, c psychology. Most of
us

may be

d.sposed toward political passiv.ty,
making

the prospects for democratic
act.on quite dim, but a series of
democratic

always change our d,spos,tions.

of them erupted
and

act.

One

In other words, these

democratic

moments could

moments-if enough

could have a cumulative effect and
eventually reverse the

gets the sense that

Wolin

is

way we

think

not holding his breath here, but
he does

maintain hope that citizens can subvert
the “state paradigm" and

in a

profound

way

reclaim their humanity.

His cautious optimism notwithstanding,
Wolin never fully convinces his readers
that there is

within

it.

much hope

Wolin

for

democracy, for he

insists that

people’s history, but

at the

never able to resolve inherent tensions

is

democracy must remain

same time he argues

that

parochial concerns and address the larger issues
hold.

More

specifically,

democracy

will never

at

localized,

grounded

in a place

democracy today has

stake in the

manage

modem

to transcend

world for

to subvert the state,

While

it

is

beyond

local concerns.

of the utmost importance

all

it

is

Says Wolin:

equally necessary that the

of such activity be recognized. It is politically
incomplete. This is because the localism that is the strength of grassroots
organizations is also their limitation. There are major problems in our
political limitations

society that are general in nature and necessitate modes of vision and
action that are comprehensive rather than parochial. And there are

7Q

“Revolutionary Action Today,” 27.
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to take

of our

democrats support and encourage

that

political activity at the grassroots level,

it

which not

only perpetuates an antidemocratic organization of power but
also influences
dispositions, if it refuses to look

and a

1

.

historical legacies

and

politics.

But the problem

0

is,

how

of wrong

and unfairness that will never
be confronted
exacerbated by exclusive concern
with backyard

may even be

can democracy be both local
and national in character?
Wolin

perceives the conundrum here,
but he also understands that
local democrat, c movements

can be ‘'bigoted, provincial,
myopic, and anti-intellectual” 8 '—
that
concern with backyard politics”
unfairness” for which the

may

modem

only exacerbate “historical legacies
of wrong and

state is largely responsible.

besetting society today are "general
in nature” and thus

response, a large scale democratic

movement

Unfortunately, Wolin never explains

problem

for future thinkers

their “exclusive

how

this

demand

that uproots the

would

The

actually

current problems

a “comprehensive”

source of all that

is

happen and leaves

who may develop “modes of vision and

wrong.

this

action” currently

beyond our scope.
While Wolin admits
to underestimate the

size and scope ot

that a tension

seventy of the

modem

society

issue.

make

between the

Many political

participatory

state,

Ibid.,

8

he seems

thinkers have suggested that the

is

only incompatible with the

state intervention

and regulation of society and

not only tor sinister reasons, like imposing order and perpetuating
social

hierarchies, but also for

80

exists,

not the size and scope of modem society. 82 But does
not the vastness and

complexity of modem society invite

economy

and national

democracy impracticable, but Wolin

dismisses this claim outright, arguing that democracy

modem

local

more

legitimate reasons, such as to improve the quality of life for

27-28.

Presence of the Past 8 1
,

“Fugitive Democracy,” 42.
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rmihons of people living
his

in close

proximity to each other? As
Stephen Holmes argues in

review of Tocqueville Between
Two Worlds, democratic majorities
often

state to offer its expertise in

accomplishing honorable social goals.
“As

call

women join

workforce, for example, voters
address a difficult-to-ignore social
demand to
authorities for elder care to be
transferred

funded social services.

modem

Holmes

state are not “inherently at

Wolin’s argument
unable to explain

improve our

that

cites this

odds ,”

84

example

to suggest that

which may be

true, but

the

political

to taxpayer-

democracy and the

even

if

we

accept

our growing reliance on the state erodes
true democracy, he

why we would

lives.

from working-age daughters

on the

is

ever turn to participatory democratic
movements to

Indeed, even professional legislatures,
which enjoy far

devote to politics than do ordinary

citizens,

more time

have increasingly delegated authority

to

to the

executive branch and the bureaucracy to
address complex issues that extend beyond their
expertise.

Participatory

democracy may even turn back the clock—maybe even
work

against social progress for

women,

for

example— and

re-introduce social and economic

conditions that most people would consider far too
primitive and uncomfortable to

embrace. Wolin would respond

that

we have been

conditioned to think this way, to

believe that only the state can marshal the expertise to solve
complex social problems.

But

it

is difficult to

imagine the demos addressing problems

that affect

hundreds of

millions of people inhabiting a land that stretches from the Atlantic to
the Pacific. Given
this

unresolved tension between the particular and the general, the local and the national,

Wolin’s democratic theology appears weak.

83

Holmes, “Both Sides Now.”
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If

pressed on this issue, Wolin
would probably agree.

founding period in American
history and has lamented the

He

failure

has written about the

of the anti-Fedcralists

and other proponents of local
partttipatory democracy to defeat
the

ratification

of the

Constitution. For Wolin, the
Constitution represents a radical
departure from the

democratic heritage of the colonial
experience
the Declaration of Independence. 85

in

America, expressed most succinctly

The Constitution marks

the beginning

in

of a new

America, primarily economic and
intentionally antidemocratic.” 86
Though vestiges of
the democratic tradition in

America remained

the final nail in democracy’s
coffin.

It

after the ratification, the Civil

may have put

an end to slavery, but

resolved the tension between local
democracy and the centralized
decisively, "reducing the

the

American

voter.”

87

power of the

citizen: instead

states,

and working a revolution

of a participating member of the

Wolin’s narrative of early American history
suggests

undermined our democratic heritage and

set

state.

polis,

War drove

in

The
in the

so doing

latter

it

won

moeurs of

he would be a

that certain

key events

us on a perilous course toward increasing

centralization, bureaucratization, and imperialism.
In this light, recapturing what

we

lost

so long ago seems a nearly impossible task.

One wonders why Wolin
nearly unattainable

and when

has devoted his career to a

it is,

way of life he

believes

is

only momentarily. Indeed, his Weberian pessimism

precedes him, and he has just stopped short of declaring outright

85

that

democracy

is

dead.

Other scholars, of course, interpret the Declaration as a liberal document, an
articulation of natural rights, not of democratic principles. See Zuckert’s The Natural
Rights Republic for example.
,

86

87

“People’s

Two

Bodies,”

Tocqueville Between

1

1.

Two Worlds

,

269.
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He even

suggests ,ha, the voeatton of
(he political theorist
resembles that of the eulogist,

devoted to preserving the
loss for humanity.

memory of democracy and

articulating the signtfrcance

But, for Wolin,

waiting to reawaken in

democracy

moments of erists and

is

no, exactly dead;

much

soberer version of it. Quite
realistically, Wolin accepts
that the

tirst

ot

all,

it

is

state in

modem

democrat, c theology strikes a melancholic,
even tragic, chord.
a

mode of being

that is conditioned

by

bitter experience,

temporarily, but. ..a recurrent possibility
as long as the
survives.

And

fullest.

He

never

can.

In the end. his

describes democracy

doomed

to succeed only

memory of the

He seems

from the diverse relations and

distilled

to suggest that in

political

reminds them of the

futility

of it

all,

have again. Accordingly, Wolin’s

“Political Theory:

circles

we move

them

its

to act but continually

evoking what they once had and can never really

radical

From Vocation

sensibility,

modernity democratic power endows

participants with a critical perspective, one that drives

democracy assumes

to Invocation,” 20.

OQ

“Fugitive Democracy,” 43.
30

state will

those participants fortunate enough to taste
the bitterness of democracy

wisdom, even melancholy

88

embraced a

moments which

enjoy a strange kind of power, which Wolin
describes as “experience,

within.

dormant,

check and, perhaps more importantly,
give people an

opportunity to experience, however
briefly, their humanity to the

as

lies

as he has

here to stay-bu, he does hope
for more democratic

keep the

i,

to emit occasional shocks
to the state. This

suggests that Wolin does not lack
a democratic theology so

disappear

of its

88

“What Revolutionary Action Means Today,”
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27.

the tenor of a

“melancholic

democracy-more a

sad remembrance of what
has been

lost

than an

upbeat theory of what can be.

IV.

Wading through
the least, and one can

the oeuvre of Sheldon Wolin

become quickly entangled

contradictions. But examining his

work through

in a

jungle of apparent tensions and

the lens of the three pragmatist
tenets

reveals an overall coherence to his
democratic theory.
collectivities, unrestrained

epistemology); that

and action toward

man

formidable enterprise, to say

is a

He

believes that deliberative

and unbounded, have a grapple hold on the

is

common

mutable and thus has the capacity

truth (democratic

to direct his habits

concerns (democratic psychology); and that

occasion, and in defiance of the

state, seize

men

extreme

in his

Jamesian admonition

eschew attempts
in the context

dream

in a

that the search for truth

Ephemeral and

to their

to foreclose

new

must always remain open and forever

approaches.

It is

of modernity, ends on a melancholy

to

on

democratic theory. His rabid anti-institutionalism invokes
the

no wonder

that his

democratic theory,

The open universe seems but

note.

world increasingly dominated by technology,

would come

will

the opportunity to act collectively

(democratic theology). In some ways, Wolin has taken
the pragmatist tenets
logical

of mind

in a

a

world wherein everything

an abrupt halt without our established routines, procedures, and processes.
elusive,

democracy

is

a precious experience that can never be sustained

long enough to yield epistemological or psychological benefits.

To give

game

these rather abstract concepts

some

life,

it

of baseball as a metaphor for democracy. Wolinian
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may be

helpful to consider the

democracy evokes images of

8

the sandlot, a place
a

where neighborhood k.ds gather

nekety wooden fence

brown and yellow
tncky bounces

in the outfield, sweatshirts

patches, and countless

in the infield.

nor fame; they play
players regulate the

used as bases,

bumps and

1

love.

unmowed

Imagine

grass with

divots in the ground which

of the game. There

settle disputes

is

no need

make

for

for umpires, for the

themselves. While there

agreement on the rules of the game, they
are hardly
than

game they

But the children do not eare. They
play for neither money

for the sheer thrill

game and

to play the

fixed.

is

For instance,

general

if

more

or fewer

players arrive on a particular day,
the rules will be altered to ensure
fair play and

equal playing time.

One team may be

short a player, for

which they

will receive just

compensation by giving the other team only two
outs per inning instead of three. Both
teams

may have more

than nine players which will require either
rotating substitutions or

allowing more than nine players on the

powerful player
advantage.

A

may

field.

Or perhaps an

older and

much more

agree to bat left-handed so as not to give his
team an unfair

late arrival

may change

the entire

dynamic of a game, requiring some ad

hoc adjustments, maybe even switching a player from
one team
matters in the end, for they

may

choose not

to

to another.

keep score today. Winning

is

It

hardly

hardly as

important as an evenly matched, well-played game. Finally, there
are no spectators or
fans.

play

Whoever

arrives at the sandlot,

or, if he prefers, to

a base coach.

sharpening his

Everyone
skills,

no matter how

be directly involved
is

in

late,

another

receives a

way

a participant, contributing to the

warm

—perhaps
game

invitation to

as a scorekeeper or

in his

own way,

and enjoying an authentic baseball experience. Collectively these

participants represent the demos.
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Shamocracy evokes images of
professional baseball and

the assoeiated

all

glamour. Adorned in their
freshly-washed and -pressed uniforms,
the muscle-bound
athletes play

set rules

on an impeccably manicured

which are

strictly

With

billions

for the

owners and fans tssue a

of dollars on the

what was a gentleman's game

drawing millions of fans

45,000-seat stadium.

line for

in the nineteenth

clear

game

that

winning

is

century becomes a mass spectacle,

is its

Of course,

the most

exclusiveness, drawing a clear line

between players and spectators. Passively
watching the
field, spectators

mandate

owners, players, and merchandisers,

to the ballpark or their televisions.

important feature of the professionalized

heroes on the

They observe

enforced by umptres. Without these
tmpartial judges there

would be chaos on the held,
everything.

field in a

can only find meaning

trials

in their

and triumphs of their

own

lives

from the

comfortable confines of their luxury box seats or
living room. They can only experience
baseball vicariously. Representing the fans
of their fair city, players constitute a

meritocratic elite

who

enjoy not only the rare opportunity

to

play but also the bargaining

position to negotiate multi-million-dollar contracts.
In the end,

corrupt the players,

whose

celebrity turns

endorsement and makes them forget

them

into

why they loved

commodities
the

game

case in politics today, Wolin would suggest, both players
(i.e.,

citizens) are unable to

In

(i.e.,

the

money and

fanfare

for product

in the first place.

(i.e.,

As

is

the

and spectators

politicians)

have an authentic experience of baseball

democracy).

keeping with the momentary and melancholic nature of Wolinian democracy,

the sandlot will not last forever.

some

all

kids will

move away, and

League organization

The

better players will

go on

to

play organized

others will develop other interests.

will turn the sandlot into an
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Maybe

unblemished and enclosed

ball,

a local Little

field,

complete with bleaehers and a
concession stand. Other potential
Play will be harder to

where children can

come

play.

by, as parents and property

sites for

owners place more

Lest their lives be beset with
tragedy or disaster,

aspect of our children’s lives,
even their recreation. With good
intentions

manage

their activity,

making sure things do not

Ultimately, the fear of broken

managed

recreation.

spontaneous

windows and

get out of hand and

restrictions

we

we

on

plan every

try to

no one gets

hurt.

legs and the ensuing lawsuits
inspires

But Wolin would suggest

that

such attempts to eliminate risk take

the fun and spontaneity out of life,
create merit-based hierarchies, and
set limits on
inclusion. Recall that talented kids
play

more than

others in Little League, and that

overly-involved parents often take these
organized games far too seriously and put
undue
pressure on their 10-year-olds, even in
ostensibly supportive environments.

without saying that the intrusive adults in
It

becomes apparent

fragile enterprise.

the

demos

A

we

metaphor represent the

play out this metaphor

that, sadly,

goes

paternalistic state.

democracy

in different directions.

in this world,

it

is

almost as

As

if the stars

and planets have

As

to

—

would
the

becomes

rather experience the

game

there

it

is

s thrills

without

its

far easier

game

i.e.,

and more pleasant for us

to

vicariously, not authentically, as

it

be

baseball has been

increasingly professionalized and institutionalized through media
technology
etc.

a

opportunities for participation

perfectly aligned for an authentic democratic experience to
occur.

video games,

is

myriad of factors can undennine the unity of its
participants

and send them

become more scarce

as

this

It

television,

be spectators.
provides

We

many of

discomforts, both mental and physical. Wolin recognizes

a certain inevitability to

all this,

but he holds on to the dream

that,

whenever

possible, people will choose to take part in those spontaneous, natural experiences in
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life,

l.ke sandlot baseball or
pure

democracy, and when reflecting
on those days, will

remember with sorrow what has been

lost

and dimly hope
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to recapture

it

once again

.

CHAPTER

VI

BENJAMIN BARBER AND QUIXOTIC
DEMOCRACY

Political theonst

Benjamin Barber, the Gershon and
Carrol Kekst Professor of

Civil Society at the University
of Maryland,

democracy whose sharp
democracy”
do.

In his

critique of liberal

is

another advocate of participatory

democracy-or what he

calls “thin

proves far more convincing and
illuminating than his democratic
remedies

landmark work of political theory, Strong
Democracy he argues
,

democracy”

rests

on a

set

of metaphysical assumptions

fundamental inability of the human beast

own

species/'

1

The

of our nature

nghts of individuals. As a

these

is

to

human

left

with members of its

inconceivable, even perniciously idealistic, to

become unruly hordes posing
amounts

to little

a threat to the

more than

devising the right institutional mechanisms and barriers
to ensure that
beasts can co-exist peacefully within a finite amount of
space. Liberal

much

as he is a solitary figure

whose

man

greatest wish

alone and guaranteed protection from would-be intruders. His engagement

politics extends

govern

is

result, liberal politics

not innately social or political so

be

to live at close quarters

In their view, collectives quickly

zookeeping,

that perpetuate the “belief in the

idea that communities, working collectively
for the greater good, can

reflect the better angels

liberals.

that “thin

no further than the voting booth, where he periodically chooses

in his behalf.

the zoo, liberal

man

So long

as these elites successfully limit the

leels content

Barber, Strong Democracy, 2

and

will happily re-elect them.

1

280

it

in

elites to

amount of conflict
Perhaps

is

in

goes without

saying that, for Barber, liberalism
lacks imagination or vision,
and

it

embraces a

far too

pessimistic and simplistic
understanding of man.

At the heart of liberal reductionism,
says Barber, are three often
conflicting
dispositions

anarchism, realism, and minimalism.
Valuing above

of the individual and the

relentless pursuit

of property, liberalism

all

the nega.tve rights

disposed toward

is

anarchism, endorsing a radical
individualism which rests on the belief
that the state only
stands to get in the

way of the

individual and

become an unwanted

authoritarian

presence. But understanding that
individual rights will never be secure
in a stateless
society, liberals also

conflict

realist

and

instill

embrace realism and allow for the

,

of his

of power

peers.

that

only an absolute sovereign could protect

Later, liberals like

Locke and Madison argued

formidable state might successfully restrain the
actions of tyrannical

never be able to restrain

anarchism and realism,
is

a necessary evil

strict neutrality

to mitigate

order. Hobbes, probably the first
libera] political philosopher,

par excellence believing

the ferocity

state’s use

liberals

whose

on the

So, in an attempt to find a

itself.

that

men

was

a

man from

such a

but

would

happy medium between

have tended toward minimalism, the notion

that the state

authoritarian tendencies can only be avoided if it
maintains

common

institutional safeguards to limit

good, endorses pluralism and tolerance, and creates
its

own

authority.

While we might see minimalism

reasonable balance between our desire for liberty and need for political
power,
resolves the tension so neatly, according to Barber.

Our

it

as a

never

natural condition requires the

creation of the state to protect our liberties, but the state itself poses a threat to those very
liberties

it

is

meant

to protect.

The

point at which the state satisfies the
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demands of

realism without compromising
the concents of anarch,
stn
pin

in the

end be impossible to

down, thus exposing the incoherence
of liberal thought.
Barber finds

liberal, sm

so frustrating largely because

faulty assumptions about
humanity. Liberals presume,
that

may

-humans

are material betngs in

polmcal time and space are
believe

humans

mechanics.”

2

are “governed

As

indivisible.

first

Newtonian atomic

and self-contained

No two

unit,

they are and in

rests

on a number of

sometimes without realizing

all

they

do-4® then social

it,

and

matenal or physical tune and space,”
and thus

by laws

physical entities

characteristics of a

distinct

literally

all

it

that

correspond to the laws of physical

and foremost,

According

particle.

human

liberal

beings assume the

to liberals, each

human

is

a

an atom whose motives and actions are
always whole and

people can occupy the same space

at

the

same

time, neither

physically nor politically, socially, or
psychologically. Finally, only that which excites

our senses can affect us either physically,
emotionally, or intellectually, and each one of
us responds to these external stimuli in exactly
the same way. This mechanistic

conception of

man

leads liberals to believe that

and politically apathetic being who only seeks

remove any impediments toward
motion, liberal

man

that goal.

believes other

human

man

to

to

be alone, free from any intrusions on

by nature

maximize

his

a solitary, hedonistic,

own

sensual pleasure and

Free to the extent that nothing impedes his

beings, no matter

potential threat to his freedom. People interact with

beneficial, serving each person’s private

is

interests.

their personal space

2

Ibid., 32.
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they are, represent a

them only when

and hedonistic

way.

who

it

is

mutually

Otherwise, they prefers

and any obstacles

in their

Both the anarchist and
exactly the

same way,

realist

tendencies ofliberalism view
every

3
as a "radically individuated
particle.”

human being

in

At the same time, they hold

disparate views about the role of
the state mainly because each
tendency rests on a
distinct understanding

infinite

of political space. The liberal-anarchist
sees

and imagines there

freely without

is

enough space

in the

any danger of conflict. Only the

atom; other atoms never present such a
menace.
sees political space in finite terms:

roaming atoms are

is

it

world

political

for individual

state threatens the free

On

atoms

space as
to

roam

movement of each

the other hand, the liberal-realist

a "densely populated” universe wherein
freely

one another. 4 Tension and conflict among
atoms

apt to collide with

is

the norm, requiring the state to intervene,
to create boundaries so that individuals
are

protected from encroachments by others.

middle ground leads him

The

to value tolerance

liberal-minimalist,

and mutual respect,

whose search

flirts

5
conflict does not exhaust the potential of human
concourse,” that

the capacity to

work together toward

greater ends, but ultimately

never relinquish an atomistic conception of humanity. Liberals

much

entropy animates the particles

fundamental objective of politics
Collective attempts

at

in the political world, but

is to

promoting the

Ibid., 41.

4

Ibid., 38.

5

all

Ibid., 40.
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other.

of

can

how

agree that the

will only increase the level

entropy, almost certainly putting these atoms on a collision course.

3

disagree about

keep these atoms away from each

common good

beings have

too, says Barber,

may

they

with the idea that

human

he

for

Forever fearful of the authoritarian
tendencies of collectives, liberals
always
detect something sinrster
beneath the surface of their
ostenstbly good intentions. Tins

wariness breeds conservatism, an
outngh, fear
well-reasoned and popular,

we

erect institutional

may

bamers

consequences. Better

that

that

any democratic

to collective energies than

we do

nothing

it

at all,

later.

even

if

nsk

liberals refuse to accept that

cities, in the arid desert.

warn. Liberals

gifts

demand

action,

In the liberal universe, there
are only a

peril

of nature. Desperately clinging

communities can build

It is

their potentially dire

circumstances

oases of certainty in a vast empty desert,
and our lives are in

wondrous

no matter how

trample the “natural” rights of
individuals. Better that

than proceed impetuously and regret

too far from these

action,

their

own

any time

few

we wander

to these natural oases,

oases, even

towns and

never wise to build a city on a foundation of
sand, they

call this political paralysis

by

a variety

of euphemisms— prudence,

circumspection, caution— which, they claim, political
uncertainty makes necessary. But,
oddly, liberals are selective with their skepticism.

may

political convictions

of majorities

arouse their incredulity, but liberals are quite certain
of their atomistic assumptions

about humankind. They never bother

deduce certain
free

The

political “truths’

to question these

—namely,

that

movement of autonomous atoms— and

among

assumptions from which they

government

exists solely to safeguard the

they assuredly espouse political quiescence

the citizenry.

As Barber understands

it,

liberals fear political conviction

and change because

they skitter back and forth between radical absolutism and radical skepticism and cannot
find a reasonable middle ground. Either in an absolutist or a skeptical frame of mind,

liberals

come

to the

same conclusion

—

that collective action

2K4

of any kind can only cause

trouble.

them

The problem with

together"'' is that

it

this

comes

emphasis on “keeping
at tire

men

apart rather than. .bringing
.

“pnce of undermining

concerted action will yield beneficial
results— and afraid that
disaster

liberals prefer inaction to

anything

else.

activity.”

it

7

Uncertain that

may even

invite

But the lack of certainty, says Barber.

should not necessarily preclude concerted
action. Minimalist timidity
introduces

its

own

dangers.

Afraid of overstepping the prudent
boundaries set by skeptical reason, the
liberal is politically paralyzed.
Because he is uncertain of his beliefs, he
hesitates to act. But in a world of
necessary actions and ineluctable
consequences, the liberal’s diffidence cannot
mean that nothing happens,
only that he causes nothing to happen. He
may modestly abstain from
acting on behalt of public goods that he
does not think can be legitimated,
but his reticence only means that private

and clearly illegitimate forces
unopposed. Refusing to impose himself or a
public will on others, he willy-nilly permits
market forces, which are
neither public nor just, to ride roughshod over
8
his fellow citizens.
will control his destiny

Understanding liberty merely as "freedom from" intrusions
on our personal space and
property encourages a dangerous passivity that leaves

many

people vulnerable

to

an

increasingly boorish private sector. Vigilantly adhering
to constitutional limits, the
liberal state

agonizes over the extent to which

the majority will, while

dominant role

in

our

economic

lives.

it

can lawfully intervene on the behalf of

elites consolidate their

power and play an increasingly

We may not be certain about the consequences of any given

civic action, but Barber maintains that political paralysis invites a certain end:
the

“random coercion and

6

arbitrary force"

of faceless corporations which

Ibid., 21.

7

Ibid., 106.

8

Ibid., 106.
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will “seize hold

of

our

common

destinies.”

powerful, and

it

9

Merely protecting negative freedoms
suceors the economically

does nothing

social good. After

all, elites

to aid the less fortunate
or to

have

far

more resources

their authority in the private
sector but to

The minimalist attempt

discounts the prospect of citizenship,
the idea that

autonomous

at their

buy influence

to reconcile liberty

promote

a broader sense

of the

disposal, not only to assert

in the public sphere.

with power, anarchism with realism,

human beings

are

more than just

particles and in fact often define
themselves in the context of their political

community. According

to Barber, the citizen cares about
far

more than

pleasure and maintains strong political
convictions and loyalties.

his

He does

own

sensual

not recoil from

imagining a better and more just society than
the one he currently inhabits, or from
taking
action to

city

make

his

dreams a

reality.

on a foundation of sand!

idea that liberty and

power

“With some pluck and

free,

most

can too build a

men remain

hand of the

state,

we

are confronted.

name

only,

it

is

the

common

while a politically engaged citizenry can alter

needs. Without

merely an abstraction

Like Rousseau, Barber believes

that

power

that has

man

Only

vulnerable to the caprices of market forces and

the balance of power in society, curbing the cruel excesses of
the market, and
state responsive to

is

are connected, that freedom depends on taking
control of our

liberal

invisible to the helpful

we

says the citizen. Perhaps most important to
Barber

destiny and not simply acquiescing to the world with
which

nominally

creativity

is

no

bom

to

real

go along with

Ibid., 108.
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freedom exists

the

in

meaning based on experience.

not free but in chains, and he achieves

freedom not by eluding his fellow man but by cooperating with him.

9

it,

making

—
For Barber,

man

is

an inherently social creature.
Embracing an atomistic

conception of man, liberals

fail to

take into account the fact
that

profoundly conflicted creatures
whose selves are often

split

human

beings are

between competing

loyalties

or impulses, that our identities
are the products of our
relations with others, and
that
often respond willfully (and
not mechanistically) to the
world around us.

eminds

his readers,

no

man

we

As Barber

possesses an undivided and
unencumbered self that

completely precedes social relations,
and his actions are not merely
predetermined
responses to external stimuli. Each
of us

is

ambivalent and complex, socially
constructed

and interdependent, idiosyncratic
and

willful.

defined. Every one of us resembles
a

community

product of

many hands and

Man
he

is

s

Identity is not monolithic or clearly

is

a whole,

example,

we must

may be

intricate patterns, the

not tantamount to the unimpeded atom,
for in large part

the product of his community. Each
of us
parts.

whose

influences, reveal myriad inconsistencies
and contradictions.

freedom, then,

and conflicting

quilt,

We can no

is

a “complex entity

made up of different

longer speak of the entity being coerced or
being free as

10
specify which parts and which objects are
in question.”

free

and uninhibited but

my mind may not be.

It

may

My body,

for

be under the spell

of a powerfully persuasive influence or of unseen
habits of mind formed by years of
education, socialization, and subliminal messages.
that

he

is

aware of all

As

man

is

only free

to the extent

the outside influences and internal contradictions that
constitute

him and can then consider

his options before acting. Reflexive or instinctive actions

mechanistic responses to external stimuli— indicate he

10

such,

Superman and Common Men

,

48.
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is in

chains. But as long as

man

is

—
a

conscous and deliberate

and the regret he

may

actor,

feel later,

If we are to understand

he

keeping

human beings

We will

expectations of it.

and then devise a

worthy of a

political

not

political

assume

costs of any decision

more

sophisticated

way-as

are free to the degree that
they are aware

will no, conclude, as
liberals do, tha,

humanity

system based on our worst and
most pessimistic

that

people are pnmarily hedonistic and
selfish

system that offers no hope other than
protecting each

individual particle from intrusion
on
in

in this

who

of their condition of interdependence-we
a lost cause, only

nnnd the opportunity

is free.

inherently soctal and conflicted
creatures

,s

in

its

personal space.

Nor

will

we

understand politics

crudely pluralist terms, as an arena
wherein private interests compete for
influence

over the state and fight over
Barber,

we

will see

its finite

humankind's capacity

perspective, cooperate with others in

sake ot another.

amount of goods and

And we

its

to

and become politically engaged

one

in

to

else’s

sacrifice personal gain for the

human freedom

of the world around us and our complex relationship
a far different political landscape,

Instead, suggests

view issues from someone

community, and

will understand

services.

it.

in social terms, as an

Accordingly,

which people transcend

citizens, directing their energies

awareness

we may

imagine

their individual interests

toward the

commonweal.
Through

his relationships with others,

transform himself.

man

can

—

Unbound by preconceptions of what

can define himself by the

way

in

which he

quite unlike an atomic particle

it

means

interacts with others.

to

be a human being, he

He

can liberate himself

from unconscious influences and the dogma of hedonism through democratic

When reminded

of Rousseau's admonition

that

288

men must be

action.

“forced to be free,” liberals

shudder with

fear, recalling the

Barber, this phrase is far
free, citizens

bloody excesses of the French
Revolution. But.

more innocuous than

i,

must be made acutely aware of the

sounds and simply suggests
civic duties for

responsible in their community.
Democracy, with

for

that, to

be

which they are

all its institutional

mechanisms

for

deliberation and careful consideration
of alternatives, creates the conditions
under which
citizens can exercise this kind
of freedom.

Unfortunately, liberal democracy only
provides opportunities for democratic
participation to a handftil of elites-those
fortunate

representatives.

A

become our

to

champion of participatory democracy, Barber

calls “strong democracy.’'

classical

enough

offers a version that

While “strong democracy has a good deal

democratic theory of the ancient Greek polis,”
says Barber,

envision politics in the ancient sense of a
‘way of life,’ and

more extravagant claim

that politics is the

is

elected

in

common

with the

“does not quite

it

explicitly hostile to the

way of life.” 11 Like

he

liberals,

Barber

still

is

sensitive to the dangers ot totalizing politics
and resistant to communitarian notions that

the political should

subsume every

frustrated with the citizen passivity

facet

of our

lives.

Yet, as

we have

and market dominance inherent

seen, he

is

to liberal politics.

Representing an attempt to find a middle ground, strong
democracy
envisions politics not as a

way of life

way of living— as, namely,
beings with variable but malleable natures and with
competing but overlapping interests can contrive to live together
the

way

that

but as a

human

communally not only

to their

mutual advantage but also

of their mutuality. 12

1

Strong Democracy, 118.

2

Ibid.,

1

18.
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also

to the

advantage

In a strong dentocracy,
cit.zens

engage more actively

in polities bu,

do so voluntanly,

understanding that their panic,
pat, on will benefit
themselves and the community
as a

whole. Strong democrats do
no, relinquish their private

pohs do, bu,

a,

the

same time

this

liberalism and

its

in a

profound way.

happen, citizens in a strong
democracy participate directly

ree phases of politics

Wohnian democracy,

of the ancient

their part, e, pa, ion strengthens
their attachment to their

community and thereby transforms
them

To make

lives, as citizens

in all

deliberation, policymaking, and
implementation. Unlike

strong democracy does not
represent a wholesale rejection
of

institutions or

uphold a radical vision of the

political.

Instead, Barber

intends strong democracy to be
an achievable goal that will modify
rather than undermine
existing liberal institutions. Barber
considers the liberal fear of majority
tyranny to be

overstated— for, indeed, he often quotes Louis
Hartz who quipped

that the

“American

majority has been an amiable shepherd
dog kept forever on a lion’s leash” 13

—but he

recognizes the need for liberal institutions
to protect minorities from potentially
repressive collective action.

institutions,

By

grafting strong democratic institutions
onto existing

Barber wants merely

remove many, but not

all,

limits

to

change the emphasis of American politics— to

on majority

action.

If this

shepherd dog” would have the opportunity to roam on
his
very

least,

were

to

happen, the “amiable

own once

in a

while

or, at the

enjoy the freedom that comes with a longer leash.
Liberals maintain that

citizens could never govern themselves well because
they

do not have the expertise

to

address complex policy issues and will sooner succumb to the
persuasive rhetoric of

See for example,
Everyone, 155.

A Place For

Us,

1

9;

Strong Democracy,

290

1

7;

and An Aristocracy of

demagogues than engage

in politics with

any degree of seriousness.
Barber respectful*

disagrees, asserting that
part.cipation itself provides the
edueation any citizen needs
to

contribute intelligently.
better, in fact, than a

We can

expect a deliberative cit.zenry
to govern itself well, far

group of elites ever

will.

So long

as strong

democrats

institutions

the

which

are put in place, citizens
will rise to the occasion.

Perhaps the most important phase
of strong democracy
citizens

engage

in public

deliberation-^ what Barber

political talk “protects the
political process

from

is

first,

in

calls "political talk.” In his
view,

rigidity,

orthodoxy, and the yoke of the

dead past” and also "enlarge[s]
perspective and expand[s] consciousness
[among the
citizenry] in a fashion that not so

the antagonisms they breed.” 14

much accommodates

To

as transcends private interests and

institutionalize political talk,

Barber

calls for the

creation of neighborhood assemblies
throughout the country, which would provide
a

forum

in

each community for citizens to deliberate
with fellow citizens on important

political matters, especially those

opinions but also
that the art

dogma

interest.

listen to the perspectives

we able to

to

perspective,

Citizens would not only voice their

of others

of listening may be the linchpin

listening are

the

of local

in their

to strong

community. Barber suggests

democracy, for only through

see beyond our private interests and consider ideas
that challenge

which we have become blindly attached. With such

we become

citizens

consensus about the appropriate

who

can arrive

at a

a broadened

mutual understanding and reach a

mode of action.

This leads us to the next phase of strong democracy. Once citizens have carefully
considered an issue from various perspectives, they can

14

Ibid.,

189-90.
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move on

to the

decision-making

process.

else,

Though Barber seems

he understands

that

,o extol the vtrtues

of political

talk

more than

anyth, ng

people will only avail themselves
of opportunities for

deliberation if they can ultimately
exere.se political power. Talk

means nothing if it does

not lead to action. So, not
surprisingly, Barber proposes
institutionalizing a national
initiative

and referendum process

however,

that

states right

and

elites,

he attempts

now. He
that in

its

to

empower

the citizenry.

remedy the problems plaguing

aware

is

to

that direct

democracy

current form the referendum does

before citizens issue an up-or-down
vote. This

resembles the one once used

much

settle a

matter as

it

Barber proposes

may

is

in the

is

It

is

direct

democracy

in

many

vulnerable to manipulation by
little to

why he

encourage deliberation

endorses a process that

Republic of Raetia, where the referendum
did not so

sparked further debate. 15

that

neighborhood assemblies host meetings

discuss the issues relevant to an impending
referendum vote.

deliberation he

important to note,

recommends

that referenda

in

which

citizens

To encourage

further

be voted on twice before they become law.

He

also favors a multi-choice referendum
ballot that offers a

set

of choices capable of eliciting more nuanced and
thoughtful responses” from the

citizenry.

“more varied and searching

Rather than just yes or no, citizens will have five voting
options:

unequivocal yes;

2.)

this proposal, 3.)

unequivocal no;

yes in principle, but with

4.)

some

no with respect

to the particulars

of this proposal,

5.)

no

for the

was the subject of Barber’s dissertation, which he eventually turned into a book
The Death of Communal Liberty. I will discuss this book more fully later in the

Raetia

entitled

.)

reservations about the particulars of

but not opposed in principle (suggest “reformulation and resubmission”);

15

1

chapter.
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moment, but not necessarily opposed
Barber claims that

this multi-choice

in principle (postpone
farther action at this time).' 6

format would infonn the
second round of

deliberation. For example, if
a majority votes “yes”
on a referendum, but a large
portion

of that majority lends

its

support “with

some

reservations,” citizens will
have the

opportunity to explore these
reservations in the neighborhood
assemblies. The idea here
is

that two-stage voting

making and

and a multi-choice format

will also ensure that the

will

encourage thoughtful decision-

shepherd dog remains amiable-and,
perhaps more

importantly, regretful. In Barber’s
view, free political actors should
experience regret

about the

lost opportunities that

come from making any

important decision. Infused with

a feeling of “perpetual regret” for
what could have been done (or not done),
participants
in a strong

democracy understand

politics as an

ongoing and endless process

always correct the mistakes, or build on the
incomplete successes, of the
should

feel

compelled

to revisit

an issue ad nauseum

lest

subtle modifications for improvement) are
overlooked.

in

past.

which we

Citizens

any better options (or even

(Of course, one wonders

at

what

point regret turns into political paralysis— the
kind with which liberals are often infected.

Barber poses

this

Where

question himself but, unfortunately, does not venture
to answer

regional or national issues are concerned, Barber has
exhibited in the past

a fairly naive belief that the use

among numerous
participatory

scope of

and

Ibid.,

of telecommunications technology could establish links

assemblies and

facilitate

nationwide discussion. While

democracy have often focused on

modem

nation states

institutional melioration.

16

it.)

the problem of scale

Barber has asserted

Once we

that

it

—

critics

of

the sheer size and

“is susceptible to technological

see the potential political benefits of modem

286-87.
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technology, he has suggested,
"scale becomes a tractable
challenge rather than an
insuperable barner.’" 7 But, to
be
melioration has matured qu„e a

Barber's m,d-80s confidence
in technological

fair,

bit.

In

more

and nuanced analysis of democratic
hopes
technology.

erect just as

This

He

sees

how

as

it

less

world increasingly dominated by

can create avenues to strong
18
democracy.

explain in part

he has concentrated

in a

more sober

technology, harnessed by the state
or big corporations, can

many barriers

may

recent writings, he presents
a

on

why

in his recent writings,
especially in

institutionalizing strong

A

Place for Us

democracy and more on

strong democratic brand of civil
society. Barber defines strong
democratic
as the realm that mediates conflicts
between the private and the public.

,

fostering a

civil society

We are

conditioned to think that the tension between
the state and the private sector, or
between
the

community and

the individual,

is

a “zero-sum

game ’-that

a

more

active state

means

diminished liberty and more dependency; that
a more robust private sector (and

diminished

state) leads to

Barber maintains that

rampant inequality and destruction of the commonweal.
But

this third sector,

democratic

civil society,

cooperation between these two spheres. Democratic

can foster a

spirit

of

civil society

can place limits on government without ceding public
goods to the private
at the same it can dissipate the atmosphere
of solitariness and
greed that surrounds markets without suffocating in big government’s
exhaust fumes or in the stifling air of would-be communities.
Both
sphere, and

government and the private sector can and should be humbled by the
growth of civil society, for it absorbs some of the public aspirations (its

17

Ibid.,

18

247.

See twentieth anniversary edition of Strong Democracy, also see technology-related
A Passion for Democracy.

essays in Barber’s
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commitment

to public

work) without being coercive,
and it maintains
anarchy of commercial markels

liberty without yielding
to the jungle

Lymg a,

the threshold between the
public and private spheres
of

society can appropriate the
best elements of each in
participatory and

communal

its

quest for

life,

democratic evil

common

(like the public sector, yet
voluntary

'

ends:

is

i,

and uncoercive

(like the

private sector).

Barber has recently situated strong
democratic practices outside (or
traditional state institutions
because, like Wolin,

he has begun

to see that big

has eclipsed opportunities for
meaningful political participation as
has.

Caught

in the crossfire, civil society

at the

much

edge of)

government

as big business

has been a casualty of an ongoing war
over the

course of American history between
the private and public sectors. While
the former

crushed

civil society in its

mad

rush to turn profits, the

latter heroically

came

to the

people’s defense but undermined their chance
to participate in the process by not

involving them in any fundamental
larger role in our lives,

these entities in which

tendency of

all

we

way

20

As

.

the state and private corporations played a

could do was watch passively and leave public
concerns to

we had no

active role to play. Barber has always understood
“the

all

institutions to ossify

and become distanced from

called iron law

of oligarchy ),"" and

his later

institutions,

if

1

controlled

democracy can

their constituents (the so-

by

state,

can have

better avoid ossification

A Place for All of Us,

works suggest

if it

this

that

even strong democratic

same tendency. As

a result, strong

remains somewhat independent of the

64-65.

20

Ibid., 40.

21

Ibid., 69.

295

state

and of bus, ness. Instead of
drawing a bluepnn, of potential
strong democratic

institutions,

he

now

spontaneous and

calls for fuzzier

measures

that

less formally institutionalized

advocates the creation of public
spaces

in

encourage the growth of more

democratic participation. For
instance, he

which

citizens can

meet ad hoc

to redress

public problems, but he no
longer stresses the importance
of institutionalizing a

nationwide network of neighborhood
assemblies.

He

also calls

on consumers

to organize

boycotts against corporations that
engage in unscrupulous business
praetiees-sueh as

outsourcing production to off-shore
sweatshops or squashing union drives—
which
suggests he holds
Nevertheless,

we

little

for

still

believes participatory

to

curb corporate excesses. 22

democracy

is

the solution to our current

woes.

Having dedicated most
consistently

learn

democratic state action

should not mistake his growing wariness
of the state for any kind of

retrenchment, for he
political

hope

new

shown

tricks,

a

of his career to deepening democracy,
Barber has

deep respect for Hartz's shepherd dog, believing

no matter how old

that

it

can always

grows. In “the absence of independent ground” or

it

foundational truth, citizens in a strong democracy can
join together and learn from their

experiences to address problems in their communities.
surprise, then, that

should hardly

come

as a

Barber often draws explicitly on the pragmatist tradition and

understands his theory and his work as a
pragmatists

It

Peirce, James, and

vital part

—

Dewey

of it.~

2

The big

three classical

feature prominently in his writings and deeply

22

Ibid, 76-79,

101-105.

23

Barber even admits in the introduction of his landmark work of participatory
democratic theory. Strong Democracy that he has “been much helped by the tradition of
American pragmatism,” xii.
,
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influence his political Ihough,.

As he

sees

it,

strong democracy goes a
long

way toward
completing the pragmatist
project which forsakes
phtlosophtca. huhris, the
ill-advised
quest for certainty, and any
reliance on foundational truth,
and which instead sees both

knowledge and man himself as
‘hs

pragmatism translated

social constructions. “Strong

into politics in the panic,
patory

he embraces uncertainty and
sees
dectde their

own

it

mode.” 24 Like the pragmatists,

as an opportunity for people
to resolve conflict and

destiny collectively rather than
defer to metaphysical assumptions
that

bear the fraudulent stamp of truth
(democratic epistemology).

he believes man’s nature
others in his

democracy,” Barber says,

is

And

like the pragmatists,

no, fixed bu, educable, forever
shaped by his interaction with

community (democratic psychology). Quite
manifestly Barber embraces a

democratic epistemology and psychology,
but his democratic theology
shaky.

Though

not as defeatist as Wolin,

psychology completely undermine
modernity and

its

is

somewhat

whose uncompromising epistemology and

his theology.

Barber has also shown a frustration with

tendency to foreclose democratic opportunities.

I

now examine more

closely the three democratic tenets in Barber's
thought.

I.

Barber
to accept

s

democratic epistemology

our epistemological limits as

experientially, not in the metaphysical

which

this

quite evident in his work.

human

He admonishes

beings and find truth only in what works

dogma of religion

or rationalism.

The

point at

experience-based truth becomes contestable, where people with varying

experiences

~4

is

come

to different conclusions, strong

Strong Democracy

,

1

78.
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democratic politics emerges as the

us

arena in wh.ch cifzens can
engage
after

bnnging

their

expenences

in

d.scuss.on with others ,n
their

to bear

on the tssues

at

community

hand, reach a tentahve
settlement

about the right course of action.
These settlements serve as
prov.stonal
the

moment

to

re-examinahon and further

tself only with those realms

consensus stops, politics

where

starts/’

truth is

25

° Wn e P' stenlol °gy-”

not-or

Politics as

this

in life is to

is

“Politics concerns

it

is to

actually serves as

we

specifically,

conclude

that

them opportunities

that

power determines

that their metaphysical

vital caveat

is

a “radically individuated particle”

when we frame

this “truth”

the

informs our

human experience

in

people do not have the capacity for meaningful

more

to protect their

for political participation.

this reliance

25

Ibid., 129.
26

Ibid., 167.
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on

negative

Liberal epistemology,

we

logically

derive specific political knowledge, such as the proper role of government
and

Barber maintains that

truth,

assumptions about

deductive, beginning with a set of general principles from which

institutions.

work

will.

be free of all encumbrances, and

knowledge. Or, more

rights than to offer

it,

formulation but of course with the

collective action and thus should live in a polity that
does

then,

for

not yet-known... Where

epistemology suggests

on the other hand, believe

these atomistic terms,

is

puts

to generate provisional truths,

humanity should be the basis of politics. Each
man

whose only aim

As Barber

the business of democracy

must be an expression of communal

Liberals,

political

whtch

26

and indeed Barber would agree wilh
that this truth

scrutiny.

And because

toward a consensus not yet reached,
itS

truths,

are the best answers to
the quest, ons before the
community, but forever

remain open

“

and.

its

syllogistic thinking stifles our political

magmation. Under
from

this

the liberal regime (in
both senses of the word),

chain of logic whtch determines
from the outset what

Unconstrained by

and accomplish

this logic, strong

politically.

Though Barber does

epistemology shows

itself to

empirical facts which

not say

inclusive.

is

so

infer useful political

means “conceiving politics
liberal priority

many words,

new

data

and deliberatively

guidelines— guidelines

come

to the surface.

that they

The

it

is

a validity that

effectiveness of

is

as socially constructed... has a genuine
validity,

to

be more or

is

less democratic,

more or

the level ot participation increases, with

knowledge and

will

it

arises can

more people

number of people.

they will be "p ersuas i v o

be

less self-reflective,

more or
produced by
to

which

contributing their experiential

political imagination to the discussion, the

more general appeal

be more

It

The only truth the modem school can have is
democracy: consensus arising out of an undominated
discourse
28
all have equal access.

emerging guidelines

will

have

(or effectively “true”) for a larger

Indeed, Barber embraces the Peircean “metaphor of truth as a cable

27

Ibid., 166.

An

as

the strong democratic

interpret collectively

less inclusive.

1

should

Says Barber:

shown

28

we

of epistemology over

conditioned and thus conditional.
or less persuasive to the degree the community
from which

As

can learn

[itself]

only limited by the degree to which the
democratic process

Knowledge understood
but

man

be inductive, resting no, on unsubstantiated
assumptions bu,

continually reconsider and modify as
these guidelines

in

it

members of a community

and from which they then

what

to

Instead of ceding politics to a
ng,d epistemology,

epistemology and thereby inverting
the classical
politics.”

cannot deviate

poldical truth.

democrats see no limits

"depict epistemology in political
terms,” winch

27

is

we

Aristocracy of Everyone 2 1 4.
,
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woven

together from

democrats

polity.

citizenship,

many

slender strands” which he
believes

is

redolent of a strong

-'Many c.tizens are bound
together intimately through

and they

provisional but that

interact

inspire powerful conviction

together into a

communal

Indtvidual citizens

when they form

will

and a public purpose

may never know anythmg

make

it

is

with

a deliberative collective, they
represent a

formidable force of common eonvtction.
Together, they become convinced

approach or course of act.on

common

gutded by opinions that in
themselves are slender and

when woven

absolute certainty, but

their

that a certain

the best political solution, and
they exert their

power

to

happen.

We may find much more comfort and satisfaction in

certainty, but

it

is

not

available to us, especially in the realm
of politics, where truths and principles will
forever

be strenuously contested. With certainty
out of the equation, the
to reach an

maxims

trick, then, is for

agreement on what works for them. “Since the
objective

is

to find

people

working

rather than fixed truths and shared
consciousness rather than immutable

principles,

what

is

needed

is

a

common

legitimate political judgments.'

language and a

mode of seeing

that will facilitate

30

Politics does not involve the search for truth

—we have

philosophers engaging daily in that fruitless activity—
but rather entails making

judgments, seeing the problem before

us,

communicating our various perspectives

to

each other, developing a shared vision of our goals, and ultimately
finding “working

maxims

that

achieve these aims. Only a democratic community can make

judgments, for

29

Strong Democracy, 166.

30

Ibid., 170.
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political

produces rather than (as with
Democratic political

tics.

interacting with

one another

>ion-making on the

In a

world devoid of intrinsic meaning
or

making these judgments,

truth,

way

in

to

communities bear the responsibility
of

figuring out together what works
best for them.

Liberals decry this as politics
without foundations, and they assert
that a healthy
polity

must have

first

principles to

which

it

can always return

in

times of crisis. Without

these foundational truths supporting
our political institutions, they will
necessarily
collapse. But Barber remains
undaunted

Dewey
and

that political

the

method

by these

cries

of alarm, for Barber agrees with

knowledge requires not foundations but the
application of method—

turns out to be

inherit foundations, but

democracy

itself.”

32

Democratic regimes certainly

Barber claims that they flourish

both in spite of the foundations that have
supported their birth and in the
absence of all foundations. Like every political
system, democracy too
has a birth mother, and thus rests on foundations.
Unlike every other
political system, however, democracy is
necessarily
self-orphaned, the

child

who

slays

autonomously.

Democracy
hacking up
polity

31

32
“

33

as a

its

its
33

parents so that

form of parricide

aged parents

must be prepared

is

may grown and

25.

A Passion

24.

Democracy,

flourish

a chilling image, indeed, but Barber asserts that

melancholy necessity.

to rebel against the traditions

A Passion for Democracy,
for

a

is

it

Ibid., 26.

34

Ibid.
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it

34

Citizens of a democratic

inherits

and come

to realize that

our

common

experience mforms our political
knowledge more than recetved
wisdoms.

democracy has any foundations
other than those
only be found within the
democratic process

it

itself.

If

so enthusiastically renounces,
they can

For democratic methods or

procedures provtde the means by
which communities can bring
conflict into the open and
resolve them.

Barber has no doubt

that citizens

applying the democratic method
are capable of

maktng sensible judgments. While
strong democracy
capacity of indtviduals to govern
themselves,”
the

it

‘‘does no, place endless faith in
the

does maintain “that the multitude

will

on

whole be as wise or even wiser than
pnnces.” And, says Barber, strong
democracy

accords with these words spoken by
Theodore Roosevelt (incidentally, a former
student

of William James): “The majority of the
plain people

will

day

and day out make fewer

in

mistakes in governing themselves than any
smaller body of men will

govern them.” 35 While most

political theorists

people” and have instead placed their
in the mitigating effects

in trying to

have doubted the wisdom of “plain

faith in the

wisdom of aristocrats

of institutions. Barber believes

that

democratic method, deliberating with their fellow citizens
will

make

or philosophers or

people applying the

to

address

common

concerns,

govern themselves perfectly well.

The Republic of Raetia
dissertation,

is

a telling example. In the published version of his

The Death of Communal Liberty Barber recounts the history of this once
,

thriving and idyllic participatory republic nestled in the Swiss Alps.
At the heart of

freedom

in the

Republic of Raetia, which achieved independence

hands of Napoleon

35
'

in

1

799, was the

commune. Later

Strong Democracy, 151.
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to

become

in

a

1524 but

lost

it

at

the

Swiss canton by the

name of Graubuenden

in .he early nineteenth
century, Raetia

of communes, each about the
size of a netghborhood,
directly in every aspect

on

tssues

of importance

of political

Men

life.

to them, reached

in

each

in

was

which

a loose confederation

citizens participated

commune

deltberated for long hours

consensus before making

final decisions,

and

even worked together to implement
their proposed solution. 36
The central government
the republic had surprisingly

little

authonty, and even though

in

tins radical decentralization

of power created many organizafional
inefficiencies (even chaos) and thus
slowed the
pace of economic and technological
progress, citizens experienced the
exhilarating

freedom of deciding
liberal critics

their

own

destinies with others in their community.
Despite

would expect, Raetian

what

citizens did not experience majority
tyranny.

As

a creative participant in the formation
of the communal will, the
[Raetian] individual needed no guarantees for
the containment of
communal power; as the instrument of policy implementation,
he

needed
no sacred rights with which to defend himself
against the encroachments
of an ambitious bureaucracy. In the most fundamental
sense, the citizen

was

the

communal

authority:

its

will

was

his will,

its needs were his
were his very limbs, and its power was his
sweat and blood. To speak from a liberal constitutional
perspective about
the dependence of freedom on the separation of
powers and the
constitutional containment of power is, in the context
of the self-

needs,

its

instrumentalities

governing, face-to-face polity, to speak an alien tongue. 37

The Raetian
the

36

citizen did not require protection

community

from communal authority because he saw

as an extension of himself, of his

own needs and

desires expressed in his

Barber stresses the importance of

“common work in the Raetian commune. Citizens
did not delegate the implementation of their decisions to experts; they did the
work
themselves.
For example, the decision to build a new road could not be made in a
splendid flurry of democratic spirit and then forgotten,

complete.

To

will the road into being, as

left to

some engineer corps

to

Those who willed
it built it, and their labor was regarded as an expression
of commonality for which no
compensation was required.” Death of Communal Liberty, 176.
37

it

were, entailed building

Death of Communal Liberty 178.
,
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it.

willfuJ democratic
participation.

Having devoted countless hours

to deliberating with his

fellow citizens and reaching
consensus with them, the Raettan
identified with those very

communal

decisions in which he played
a vital part.

Though

difficult for

to conceive, the Raettan
did not understand liberty as
individual

or obstacles but rather in

autonomy.”

barriers”

liberals

freedom from intrusion

terms, “as collaborative self-reliance
and

community

38

Given

his enthusiasm for

why

understand

communal

modem

as

communal expressions of liberty, Barber does

liberals fear an unrestrained

Madison

demos and

not

think that “parchment

referred to the Bill of Rights in his
initial criticism of it— will

effectively protect individuals from
majority tyranny. In the United States, the

Constitution secures a

number of rights

to

which every person

is entitled,

and because

they are supposedly grounded in reason
and perhaps god, they precede political
discussion.

They

are pristine political truths that real
world politics should never sully.

The problem, says Barber,

is

that these rights, abstract

constrain a potentially tyrannical majority

and untouchable, would not

whose members had no involvement

in their

construction and hence no real attachment to them. They
would either ignore these rights
outright or, if need be, find clever

ways around them. One hundred

speaks to the crafty circumvention of the Civil
original ten)

More

War amendments

years of Jim

(as well as a

few of the

by an oppressive white majority.
effective, according to Barber,

would be

an appeal to the citizenship of its members, reminding them that they are
embarked on a public course of action that cannot meet the objections of
reasonable public discourse. Lynchings are carried out but they are not

38

Strong Democracy 171.
,
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Crow

d efended

They may be

m° re succe ssfully interdicted by an anneal
" eS ' hat COnnecl ,he
Participants under normal
circumstances
cumstances than
tifT"
by an invocation of the ‘rights’
of the victim In
reasonableness, commonality,
part, c, pat, on, and citizenship
™he most
to thp ,

,

,

I

sy"an°“
Engaging people
their

.mended
111

™d mob behavior that a political

in public discourse,

actions,

is

givtng them the chance to
art.culate and defend

apt to produce second

cultivating

democracy places

among

,°n

ongoing public

internal

talk

thoughts-and perhaps moderate

and participation

their

in public action,” strong

checks on the “extremes of popular
passion” and creates

40
the people "a spirit of
reasonableness.”
Liberal democracy, on the other
hand,

can only introduce external

limits, delivered to

us from on high, to prevent

mob

rule.

As

the contemporary political landscape
teaches us, a mindless invocation of
rights will not

spark useful dialogue, and those accused
of violating rights will only

call forth a similarly

abstract political principle in their
defense, thus hardening their resolve to act

inhumanely. As Barber sees

it,

appeals to abstract rights or

first

principles sever our ties

with others in the community; they discourage
the hard yet rewarding work of political
talk

and striving for a reasonable middle ground.

Although

political talk is hard

work,

it

affords participants the opportunity to

define rights democratically. In the liberal framework,

philosophers and founders
refiain

who

from challenging the

like triangles or the

we must

rely

on the wisdom of

decide which rights are indeed “natural,” and

truth

we must

of their judgments. But Barber says, “Rights are not

Second Law of Thermodynamics: the

39

Ibid., 160.
40

Ibid.
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issue

is

not truth and error but

at

best right opinion,
intersubjective agreement,
and

precede political discussion
but are rather
deliberation can citizens

come

to

its

common

ground.”

end product. Only

41

Rights do not

after exhaustive

an agreement on those rights
to which

all

human

beings

are entitled, and even then,
they remain contestable,
open to further challenge and
debate.

What

is

required

political skills

wwt

What

is

J

not foundational mandates or
individual mental
s andards to a changing
world, but such
^
nece ssary to discovenng
or forging

3PPlym8 tlXed

n or even
right,

common ground

what a

right

is,

cannot in

itself

determine political

judgment. Rights themselves are
constantly being redefined and
reinterpreted, dependent for their
normative force on the engagement
and
commitment of an active citizen body.

According

to Barber,

no

political truths, not

even those “inalienable” rights
celebrated

in

the liberal tradition, exist prior
to civic engagement. If we
merely adhere to “fixed

standards

or absolutes,

we nsk

the danger of embracing antiquated
ideas, so-called

nghts that no longer have any relevance

in today’s world.

We face this problem

in the

United States, where large corporations have
received the status of “legal persons” and
thus enjoy the rights of pnvate individuals.
entities

whose impact on

depends on those

The

reality is that corporations are public

society can hardly be overestimated and

“states they

now

assail.”

whose very existence

42

Nevertheless, the unassailable

wisdom of

the liberal tradition insists that corporations are
entitled to these “natural” rights which

precede political discussion, even when history teaches us that
the legal status of
corporations

is

mere

artifice,

that coiporations exert

41

an unimaginable amount of power and influence

A Passion for Democracy,
A Place for

and even when our experience demonstrates quite clearly

61.
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in

our society

today. In a strong democracy,
civtcally engaged citizens
could revist, this question and

perhaps agree to curb those
rights currently enjoyed
by corporations.
in Barber's view,
political truths

of civically engaged and deliberating

of any kind are agreements
reached by a group

cttizens.

We should

wisdoms about the nature of human
beings or about
their organizations) are
entitled.

bodies labeled

whom

God

to debate,

the “natural" nghts to which
they (or

no longer

is

to

be mined from extra, errestnal

or nature or reason or metaphysics.”
Like the pragmatist thinkers to

he continually pays

and open

For “truth

never blindly accept received

tribute,

Barber believes

and even those truths arrived

all

at

received wisdoms are contestable

consensually and deliberatively are

provisional, inviting re-examination and
refinement. But the truth— even provisionally
useful truth-will never emerge unless

we conform

“to

communicative processes

genuinely democratic and that occur only in
free communities.”

No

that are

one should be

excluded from the discussion, for the emergence
of truth requires input from everyone

concerned with the issue

at

hand. Says Barber:

the conditions ot truth (such as 'truth

is in this residual post-modernist
form) and the conditions of democracy are one and the
same: As there is
freedom, as the community is open and inclusive and
the exchange of
ideas thorough and spirited, so there is both more
democracy and more
learning, more freedom and more knowledge.
Knowledge is always

provisional, ideas conditionally agreed upon.

And just as no argument
be accorded merit because of its source alone, so no individual will
be
privileged over others simply because of who he is (white or male
or
will

straight) or

where he comes from

(old

money, the wrong side of the

tracks,

the United States of America). 43

In short,

uncompromising openness and the vigorous exchange of ideas

devising provisionally useful truths.

43

An

And Barber claims

Aristocracy of Everyone, 223.
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his strong

are the

key

to

democracy, which

remams open

to all

and involves never-ending
deliberation, provides the forum
wherein

citizens can create such

truths-and

in the process (re)crea.e
themselves.

II.

In arguing that strong

citizens

who engage

common

democracy transforms

in politics not

ends. Barber

its

participants, turning

merely to satisfy private object, ves
but

makes evident

his

democratic psychology. Barber

them

work toward

to

is

into

quite explicit

about the pedagogic value of political
participation, arguing that the democratic
process
serves as a school where participants
receive a civic education and begin
to think beyond

themselves (and their private interests) and
more

in public terms.

Community grows

out of participation and at the same time
makes
participation possible; civic activity
educates individuals how to think
publicly as citizens even as citizenship
informs civic activity with the
required sense of publicness and justice.
Politics become
its

university, citizenship

its

own

own

training ground, and participation

its

own

tutor.

While we may leam some valuable information about
our

rights

and the law

in the

classroom, people do not receive a real civic education
until they are politically engaged.
If

given the opportunity to wield “some significant power,”
people “will quickly

appreciate the need for knowledge, but foist knowledge on them
without giving them
responsibility and they will display only indifference.” 45

engagement turns private individuals

political

In a strong democratic

44

Ibid.,

into public-minded citizens.

Says Barber:

community... the individual members are transformed, through

Strong Democracy, 152.

45

The knowledge gained from

234.
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their participation in

common

autonomous persons

whom

seeing and

participation

common

work, into citizens. Citizens
are

endows with

a capacity for a

Talking with and working along
side others to solve problems
us ,0 see ourselves and our
relationship with others

our political participation

we leam

common

common

to us all enables

in a radically different

to sympathize, to

imagine what

it

is

vtston

way. From

like to

walk

in

another man's shoes, and this
experience changes us profoundly.
Barber often invokes

Rousseau

to

make

h.s point clear:

as Rousseau understood,

participation in

it,

man's

it

human

nature

is

in the

crucial about democratic

community is

'produces a remarkable change in man';
that

whole soul

-

elevated.

As

Man

base or noble as the community

a reflection

in

which he

to say, through

is

'” 47

a social creature,

is

is

man’s nature

grounded

is

in the idea that

determined by the

of his socio-political relationships; he
is

embedded.

Strong democratic theory posits the social nature
of human beings
world and the dialectical interdependence of man and his

in the

government. .Like the social

reality it refracts, human nature is
potentially both benign and malevolent, both cooperative
and antagonistic... But all these qualities can be transformed
by legitimate
.

compound;

it

is

and illegitimate social and political forces. For man is a
developmental
animal a creature with a compound and evolving telos whose
ultimate
destiny depends on
destiny.

46

Ibid.,

how he

interacts with those

48

232.

47

Ibid.

Ibid.,

215.
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that,

and developed, his ideas broadened, his

transformative power of democracy

malleable.

he interacts with others.

is

'faculties are exercised

feelings ennobled, and his

This belief

"What

who

share the

same

way

is

as

Human bemgs
Each one of us

are no, fatally flawed,
their
is

sms indeliUy etched

then vety souls.

a blank slate with the
potential either to sink into
the abyss of depravity

or to nse to the heights of
righteousness. Accordingly,

system

into

that provtdes

its

we

should devise a political

citizens with a etvic educatton
that elevates us. Setring
people in

an environment where ruthless
competition and crass materialism
are the nonn runs the

of turning them

risk

into those

depraved creatures

Liberal theorists have long

human bemgs have
accept

men

certain

as they really

liberals

assume we

assumed-or have argued

immutable

traits, traits

are— solitary and

sown

it

is

are

safer to

by

nature.

assume-that

We must

into their very nature.

independent, selfish and acquisitive,

hedonistic and pain-avoiding, base
and corrupt, power-seeking and aggressive—
and not
rest

our hopes on their moral bettennent.
Consistent with Judeo-Christian theology,

liberal

man

has fallen from grace and has

never expect too

much of him. We

little

chance of redemption, and thus

anarchist disposition remind us that

individuals

who

The end

better than the rest us

result is a political

much damage,

are untrustworthy, liberals of a

should exalt and leave unfettered those few

system

— something akin

some combination

—whose

thereof)

expectations,

Nietzschean superman
too

—those Rockefellers and Camegies

makes them exemplary and admirable beyond

life

men do

creativity, entrepreneurship, ingenuity, greed, or

These men do not rely on help from
complaint the stark reality of

to the

all

that frustrates concerted civic action, lest

but yields to those unique individuals

and Edisons and Picassos
(or

we

men

can transcend the human condition and, exceeding

become something

should

should instead assume the worst and devise
a political

system based on those assumptions. But while
most

more

we

all

fame

measure.

others; they stand alone and firm, enduring without

and imposing
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their creative will onto the world.

In a

solution

is

world with

to

many base men and

few extraordinary ones, the

discourage the collective action
of the former and to

heroism of the latte. Either
way, the

And

a

result serves to

while society and collectivities
are inevitable

space, liberal

man

political

facilitate the individual

keep people away from each
other.

in a

world with a

finite

amount of

chooses to view these social
relationships as mere contracts.

In his

universe, there can be “no
fraternal feeling, no general
will, no selfless act, love
or belief

or

commitment

to

be

fraternal

that is not

wholly private” 49 because human
relationships-what appear

bonds or moral commitments— are

really just the result of rational

calculation to serve the hedonistic
aims of individuals.

theory of human nature,” says Barber,

is that it

The problem with

“defines]

of the potential strength of mutuality,
cooperation, and

man

in

common

ways

“the liberal

that deprive

being.”

50

The

him

liberal

conception of human nature completely
ignores the possibility that politically
cooperative
experiences can be formative and contribute
to our moral education and development. 51

49

Ibid., 72.
50

Ibid., 75.

It

is

important to note, however, that there are some thinkers
in the liberal tradition,
J. S. Mill, T. H. Green, and L. T.
Hobhouse, who agree that human nature is not
that people are capable of moral growth and
development. Green and Hobhouse,

including
static,

saw society in organic terms and believed that removing an individual
from
would destroy his humanity. Embracing a democratic psychology, they
maintained that man's relations with others not only helped to define him
but could also
especially,

his social context

contribute to his personal growth.

Hobhouse comes quite close to advocating
groundbreaking work Liberalism in which he says,
“Democracy is not merely founded on the right or the private interest of the individual.
This is only one side of the shield. It is founded equally on the function of the individual
as a member of the community. It founds the common good upon the common
will, in
forming which it bids every grown-up, intelligent person to take a part. No doubt many
participatory

democracy

in his

,

good things may be achieved
democratic theory
17

is that,

for a people without responsive effort

on

its

own

part...

so obtained, they lack a vitalizing element.” Liberalism

.

311

,

1

But

lb-

Th.s

not to suggest that liberals
reject etvic education
altogether.

is

They have

often praised the vtrtues of
a liberal education which
can prepare our schoolchildren
for
citizenship and

diversity,

instill

those values friendly to liberal
democracy, such as tolerance,

and mutual respect, among others.
Although Barber believes
democratic

participation

is

the true school wherein
citizens receive their civic
education, he does not

ignore the importance of liberal
education in our schools. But he
claims that merely
instilling values in our future
citizens, as if they

knowledge,

falls short

involve receiving

of a true

dogma

were empty vessels awaiting the

liberal education.

As he

sees

it,

liberal

elixir

of

education does not

delivered to us from the teacher’s
lectem, passively accepting as

true whatever emanates from his
mouth. Instead, libera] education

must be an adequate

preparation for democratic participation,
compelling students to challenge conventional

wisdom, think

critically,

and deliberate over the options presented

to them.

Says Barber:

Education

is a training in the middle
way between the dogmatic belief in
absolutes and the cynical negation of all
belief. On the fringes where
dogma or nihilism prevail, force is always master.
Well-taught students
learn to suspect every claim to truth and
then to redeem truth provisionally
by its capacity to withstand pointed questioning.
They learn that

somewhere between Absolute Certainty and Permanent
Doubt there is a
point of balance that permits knowledge to be
provisionally accepted and
applied (science, modestly understood, for example)
and allows conduct to
be provisionally evaluated in a fashion that makes ethics,
community, and
democracy
In

promoting

this

possible.

kind of middle ground, liberal education becomes a training
ground for

democracy. Like citizens
an d
that

52

52

in a strong

democracy, students learn

through a slow, communal, and deliberative process

can withstand these challenges.

An Aristocracy of Everyone
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1
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—

to challenge truth claims

to forge provisional truths

But Barber acknowledges the
danger of post-modern excess,

and intellectuals find joy

in deconstrnoting truths
until there are

in

none

which students
Truth

left.

may

be

illusory, as post-modernists
contend, but they are necessary
nonetheless, says Barber.

"Civilizatton, Yeats reminded
us, is tied together

dangerous to pretend
as post-modernists

that the illusion is real, bu,

would have us

by a hoop of illusion.
i,

is fatal

It

would be

to dispense with

i,

altogether,^

do.

Justice and

democracy are the illusions that permit
us to live
knowledge are the illusions that permit us
to live
commodiously Art and literature are the
ruth and

in comity.

illusions that make commodious
nd us of all our illusions and thus
no way at all to live 53

living worthwhile. Deconstruction
may
seem a clever way to think, but it is

.

These “illusions”

may not

be true

correspond to any a priori reality

in the Platonic sense, as

(e.g.,

hve commodiously” and make our
rewarding and ennching

Once

in

students understand

will instead see the value

holding up

all

this,

Forms or Divine Law), but

common

to

be

truth in a democratic fashion,

of common experience. Some conservatives

democratizing education in

promoting a dangerous relativism

full

prove

experience, they are true in the existential sense.

this

way

that has all but sent us

toward nihilism. Accordingly, they agree with Plato
receive the

they help us

they will not wallow in a malaise of existential
despair but

truth claims to the test

that

if

lives “worthwhile,” if they actually

of citizenship, pursuing the

Alan Bloom have claimed
disastrous,

our

the

they are not concepts that

has already proven

down

the precipice

that only a gifted elite should

breadth ot a liberal education, which involves challenging received

53

Ibid.
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like

w,sdo ms and

flirting

with relativist while the

res,

of us should obcd.ently
accept the

absolute truth given to us. 54

Because

liberals hold that there
are a

few men more g.fted than the

res,

of us,

i,

is

no, surprising that they
exalt expertise and leadership
in politics. With regard
to the

former. Barber argues that
deference to specialists and
professional polihcians, whose

“only distinctive qualification...
turns out to be simply that
they engage

completely unnecessary

«

So-called experts have

more

political

of us simply because they enjoy
the privilege of participating
attain this expertise if given
the opportunity to

engage

says Barber, “is the polities of
amateurs, where every

every other

man

and

this

Any of us

res,

could

“Strong democracy,'’

compelled to encounter

without the intermediary of expertise.” 56

Barber acknowledges
leaders,

is

knowledge than the

in politics.

in politics.

man

in politics,” is

that leadership is a trickier issue.

Not

all

people are

bom

poses a serious problem for strong democracy.
Those more naturally

gifted leaders could rise before their
fellow

comfort for which so

many of them

dynamic encourages passivity

men and

provide them the guidance and

are desperately searching. This leader-follower

in the vast

majority and thus threatens to undermine strong

democracy. As leaders assume more power and authority,
followers soon relinquish

demanding duties

as citizens and

show deference

to those they believe

their

more capable of

54

See especially Alan Bloom's famous political and educational polemic,
The Closing of
the American Mind. Bloom claimed to be a proponent of liberal
democracy, but as a
follower of Straussianism, he may have represented a particularly elitist form
of it.
Nevertheless, Barber would argue that this
55

elitist

Strong Democracy, 152.

56

Ibid.
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tendency pervades

liberal thought.

governing. But Barber
maintains that natural leaders,
though potentially inimical
to
strong democracy, could
also facilitate the
democratic process.

could prove very helpful

the transition to strong
democracy.

leadership would -guide
people toward self-government”
and,

withdraw

awesome

to the role

To begtn

An

when

transit, onal leadership

we do

facilitating function, playing the
role

role.

to his questions

their

We could not

it

and problems on

democracy would always encourage

would encourage deference and

may

of “teacher’ or “judge”

also provide an

to ensure that the

toward specific outcomes. Barber also likens

the facilitating leader to a psychologist
or group therapist

their

own.

who

In short, leaders in a strong

passivity in the citizenry.

at its

their civic responsibilities with relish.

helps his “patients” find

57

participation and never

poses the greatest challenges for strong democracy

assume

that leaders like

our founders in the United States
today.

process runs smoothly without directing

yet to

assume the

this point, the

After the establishment of strong
democracy, natural leaders

answers

to

would be -founders” of the strong
democrat, e regime, but

success would largely depend on
our forgetting their crucial

on-going

their job is finished,

of self-governance and help them
understand

them are no longer necessary. Though
Barber does not concede

memorialize them as

ideal transitional

of citizen. These leaders would
inspire citizens

responstbility

with, leaders

It

assume an authority
seems

that

that natural leadership

early stages,

when

citizens

have

But as average citizens grow more

confident in their capacity to govern, they would likely

resist

and squelch the demagogic

tendencies of natural leaders. Nevertheless, Barber does not resolve the tension
between
leader and follower, between expert and amateur, to one’s complete satisfaction.

57

Ibid.,

240.
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Though

Barber maintains .ha, strong
democracy
natural leader in a strong

democracy

rejects the “intermediary

will always

assume

require a certam expertise
most of us do no, possess.
learn to res, ram themselves

roles,

How

of expertise,” the

such as the

facilitator, that

these leaders or experts
will

from disruptmg the strong
democratic process remains an

unanswered question which we

will consider

more

fully in the last chapter.

Despite the challenges presented
by leadership, Barber's democratic
psychology

never wavers. That

men

education he takes on

are educable and that political
panic, pation provides the proper

faith.

He

says:

Faith in democracy requires
a belief neither in the benevolence
of abstract
human character nor in the historical altruism
Altruists do not need government.
What
ai h in the democratizing
effects that

of democratic man

is

required

is

nothing more than a

political participation has

taith not in

Some would

what men are but

argue that this

is

in

on men

a giant leap of faith.

Although Barber asks of his reader

“nothing more” than a belief in the
transformative effects of democracy,
maintain a natural incredulity. After

a

what democracy makes them. 58

all,

human beings have had

many

critics

limited experience with

participatory democracy, and those few historical
examples do not accord entirely with
theory.

in the

There

New

is

no clear evidence

that participating citizens in the

England town meeting during

transformation described by Barber.
transformation,

we

are

still left

distractions plaguing the

engage extensively

Ibid.,

in

its

hey-day ever underwent the kind of radical

And even

if

they

did—or could— experience

with another question: with

post-modem world,

Athenian assembly or

will

democratic politics?

237.
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all

this

the temptations and

people today actually take the time

to

III.

Despite an overall optimism
that pervades most of
his work. Barber has
on

occasion betrayed an almost
Woltnian melancholy, even

The

title

of his

dissertation,

democrat, c theology, his

a, the earliest stage

of his

career.

The Death of Coruna, Liberty,
speaks volumes about his

faith that

people possess the will

to

St0ry le ,e " S is a meful one:
a con federation of autonomous

govern themselves. The

'

was

a

model of participatory democracy,

communal

liberty,

the Republic

communes, each of which

of Raetta stubbornly preserved

even in the face of persistent
colonization and subjugation by foreign

aggressors, but finally

succumbed

to the forces

of modernity. Even Napoleon, who

indeed took away Raetian independence,
could not destroy their communal

advances

in centralized administration,
technology,

canton called Graubuenden, the former
Raetia
that

government and,
participation.

relatively

a ghost of what

have relinquished a good deal of their power

as a result,

While the

backward

is

it

government has managed

Now

a Swiss

once was, containing

to the central

have experienced a precipitous decline

central

liberty, but

and commerce eroded the people's

sense of citizenship and alienated them
from their local communities.

220 communes

its

to turn a

in direct political

confederation of

villages into an economically robust nation state,

it

has

come

at

an

incalculable expense.

Barber suggests

Graubuenden, was

that this sad ending, the death

59

rural

liberty in

inevitable. In the final sentence of the penultimate chapter, Barber

poses the problem in the form of a question: "Is

autonomous

of communal

communes

life in

small, self-governing relatively

possible in the Western industrial world in the 1970’s?” 59

Death of Communal Liberty 236.
,
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His answer

is

plainly no.

He

considers

it

“improbable

that the

communes

anything like their traditional,
face-to-faee democratic form"
and clatms

of communalism and

dtree.

democracy reveal the

centralism in an industrializing
society."*

politically devastating effects

Graubuenden lace
tndisputedly vital

As Barber

may mean

he sees no escape

in

modem day

the surrender of both

self-government .” 61

ruefully relates, modernization has
forever transfonned

Swiss communes. One of the more distressing
trends
can preserve the survival of the communal
villages, often

compelled

to

dying

the apparent requtsites of
national survtval in an

Progress in this context

real

"that these

the product of a century-long
collision between

communal norms and

meaningful personal autonomy and

life,”

of modernity. Communes

a difficult dilemma,

industrializing world.

mode of political

that the “failures

and potency of pluralistic

And while Barber hopes

forms contain the promise of
an alternative

from the

inevit ability

will survive in

ideal, are

move elsewhere

is that

the

young people, who alone

drawn away from

for educational

life in

their

home

and economic opportunities,

but just as often lured by an outside world
teeming with activity and temptation.

Moreover,

modem

transportation systems

—including

the automobile,

which Barber

considers the instrument of liberal individualism—
have uprooted people from more
traditional

recreation.

communities, allowing them

And

to travel greater distances for

multinational corporations have

providing jobs for those people

who can no

240, 241.

Ibid.,

239.

61

into these communities,

longer subsist on those sheep-herding or

60

Ibid.,

moved

work and
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fish,„g practices tha,
might have strengthened co

economic progress
of these

traditional

impossible

to

“

Neo-Luddtte attempts

communities have

to preserve or recapture
the pastoral

punty

time and again, says Barber,
because

i,

is

"impede the inroads of cosmopolitanism;
any more than silence can
impede

no,se; or placidity, ambition
life

failed

mm una, bonds bu, certatn.y frustrated

Barber suggests that the

many trappings of modem

such as economic efficiency,
intractable consumerism,
centralized administration,

professional expertise,

mass mobilization, and immediate
access

incompatible with the kind of rustic
simplicity democratic

though he has maintained a

spirited

optimism throughout

life

to informal, on-are

seems

his career,

to

demand. And

an undercurrent of

despair and hopelessness runs beneath
the surface, only to emerge in
those few moments

of what

may be

theoretical candor.

But Barber does not simply wax nostalgic
for a bygone era of democratic
authenticity

as

Wolin seems

he has hitched his wagon

to do.

to strong

He

refuses to relinquish his democratic hopes,
and

democracy, which he believes

of political life” that can reconcile
modernity with

not

seem

cannot

fit

feasible largely because

into an

assembly

hall

communal

of problems of scale. After

and discuss an issue

is

the “alternative

liberty.

all,

At

first, this

mode

may

millions of people

that affects us all, like the national

defense budget. Modernity has deracinated people from
their small, tight-knit

communities and thrown them

willy-nilly into a global world, horrifically vast and

alienating, yet inconceivably interconnected. Citizens in
a small participatory

62

See the

two chapters of Barber’s Death of Communal Liberty
of modernity’s impact on the Swiss communes.
last

63

Ibid.,
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democracy

for a detailed account

can ge,

,o

know each

other and develop a strong
tnu.ua, understanding,
bu, the

world does no, afford such
opportumties. Suspieton of the
unknown Other

is

modern

the nonn.

and unseen suffenng (or jus,
grumbling) half-a-world away,
or even in a nearby town,
hardly elicits sympathy.
Bu, in a world where
implications for those very
people from

recapture in

larger scale.

we once

some way what

whom we

did, but sophisticated

we

are afienated, Barber believes

we must

face-to-face with people in our

a

community

communications technology could approximate

as

this

allow ourselves to dream big,
communications technology has the

potential to turn this

enormous planet riddled with war and mutual

While the dream of a global

technology could

aettons have significant

communities once had-but, of course,
on

We may no. be able to meet

experience. If

village.

traditional

many of our

at the

very

least

village

may seem

distrust into a global

far-fetched at this point,

connect people to their fellow countrymen
and their

government, promoting an ongoing dialogue
on issues of national importance, and

empowering people throughout

work

the country to gain crucial political

knowledge and

to

collectively to address these issues.

Barber understands, however,

that there is

nothing inevitable or teleological about

the democratic use of communications technology.

democratic futurists

who

He

sharply criticizes those

believe technology will one day lead us to a glorious
promised

land ot widespread political participation. Technology
can be as democratic or fascistic
as those

who

force in Nazi

the

harness

it

power.

Nobody would

claim that the radio was a democratizing

Germany, where mass media was under the

summer of

wherefrom

its

1994, the genocidal regime in

waged

a deadly

Rwanda

control of a repressive state. In

seized control of the radio stations,

campaign of misinformation and propaganda,
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inciting

.

Hutus

to slay their Tutsi neighbors

with the maehetes they had
been given

Says Barber: ''Ends condition
means, and technology

earlier.

means. The new telecommunications
are

and augment our current socioeconomic

institutions

technology does not serve genoeidal
ends
interest either.

Not

less likely to alter

and

is

just a fancy

word

political attitudes.” 64

in this country,

purposes— to serve

few months

and improve than to

it

for

reflect

While

hardly serves the public

surprisingly, in our liberal democracy,
technology has

primarily for commercial

a

been used

private interests and to further
the ends of

capitalism. This does not have to
be the case, of course. “It remains true
that technology

can assist political change and
unless there

that:

is

may sometimes

even point

in

new

political directions... but

a political will directed at greater
participation, the potential remains
only

a potential.” 65 Technology could be
used for democratic purposes if we had the

“political will,” but

why do we

lack this will?

Certainly, liberal attitudes have

become deeply entrenched

in

our society, and so

long as they prevail, technology will continue
to be the servant of private

Barber also sees a problem with technology
discussing

its

itself

interests.

and devotes considerable space

“vulnerability to undemocratic forces” 66 This

is

s

woes

in the

modem

to

especially troubling

because Barber has often argued that technology represents
the only solution

democracy

But

to

world. If technology proves susceptible to

undemocratic forces, there would seem

to

be very

little

hope

for strong democracy.

Nevertheless, Barber cannot ignore the warning signs. Large corporations
have seized

64

A Passion for Democracy 26
,

65

66

1

Ibid, 263.

Ibid, 258.
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control of our communications
and tnedta technology to ins,
,11 and reinforce
the values of

passive individualism and
consumerism-, o undermine our
democratic will. Evoking an

Orwellian nightmare, Barber
argues

world has become an agent ot

that, a, its worst,

soft totalitarianism, a

technology

in the

means by which

postmodern

“subtle tyrants

possess their subjects' hearts and
minds through the control of
education, information,

and communication and, thereby,
tun, subjects

While technology need

into allies in the enterprise

not inevitably corrupt democracy,”

its

of servitude.” 67

"potential for benign

enslavement cannot be ignored.” 68
Like

many

cntics on the

left,

Barber believes the problem begins
with the

deregulation of the media and
communications in the United States which has
led to the

concentration of ownership. Deregulation
advocates often claim

it

has loosened

government control over the media and given
consumers more choice and access
wider range of information. But Barber argues

that the proliferation

to a

of television

channels has merely created the illusion of
greater choice, for only a handful of media

conglomerates owns them

monopoly,”

all.

These companies, which “exercise an effective

produce a narrower range of programming than ever
before and, as a

result,

provide fewer sources of alternative news or entertainment.
The hundreds of channels to

which we have access merely give us more
cultural

homogeneity

Ibid.,

252.

Ibid.,

254.

Ibid.,

253.

that is inimical to

ot the same, perpetuating an

democracy. Because
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it

overwhelming

“thrives on dissent.

deviance, political heterogeneity,
and individuality,”™ democracy
requires a true
divers,, y

of medta

outlets

democratic technology

web

sites,

has

become

and tnfonua.ton sources. Bu,
even the

that gives

every browser immediate
access to

increasingly dominated

the real choice of content.

only

is

It

internet, a purportedly

a

by

large

literally billions

media corporations whtch

of

limit

matter of time, according to
Barber, before big

corporations close this vast and open
71
frontier.

While corporate control of media technology
has imposed

media content,

it

has also had an atomistic effect on
society, promoting reclusion
and a

withdrawal into private

same but

life.

also divides us

That corporate-controlled technology
shapes us

may sound

market-driven technology,
ideals

we

which encourage people

vigor.

In short,

opposite

that

a rigid uniformity of

we conform

all

contradictory, but

come

to believe in,

it

is not.

to the ethos

be the

Under the sway of this

and readily conform

community and pursue

to spurn

to

to, capitalist

their private interests with

of solipsism when democracy demands the

each of us choose to work toward

common

ends and become citizens.

Technological advances like television and the internet,
both hailed as purveyors of

democracy, do
than ever. In

little to

fact,

connect us a larger community and instead keep us

they do

more

to support

and providing us the convenient means

Without our necessarily realizing

it,

to

Ibid.,

238.

Ibid.,

260.

home more

our consumerist habits, telling us what

do

so, than to teach us the

to

buy

values of citizenship.

these technologies turn us into passive recipients and

adherents of capitalist dogma.

70

at

71
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But

many Jurists

assert that because

it

is

both interactive and melusive,
the

internet in part.cular
provides opportunities for
democratic action and

building.

Barber

How

is

common, ty-

not so sanguine.

can there be

“common ground” when ground
women and men inhabit abstractions?
There may

itself vanishes and
be some new form of
community developing among the myriad
solitaries perched in front of
eir screens and connected
only by their fingertips to the new
web
defined by the internet. But the
politics of that “community”
has yet to be
invented, and it is hardly likely
automatically to be democratic, certainly
not as a result of market
imperatives. It has yet to be

shown

anonymous

that

screen-to-screen interaction can do for
us what face-to-face
interaction has done. 72
In

Barber

view, technologies like the internet
that give us access to information
and

s

connect us electronically to other people
have not proven to be adequate substitutes for
tace-to-face interaction.

community,
identity

is

it

is

No

matter

how much

highly unlikely that “an

internet enthusiasts “prattle

anonymous exchange with

on about

strangers

whose

a matter of invention and artifice [can]
replicate the kind of conversations that

occur spontaneously among fellow

PTA members

about a school board election.” 73

Indeed, Barber’s exploration of the internet has
revealed very few traces of community or

democratic

activity.

If anything, the internet

has afforded users

new ways

to

exclude

others and cultivate their prejudices. 74

Finally,

Barber maintains that the technological focus on expediting tasks with

speed and efficiency does not agree with the deliberate pace and tedium
of democracy.

We live in
72

Ibid.,

an impatient world, where people expect instant gratification and demand

268.

73

Ibid.

74

Ibid.,

270.
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entertainment and stimulation
every second of the day.
Indeed,
strong democracy

demands

that

we slow down and

“certifiably unentertaming”
process

revel in the

we

bore quite easily. Bu,

“cumbersome” and

of deliberation. Says Barber:

The problem goes deep— to

the very core of what democracy
means
dCPendS °n dellberatl0n Prudence,
slow-footed interaction
and
id time-consuming (thus
“inefficient”) forms of multi-lateral
conversation and social interaction
that by postmodern standards
may
r
e t lme ' COnSUmm8 demandin
sometimes
&
interminable,
an7airv
K
always certifiably
unentertainmg. Computer terminals,
on the other
and, make process terminable,
for electronic and digital
technology’s
imperative is speed. Computers are
fast as light, literally.
Democracy is
s ow as prudent judgment,
which is very slow indeed, demanding
silences
as well as communicative
exchange and requiring upon
>

Tr

or

’

,

months pass by before

occasion that days

further thought or action can be

demanded.

75

We live in a technology-laden culture that prizes decisive

action, getting things

quickly and without hesitation. The logic
of computers

binary,

“between on and

off,

A and B

,

yes and no” and then

is

moving

to the

making

done

a choice

next decision without

ever looking back. But politics eschews
simple dichotomies and requires “complex and

nuanced” reasoning from
that both

A

and

B

its

participants.

76

are correct or that neither

them

It

obliges

is

correct, to challenge the very

to entertain the possibility

premise of

the question, to feel “perpetual regret” about
decisions of the past, and to engage those

past decisions in an endless dialectic of revision.

Technology
tasks in a short

hopes

°

that

Ibid.,

is

often hailed as a great convenience, allowing us to complete
life’s

amount of time and thus giving us many hours

one day we

will reach a point

for leisure.

Barber also

where technology affords us with plenty of time

259.

76

Ibid.
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to

engage

in politics,"

but he understands that
technology, gu.ded and
controlled by

capitalist forces, has eondit.oned
us to

make speed an

unperative in our

our expectations of what one
can reasonably accomplish
us busier and

more

frantic than ever.

about

how

says Barber, and

easily

we

it

technology has made

Unfortunately, this frenehc pace

democracy. Our technologteal “tools
are
out of control,

in a day,

in a certain sense out

becomes increasingly

clear

can become the tools of our tools” 78

technology for democratic purposes,
but

this

anathema

is

why Thoreau

We may want to
if

“worried
use

technology has taken

hold of us. For example, he warns
his readers that cyber-democracy,
which

lets citizens

vote for or against policy proposals
with a simple click of a computer
mouse,

make

to

of synch with democracy,

proves impossible

susceptible to majority tyranny. In allowing
people to

Changing

lives.

is

decisions instantaneously,

without taking the time to deliberate with
their fellow citizens or

to

consider carefully

all

the relevant positions and facts, this
unmediated form of participatory democracy “would

do more

to

undermine democracy than

The

fragility.

says Barber.

are clouded.

Despite

he also continues

78

See the

A

last

“About

Because
its

the future role of democracy in society

it

is

a fragile

form of social organization,

hopes will be dashed for good

last opportunity to turn the

chapter of Barber’s

A Place for

Passion for Democracy, 259.

79

Ibid.,

we
its

cannot be
prospects

uncertain future, Barber maintains his faith in democracy.
But

to fear that these

now: “This may be our

77

79

vulnerabilities ot technology to undemocratic
forces speaks to the larger issue

of democracy’s
certain,

to reinforce it.”

243.
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if

technology

technology of the

Us, 124-47.

new age

fails

into a

us

servant of an old political
,dea: democracy.

Democracy has

a difficult time surviving

under the best of c, reams,
ances” (my emphasis) .» Although
Barber

remind the reader

any way,
to

that

that the poht.cal

consequences of technology are not
preordained

window of opportunity

market forces co-opt our technolog,
es for their

stamp of corruption upon

will not

own

remain open forever. Once

purposes and then those technologies

us, all is lost.

Before technology conditions us

homes

always qu.ck to

technology can be either the savior
or deaih-knell of democracy,
he seems

suggest here that our

plant their

is

to

use technology from the confines
of our

solely for the purposes of solipsistic
activity,

we must summon

the political will to

develop state-of-the-art technologies
that can really enhance civic
communication,

that

can draw people out of their homes and
into neighborhood assembly halls
wherein they
can engage in senous political deliberation
with not only others

in their local

but with participants in other assemblies
across the

the

and sophisticated telecommunications network.
democratic hopes on

civil society

In recent years,

and not on the

opportunities for democratic participation. But

country—or

world— via

a vast

Barber has rested his

state alone, lest the state eclipse

it

depending on these technological enhancements,

community

is

quite obvious that strong democracy,

will require

largely unorganized civil society could never get such
a

massive

state support.

A

complex and large-scale

operation off the ground; only the state could muster the requisite
resources for this kind

of radical change. Barber must be aware of
point. After

program

80

Ibid.,

all,

this necessity, but

the likelihood that the national government

which would take power away from

237.
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he never concedes

would invest

political elites

in

this

such a costly

and currently enjoys

little

popular support
participatory

anyway-is

quite slim. And, even if
this were to happen,
a state-run

democracy may become hopelessly
bureaucrat, c and fad

condmons of community experienced

nmmng out.
that

It

may no,

in

to replicate the

anden, Athens or Raetia.
Meanwhile, time

be so long before

we become

evokes a dystopian future often
deptcted

is

the “tools of our tools,”
a sentiment

in science-fiction

fdms.

IV.

Barber

may not

exhibit the

melancholy and defeatism of Wolin, but

democratic theory does betray what

would

I

call a thin

optimism.

He

his

goes to great

lengths to criticize liberal democracy
for being too thin, but his faith that
people will

summon

the will to engage in politics

theories, as

have argued,

I

rest

is

on three

a bit thin as well. Participatory
democratic

tenets.

Imagine a three-legged

each leg

stool,

representing a tenet, and you will see that
Barbers strong democracy has two sturdy legs,
its

robust democratic epistemology and
psychology. But

theology,

is in

the same.

I

itself.

I

democracy,

moments,

is

would suggest

will

democracy

never be again, except for brief

that Barber's theory strikes the tone

remote possibility

To shed some
the baseball

missing a third leg

In the end. Barber’s strong

a stubborn faith in what he acknowledges, in his
a

is

democratic

characterized Wolin’s theory as “melancholic democracy,”
a sad

remembrance of what democracy once was and
moments.

third leg, his

danger of coming loose. Wolin's radical democracy

and, as a result, immediately collapses on

may do

its

light

more

intellectually honest

at best.

on Barber's

metaphor explored

of a “quixotic

in the

political theory,

previous chapter.
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it

may be

We can

useful to revisit briefly

liken strong

democracy

to

an organized baseball league
that remains inclusive
and amateur. Anyone can

parttcipate in the league,
either as a player or in
another capaeity, and these
participants

decide collectively on the rules
of the game. Voluntary
umpires will preside over games
to ensure fair play.

While participants

certainly enjoy the sheer
thrill of the

objecttves extend far beyond
the destre for an authentic
experience.

game

will

have realizable community
benefits— such as health and

sportsmanship-for which they always
can to

make

sure the league

take root in the

community

is

rather, they

that is planted in its soil.

schedules, and organize practices.

They

win games but

They believe

mind, panic, pants do

They want

want the game

it

to

Though

structured, the

sort, for the

to partake in the

impeded because they

the

all

they

endure and

itself to nurture the

game

its

make

will not abide

ultimate goal

game and

their

good

fitness or

will build fields, order uniforms,

exclusionary practices or hierarchies of any

talented players will not feel

this in

not a short-lived enterprise.

community-or,

best players and

With

strive.

game,

is

communal

not to field the

benefits.

More

will find a useful role in teaching the

fundamentals and raising the overall quality of the
game.

On
far less

a final note,

I

would suggest

convincing than the sandlot.

that the

Many

of us have experienced something

approximates sandlot baseball, a brief moment
align in such a

way

that everything

was

in one's life

to strong

way

democracy resembles nothing

the see

this

expend time and energy building an organized league
to enjoy, that will

become

a vital part

when

perfect, with players

spontaneously to play the game they love in the

analogous

image evoked here is— in some

of community
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the stars

ways—

that

seemed

to

coming together
fit.

But the baseball league

author has ever seen. Participants

that will last for future generations

life,

yet

somehow over

the long term

they will

equahty

manage

,o suppress Iheir
competitive impulses

in the league.

This seems unlikely.

the competitive nature
of even Little

exclusionary practices. While
this

is

1

and preserve both mclusion
and

already described

in the

prev.ous chapter

League baseball and the resulting
hierarch.es and
no, to say that strong
democracy

should give us pause.
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is

unfeasible,

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

Once
itself to

be impracticable, merely

The

application.

its

situated within the pragmatist
tradition, participatory
a theoretical concept with

impracticability of participatory

man's

free will in the

modem

modem

world. Holding a

no hope

democracy

contemporary enthusiasts, such as Wolin
and Barber,

more

democracy reveals

first

for real-world

becomes evident when

raise considerable doubts
about

pessimistic view of power in the

world, participatory democrats do
not share with classical pragmatists
an

optimism about man’s freedom

make

to

choices.

In their understanding,

we

are

all

constrained by social and political forces
that are always remote and often
unseen and
sinister.

Both Wolin and Barber suggest

have made

engaged

it

modem

systems of organization and control

increasingly difficult for citizens to exercise
free will and

in civic affairs.

demanding

that

In other

truly

words, participatory democracy proves far too

for the average person,

whose

free will (and

systematically enervated by the forces of modernity.
In
first

become

hence

political will)

my view,

this

has become

suggests that the

two tenets— the democratic epistemology and psychology—
require democratic

conditions that are unattainable in modernity. After
political

knowledge and educate us

to

all,

democracy can only improve our

be upright citizens

if

we have

opportunities for

authentic and widespread civic engagement and live in an environment
conducive to the

kind of sustained and deliberative democratic activity championed by Dewey.
If we no
longer have the will to attend

time to civic

life,

we

will

all

those meetings and devote a significant portion of our

never enjoy the reputed epistemological and psychological
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benefits of p artl cipa„on.
Participatory democrats

know

varying degrees they assume
a measure of pessimism
outside the realm of theory-and
Panicipationists like

man's

two

free will

tenets

means

practice,

foolish or

work and

if

only

in brief

still

strive in

that

modernity constrains
that the first

well.

This

as a coherent political theory,
an

hopes of somehow approximating

moments. This seems clearly

to

it

conceivably,

first

two tenets and subject them

human beings may

pragmatists claim, and they

may

to careful scrutiny.

education to improve. If either of these tenets

fails to

which only await

critic to

Quite

not attain truth in the inductive and
deliberative
not enjoy malleable natures

in

be Wolin’s view. But

viewing participatory democracy through
the lens of pragmatism also enables
the
evaluate the merits of the

to

rarely venture

and psychology-are alive and

democracy may remain useful

which humanity should

why

is

awkward when they do,

Wolin and Barber may concede

the democratic epistemology

even

in their

which

and makes their theory impracticable,
but they both suggest

that participatory

ideal for

seem

this intuitively,

manner

a proper

withstand such scrutiny and proves

—and, of course,

untenable, participatory democracy fails to stand
up even as a theory

proves even more impracticable than

Recent developments

in the

initially suggested.

philosophy of science present serious challenges to

the epistemological assumptions underlying participatory
democracy. In his ground-

breaking work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

{

1962),

forever our understanding ot scientific inquiry.

He showed

deliberative, the pursuit ot scientific

is

as other institutions

knowledge

just as

Thomas

that, far

bound

S.

Kuhn changed

from being open and

to its historical context

and thus not necessarily an agent of progress. The belief that science

marches us steadily toward the ultimate

truth is nai ve,
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based on an

idealistic

view of how

scientists operate.

Drawing on

scenttsts belong to an open

mvent
satd,

creative

most

historical

examples, Kuhn debunked the
notion

community of competent

inquirers

who

ways of enhancing our knowledge
and discovering

sc, enlists

are nothing

down

a se,

use their expert.se to

truths.

winch begins with

of plans and procedures

a canonical piece

for fitture research.

be intellectually flexible and
innovative, scientists work solely
within

which provides them the

when an
compels

existing paradigm fails to solve a
scientists to think

approaches.

that

and methods for solving puzzles

tools

A revolution

can resolve

procedures.

The

number of puzzles,

more broadly about
occurs

this crisis,

In reality,

he

more than highly educated technicians
working within

the narrow confines of a
dominant paradigm

research that lays

that

when

their discipline

it

Not taught

their

in their

to

paradigm,

narrow

field.

But

faces a crisis which

and to entertam alternative

scientists shift their allegiance to a

whereupon they lock themselves

of

into a

new

set

new paradigm
of plans and

history of science, then, can be characterized
as long stretches of tedium

and conformity, punctuated by brief revolutionary
moments.

Kuhn's work dropped

showed

that science

institution, science

bomb on

was not immune

crisis

community was

information and ideas and

the world of science and philosophy, for he

to ossification

could become trapped

assumptions, and only a
scientific

a

in its

and corruption. Like any other

own web of practices and

could bring about significant change.

not an open society wherein

make piecemeal reforms

members

become regarded

tew

intellectual authorities

as canonical and unassailable.
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Kuhn argued

freely

that the

exchange

to standard practices as needed.

the contrary, his study of the history of science revealed

Scientists deter to those

specious

its

On

authoritarian tendencies.

whose exemplary research has

The most devout

followers of this canon

enforce obedience to (he
so far as to suggest that

new paradigm and quickly

‘'the

member of a mature

ostracize heretics.

scientific

Kuhn even went

community

is,

like the typicai

character of Orwell’s 1984,
the victim of a lustory
rewnt.en by the powers tha, be.”'

Hyperbolic compansons

to

an Orwellian un, verse
notwithstanding,

judgment of scientific practices and,

in fact,

usefol source of stability. But

critics

many

Kuhn withheld any

considered their authoritarian
tendenc.es a

of science used Kuhn

for their

Postmodernists were especially eager
to invoke Kuhn’s work which,

own

in their

purposes.

view,

corroborated their claim that discourse
can never escape relationships of
power. Cntics

of America’s Cold War policy believed

why

the scientific

work, he did believe

and severely limited

to

that

power arrangements

their range

of activity. As a

The many

indicate that scientific progress

be more precise, have

paradigm carry

offered a plausible explanation for

scientists

is

affected

result,

historical

how

Kuhn

by an ominous

critical applications

scientists seek

we had

cited in his

taken

it

to be.

to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit,
that

and those

who

learn

represents a step forward epistemologically.

It

2

Ibid., 170.
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no guarantee

may be just

scientists are forced to operate.

Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,

is

167.

knowledge

landmark

..We may,

changes of

from them closer and closer
there

of

also called into question

examples he

not quite what

A new paradigm may resolve the last crisis, but

1

to co-optation

Although Kuhn did not endorse such

the notion of scientific progress.

work

Kuhn

community had proved so vulnerable

military-industrial complex.

his

that

to the truth.”

that overall

2

it

another framework in which

If

we

democracy

take

seriously,

understood, in

always the best

when

Kuhn

way

we have to

Deweyan

to attain political

terms, as the sctentifie method
writ large-is

knowledge. Even under the most
.deal eondttions,

participating citizens successfully

communities

may not

reconsider whether participatory

employ

the

methods of sctence, democratic

always produce the best policies, for
they too will work within a

closed system, a particular paradigm
that limits their thinking and
modes of operation. In
a worst case scenano, they

'doublespeak"

may prove

may

yield to an Orwellian authority

At

irresistible.

whose demagoguery and

best, they will operate within the

parameters of a dominant political ethos
and become susceptible
call

groupthink .”

to

narrow

what social

scientists

3

In their

social problems, democratic

experiences. Instead, they
entertain alternative ideas

attempt to acquire knowledge and devise
policies that solve

communities may not draw openly on

may

—

all

relevant

gather information too selectively and thus

fail to

ideas that might have proven extremely beneficial
to the

community.

Kuhn's notion of paradigm
fugitive democracy.

shifts

Kuhn suggested

may

give credence to Wolin’s concept of

that the ideal notion

—described by

of science

the

pragmatists as a model open society in which every scientist tested
and verified truth

claims

—occurs during

Wolin

indicates that true and authentic

those occasional revolutionary

perhaps emit forceful shocks to the
state

political

may make some accommodations

For more on

democracy

until the state

demands of the

this concept, see Irving, Victims

in history.

Similarly,

will erupt for brief moments

system

to the

moments

and

tames and co-opts. The

short-lived

demos, thereby

of Groupthink', Irving, Groupthink:
Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos', and Allison, The Essence of
Decision.
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altering

its

paradigm, bu, the democrat, c

moment

of bureaucratic procedures and
protocols.

In

wtll quickly vanish,
ossified into a se,

both the worlds of science
and democracy,

groupthink and bureaucratic regimen
represent the normal state of
affairs. Deliberation

among
need

participants in a free and

for alterative points

open forum

of view becomes

will only

that

emerge

much more

Recent research has also posed serious
challenges
In his recent

book. The Blank Slate: The

Modem

in times

pressing.

to the

democratic psychology.

Denial of Human Nature, Harvard

psychologist Steven Pinker draws on
recent research to

show

that nature places limits

what human beings can reasonably
accomplish, and he maintains
can lead to disastrous consequences

politically.

of crisis, when the

To assume

that

that

man

denying

is a soft

on

this fact

piece of

clay that can be molded into any
conceivable shape or form, a blank slate on which
any

teaching can be written, invites the kind of
political hubris or over-reaching of which

should remain forever wary, especially

in the

wake of twentieth century

Prudent politics requires a sober acceptance of our
psychological
not even the best education will turn

harbor a

lust for

power and

men

with

little

into angels.

To some

material gain, and in our darker

our capacity for unspeakable
fellow

men

evil

and an uncanny

human

must re-evaluate the democratic psychology which presupposes
(the near perfectibility) ot

humankind.

And we must

those political institutions that are mindful ot

power and channel human

human

we

will

will

frailties

always

demonstrate

misery of our

nature has limits,

we

the infinite malleability

not dismiss so casually as

energies toward moderation.
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recognizing that

moments we

ability to witness the

or no sympathy. If we accept that

totalitarianism.

limits,

degree,

we

and designed

to

elitist

fragment

Pmker contends
“human

that a

number of recent discoveries “make

nature might radtcally change
in

some tmagined

it

unlikely” that

society of the remote future.”*

Synthesizing a large body of
research, he finds plenty of
evtdence to support his claim
.ha,

human

nature has limits.

He

and inheritance stem from the
generally,

points to studies showing that
the practices of nepofism

pnme status

human beings have shown an

exchanging goods

of famtly

ties in all

them community;

neurolog, cal explanattons for the
preponderance of vtolence

group

all

which suggests

economic systems;

and sociability

that social inequality will

human beings

way of coping

human
others.

human

are, to

emerge

societies; that

of group-against-

some
in

with

life;

degree, genetic

even the most

and

stature, cleanliness,

to Pinker, this research implies that the
intellectual

that the

moral

and beauty.

4

5

5

and moral capacities of

beings are not boundless, and some people operate within
narrower bounds than

Though

this is not the

us think twice before

its

fair

own

proper forum in which to assess the validity of these

studies, the suifeit ot evidence in support of Pinker' s thesis
should at the very least

ot

and

reveal innate biases, such as associating “the
good” with

our family and friends, and with conformity, social

According

in all

people are prone to deceive themselves about
their

that

independence, wisdom, and integrity as a
sensibilities ot

that there are genetic

societies exhibit ethnocentrism and
other forms

hostility; that intelligence, assiduity,

characteristics,

societies; that,

innate preference for reciprocatmg
favors and

to sharing with others in

human beings from

human

citizens.

John

we

endorse a

political

Dewey complained

to

system

that relies so heavily

Sidney Hook

Pinker, The Blank Slate, 294.

See Pinker, 44-58, 241-82, 294, 306-36, 372-99.
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that critics

make

on the education

of democracy

assumed every man was a
“sonofabi.ch
do not have

may be

it

in

them

to

engage

in tireless activism

unfair to characterize every

Enron, but

it

is

We might acknowledge, too, tha, most

man

as a

Tom

Hayden and

man

I,

CEO of

to exhibit the lifelong
public

his fellow

members of SDS displayed

1

orthodox religious teachings,

many of them

for humanity.

destiny when, after

good.

Hayden.

June of 962. Though most of the
participants

wondrous future

common

would-be Kenneth Lay, the former

equally unfair to expect every

commitments of a

on behalf of the

people

It

was hard

at

Port

a profound democratic faith in

Huron

did not subscribe to any

as if their experience there
portended a

felt

for participants not to feel this
sense

many hours of discussion

of

plenary assemblies and hammering out

in

the finer points of their manifesto,
they walked into the evening and beheld
the aurora
borealis.

The almost mystical atmosphere described by some

reflected their near-religious zeal, an

undying

faith in

Port

humankind,

Huron
in

what

participants

it

could

achieve collectively and democratically. Without
a shadow of doubt, they believed that

man

could arrive

and not chained
civic

at

to

engagement.

provisional truths in a deliberative fashion, that

an immutable nature, and that

We can

As suggested

in

men were

men were

from any obstacles

free

to

find the origins of this faith in pragmatism.

chapter four, an interesting irony

is

apparent here: the early

pragmatists prided themselves on their anti-foundationalism, insisting
that

can only promote tolerance and social justice

and focus their attention on the means

of John Dewey, and then the
have called the democratic

educable

New

tenets.

if

they reject

first

human

beings

principles and fixed truths

to achieving a better life, but the democratic faith

Left, actually rested

The problem
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is

on three

first

principles

—what

that all three tenets are untenable,

I

.

Which leaves us wondenng
seriously.

The Students

to

for a

what extent we should take
panic, patory democracy
Democratic Society voiced legitimate
complaints

in the

early 1960s-rac,al segregatton
in the south, the growth
of social and ceonomtc
inequality in America, the

alarmmg policy of nuclear bnnkmanship

the Soviet Union, and the
government's apparent disregard for
the

the

American people. Undoubtedly,

others. But

what

really

why
was

did they

a

become

fixated

the last

fair

it

was

our relattons with

demands and needs of

problem as the root cause of all the

on part.cipatory democracy as the
solution

problem of representation? They

democracy because they believed
could be given a

SDS saw

in

first

to

turned to participatory

the only legitimate

means by which

citizens

hearing and a voice in directing government
policy. In an

epistemological sense, representation could
not substitute for self-detennination.

But throughout the 1960s, student radicals
became enamored with the idea

democracy was

a transformative experience for the
participant.

coined the phrase “participatory democracy" and
stressed
his earlier writings,

In his

grew

to regret that this idea

would give

only book, The Radical Liberal which was
,

complained

began

that the issues at

to play

second fiddle

hand

—

its

first

Arnold Kaufman, who

transfonnative benefits in

rise to the cult

released in 1968,

of authenticity.

Kaufman

racial segregation, poverty, the cold war,

to the self-realization

Vietnam

of the participant.

[M]any members of the “the Movement" have grown impatient with the
compromises that effective participation in that process
imposes. They are, as I have said, too often concerned with the state of
calculations and

their souls than with the preferences

They

and welfare of those they aim

are too often unwilling to act in

ways they regard

the sake of a greater prospect of definite results. 6

6

Kaufman, The Radical Liberal

,

5

1
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that

to help.

as inauthentic for

Kaufman found

this fixat.on

with authentic,
ty especially “self-indulgent” because
the

"children of middle-class
parents have

then perilous

way back

somewhere

else to

go

if they fail

- often
“beating

to lucrative professional
careers,” while the people
for

whom

they ostensibly work so hard
do no. enjoy such a luxury. True
radicals, satd Kaufman,

had

to consider the “welfare

of those they aim

to help,” not their

own

punty.

As a

result,

defining authenticity as a principled
refusal to engage in political
calculation and

compromise was “perverse,”

“insincere,” and “ineffectual.” 7 At
best,

we

can see this as

the youthful cry for authentic
experience in a world laden with
superficialities and

phomness;

at

worst, the petulant

demand

for an indefinite extension

of adolescence.

Neither provided adequate justification
for participatory democracy.
In the

wake of the

democracy made

student radicalism of the 1960s and early
1970s, participatory

a swift retreat behind the ivory-covered
walls of academia.

Many of its

adherents could not relinquish the uncompromising
view of democracy to which they

clung since their

first

protest or teach-in forty years ago.

camp. Others seemed

to follow

must create opportunities

Kaufman’s lead

participatory democrats of the deliberative

group remains petulant and cranky; the
the end, both

Ibid.,

is

to

seems

our

this radical

political

system

also continues to function as a

its

citizens.

These are

which Barber belongs. The former
to

have grown up. But not so

that a sustainable

democracy, which demands a surplus of political

Wolin

it

and positive, for

camp

latter

Wolin and Barber concede

not in this world. While

in suggesting that

for civic participation while

liberal state that secures rights, both negative

Wolin represents

fast.

In

form of participatory

will, is not

an achievable

goal— at

least

well aware of this sad reality. Barber can only admit as

51-52.
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much

in

moments of intellectual

honesty, for he

is

not quite ready to relinquish
his hope

of institutionalizing participatory
democracy. Wolin’s

theory, though

bom

out of

ill-

tempered adolescence, assumes the
tenor of a -melancholic
democrac/’-a mournful and
thoughtful remembrance of what
has been lost and can only be
recaptured in brief

moments,
‘quixotic

at best

if at all.

Barber's ostensibly more mature
theory takes on the tone of a

democracy”— an upbeat message about what
could

a remote possibility.

foolish, a

Hamlet or

The

be,

participatory democrat, then,

a Quixote. Neither choice

demands

real political solutions.

practical

and prosaic, should lay the foundation

It

is

is

even though

must be

it

remains

either sullen or

terribly appealing in a

world that

ironic that pragmatism, a philosophy
stressing the

theory.
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for such a romantic

and poetic

political
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